Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes; Proceedings of an IIASA Summer Study on Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes, Sopron, Hungary, August 16-26, 1984 by Grauer, M. et al.


Lecture Notes
in Economics and
Mathematical Systems
Managing Editors: M. Beckmann and W. Krelle
248
Plural Rationality and
Interactive Decision Processes
Proceedings of an IIASA (International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis) Summer Study on Plural Rationality and
Interactive Decision Processes
Held at Sopron, Hungary, August 16-26, 1984
Edited hy
M. Grauer, M. Thompson and A. P. Wierzbicki
Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo
Editorial Board
H. Albach M. Beckmann (Managing Editor)
p. Dhrymes G. Fandel J. Green W. Hildenbrand W. Krelle (Managing Editor)
H. P. Kunzi G. L. Nemhauser K. Ritter R. Sato U. Schittko P. Schonfeld R. Selten
Managing Editors
Prof. Dr. M. Beckmann
Brown University
Providence, RI 02912, USA
Prof. Dr. W. Krelle
Institut fOr Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der UniversiUit Bonn
Adenauerallee 24-42, 0-5300 Bonn, FRG
Editors
Prof. Dr. Manfred Grauer
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria and
Institute of Informatics, Academy of Sciences of the GDR
Berlin, GDR
Dr. Michael Thompson
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria and
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Prof. Dr. Andrzej P. Wierzbicki
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria and
Institute of Automatic Control
Technical University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
ISBN 3-540-15675-5 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo
ISBN 0-387-15675-5 Springer-Verlag New York Heidelberg Berlin Tokyo
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material
is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting,
reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. Under
§ 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use, a fee is
payable to "Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort", Munich.
© by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg/Austria 1985
Printed in Germany
Printing and binding: Beltz Offsetdruck, Hemsbach/Bergstr.
2142/3140-543210
PREFACE
These Proceedings report the scientific results of the Summer
Study on Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes orga-
nized jointly by the System and Decision Sciences Program of the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (located in Laxenburg,
Austria) and the Hungarian Committee for Applied Systems Analysis. The
Stuay, which was held in Sopron over the period 16-26 August 1984, had
a very special character. Sixty-eight researchers from sixteen coun-
tr~es participated, most of them contributing papers or experiments.
In addition many members of IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program
were present. All of these participants were heavily involved in dis-
cussions; discussions that were not limited to the allotted time but
extendeci well into the evenings and nights. By design, the Study
gathered specialists from many disciplines, from philosophy and cultur-
al anthropology, through decision theory, game theory and economics,
to engineering and applied mathematics. A further element of diversity
was the representation of several varieties of culture, from typically
Western countries, through Middle and Eastern Europe, to the Far East.
The unifying factor was a common interest in the topic of plural
rationality and its implication: the need for an interactive, learn-
ing approach to any decision situation in which diverse rationalities
might occur. This does not mean that the very concept of plural ra-
tionality was clearly understood by all of the participants at the be-
ginning of the meeting. However, as the discussions progressed, the
concept of plural rationality became more clearly defined, involving
not only differences in tastes, interests and values, but much more
fundamentally, different frameworks for perceiving what type of behavior
can be regarded as rational. Such differences have deeply rooted dis-
ciplinary or cultural origins, relate to basic cultural or ideological
values, and develop (either intuitively and holistically, or formally
and analytically) into frameworks for rational behavior.
Examples of the holistically developed frameworks mentioned in the
discussions include: an intuitively formed, "naive", individualistic
rationality of the "zero-sum game" type ('if I make any concessions,
the other player will win'); an equally "naive" worst-case rationality
('prepare for the worst'); and complex cultural rationalities from the
Far East, such as those implied by the various forms of Buddhism.
Formal and abstractive frameworks are also diverse: the maximum utility
theory that accompanies an individualistic cultural background; the
schools of bounded rationality and satisficing behavior that have
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emerged in response to the culture of big organizations; and the goal-
and program-oriented management school that has grown up against a
background of planning. The issue of individualistic versus coopera-
tive approaches to rationality was an important element in the discus-
sions and was much stimulated by Rapoport's paper on the use of ex-
perimental games in increasing the understanding of social traps and
the evolutionary need to develop more cooperatively and socially in-
formed attitudes to rationality. Other issues discussed in detail
include the "soft" versus "hard" approaches to systems and decision
analysis; holistic versus analytic types of decision making; maximizing
versus satisficing; decision making versus decision support; and the
content versus the context of decisions.
An unusual characteristic of the meeting was the relatively large
number of experimental sessions (not all involving computers) in which
decision support systems and the behavioral strategies and rationality
frameworks of the participants were tested. Thus, those present were
able to take part in the various stages of the cognitive cycle - from
description, through abstraction, to prescription and implementation.
Of the forty-two papers presented during the meeting, only twenty-
eight are included in this volume. Some excellent contributions were
not available for publication; some very good papers of survey charac-
ter also had to be excluded for reasons of space.
The congenial atmosphere of the meeting was in large part due to
the efficiency of the organizers, in particular Ms. Nora Avedisians
from IIASA and Dr. Tibor Ashboth from the Hungarian Committee for Applied
Systems Analysis. Helen Gasking put in much work editing the papers
and preparing the final version of these Proceedings for publication.
Manfred Grauer
Michael Thompson
Andrzej Wierzbicki
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I. CULTURAL ASPECTS OF RATIONAL PERCEPTION

INTRODUCTION
This section presents a collection of papers reviewing the clas-
sical concepts of rationality and presenting various critiques and re-
definitions of these concepts, mostly, but not exclusively, from a
cultural perspective. At the meeting, these papers were followed by
discussions that helped participants to gain a better understanding
of the concept of plural rationality as a culturally conditioned
framework for perceiving what constitutes rational action. One of the
papers presented in this group, Technologies as cultural products by
Brian Wynne, is unfortunately not available for the Proceedings.
In his paper The approach to plural rationality through soft
systems methodology, Checkland gives a succinct review of two percep-
tions of the concept of a system. The result is two distinct method-
ological approaches: "hard systems thinking" and "soft systems think-
ing". The first is based on the perception of a system as a part of
reality, as an organized composition of elements; it stresses the re-
ductionist (and Cartesian) analytical approach to systems investiga-
tion. The second is based on the perception of a system as a mental
(culturally dependent) model of reality, or as a means of perceiving
and trying to understand reality; it stresses the holistic and dialec-
tical approach to systems investigation. In the latter case systems
analysis is seen as a study of organized human actions ("human activ-
ity systems") and as a learning process that does not necessarily lead
to precise scientific models of reality.
Further discussions, while accepting Checkland's arguments,
stressed that their logical conclusion would be to recognize the need
for some synthesis of "hard" and "soft" systems approaches. Several
attempts at such a synthesis have been made during the last decade.
The paper Beyond the politics of interest by Schwarz and Thompson
gives a fundamental critique of the classical, interest-oriented theory
of decision making. The authors distinguish between "rational~ "incre-
mentalist", and "mixed" approaches in the classical theory; these ap-
proaches take different views of the problems of social aggregation of
interests, bounds on rationality, mutual adjustment and social negoti-
ations, and different ways to resolve these controversial and often
paradoxical issues. However, all these strands within the classical
theory take for granted goal-seeking behavior with given interests.
The fundamental deficiency of this theory is the exclusion of questions
concerning the origins of interest, of purpose, of culturally-motivated
4moral determinants, of goal-setting processes. The authors propose an
approach based on the perception of social organizations as cultural
entities bound by common moral commitments (shared basic cultural
values). From this position of constrained relativism, they arrive
at the conclusion that the goal-setting process must be viable in terms
of justifying the goals by asserting basic cultural values. Further
discussions showed that the views of Schwartz and Thompson can be
accepted only with considerable difficulty by classical theorists;
however, it may be that this tension between the various schools of
thought is more pronounced in the western European and North American
cultural settings. The middle and eastern European cultures have al-
ready produced scientific approaches close to those suggested by
Schwartz and Thompson. The concepts of constrained relativism and
aependence on cultural and ideological premises, the role of purpose
in research, modeling and decisions, and the impact of all these fac-
tors on learning in goal- or aspiration-setting, are issues widely
discussed and accepted in the eastern European scientific literature.
The paper The plural rationality and interest of national planners:
experiences in Hungary by Bager supports the thesis that goal-setting
is widely recognized as culturally dependent; this view seems to be
held by a number of hungarian economists (even if economists are al-
ways more prone than other social scientists to concentrate on the
interests rather than on their cultural determinants). The paper pre-
sents an in-depth analysis of the planning culture in Hungary, and its
changing determinants and basic values, including the shift away from
an emphasis on products and means towards the idea that social and
human values are important in planning. This, in turn, leads to the
explicit recognition of the need to take diverse rationalities into
account in the planning process itself.
Further discussions at the meeting stressed the need for a clear
conceptual distinction between plural rationality and plural interests.
A rationality is a conceptual framework for perceiving what constitutes
rational action: for example, an individualistic market-oriented
culture will tend to identify rationality with the maximization of
individual interests and will tend to neglect the question of how
these interests actually arise. After all, if the hidden hand is to
do its miraculous work it must remain hidden. Interests may be as
diverse as the individuals who hold them but all that diversity is
ultimately unified by the single rationality of the market.
But, in a social system that has elected to operate not through
5the market but through the imperfections of the market - the institu-
tionally organized reduction of diversity in individual interests - the
opposite will apply. Attention will then focus on the patterns of
interest that institutions give rise to. Here rationality will tend
to be understood as a highly visible link between certain basic cul-
tural values and the survival - the viability - of certain social
institutions. Such an emphasis focuses attention on the question of
legitimacy and on the consistency of interests and institutional goals;
it takes for granted the proposition that diverse individual interests
cannot be socially aggregated unless they are supported by common
basic cultural, ideological or moral values. But, of course, different
institutions can give rise to different patterns of interests and these
patterns may well be in conflict. In this case, the market solution
(to destroy the patterns) simply is not available since the choice to work
through the patterns has already been taken. Each pattern has to be
understood in terms of the particular rationality that informs and
sustains it.
There are many possible frameworks for advancing this sort of un-
derstanding. We can try, explicitly or implicitly, to judge the pat-
terns - to pronounce upon the quality of the rationality embedded in
each of them - or we can try simply to describe, abstract and predict
their development and their mutual interactions.
In his paper Beyond rationatity, Dreyfus presents another deep
and fundamental critique of the classical concepts of rationality.
His argument is that most decision analysis is based on what he calls
"calculative rationality", that is, a system of answers to "what-if"
questions. Against this he sets up the concept of "intuitive and de-
liberative rationality" and illustrates this new concept by describing
the ways in which decision makers at various levels of experience
approach a problem. A novice or advanced beginner (or even a competent
decision maker) requires calculative analysis which becomes more sophis-
ticated as he becomes more experienced. A more proficient decision
maker learns to see the situation as a whole, while an expert typically
does not need any conscious analysis at all to choose the right course
of action. He might deliberate, if he feels uneasy about certain as-
pects of a given situation, but this deliberation serves only to con-
vince himself that he is approaching the problem from the right per-
spective. When this perspective has been found, he knows what to do
without breaking the problem down into its components and calculating
the best strategy.
6Dreyfus' contribution is challenging and points to important new
directions for research in decision theory. However, further discus-
sions served to point out that, while holistic expert decision making
is truly the most effective approach in standard situations, decision
analysis is usually applied in situations that are perceived to be
novel. If this is indeed the case then a "calculative" analytical ap-
proach might be necessary even if experts on more traditional aspects
of the situation are available. The real challenge then would lie in
a deeper understanding of the holistic decision-making process in order
to combine it with elements of more analytical decision making for ap-
plication to new problems. Some of the approaches to interactive de-
cision analysis presented in Section IV try to take into account the
holistic perceptions of the decision maker. However, much still re-
mains to be done in this area.
Krieger's paper, The culture of decision making, has some dis-
concerting things to say about big and little decisions. Little de-
cisions are bound by existing practices, technologies and ideologies;
big decisions often violate those bounds - they radically alter the
settings in which they occur. Since this means that the same decision
can be little in one setting and big in another, the whole focus of
our attention is shifted away from the decisions themselves and towards
the sorts of settings in which they can occur. The result is a typol-
ogy of cultures of decision making.
Krieger's paper, perhaps more than any of the others at this
meeting, highlights a major stylistic divide between the participants.
The classical decision theorists are contentualists; their cultural
critics are contextualists. Each is busy rejecting what the other
holds to be the essence of decision. Thesis and anti-thesis were
boldly contrasted as the meeting progressed. Whether there has also
been real progress towards synthesis will become apparent only when
the dust has finally settled. Decisions over what decision theory is
are themselves big or little according to their cultural setting. It
may well be, as we have already suggested, that this one will be big
in the West and little in the East.
The paper Different dissolutions of the man-and-world problem by
Zsolnai and Kiss considers possible perceptions of the real world in
relation to possible systems of belief. The issue is illustrated by
a comparison of the Western and the Buddhist systems of economic thought.
These two systems differ considerably in their attitudes towards nature
and towards consumption, in their perceptions of the role of the indi-
7vidual versus the group, and in their acceptance of self-interest as a
legitimate value. In view of these contradictions, it is difficult to
imagine a framework for rational action that would encompass both be-
lief systems.
The final paper in this section, Rationatity and equivatent rede-
scriptions by MacLean, returns to a more detailed critique of the pre-
mises of the most widely known Western perception of individualistic
maximizing rationality. In a sense, it provides a bridge to the next
section. It analyzes the axioms of expected utility theory and con-
centrates on one of these: the axiom of independence. By considering
the Allais paradox, MacLean examines in detail the various ways of
justifying classical expected utility theory and concludes that the
assumption of independence cannot be justified in real-life situations.
Cultural and moral values, he concludes, make it impossible for prob-
lems to be liberated from their contexts.
Michael Thompson
Andrzej Wierzbicki
THE APPROACH TO PLURAL RATIONALITY THROUGH
SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY
Peter Checkland
Department ofSystems, University of Lancaster, Bailrigg, UK
PREFACE
We can get no nearer to 'reality' than the mental representations we
make of it. And those mental representations will derive to a large
extent from our cultural endowment, from the Weltanschauungen we learn
to adopt - and do not question - through our membership of specific
social groups and of a specific society.
At the University of Lancaster Department of Systems in the early 1970s
this problem faced us dramatically. We were attempting, through tackling
real-world problems, to find out what happened to the well-established
methodologies for "systems engineering" when they were applied to very
messy and ill-defined problem situations. The methodology of 'hard'
systems approaches can be reduced to: (1) define the objectives to be
achieved; (2) working from the objectives, engineer the system necessary
to achieve them. We were working in situations in which the fact that
clear objectives could not be defined was a significant part of the
problem. Different actors in a situation, with their culturally-deter-
mined plural rationalities, perceived different objectives as desirable.
In such situations' hard' systems methodology could never complete its
first phase.
Out of our experiences a new systems methodology emerged, one so dif-
ferent from the systems engineering with which we started that it
required a new name. We call it "Soft Systems Methodology".
This paper t describes what is normally meant by "applying a systems
approach", and relates our experience of developing soft systems method-
A version of this paper was given at the Annual Meeting of the Euro-
pean Association of Programmes in Health Services Studies, Rennes,
France, June 1984.
9ology to that received view. It argues that plural rationalities,
deriving from cultural differences, cannot be ironed out but must be
accepted. Accepting them entails accepting a systems paradigm of learn-
ing rather than optimizing.
INTRODUCTION
The word "system" has become one of the most common abstractions in
everyday language. Although the concept may have a precise definition
within professional discourse in many different fields, its most common
usage is in everyday language. We casually refer to any complex set of
purposeful arrangements or procedures as "a system". We refer all to
easily to transportation systems, education systems, political systems,
health care systems. It is no surprise at all to read in the Declaration
of the 1978 International Conference on Primary Health Care (1) that:
Primary health care. . forms an integral part both of the
country's health system, of which it is the central function
and main focus, and of the overall social and economic develop-
ment of the community. (Author's emphasis)
Note the assumption, taken as given, that any country will have an entity
called "a health system". From that assumption, and hundreds like it in
other fields, follows the next unquestioned assumption, namely that to
adopt "a systems approach" is to focus on "systems" in the real world,
usually with a view to designing them or improving their efficiency.
The experiences described here will tend to shake that assumption. It
will argue that this idea that the world contains systems which can be
"engineered" (in the broad sense of that term) is the systems thinking
of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s a new version of systems thinking
has emerged in which it is the process of inquiry which is "the system",
rather than, necessarily, the thing upon which inquiry focusses. This
new systems thinking is relevant to any messy real-world problem situa-
tions in which views differ, resources are limited and objectives are
problematical; hence it is ripe for application to the problems of
providing health care, this provision being subject to resource scarcity
at a time of rising expectations.
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APPLYING A SYSTEMS APPROACH: THE RECEIVED VIEW
A working conference held under the auspices of NATO's civilian Science
Programme in 1982 provides an excellent illustration of the normal
assumptions surrounding the application of a systems approach in a
particular field, that of health care. The conference was called "Re-
orienting Health Services: Application of a Systems Approach", and its
deliberations have been recently published (2),
The organisers of the conference had an excellent idea for ensuring the
coherence of the discussions. An initial paper (3) presented a systems
model of any 'health service system'. and sessions of the conference then
focussed on particular sub-systems of the model. The scene-setting paper
begins:
In every country there is a system of health services, just
as there are systems of education, of agriculture, transport-
ation and many other social activities.
This is a very clear expression of the normal view of "a systems approach",
namely that it involves taking the world to consist of or contain systems
of various kinds. The paper presented a view of a health service system
as consisting of a central sequence of operational sUb-systems: acquire
resources; organise programmes; deliver services. These are then all
supported by two other sub-systems, concerned with provision of economic
support and provision of management. This instrumental view of what is
meant by a "health service system" certainly served to provide a co-
herent intellectual shape for the meeting,
Other papers at the meeting reinforced this received view of "a systems
approach". Ten papers described the "health service system" in ten
different countries, and several other papers made explicit the assumption
that the world is systemic; for example:
In the systems approach reality is considered as a system (4)
The health services are a system with many elements and a
myriad of relationships (5)
It was interesting to note at the meeting that the one pre-prepared paper
to cast doubt upon the value of a systems approach was the one concerned
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with research and development. Affeld's paper (6) introduced the cultural
dimension. He queried whether the systems view of health services could
... cope with the concrete peculiarities and given problems
in historically specific situations of health care in different
countries.
This was significant in the conference discussions, in which the general
satisfaction with the systems model as a means of structuring discussion
did not extend to satisfaction with it as a means of grappling with
cultural issues and problems in health care. A sense of frustration with
the systems model developed, and an account of the 'alternative' systems
approach was prepared and presented in situ (7). It is that alternative
systems approach, not based on the ontological assumption that "reality"
is a system", which is the subject of this paper. It will be presented
by discussing the origins of systems thinking and the two main manifesta-
tions of a systems approach - the 'hard' tradition of the 1950s and 1960s,
and the 'soft' tradition developed in the 1970s. (This account draws
upon other recently published accounts (8, 9, 10)).
THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SYSTEMS THINKING
All civilisations have possessed their own art, religion and technology.
What makes our own civilisation, Western civilisation, unique is its
development of the most powerful way of finding things out which man has
discovered: the method of natural science. This method, a combination
of (repeatable) observation and rational thinking, became explicit in
the so-called Scientific Revolution in the 17th Century and developed
with the rise of rationalist philosophy. Given this perspective, one of
the most important books in Western civilisation is Rene Descartes'
Discourse on Method of 1637. In that great book Descartes offers four
rules for using the mind. It is the second which urges that, faced with
complexity, the best approach is to split it up into several parts and
tackle the parts one by one. This principle of reduction is very suc-
cessful in the natural sciences (that is why we know them, arbitrarily,
as separate subjects of study) but it is obvious that the reductionist
principle has a profound limitation. Descartes made the unquestioned
assumption that the part is the same when separate from its parent whole
as when it is within the whole.
My medical student daughter tells me that she learnt much about 'the
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hand' by dissecting a hand previously cut from a cadaver; but it is
obvious that a hand which is part of a living body is rather different
from a hand severed from the organism.
From this illustration we can see that it is not surprising that the
questioning of reductionism - the attempt to develop explicit forms of
holistic thinking - was initiated by biologists. It seemed to the so-
called Organismic biologists in the early years of this century that
the reductionist method of natural science was probably not the best way
to try to answer the question: What is a living organism? They developed
thinking in terms of wholes; they are the pioneers of the development of
self-conscious systems thinking (11) - even though the history of thought
reveals many intuitive systems thinkers, figures such as Plato, Aquinas,
Locke, Marx.
The most important idea in systems thinking is the notion that whole
entities have properties which have no meaning in terms of the parts
which make up the whole. The wetness of water, for example, is a property
of that substance which has no meaning in terms of the hydrogen and
oxygen which are water's components. Such properties are described as
emergent, and systems thinking is thinking in terms of wholes having
emergent properties.
The idea of emergence is the most important idea in systems thinking.
To that we must add three more to assemble the core concepts upon which
systems thinking is based: hierarchy, communication and control. Taking
the four ideas together we get the basic systems image or metaphor: of a
whole (showing emergent properties) which may itself contain smaller
wholes and be part of a larger Whole in a hierarchical structure; and
which, possessing processes of communication and control (in the control
engineer's sense) may adapt and so survive in an environment which
changes. Taking a "systems approach" simply consists of consciously
using this concept of a surviving entity in a changing environment to
understand the world or to tackle problems within it.
A SYSTEMS APPROACH: THE 'HARD' TRADITION - 'SYSTEMS ENGINEERING' AND
'SYSTEMS ANALYSIS'
The best-known version of the organised use of a systems approach is that
which developed in the 1950s under such names as "Systems Engineering"
and "Systems Analysis".
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In Bell Telephone laboratories the scientists and technologists sought
procedures for ensuring that they could generate "organised creative
technology" (12). Simultaneously but independently the RAND Corporation
analysts were formal ising a process by which they could help real-world
decision takers faced with a problem of choice to decide which of the
possible alternative systems would best meet their needs. The Bell
Telephone engineers generalised their methodology from project experiences;
the RAND analysts put together ideas from engineering and economics to
define the process called "systems analysis" (13).
Both "systems engineers" and "systems analysts" in these methodologies
are professionals operating within the value systems of their clients.
A systems engineer making a study of transportation systems will look at
alternative means of transportation, comparing their technology and costs
and thinking carefully about the criteria for selecting between alterna-
tives. A RAND analyst, asked by the Department of Defence to make a
study of radar systems, will propose the realisable system nearest to
optimum requirements, balancing benefits against costs. It is inconceiv-
able within the methodology of systems analysis that his recommendations
might be to re-think foreign policy:
The reason for this, revealed by analysis of many accounts of this kind
of systems thinking (11), is that they all reduce to a procedure having
these characteristics: the real-world client (person, group or society
as a whole) is taken to be the owner of the problem; his needs are taken
as given and expressed as the objectives to be achieved by a system;
there follows a systematic search for an efficient system to achieve the
known-to-be-desirable end. In other words, this "hard" systems method-
ology tackles the question: how? By definition, if objectives are them-
selves problematical, if the questions to be answered are 'what' as well
as 'how' questions, then "the system" cannot be taken as given, and the
approach must be modified. This modification has occurred in the 1970s.
A SYSTEMS APPROACH: THE 'SOFT' TRADITION - 'SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY'
The first systems approach assumed that there is a need to be filled and
that real-world arrangements to do so can be taken to be systems; these
"systems" can be "engineered". This perspective has several good results.
It requires the analyst to take a broad view and directs his attention
to connections and interactions.
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Inevitably, though, it concentrates on the logic of arrangements to meet
the defined need, and will be most helpful in situations in which the
logic of the real-world manifestations is faulty, a not uncommon occur-
rence. For example, the model of a health service system upon which the
conference described above was based expressed an implicit logical argu-
ment of the following form:
There is a need for the delivery of health care.
This need can be met by providing appropriate resources, defining
programmes, and delivering services via those programmes.
These three operations (provide; define; deliver) must themselves
be supported by the provision of (a) management, (b) finance.
Now, in the real world of health service provision this may well be use-
ful: resources may be fundamentally inadequate or inappropriate, pro-
grammes may be inadequately defined, or spoilt by inadequate delivery;
management may be neglecting the balance needed between programme defini-
tion and delivery capability; finance and feasible programmes must be
matched, etc. On the other hand, real world problems are not usually
signalled in so logical a manner. In a real-world problem in a hospital,
for example, the observed "problem" might seem to be a history of bad
relationships between administrators conscious of the need to spread
resource use over the period of a budget and clinicians acting upon the
principle of taking medical decisions on purely medical grounds. Here
is an example of Affeld's "concrete peculiarities" in "historically
specific situations". The general model of a logical health care delivery
system may not seem very relevant to these particular peculiarities:
It was findings of this kind - in a general management, rather than a
health service context - which led to the re-thinking of "a systems
approach" during the 1970s.
In the research programme of the Department of Systems at Lancaster we
wished to research the relevance of systems ideas to problem solving in
these ill-structured situations in human affairs which are far more
common than the rather well-structured situations for which systems
engineering and RAND systems analysis were developed.
The approach adopted was one of 'action research', working in real
situations with real problem owners. With the benefit of hindsight it
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is possible to see the decade of work which followed in terms of the
systems model of Figure 1. Here, definition of systems methodology
leads to its use; its use yields learning; and that learning is a source
of the original definition. Of course, such a system can never begin
operations, since the definition requires the learning, which requires
the use, which requires the definition: Like all self-creating ("auto-
poietic") systems it is organisationally closed.
hence
Learn from use
Define systems
methodology
Use systems
methodology
FIGuRE 1: The Methodology-Creating System
In the action research programme we broke into the closed system by
taking systems engineering methodology as given, applied it in unsuitably
"soft" problem situations (in which whats as well as hows were problem-
atical), did what seemed best in the circumstances of the individual
projects, and then generalised the lessons learned in the re-definition
of the methodology. Soft Systems Methodology is the redefined Systems
Engineering which emerged from this process.
The most difficult learning to acquire during the action research pro-
gramme was a deep appreciation of the kind of system concept most relevant
to our interventions in soft real-world problem situations. Much is
known about the concept natural system, which can be mapped onto such
things as river basins, forests and frogs, and much too about the concept
designed system, which can map either physical manifestations such as
fire engines, bicycles and computers, or abstract ones such as mathematics
or philosophy. Our notion was that a set of human activities linked
together so that the whole constitutes purposeful action constituted a
system concept relevant to real-world problems in which, in the midst of
differing perceptions and interpretations, purposeful action is sought.
We were developing the concept human activity system. (The reader will
have noticed that I am going to some lengths to avoid describing the
world as consisting of systems.)
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The difficult learning was to appreciate the nature of this particular
system concept. The point is this: where accounts of real-world mani-
festations of natural or designed systems will be publicly testable (if
I say "this bicycle has two wheels and a saddle", you can check whether
this is correct) accounts of human purposeful activity will not be test-
able in the same way. Linked activities in the real world which one
observer may describe as "terrorism" will for another observer constitute
"freedom fighting". Such descriptions are not publicly testable.
Consider another example: if you ask people to answer the question "What
is a prison?", many different answers will emerge. It is to be described
in terms of a punishment system, a rehabilitation system, a system for
revenge, a system to protect society, a system which constitutes a
'university of crime'? Many such answers might emerge, and it would be
unhelpful to try to decide which one was "correct". All the answers
given - and many other possible answers - could produce valid accounts
of a prison as a human activity system, valid that is according to a
particular image of the world, a Weltanschauung which the observer is
taking as given.
Use of the concept of human activity system has always to consider:
(human activity system + Weltanschauung) and to explore a wide range of
possible world views which concerned observers might regard as meaningful.
For this type of system the idea of an account being meaningful has to
replace the idea of anyone account being correct. (Of course, actual
real-world activity is always simultaneously meaningful to different
observers according to different and changing images of the world; this
reminds us that technically, as I have tried to insist, any account of
a human activity system is an intellectual construct, an account which
one-sidedly emphasises a particular Weltanschauung, rather than a pro-
posed description of part of the real world. This careful separation
between the real world and systemic accounts which relate to it is
important in understanding human activity. It does not matter if a
systems model of an industrial plant (describable as a designed physical
system) is casually treated as a surrogate for the plant itself. It
does matter if this kind of mapping is assumed casually in the case of
systems models of human activity systems. Such models are "ideal types"
in Max Weber's sense; they are models relevant to inquiring into real-
world human activity, not models of that activity (14).
As an example of the use of these ideas, consider the U.K. charity 'Oxfam'.
We carried out a systems study aimed at improving the management informa-
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tion available to Oxfam's managers. Here the organisation as a whole is
to be regarded as a relevant system but there is no single answer to the
question: What kind of human activity system is Oxfam? It can be taken
to be a relief-providin~ system. That is what is implied in its name,
which derives from its origins as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief.
But Oxfam in the field can be observed carrying out such projects as
providing water pumps for African villages: it is legitimately viewed as
an aid-provision system. At a higher level of abstraction it may be
regarded as a political education system, one concerned to persuade the
rich countries of the world to devote more of their resources to helping
the developing countries. None of these accounts of Oxfam are "correct";
the thing to do is to treat each of them as relevant, make models of
the systems named, use those activity models as a means of defining
information flows, and compare those information flows with the ones
reaching Oxfam's managers, in order to bring about improvements.
SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY AS A PROCESS
I am now in a position to describe the formal structure of the systems
methodology which uses the human-activity-systems concept: "soft systems
methodology" (11). Being concerned with helping to achieve improvements
in real-world situations regarded as problematical, it can most simply
be expressed as a way of getting from "finding out" about a problem
situation to "taking action" in that situation. It does that not by
relying on previous experience (which is the most common way of moving
from finding out to taking action) but by introducing an organised use
of systems thinking.
After finding out about the problem situation (for which formal guide-
lines have been developed) some human activity systems which the analyst
hopes will be relevant to the problem situation are selected and named.
The naming needs to be done carefully and explicitly, since the names
will be used as a basis for making models of the systems selected. This
is so important that we use the technical term "Root Definitions" to
describe the names of these (hopefully) relevant systems. Ways of making
sure the Root Definitions are well-formulated have been developed (11,
15). In the example of Oxfam, above, the three concepts of famine-relief,
aid provision and political education could each be the basis of a Root
Definition.
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For each Root Definition a model of the system named is now built. The
components of human activity systems are words defining activity, namely
verbs, so the building of "Conceptual Models" from the Root Definitions
consists of assembling and structuring the minimum necessary verbs needed
to describe the activities which would have to go on in the system named
in the Root Definition. The Definition is what the system is; the con-
ceptual Model is what it does; but remember that the model is derived
from pure Weltanschauung, it does not describe parts of the world.
Hence it is important to build the model from the words in the Root
Definition, not from real-world knowledge of any activity which may
superficially appear to be close to that in the Root Definition. The
Conceptual Models themselves, of course, are a manifestation of the
systemic metaphor: emergence, hierarchy, communication and control.
Once the models are built (the techniques for building and testing them
are ignored here - see (11) and (16)) then we are in a position to bring
the models to the problem situation in order to make a comparison between
the models and what is in the situation. The comparison itself may
entail doing more finding out about the situation, or may quickly suggest
new "relevant systems" not thought of initially. Both of these things
happen on the way to achieving the ultimate aim of the comparison, which
is that it should comprise a debate, discussion or argument out of which
come possible changes which could be made in the problem situation. These
changes must meet two criteria simultaneously, that they are systemically
desirable, given the systems analysis via Root Definitions and Conceptual
Models, and culturally feasible for these particular problem owners in
their historical situation. Meeting both criteria at once is not easy:
Once the debate stages have revealed possible changes, then the new
problem situation becomes that of implementing these changes in the real-
world. Learning has been achieved in arriving at these particular changes
and the cyclic learning process can begin again as the new situation is
confronted. The methodology never "solves" "problems" out of existence
(that language is a poverty-stricken representation of what goes on in
purposeful activity); it is a learning rather than an optimising system,
and the competent analyst will always iterate many times round its various
stages. Figure 2 illustrates the shape of the methodology as a whole.
Finding Out
Root Definitions
of relevant human
activ ity systems
Taking Action
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Real World
Systems Thinking
about the Real World
Conceptual models
of the system
concepts named
in the Root
Definitions
FIGURE 2: The Structure of Soft Systems Methodology
CONCLUSION
More than a hundred applications of Soft Systems Methodology have con-
vinced its users that it marks a significant move away from the hard
methodology which was its parent. That is concerned with questions of
how, given that what is required can be sharply defined at a broad level.
The soft methodology assumes that both what and how questions are un-
answered: it helps people learn which (and whose) objectives are (or are
not) relevant, as well as explores possible hows.
Soft Systems Methodology is itself an inquiring system, a learning system.
It does not assume that the world contains systems to be optimised;
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rather it uses systems models built specifically because of their per-
ceived relevance to the "concrete peculiarities" of "historically
specific" situations, to orchestrate a debate about change. It finds
its way to accommodations of the permanently conflicting perceptions
which always characterise human cultures.
When Affeld (6) refers to
the inadequacy of system approaches to cope with concrete
peculiarities and given problems in historically specific
situations of health care in different countries
he has in mind the 'hard' approach with its concentration on the logic
of need-provision systems. The soft approach, accepting the degree to
which a splendid and rich illogicality informs the activity of mere
humans, offers - at the cost of giving up the idea of optimising in
favour of learning - the prospect of the "new dimension" in the ongoing
discussion which Affeld suggests is needed if system approaches are to
transcend their present marginal role in real-world decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
Most political theorists share the basic assumption that the pursuit of self-interest
lies at the heart of political behaviour. In consequence, theoretical approaches in politi-
cal analysis, diverse though they may be, can all be assembled under one rubric - the
poLitics oj interest. In this perspective, the political realm is seen as an arena into
which individual or group interests enter in some fashion, to be dealt with by certain
processes and to be transformed into outcomes, policies or outputs. 1 This notion of polit-
ical processes treats political society, not as a single entity-a community-but as frag-
mented into groups that are distinguished by their respective interests. On this view,
groups and their interests constitute the essence of politics, providing the conceptual
terms in which political behaviour is to be explained.
This idea of politics as the conflict of interests has been widely reflected in the work
of political theorists during the past decades. Indeed, the characterization of political
behaviour in terms of competing preferences for actions, demands or wants-in short,
interests- is sufficiently prevalent in modern political science for us to be able to argue
that the pursuit of interest is the dominant assumption in the analysis of political
events. We will question this assumption, arguing that it is unsatisfying as a conceptual
premise for understanding political action, that it sets up a circular explanation of dis-
tressingly small circumference, and that, since an alternative formulation is available,
we are not forced to remain trapped within it.
THE POIJTICS OF INTEREST
Policy analysts and decision theorists alike have largely concerned themselves with
examining the 'logic' of political decision-making in terms of competing interests. Ana-
lyses of the determinants for political behaviour have reflected this conceptual focus
and the dominance of the poLitics oj interest is inherent in much of the political science
literature. Various kinds of interest definitions can be found among political theorists
concerned with the 'essence of politics'. Their number and prevalence supports the
claim that they share a basic common premise about the nature of political events.
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The essence of politics
Van Dyke, for example, defines politics as a struggle among aclors pursuing
conflicting desires on public issues, public issues being defined as concerned with groups
in some wai. Harold Lasswell in his classic book on Politics sees the political arena as
being occupied by political actors who, having certain "base values", "demands" and
"political strategies", attempt to achieve specified outcomes which are seen to maximize
their "value indulgences".3 For Lasswell individuals and groups of individuals are moved
by fundamental goals and objectives that they seek to achieve. Their desired value pat-
terns provide the motivating force for action and choice. Value preferences are also
considered the key to the formation of coalitions. arising out of aggregation of interests.
whenever there is a substantial degree of overlap 4 The interest premise in political
theory is also reflected in David Easton's highly influential definition of political events
as those concerned with "the authoritative allocations of val ues for a society. ,,5 It is fun-
damentally dependent on an understanding of values as preferences or demands held by
those involved in political society.
The politics of interest readily includes the "interest group" theories of Bentley. Tru-
man. Latham and others who have made group interests the main characteristic and
raison d'etre of organisations. In the words of Arthur Bentley. the founder of "group
theory" in political science. "there is no group without its interests".6 The notion of goals
and goal-attainment are likewise fundamental to the group approach to society. Group
actors involved in political processes are seen as being impelled by their respective
interests and claims upon the other actors in the system to participate in the 'group
struggle' that constitutes society. In this perspective the drive for goal-attainment or
goal-see/cing is accepted as the single most important motivating force of the political
process.
Common to all theoretical statements involving interest politics is the idea that
each political actor has a set of preferences and associated goals that determine his
behaviour. The interest bias in political science is particularly striking in the analYsis of
policy-making and political choice.
Public policy has been defined as a set of inter-related decisions taken by political
actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them? Within the
politics of interest. policy analysis is reduced to explaining actors' behaviour in relation
to the interests displayed by each policy aclor. Interest theories of political behaviour
are purposive, with the policy goals taken as givens. They assume that attention to par-
ticular aspects of issues and the selection of policy options follow preferences (as
identified by each policy actor). Policy actors' respective interests are somehow
accepted as being self-evident; they are the premise of most political analysis.S
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The good lie
Political scientisls are a dispulatious lol yel lhey have been remarkably reticenl
over lhe limilations of lheir various analytical models based on lhe politics of inleresl.9
The concepl of inleresl ilself has nol been properly scrutinized for lhe lheoretical
assumptions lhal underpin ils use in politics and decision-making. There has been no
real attempl, for example, lo clarify lhe relationships belween economic and non-
economic inleresls, belween egoistic and non-egoistic inleresls, or belween individual
and group inleresls on lhe one hand and lhe more general social inleresls lhal lran-
scend lhem on lhe olher. BUl, even lhough political scientisls may have lacitly agreed
nol lo poke aboul in lhe foundalions of lhe edifice lhey all inhabil, cracks have slarled
lo appear. The politics of inleresl model is more and more under slress in relation lo
lhe empirical reality of political phenomena.
Politics of inleresl models consider inleresls as psychological facls; simply as
behaviour wilhoul any references lo lhe social conlexls impinging upon lhe slale of
mind of lhe aclors. Cochran, for example, has said of lhis reductionisl approach:
The politics of inleresl, following lhe lead of modern nalural science, ignores
lhe realily of purpose and lhus is incapable of underslanding lhe lolal experi-
ence of political life. Indeed, one of lhe manifeslations of lhe politics of inleresl
is ils definition of politics wilhoul reference lo purpose. 10
In lhe broader conlexl of policy analysis, bul in similar vein, Majone has criticized
'causal' lheories of policy-making of which lhe politics of inleresl may be seen as a
prime example. He has argued lhal causal accounts of political behaviour seriously res-
trict the range of queslions lhal can and should be asked aboul lhe policy process. ll
Majone has specifically identified the shorlcomings of lraditional policy analysis by
pointing al the processes of legitimation and consensus building which are considered so
essenlial for "policy viability". He argues lhal policy analysis should move beyond lhe
limiled ulililarian perspective where success and failure in policy choice is considered
lo be dependenl solely on whelher il correctly delermines lhe actions required lo
achieve a given goal.
The failure of the politics of inlerest lo deal wilh lhe issue of policy viabilily musl be
sought in the facl lhal it considers the delerminants of goal maximization in a social
and cullural vacuum. The major limilation of this theoretical conceplualization is lhe
assumption of the pre-existence of lhe preferences held by policy aclors. The pursuit of
self-interesl as premise for policy choice assigns lo "the decision-maker" a position
devoid of social relations: each policy-maker will act singularly on the basis of lhe mer-
its of alternatives in relation lo his self-proclaimed objectives. Majone rightly points oul
thal the practice of public policy-making is seriously al odds wilh this theoretical per-
spective:
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In public life to decide, even to decide rationally, is not enough: decisions must
always be justified. However whimsically policy actors come to their conclu-
sions, good reasons have to be given for their preferences if they are to be taken
seriously in the forums of public deliberations. 12
Policy analysis within the confines of the politics of interest has over-stated its singular
concern with policy action as the selection of the best means to achieve a given end. In
this limited perspective, rationality in decision means maximizing something; it means
selecting the best alternative, subject to a pre-existing set of constraints. 13
To understand the limitations of such a goal-seeking model of social choice, we will
have to examine the notion of rationality that sustains it. Can rationality exist in a
social and cultural vacuum? Can a model of social choice that is predicated on isolated
decision-makers-automata that arrive miraculously upon the political scene completely
equipped with pre-programmed goals-tell us anything about political life in society?
Are not 'rational' models of decision-making coming to the end of their explanatory life,
if they prove unable to handle the inescapable social environment on which politics
depends?
DECISION RATIONAIJTY AND THE PURSUIT OF INTEREST
Theoretical models of decision-making and rationality have been numerous. Rather
than re-iterating the well-established decision-making literature-which would, in any
case, go beyond the scope of this paper-the discussion below will be cast in terms of the
two headings under which much of the decision theoretical literature has conventionally
been organized. The conceptual models concerned with 'rational' decision-making and
those dealing with 'incrementalism' are conventionally presented as extremes on some
theoretical continuum. A third group of "mixed" theoretical approaches have been posi-
tioned in between as partial criticisms, as well as refinements of, the two 'extreme'
models. This range of three clusters of theoretical models of policy-making will serve as
the framework for reviewing the theoretical literature on decision-making and rational-
ity, with the specific aim of exposing the extent to which the various models are depen-
dent on some notion of the pursuit of goal attainment as premise for policy actions.
The first extreme
Rational decision-making models consider policy as effective goal achievement or
goal maximization: a "rational" decision is one that most effectively achieves a given
end. Simon has phrased the classic notion of synoptic rationality in public decision-
making as follows:
The task of rational decision is to select that one of the strategies which is fol-
lowed by the preferred set of consequences. 14
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More precisely, as lo the sleps or activities involved in making a decision in lhe
rational-synoptic model. March and Simon have provided the following description:
(The decision-maker) has laid oul before him the whole sel of allernatives from
which he will choose action ... lo each alternative is allached a sel of conse-
. quences ... Allhe oulsellhe decision-maker has a "ulilily function" or a prefer-
ence ordering lhal ranks all sels of allernalives from the mosl preferred lo lhe
leasl preferred ... The decision-maker selecls the allernative leading lo the pre-
ferred sel of consequences. 15
In lheir mosl extreme form, models of synoptic rational decision-making are based on
comprehensive knowledge of all possible policy options and lheir consequences, as well
as of the desired goals and values which make up the "utilily function". II is the choice
of the besl means lo desirable ends.
The criticism levelled al the rational synoptic model has been mosl pronounced in
relation lo public policy-making, and cenlres around the assumptions lhal have lo be
prerequisile for lhe process of rational choice in policy-making, namely:
(i) carrying oul a comprehensive comparison of all allernative policy options and all
their consequences; and
(ii) finding agreement on a single sel of collective ends or values which are to be
maximized.
Lindblom has been the mosl prominenl policy lheorisl among critics of the ideal of
synoptic rationality, arguing lhal
Too many inleracting values are al slake, loo many possible alternatives, loo
many consequences to be lraced lhrough an uncerlain future - the best we can
do is partial analysis. 16
These practical objections lo the synoptic rational model as a description of policy-
making behaviour, have nol remained unanswered in the rationalily lileralure. The
'modifications' which have been made lo the notion of rationalily in decision-making
have exposed the behavioural assumptions underlying the rationalisl models. Simon
himself has inlroduced the notion of bou.nded rationality conceding lhal "il is obviously
impossible for the individual lo know all his allernatives and all his consequences".21
Bounded rationalily allows for ways of Limiting the number of policy options which are
being compared and evaluated.
Althe hearl of the process of decision-making is lhus some form of "closure"-some
reslriction on the number of variables and options which are included in policy-making.
The essential issue in relation lo the analysis of policy behaviour lhereby shifts lowards
finding explanations for the imposition oj bou.ndaries on the scope of decisions under
consideration. The choice of "rules of closure" will inevilably have a direct impact upon
the oulcome of any policy-making exercise.22
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Indeed, proponents of the rational school of policy-making have come to accept that
they are using a model of "limited" or "partial" rationality that takes into account only
some alternatives, and some consequences, related to some objectives. 1S Simon himself
has advanced three procedures for "closure": (i) decision-makers ignoring those conse-
quences which are not of interest, (ii) "satisficing" by choosing a satisfactory rather
than a single optimum policy, and (iii) adjusting scopes of concern in the light of
experience from earlier decisions.20
Whatever strategy is followed to limit the scope of analysis, the crux of the matter is
that it is assumed that agreement can be reached on the set of goals and objectives (of
an organisation or community) which are being pursued. The fact that attempts at a
comprehensive comparison of alternatives is meaningless unless there is prior agree-
ment on the criteria for evaluation, leads us to the second objection of the rationalist
model of policy-making: the need for consensus on ends.
This objection stems from Arrow's demonstration of the impossibility of a "social
welfare function" in public decision-making, that is, a preference ranking by society on
some set of alternative oplions.21 Undblom, again, can be cited as representing the
major political theory attack on the rationalist contention that agreement on a social
welfare function is possible. In his words,
In synoptic analysis the common requirement that values be clarified and sys-
temlsed in advance of analysis is impossible to meet in many circumstances ...
disagreement on values guarantees that no stated principles or wel1are function
can command agreement ...22
This theoretical objection to rational decisions, on the grounds that it is impossible to
find agreement within society over the set of values to be embodied in policy-making,
has shifted the whole emphasis of policy analysis away from a single welfare function for
society.
It has been argued, for example, that a form of rationality can still be aimed for in
the absence of a social welfare function, as long as the decisions are "vindicated", so that
consensus is reached on the process by which decisions are arrived at, when disagree-
ments persist on the deSired outcome of policies.23 In this perspective, the notion of
rational decision-making is modified in such a way as to remove the requirement for a
social welfare function, for it is substituted the policy-maker's own preferences.
Reluclantto concede outright that a social welfare function should not be aimed for,
proponents of rational decision-making have asserted that only a "working social welfare
function" is required to provide a set of objectives. In this view the optimization of such
a function is the aim of rational decision-making. When it is asserted, however, that
"alternative functions are the stuff of political opposition",24 it becomes obvious that
here too prior agreement on a set of values to be pursued is no longer guaranteed, or
expected.
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Following such 'modifications' of the rational model of decision-making lo lheir logi-
cal conclusion, has imporlanl implications for policy analysis: the sel of goals which are
being pursued become, in principle, open for negotialion. Competition belween alterna-
tive goals is allowed lo become a cenlral fealure of political decision-making, and in the
process the notion of rationality is reduced to its narrowest form. Simon has
emphasised that the "substantive rationality" by which policy aclors make choices can
only relate to the adoption of appropriate means to achieve preferred ends. In his words,
..... the rationality of behaviour depends on the actor in only one respect - his
goals...25
With every policy aclor in the decision-making process (in this definition) attempting to
behave 'rationally' with respect to his own goals, the outcome of political decision-
making comes to be viewed as a struggle over which of the competing objectives are to
be pursued. The central question from such a pluralist view of rationality in decision-
making becomes: .. Whose welfare function?". With the rationalist model of political
decision-making no longer dependent on the adoption of a single agreed utilily function
for society, the arena of public policy-making is seen to be made up of different actors
attempting to pursue their respective goals. Consequently, it is only one step removed
from Lindblom's incrementalist conception of "partisan mutual adjustment.. in policy
making. The "rules of closure" in the context of Simon's "bounded rationality" are thus
made dependent on the particular set of preferences which is being adopted in decision-
making. The comparison of policy alternatives (in whatever form) and their evaluation
will be based on the rankings of objeclives of policy actors. The process of public
decision-making thus becomes the producl of interacting policy actors pursuing
different interests-in short, the politics of interest.
The second extreme
The incrementalist model of policy-making, whilst rejecting the rationalist idea that
decisions are based on a sequential means-ends distinction (of first isolating ends, fol-
lowed by a selection of means), is similarly committed to a notion of the pursuil of self-
interest by each policy aclor. So incremenlalist theorists are in fundamental agree-
ment with the idea of bounded rationalily in so far as they acknowledge that, in choosing
which policy option to adopt, il is necessary to make reference to a limited set of alter-
natives, namely those which are seen to be in the aclor's interest.
Lindblom has inlroduced the idea of "partisan mutual adjustment" to emphasize
thal decisions are the product of "give and lake" among numerous participants in the
policy process.26 Competing interests and policy preferences are at the heart of his
model. A major idea underpinning this incrementalist model of "successive limited
comparison" of policy options is that decision-making is concerned with finding agree-
ment belween groups. Lindblom's recipes for "incremental" policy changes, and "mud-
dling through" are explicitly designed to minimise the expected disagreement among
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policy actors, each behaving in his own self-interesl.27 In relation to our concern for pol-
icy analysis, the degree of convergence between the underlying assumptions of the two
'extremes' of the theoretical continuum is considerable. Whilst the rationalist school
stresses the possibility of reaching agreement among policy actors on ends (which can
subsequently be pursued through the selection of appropriate means), the incremental-
ist model of decision-making depends on achieving mutual consensus (through bargain-
ing and incremental adjustments) between groups of policy actors on outcomes. Both
models, however, are squarely based on political decision-making as consisting of some
sort of balancing of interests (or preferences) represented by policy actors.
The third cluster
The difference between the two theoretical models is to be sought more in terms of
differing conceptions of the feasibility of different policy-making strategies for limiting
the choice of options so as to make decision manageable and to achieve acceptable deci-
sions.28 But this is not relevant for our concern or to the determinants of policy
behaviour. What we are interested in is identifying the underlying behavioural assump-
tions about the policy actors' motivations. In this respect, both the rationalist and
incrementalist models embody assumptions that policy actors will try to act in their
self-interest. Their arguments are dependent on a shared conception of goal-seeking in
decision-making. This common ground between the motivational underpinnings of the
rationalist and incrementalist models of decision-making is also refiected in a third
cluster of conceptualizations of policy-making that seeks to combine the two. Whilst
this part of the theoretical literature has a more normative rather than empirical bias,
the central concern with preferences and goal-seeking by policy actors remains
significant. The models advanced by Etzioni ("mixed scanning,,)29 and Dror ("optimal
rational decision-making,,).30 as well as the elaborations advanced by Gershuny ("itera-
tive mixed scanning,,)31 share a common focus. They are all concerned essentially with
avoiding the exclusion of desirable policy options from consideration as a result of res-
trictive closure in decision-making (such as those inherent in incrementalist adjust-
ment), whilst acknowledging that some notion of "bounded rationality" (Le. the adoption
of certain "rules of closure") is inevitable in policy-making.
The key to these approaches is to combine rationalist and incrementalist techniques
in order to select "rules of closure" so as to include those policy options which are in the
interest of the policy-makers.32 The interests which are pursued in decision-making are
at the heart of the conceptualizations of Etzioni and Dror. Disagreement on values, Le.
conflicting interests, are thereby seen to lead to alternative choices of the "rules of clo-
sure" in the inevitable process of limiting the scope and nature of analysing policy alter-
natives.
In summary, it must be concluded that the pursu.it of interest as the key to under-
standing political behaviour constitutes the central underlying assumption common to
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the main body of theoretical models of the process of public decision-making. This is
also reftected in the way policy analysis has (empirically) focused on explaining policy
outcomes in terms of the interactions between policy actors pursuing their respective
interests. Central to these approaches has been the idea that actors' interests provide a
self-evident starting point from which purposive behaviour can be studied scientifically.
The analysis of public decision-making is thereby reduced to a single level-the politics
of interest-with the pre-existence of goals as its essential premise. The next section
examines the deficiency of this conceptualization for the determinants of social choice
in political decision-making. It suggests the direction in which alternative analytical
approaches may be sought, in an attempt to overcome some of these theoretical limita-
tions of the politics of interest.
BEYOND INTEREST MODELS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
The theories of decision-making reviewed in the previous section assume the pre-
existence of preferences as prOViding a motivation for policy actors to select particular
courses of action. They accept that the process of decision-making can be understood by
looking at actors' interests as prior attributes to behaviour. Individuals and organisa-
tions are expected to explain their own actions, as well as those of others, in terms of
interest premises that are presumed to be antecedent to behaviour.
The major fundamental deficiency of this model lies in the fact that it fails to con-
cern itself with the origins of interest. It treats the interests adopted by policy actors as
self-evident, ignoring the question as to how the alignment of particular interests and
aelors is actually determined. Politics of interest models of decision-making cannot
handle the question "How do policy actors who behave in their own best interest corne to
know where that interest lies?".
Policy actors trying to determine what their interests are can only do so with refer-
ence to certain 'rules of closure'. But the setting of these boundaries on analysis and
choice has itself been considered (within the politics of interest model) an action requir-
ing reference to a policy actors' goals. In other words, any attempt at determining one's
own best interest is itself dependent on prior knowledge of the set of objectives which
are being pursued. In short, to know one's own interest one must know one's own
interest.34 It is at this point that the historical models premised on predetermined
interests break down as an analytical basis for explaining political events and the partic-
ular positions that policy actors take up in decision-making.
The cause of this total breakdown (for that is what it is) is political science's rejec-
tion of purpose. It has failed at four crucial points. First, it has focused on goal-seeking
and disregarded goal-setting. Second, it has ignored the need for decisions to be morally
justifiable. Third, it has treated rationality as extensional-as haVing an existence
independent of organisational context. Fourth, it has viewed social institutions as aggre-
gations of individuals and not as cultural entities.
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Goal-seeking and goal-setting
Interest-premise theories of decision-making are too tidy and ignore the dynamics
and ambiguity involved in policy processes. Goals can change over time. Hence concep-
tual models for the analysis of decision-making will have to move beyond theories of
goal-seeking, in order to be able to account for the processes of goal-setting. To move
beyond the limitations of the politics of interest model, it is necessary to place the pro-
cess of goal-maximization in a broader context which looks for determinants of policy
objectives outside the utilitarian means-end scheme of traditional decision theories. In
other words, if we want to avoid the pitfalls of such a circular goal-seeking notion of
rational decision-making, we will have to acknowledge the social and cultural context as
the determining factor in setting boundaries to the 'rules of closure' which are adopted
by policy actors.
Of course, one way of trying to overcome the problem of pre-determined goals in
models of political decision-making-which presuppose that outcomes reflect purely the
pursuit of interest-4S to lake a totally relativistic approach. One could simply move
away from the assumption that decision outcomes are necessarily intentional. In this
view, policy actions are no longer dominated by the intentions of goal-seeking actors.
Such an approach leads to a conceptualization of decision-making in a context of anar-
chy, based on a fluidity and an ambiguity of goals. March and Olsen have formulated
such a "garbage can model" of decision-making, built on the belief that the "processes
and outcomes are likely to appear to have no close relation with the explicit intention of
actors".S5
Such a model views the process of decision-making as a mixture of problems, solu-
tions, policy actors and choice opportunities. It prOVides a conceptualization of how
organisations operate in processes of decision-making, but cannot be conVincingly
translated to an inter-organisational context of public decision-making. It requires a
view of society where coalitions between policy actors are constantly in arbitrary flux.
Indeed, the whole question of which interest is linked to which particular group of policy
actors becomes not only irrelevant (in the sense that objectives are fluid and ambiguous
anyway and actions unintentional) but excluded from the frame of reference. The
definition of a policy actor would itself become ambiguous once the arena of decision-
making was seen to be made up of a complicated intermeshing of ever-changing organi-
sational policy choices, problems and solutions.
In the "garbage can" concept all conflgurations are in principle possible. It is based
on a high degree of u.nconstrained relativism of policy actors and the way they view and
evaluate policy problems. The infinite number of possible juxtapositions of policy actors
with their respective goals and policy perceptions (be they fluid and ambiguous) would
make any attempt at analysing public policy choices in terms of goal dissensus among
policy actors impracticable. if not meaningless. The question of inqUiring into the ori-
gins of interest would be empirically unmanageable, but, above all. theoretically
irrelevant.
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Justification and cultural accountancy
What such an approach in terms of complete anarchy ignores, however, is that in
observing actual cases of public decision-making it is obvious that there is a certain
degree of social 'stability' in the system. A limited number of policy actors can be seen
to be operating for significant periods of time; social organisations involved in decision-
making do seem to align themselves with particular policy objectives. It is this viability
criterion of justifiability that gives rise to a certain measure of repetition in the
observed phenomena. If there were no recurrent regularities in those phenomena then
there would be nothing to talk about, yet the paradox is that the relativists have insisted
in talking about it all without acknowledging the existence of these moral claims that
are precisely what makes it possible for them to talk about it all. In other words, a posi-
tion of complete relativism fails to acknowledge that the policy actors are social organi-
sations whose maintenance and viability depends on their accounting for their actions.
Much of the literature on decision-making and rationality is based on this individu-
alist falLa.cy. It has implicitly developed in the mistaken belief that its inquiry as
applied to individuals can simply be extended to the level of social organisations. Indivi-
dual choice processes, as the basic unit of analysis, may draw us initially to the belief
that the pattern of 'rules of closure' in decision-making is unlimited in variation. Given
that different individuals may have markedly different definitions of the situation they
encounter, there could be as many goal-selling directions in their behaviour as there
are individuals in the polity. At the level of policy actors as social organisations, how-
ever, rules of closure in decision-making have to be made credible, and shareable, by
mustering social support for the way they 'home in' on particular objectives.
The idea that some policy problems and some policy solutions can form relatively
stable alliances with some policy actors in the arena of decision-making, and that these
are the ones that "survive", leads us to abandon the idea of complete relativism. We can
reject the 'garbage can' models of random streams of policy actors, problems, solutions
and choice opportunities, and return to the question of the origins of interest in terms
of a purposive conceptual model. Acknowledging that the dynamic nature of processes
of decision-making indicates that a static, deterministic framework of policy behaviour
is inappropriate, (but that, at the same time, policy actors are subject to the stringent
Viability criteria of accountability, credibility and shareability) we arrive at a position of
constra.ined reLativism.
We are now in a position to formulate what may be called an 'accountancy model' of
interests, based on the notion that only a limited number of groups of policy actors with
their particular interests can convincingly account for their actions in such a way as to
be socially viable. From this perspective, we can address the question of the origins of
interest, and take aboard the significant issues of credibility and policy justification as
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an essential element of political decision-making and social choice. In effect, we are
returning here to the question of the boundaries of analysis and rules of closure in
social decision-making. In terms of the language of decision-making theory, we are re-
introducing the question of what kinds of boundaries can occur in relation to the
rationalities of policy actors operating in a social. environment.
Rationality and its contexts
Although social constraints on choice situations have received only limited atten-
tion in the literature, the idea of bounded rationality does allow scope for social factors
to be systematically included in the decision-making analysis. It is clear that the social
environment imposes constraints upon choice and sets boundaries on the range of feasi-
ble alternatives, and Simon himself has suggested that these constraints and boundaries
are in some way built into the perspectives of rational decision-makers.S6
The givens in the situation of choice (that is the environment) and the
behaviour variables (that is the organism itself) are usually kept strictly apart,
but we should be prepared to accept the possibility that what we call "the
environment" may lie. in part, within the skin of the biological organism.S7
Once we concede that the "organism" may to some extent create its own "environment",
we are led directly to a framework of cultural pluralism within which the self-interest of
each policy actor is embedded in the environment he creates for himself. This notion of
social institutions as different cultural entities, which provide both the social con-
straints and incentives for policy choices, is the key to a goal-setting model of decision-
making. The essential feature is that cultural differentiation among organisational pol-
icy actors will result in alternative socially constructed boundaries to the 'rules of clo-
sure' governing the framing of policy problems and the selection of goals. Each organi-
sational culture will justify its policy choices in relation to the internal and external
social constraints under which it operates. The boundaries to rationality thus depend on
the cultural orientation of each policy actor.
Social institutions as cultural entities
At the centre of such a cultural approach to the politics of interest is the insistence
that the social viability of organisations be seen primarily in terms of the construction
and maintenance of shared meanings and justificatory mechanisms whereby its
members collectively sustain their distinctive pattern of relationships. Organisations
can thus be treated as cultures, which are only viable in the social environment if they
are able to ensure the commitment of their members to a particular way of making
sense of the situations they encounter. Organisational cultures are viable only if people
are willing and able to support them; the sustained survival of policy actors will depend
on the credibility that individuals grant to them.S8 This idea of cultural pluralism among
organisational policy aelors is able to account for the process of goal selection by
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making reference to those incentives offered and actions taken which ensure the stabil-
ity of organisational boundaries.
However, the internal world of the organisation cannot be isolated from the world
external to it. The moral commitment that organisational members make to a particu-
lar institutional (Le. cultural) perspective is inextricably linked to the social context in
which they operate. Any cultural orientation of an organisation will be closely tied to
the social context that renders it meaningful. The social environment can be viewed as
the breeding ground for a particular cultural orientation, whilst at the same time the
resultant socially-constructed perspective provides the basis for the justification and
legitimation of its position in the social world. This notion of essential cultural plural-
ism implies that each distinctive organisational culture, whilst denying alternative insti-
tutionally induced perceptions of social reality, is in fact dependent on those divergent
cultural contexts for its own survival and social viability.39
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THE PLURAL RATIONALITY AND INTEREST OF NATIONAL
PLANNERS: EXPERIENCES IN HUNGARY
Gustav H. Bager
National Planning Office. Budapest. Hungary
Plural rationality and interest as cultural factors in national planning are almost
untackled subjects of scientific enquiry. This has been a challenge for the present
paper, although only the first steps could be made in it towards a comprehensive study.
The course of consideration will be as follows: Strongly linking human beings and
communities to the basic nature of planning, it was possible to find frames which
have helped to analyze and synthetize some relevant features of plural rationality
and interest in national planning work. Using these frames, important insights were
derived which might facilitate further and more detailed examinations.
1. NEED FOR PLANS AND PLANNING
Planned actions and their results are requisite characteristics of human species.
Still the socializable traditions and experiences - for cyclical repetitions in every
new generations of a society - have such characteristics. But in unexpected circum-
stances and in the case of new activities, goals, products and economic situations,
the cultivated ability to design actions and results, etc. is specially indispensable.
This ability might be the source of innumerable advantages, e.g.:
(i) The proportion of trial-and-error actions can be reduced to a minimum
thereby increasing the chance of desired success.
(ii) The efficiency of activities is increased by comparing the cost-benefit
alternatives and selecting the best or acceptable one.
(iii) The results of activities and their consequences might be predictable with
greater probability, thereby decreasing the risks, as well.
Planned actions and goals are characteristic not only of individual human beings but
also of large organizations, and increasingly so in a historical perspective. In-
stitutions, governments and socio-economic organizations bear testimony to the fact
that the significance of planned actions and goals is going to become more and more
important for mankind. It is striking to see how many fields transform intuitive and
dii'fuse planned work into well organized am fonnalized planned work.
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2. NATIONAL PLANNERS AND THEIR WORKS: A SUBCULTURE WITHIN A NATION
Why may it be said that there are cultural aspects in the plural rationality and
interest of national planners? Some arguments may be raised to support this proposi-
tion, suggesting some possibilites for generalization.
In a socialist country, such as Hungary, the national planners represent a special
expert-subculture within a nation. This subculture is multifaceted: its members or
groups of members are special experts in different disciplines and competencies.
These members have attitudes of their own and have special faculties to perceive and
assess relevancies, or problems. They belong to special institutions which have clearly
qutlined responsibilites, activity spheres, interests, external relationships and a
special power within the state administration. We might as well say that this subcul-
ture of planners has a special systemic character. Put together, these features may
be regarded as important sources of special nonhomogenouos rationality and interest.
Such and similar facts have not been recognized consciously up till now. But our so-
cialist planning culture has reached such a progressive stage where enough evidence
has accumulated to prompt an awareness of these facts. My paper may be taken as an
expression of this recognition which at the same time suggests some possibilities of
how to enterpret intuitively the accepted paradigm "plural rationality and interest"
in the sphere, or subculture, of national planners and their work.
3. RATIONALITY AND INTEREST IN NATIONAL PLANNING WORK
3.1. Rationality and interest belong together
Our considerations discussed later suggest a conclusion which requir~to be ex-
pressed explicitly: national planners' plural rationality may not be studied and
discussed without planners' plural interest, or else misleading interpretations
will result. Rationality and interest are strongly linked together. Rational con-
siderations on a subject matter may release special interests and value-laden
judgements, and, conversely, values and interests set off a special train of rea-
soning and inferences. So rationality and interest are mutually intertwined, alt-
hough separate examination of them may also be justified. But when one thinks about
national planning work in light of the paradigm of "plural rationality", plural
rationality must be strongly connected with plural interest. Hungarian national
planning praxis uses them in such a context where both are complementary.
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3.2 Frames for studying plural rationality and interest
In our preliminary enquiry three ordering frames helped us to identify a few
manifestations of plural rationality and interest within national planning of
Hungary. Although these frames do not encompass the whole area, our observations
seem to be relevant, and each frame has worked as a tool in analysing and synt-
hetizing our evidence: (i) specialization in an unusual interpretation turned
out to be one of the frames, (ii) planned human work with specific phases be-
came another ordering frame, (iii) finally, the natural stages of planning work
also helped us to perceive and reveal important facts.
The three frames are not at all independent of each other. Behind specializati-
on the most decisive constraints are the limited abilities of human beings an
important source of plurality in rationalities and interests. The seqential
character of planned human work and its successive phases seems to be a speci-
fic differentiating agent within the phenomenon of specialization. Similarly,
successive stages of planning (problem-solving) work may provide a deeper
insight into the nature of the first phase of planned work.
3.3 One source of pluralities: specialization
Present and future trends in specialization are probably determining factors
in a continually emerging planning culture. The diversified division of labour
with a growing complexity of cooperation can hardly be considered successful
and efficient without planning the activities, the results and the resources
used. In this sense specialization may occur according to (a) types of products,
(b ) types of activities, ( c ) abilities required to produce products and per-
form activities. These kinds of specialization are treated in a quite general
sense. Product-types may be tools, means (mass-and individually produced),
wealth, human beings (educated, socialized, cured, trained, etc), community,
organization, institution, or harmonized symbiosis between man, artefacts and
nature. Activity-types are of course determined by types of product, and abili-
ties must be adjusted to the nature of product , and activities. Anyone of
the three analytic aspects may be used separately, but only their combined
usage is meaningful. These kinds of specialization necessarily require varied
competence in knowledge, in manufacturing, selecting and distributing the reso-
urces, etc. And all these are necessarily incidental to varied rationalities
and interests.
Specializations stemming from product diversity are revealed by and large in
professional differences embodied in various state-administrative, local
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council, corporate and other organs. The divergent rationalities and interests
of these organs are exposed particularly in cases when the product structure
and market position of an industrial sector is being streamlined, or the pro-
portions of fund allocations between sectoral and infrastructural branches
determined.
ActiVities are most diverse in case of even a single product, a fact most aptly
demostrated by an often rather long process (from "raw-state" to "end-state")
of creating a product. For example, if one takes a glance at the aluminium
industry, the process starts with the bauxite yet to be extracted, continues
with the bauxite being extracted, then processed by using chemical and metall-
urgical technologies (activities), and rolled to transform it into an input
material for various industries. There are innumerable examples for such long
production processes. Whilst representatives of certain production stages in
the activities are amalgamated in various industrial sectors ( e.g., mining,
chemical industry, metallurgy, machine engineering, etc.) , these branches
reveal conflicting rationality and interest-patterns even if they take part
in the production process with the same poles of "raw-materials" and "end-pro-
ducts". The interdependence caused by this participation notwithstanding, a
coordinated collaboration with a common interest would seem essential. If,
however, the bureaucratic isolation of the branches were successfully overcome,
such chain activities would naturally produce compatible views and interests.
Specialization according to abilities is less determined than according to
products and activities. Abilities are brOUght into light in the possible futu-
re manifestation, on the one hand, and restricted in their action spheres, on
the other. These features of human abilities influence very strongly the orga-
nizational life of every society. The functions in a society are performed by
members with different abilities and qualifications who are increasingly in-
terdependent and require such structural, organizational,enterprisal, interor-
ganizational and even inter-state forms of division of labour as to ensure the
collaboration of individuals with specialized skills. Differentiation of know-
ledge, expertise and erudition results in a divergency of views on the self-
same subject even though each view happens to be a true, if fractional, reflec-
tion of reality. Divergent views lead to diverging estimations and inferences
as far as problem-solving is concerned. As collaboration in the division of
labour basically presupposes the creation of compatibility between the views
guiding actions, planning as a means of rational co-ordination in the decision-
making process is a fundamental cultural necessity.
41
3.4 Ordering phases of planned work
As empirical evidence implies, one needs to distinguish two different phases: "P" for
the planning, and "I" for the implementing phase. Both may be further differentiated
depending on the nature of the work object, product, abilities,etc. In the framework
of a national economy, practical ordering strength may be gained from the following
four phases: "E" planning, "A" accepting, "I" implementing and "E" evaluating phase.
It will also be useful for our consideration of rationalities and interests in nati-
onal planning to differentiate in each phase the planning practice further with very
great variety. We must note that over a longer period of planned economy we may
perceive a series of P-A-I-E cycles in shorter or longer forms, relating hierarc-
hically to each other in time. It is a conceded necessity that national planners
must think in terms of the whole P-A-I-E cycle, and of a series of such cycles. The
chief characteristics of this cycle are as follows:
PLANNING PHASE: (a) An analytical-synthetical fact-finding phase exploring the so-
ciety, the economy and the multiple surroundings
(b) The phase elaborating the possible future alternatives
(e) The phase for elaborating the plan guidelines or conceptual plan
(d) The phase for elaborating the detailed plan
ACCEPTANCE PHASE: This phase of the cycle is hard to be refined as there does not·
exist as clear-out a segmentation as in the planning phase in
reality either.
PHASE OF
IMPLEMENTATION:
PHASE OF
EVALUATION:
The phase of direct implementation. The phase of adjusting, modi-
fying and reshaping the plans (this admittedly depending on whet-
her or not the accepted plans should be adaptively modified for
whatever reason and at whatever stage of implementation. If need
be, this phase generally blends with the immediate phase of imple-
mentation) •
This phase is not differentiated either.
The institutions and social forces related to the P-A-I-E cycle may be conceived as
being responsible for the survival and the planned operation and development of the
society. Their responsibility is determined through their interest related to the
cycle. Moreover, the nature of this interest may be differentiated according to the
stages of the cycle. At the same time, the practical assertion of responsibility is
strongly influenced by interests. Interests related to the responsibility and the
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spheres of competence may be modified by other contexts of interests stemming from
habits, scales of values and characteristics of life styles. In the final analysis,
they may be considered to either contribute to, or block, the survival and planned
development, i.e. the functioning and progress of the society and the economy accor-
ding to certain criteria. In order to prevent the latter possibility from happening,
the society is in need of an as open a coordination of interests as possible so as to
aleviate by way of competition or cooperation the unjustified inequalities prevailing
in the distribution. Planned work to coordinate the interests in this second sense may
be considered as a cultural necessity if culture is understood to mean not only "high
culture" but, to cite Colette Guillaumin, "the totality of the knowledge and practi-
ces, both intellectual and material" (of the society).
Now the first question emerges: is it possible on the basis of criteria of the des-
cribed frame of reference to meet simultaneously the rational and interest-charged
requirements during the operation of a planner organization? In certain conservative
and ideologically biased views, there is no such possibility, nor necessity. There
are also conflicting approaches maintaining that this task can be unambiguously and
easily solved by an omniscient and omnipotent planner organ. It is more expedient to
contrast these extreme approaches giving preference to heterogenistic, independent and
random elements, on the one hand, and to homogenistic, hierarchical elements, on the
other, to an apprehension of the society and the planned institutionalized creative
work as an ensemble of heterogeneous elements being in multi-directional interaction
aimed at attaining common benefits (positive-sum game assumption). A similar reply in
the affirmative is given in the CAVALLO REPORT (1979) and by HAJNAL (1981). Their
findings testify in a very important interpretation that specialization and hetero-
genity of interests are not necessarily disintegrating factors. If we succeed to re-
solve the counteracting tendencies of isolation and interdependence, then they may
turn into one of the preconditions of evolution.
3.5 Ordering stages of planning work
After answering the question in principle, it is proper that we should review against
the background of the HUngarian national planning work what the practical experience
reveals at individual stages of institutionalized planned work. To begin with, it
warrants attention that (a) the criterion of rationality is the measure of scientific
cognition, of approppriate supply of information and of practical proficiency, and
( b) only the planning phase is dealt with.
For a qualitative change in Hungary there is a precedent in the reform of economic
management of 1968 when the earlier methods of planning with detailed breakdowns of
the plan were abandoned and a system of economic regulators, i.e. prices, wages,
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fiscal, trade and credit policies, was established in order to influence the course
of economic activity. Hence, the planners of corporations and local governments have
gained great independence since 1968, economic management has embarked on a virtual
course of decentralization, and the system of planner organizations has generated
three constituents: national, corporate and local government planning. National
planning embraces planning of reproduction as an overall process, particularly the
economic activity of the state. Corporations plan the shaping and organizing of the
companies' own goals and activities. Local governments plan the accomplishment of
the Councils' tasks, largely related to the infrastructure and the area concerned.
Once freed from the enormous burden of making detailed decisions, national planners
have been able to delve deeper into the analysis of economic conditions and marco-
economic processes. Between national planning and corporate planning a new two-way
relationship has developed. On the one hand, the state draws the companies into the
process of national planning, and on the other, the state helps the companies in their
planning work. There is also an integral conformity between local government and na-
tional planning organizations, and between corporate and local government planners
a manifold exchange of information has evolved.
From the standpoint of advancement in the sophistication of the Hungarian planning
expertise a deceisive change has come to pass in the fundamental conception: the
economic planning is gradually transformed into socio-economic planning (BAGER-
HAJNAL 1975). The change is marked by a change in the planners' approach, the object
of the plans, the patterns of planners' thinking, the interests and scales of inte-
rests employed for the assessment of prevailing facts and for selecting future alter-
natives. The most remarkable, however, is the change observed with what the thinking
of planners starts and ends along the planning process.
Many years ago the planner organization started and ended its thinking in material
wealths, tools, means and their economic implications; but this planning practice
existed previously can be found today as well. On the contrary of this, the socio-
economic planning requires from the planners that their thinking has to be started
in the societal facts of human beings and in the antecendents of these fact, and furt-
her their thinking has to be ended in the societal possibilities and their consequ-
ences. The first case can be named as "thinking started-ended in means", and the se-
cond as "thinking started-ended in human being". To quote just a few examples of
thinking primarily in "means vs. man": (1) Schools and means of education vs educated,
highly cultivated and skilled individuals. (2) Servicing institutions vs individuals
whose needs in services have been satisfied. (3) Hospitals and their equipments vs
individuals whose health has been preserved or restored. (4) Old-age pensions vs el-
derly persons living in healthy conditions. (5) Cultural institutions (theatres,
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concert halls etc.) vs. people with enriched personality and with sophisticated abi-
lity to furtherprogress. These five examples reveal that the domain of the planners'
thinking focused on human beings instead on means is necessarily broader and more
intricate, a fact having far-reaching consequences in planning work (HAJNAL 1979,
MORVA 1982).
3.5. 1 Revealing and assessing the present facts
The question "Where are we now?" must be answered analytically and synthetically in
the first phase of planning work by identifying relevant facts and unsolved problems.
The result of this activity is the picture (image) of present facts. This image is
Janus-faced: a rational picture on the one hand, and an interest-charged picture on
the other. The delineation of future possibilities is only placed on an appropriate
foundation if identical inferences are deduced from both as regards the solution of
the problem. Looking at the participants and the contributors in the national planning
work, one might easily infer to what kinds of views and interests guide their activi-
ties. A list of these planners or contributors might only suggest such orientations:
1. Policy decision makers
2. National planners: National Planning Office, ministries, etc.
3. Council /local, municipal/ planners
4. Company planners
5. Bodies representing interest groups
6. Public organizations of a political nature
7. Scientists and scientific institutions, universities, the Hungarian Federa-
tion of Technical and Scientific Societies
8. PopUlation.
In most of the cases conflicts arise because congruity between comprehensive and frac-
tional examinations can be attained not all or through extremely long procedures only.
This conflict generally emerges between the National Planning Office, the Central Sta-
tistical Office and the functional ministries on the one hand, and the sectoral minis-
tries, company planners and council planners on the other. The conflict finds expres-
sion in a number of forms.
Typical case: The fractional branch rationalities and interests - the sectoral
ministries and the company and council planners make the production
bottlenecks standing in the way of their advancement appear graver
than they really are. Allegations are often made nowadays to the
shortage in certain areas of imported items, above all those
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purchased for hard currency, investment funds and labour. In these
pronouncements the underlying motivation is evident: edging towards
a position of advantage over other planners of national economy in
arguing for a larger slice of central allocations and subsidies.
The rational motivation exacerbating the harmonizing process is also
conspicious: the fractional analyses are elaborated on the basis of
in-depth socio-economic and technological data on the specific area
concerned and information bases arranged in dissimilar system.
Typical case: The cosmetic rationalities and interests - the sectoral ministries
and the company and council planners make their achievements appear
larger than they really are for the same consideration of interest
or prestige. Examples can easily be found in the fields of energy
and materials conservation r€lated to central programmes of econo-
mic development. The rational motivation impeding harmony is conspi-
cuous here, too: it is yet to be revealed how the comprehensive per-
formance indices affect the conservation of energy and materials in
the microsphere.
It is often difficult to achieve a balanced view when analyzing the considerations
of the autonom means-aspects and the autonom man-aspects. Representational bodies,
scientists and others maintain that the present picture continues to reflect the
factor of means too much. This judgement of national economy planners, however, is
only partially justified: in this respect they obviously do not display interest-char-
ged counter-motivation! The relatively slow progress made is besically explained by
the prevailing shortage of information on the social standing (income, consumption,
etc.) of specific strata and groups of population. In order to take the autonom man-
aspects into consideration more consistently, it is necessary to create the conditi-
ons required for rational motivations to take hold.
National economy planners and scientists often clash over the implementation of new
methods of analysis and indices. In these situations the scientists' "implement-
everything-henceforth" attitude conflicts with the reluctance, if only initial at
best, of the planners.
Typical case:
Typical case:
Rationalities and interests in using special methods - the planners'
need in new indices can be satisfied with even more intricate indi-
ces which casts doubt on the improved analytical proficiency as com-
pared with increased costs. For example, the controversy over the
method of computing growth rates adjusted to worsened terms of trade
is far from over even at present.
Rationalities and interests in usi oversim lified formalized schemes
- it 0 ten happens that the new methods recommended for implementation
are typically simple (linear) in their functional approach even if
the interdependences between the phenomena examined are more intrica-
te or different.
3.5.2 Generation of preconceptions
These pictures of the future combine of necessity the following:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
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prognosis-type pictures of the spheres that can not be influenced,
plan-type pictures of spheres that can be influenced,
considerations stemming from the readiness for unforecastable,
unexpected or spontaneous phenomena.
It can be seen that in the course of generating these pictures of the future intuiti-
on plays an understandably greater role than logic as compared to the phase of reve-
aling, perceiving and judgeing facts.
The generation of prognosis-type pictures is of special importance for forecasts of
changes in world economy ( Hungary has an open economy and high debt service payments
in convertible currency). In this field, however, it is a recurrent contingency un-
dermining the rationalizations that forecasts of external conditions (e.g., price
forecasts on external markets) are not reliable enough. Hence, it is expedient to
enhance their reliability by virtue of new scientific methods, prompt supply of in-
formation and continuous adjustment of 'forecasts. It can and should be achieved by
way of a coordinated use of formalized tools (models) and various expert methods.
Breakthroughs are also expected from having the planners, including the economics
research instituties of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, increasingly elaborate
parallel forecasts which will be clashed at open forum of experts. The openness of
the forum places heightened responsibilities for the forecasts on the planners. In
these cases we might speak about the different rationalities and prestige-interests
of specialists.
With respect to forecasts relating to international markets, a peculiar interest-
charged debate has evolved between the representational bodies and public organs of
a political nature, on the one hand, and the national economy planners, on the other.
It so happened that due to insufficient command of information the former group con-
sidered the forecasts of world economy as too pessimistic and, hence, the curtail-
ment of domestic consumption, above all, the decline in investments effected in or-
der to improve the external equilibrium and solvency as too drastic. These cases
might be interpreted as examples for "attitudinal" rationalities and interests.
3.5.3 Elaboration of plan conceptions
The task at the "plan conceptions" stage is to elaborate in greater detail the con-
ceptions of possible future alternatives which are compatible with the goals and stra-
tegies of social, economic and other domains of policy andwhichcontribute to the im-
plementation of these policy measures. (In the course of elaborating the five-year
plan, these goals and strategies are summed up in a policy paper wich is approved by
the government at the inception of the "plan conception" stage. This paper aims at
47
providing central policy guidelines for planners.) Here, the number of alternatives
is smaller, but they are elaborated in greater detail than at the stage of precon-
ceptions.
In the first half of the "plan conception " stage the emphasis in planning shifts
from the National Planning Office to the other planning organizations, above all,
to sectoral and functional ministries, companies involved in national economic plan-
ning and county councils. They are responsible for substantiating the plan conception
with detailed information and for elaborating component conceptions and component
forecasts.
It follows from the manner of working out such intellectual products within the
stage of plan conception that the constituent conceptions and constituent forecasts
are elaborated through screening fractional rationalities and interests. There are
moderators builts into the methods and programs of planning work through which these
screening effects might be counterbalanced:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Typical case:
the afore-mentioned policy paper which outlines the economic policy
conceptions;
bulletins edited by the National Planning Office which help to fulfil
the requirements of comprehensive rationality and general (social)
interests, as well as to the necessity of close working ties between
planners;
a way of organizing the planning entrusting specific constituent task
to a number of planning and representational bodies thereby inducing
them to harmonize their views and interests;
professional discussions of the constituent conceptions and constituent
prognosises involving every planner, short of the population;
discussion and advancing official positions regarding the specific
constituent conceptions elaborated at the sessions of the State Planning
Commission '.
Priority-seeking rationalities and interests - the State Planning
Commission puts on its agenda such constituent concepcitons that
require identifying new priorities. Such is, for exapmle, the cons-
tituent conception of investment policy.
Preferences indirectly mediated - discussion and elaboration of an
official position regarding the conceptions and recommendation for
streamlining the system of economic management. This is at present
as high-priority SUbject because as from January 1, 1985 a signifi-
cant multi-stage streamlining process is planned to be embarked upon.
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At the second part of this phase, planning work is chiefly done at the National Plan-
ning Office. It is at this stage that the previously elaborated data and contributi-
ons are synthesized and coordinated both quantitatively and qualitatively, and then
a draft of the plan conception is elaborated in several alternatives, and its discus-
sion is prepared. If all goes well, a plan conception draft recommended for approval
contains an acceptable compromise between the comprehensive andfractionalrationali-
ties, on the one hand, and the general (societal) and fractional interests, on the
other. At times its precondition is, that on the recommendation of the state Planning
Commission and the National Planning Office planners should revise their earlier
conceptions and recommendations. In this syntetizing second part of this phase two
interesting phanomena may be observed:
(a) Among others we might mention the process of how the rationalities and in-
terests of the whole state and society - wich are socialist ones - confront
with the rationalities and interests of ministries, counties, trade unions,
etc. We may not speak about pre-decided and pre-sanctioned state/societal
rationalities and interests in general, although the policy paper might as
well suggest such standpoints too. Instead it is more correct to characte-
rize this planning phase as the planners' and contributors' etc. continuous
effort to be open to each other and to seek acceptable solutions to the
problems with acceptable compromises.
(b) Another observation may be interesting too. Two kinds of rationality and
interest may be identified according to their way of manifestation: overt
and covert. The overt ones are declared and brought into debate forum openly,
whereas the covert ones not. In politics it is generally observed that the
covert efforts are often stronger and more effective than the overt ones,
although we may discover fractional rationalities and interests beyond the
surface of covert activities.
3.5.4 Elaboration of the plan
Plans are appropriately detailed pictures with a specified number and inter-relation
of indices relating to future alternatives qualified as feasible at the plan concepti-
on stage. These indicators and their relationships can be illustrated in a more detail-
ed way by a chart (see Fig. 1). Here, beginning with the population (labour force),
resource base and known technology, the national economy is built on four basic ele-
ments:production, final use, value-added and disposable income. Among these four ba-
sic elements, final use and disposable income are shown as forming five markets.
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In planning practices this plan-model is, of course, decomposed so as to separate the
individual branches into spectrum canponents, e.g. age groups, strata, branches, in-
dustries, product groups and regions, thus resulting in a much more complex model
(or models) of the relationships considered (BAGER-HAJNAL 1972, BALASSA 1979).
In this last stage of planning work the problems of plural rationality and interest
are going to become more difficult than before. Rational and interest-charged con-
siderations become more differentiated, require more integrating efforts. The details
need more specialized competencies and the greater the specialization the more diver-
gent the rational and value-laden intentions of those competent. Hardly could these
problem situations be looked over and influenced directly by any central agencies.
Only indirect influence may be more or less effective, and in the Hungarian economy
economic regulators mediate the central rationalities and societal interest towards
the representatives and agencies of fractional rationalities and interests. A draft
of these indirect mechanisms may also be edifying. A short description of the types
of plans seems to be the most informative in our framework.
Thus the plan does not merely contain indices and levels concerning the main indica-
tors (p~ goal plan) but also the instruments to reach its objectives. These instru-
ments, direct government decisions and decisions on economic regulators form the ot-
her group of planning tasks (pa-action plan).
Direct government decisions (Pd
a plan) are made for the goals reachable in the form
of a product. In the plan, these direct decisions affect the following issues:
- state investments (individual "large" investments, "aim-grouped" investments
e.g., housing, development of telephone network, ant "other" state invest-
ments), which have a considerable bearing on the structure of the national
economy; these are Government approved;
- central development programmes and their means of execution aiming to solve
basic structural tasks; these programmes are also Government approved;
actions (including the provision of subsidies) to ensure fulfillment of in-
ternational commitments.
Beside the direct decisions the incentive system consists of economic regulators
- prices, wages, fiscal, trade and credit policies - which indirectly influence the
course of economic activity (Pia plan). Economic regulators within the plan-model
control certain flows of the income sub-system. These are not connected directly to
the real economic sphere (a product flow sub-system in this mOdel)!l) but on one
hand through the direct flow linking up value added and production and, on the other
hand, through the market. (Here, it is desired to realize the Pig plan too, e.g. the
indirect goals through the operation of economic units.)
As the recommendations regarding the direct state decisions and,to a large extent,
the economic regulations are worked out by the sectoral and functional ministries,
the National Planning Office is often confronted with their fractional rationalities
and interests.
Typical case: Competing interest and reasoning to get from limited sources-the needs
for state investments are more larger than the distributable investment
resources.
Typical case: Competing interests and reasoning to get from limited supports-corpo-
rate requests submitted for state grants are larger than the available
central funds.
Typical case: Regulated agencies' efforts for loosening regulators - the sectoral mi-
nistries, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and above all the compa-
nies themselves deem the economic re§ulators (or their extent) too
stringent and apply for their alleviation or for an exemption from the
general (normative) rules, viz. for a favoured treatment.
From what has been said so far it is clear that there are complex mutual relationships
tying together the goals and means in the planning model and the organizational-insti-
tutional system. Although the goals together are the decisive factor, the other two
strongly influence it. If these mutual relationships are not applied to a sufficient
degree, the effectiveness of planning and plans is decreased, so that the goals, the
activities (i.e, actions programe, incentives, motivations, strategies) and organiza-
tion must be coordinated. When meeting this requirement the National Planning Office
usually faces some typical problem areas. Each problem implies many specially intert-
wined and interwoven relationships between agencies with different rationalities and
interests.
4. WIDER SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING
Planning demands a high degree of professional competence that must constantly be de-
(1) An exception is that of price regulation, which enters the whole system of econo-
mic flows. This effect is not made explicit in the plan-model however.
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veloped by expanding scientific and professional knowledge. For instance ever more
complex and true-to-life plan-models can and indeed must be worked out using the
results of modern science. Sociology, psychology and other social sciences might be
employed in understanding and developing both the nature of social phenomena and the
planners' own capabilities and work. But alongside the ever developing strandards of
the planning profession in this sense and the competence required of planners, there
is also a need for a broader involvement of society in planning. Although this is
bhe most natural development in our society, one often meets, for instance, the "tech-
nocratic" view that laymen are needless and meaningless in planning or economic deci-
sion-making. The participation is not primarily essential as a strengthener of the
professional elements in planning, of course, but of the policy element. There is a
need to elaborate plans and plan variants over which a more widely debated and accep-
table social consensus has emerged, starting out from the differences of views and
interest that exist. These implicate competent vs. laymen views and interests.
However participation by society cannot be a spontaneous, disorganized "contribution".
Planning is a specific work process which has defined stages, and to these stages the
mechanism and forms of participation by society must be adjusted. The participation
by society must be so perfected as to make it clear who can help in perceiving and
exploring unsolved problems, choosing the acceptable future variants in connection
with what plan documents and on what basis of interests. It is particularly important
that there should be a broad debate in society not only on the ready plan proposal
but on the thinking that emerges in the early stages of preparing the plan, and in-
deed on the analytical and evaluating picture of the present situation and the initi-
al conceptions of future as well. And the debate should not be confined to the leading
bodies of the various political and social institutions, but embrace under public
opinion as well. Participation by society in this sense can greatly help in revealing
any contradictions to be found in adopting variants that follow from society's system
of values.
However the views and interests of the individual strata and groups in society not
only reach the planners through warnings from outside by elected bodies and bodies
representing specific views and interests (as "negative feedback"). This represen-
tation of interests is also embodied in the fact that the planner organizations also
represent various views and interests and can thus effectively promote the selection
of the socially most acceptable of the variant plans worked out. In this connection,
e.g, particular importance will attach to the role of the councils, because their sco-
pe will be increased by their growing economic independence. The funtion of reconci-
ling views and interests must also be assessed when the programmes of planning work
are drawn up. There is a need for work programmes that bring the planning partners
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together to prepare specific decisions at certain planning phases in a more purposeful
fashion than before.
5. A CHALLENGE TO STUDY: THE PLURAL RATIONALITY AND INTEREST IN NATIONAL PLANNING
The relevance of plural rationality is generally recognized in certain scientific
communities. The importance of values and interests is also well-known, although less
accepted. Nevertheless in spite of these recognitions hardly can one find researchers
who tried to interprete and study the national planners' work in terms of plural ratio-
nality and interest. Our former considerations suggest that the overt and covert plu-
ral rationality and interest in national planners' work might be recognized as chal-
lenging area for scientific examinations.
6. NATIONAL PLANNING WORK IN THE LIGHT OF PLURAL RATIONALITY AND INTEREST
Is it possible to gain new impression about national planners and their work if we
study their nature in terms of plural rationality and interest? Our answer is "yes".
And in a sketchy way I have tried to illustrate the results of the experiment to
apply and interpret these two related concepts to the Hungarian planning practice.
In what follow I shall summerize concisely the most relevant conclusions which may
imply further possibilities for less intuitive and more ordered considerations or
studies. MY summary in not more than a list of proposals.
1. Applying the plural rationality and interest to a planned economy, the
right frame of reference is the whole process of planned work which may be
analized in terms of "planning - accepting - implementing - evaluating"
stages.
2. Specialization along the course of planned work is a very determining sour-
ce of plural rationality and interest, and the coordination of views and
values involves special planning tasks.
3. It was possible to identify some special variations of what kinds of
diverging views and interests emerge:
rationality and interest according to a thinking which starts and ends
with "means vs. human being",
fractional rationalities and sectoral interests,
• cosmetic rationality and interest,
rationalities and interests in using special methods in planning work,
• rationalities and interests in using oversimplified schemes for plans
and planning procedures,
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prestige rationalities and interests of experts,
attitudinal rationalitie~ and interests (e.g. pessimistic, radical ,etc.) ,
priority seeking rationalities and interests of top decision-makers
along the planning procedures,
indirectly mediated rationalities and interests for corporations (econo-
mic units) through declared preferences,
comprehensive (state, society) vs. fractional (branch, county) rationali-
ties and interests,
competent vs. layman rationality and interest,
competing reasonings and interests to have a share in limited resources,
competing reasonings and interests to get from limited state support,
diverging efforts of corporations for loosening one or another economic
regulator,
rationalities and interests of those who represent the different parts,
strata, communities, etc. of population in the different stages of
planning work.
4. One may also observe overt and covert rationalities and interest. It is
desirable to make the covert standpoints and values overt ,too, in order
to discuss them openly and to make them compatible to each other.
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BEYOND RATIONALITY
Stuart E. Dreyfus
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research,
University of California, Berkeley, California, USA
Most mathematical models in management science and symbol-
manipulating programs in artificial intelligence attempt to describe the
relevant problematic world in terms of facts, decisions or actions taken
in the present and often also in the future, and relationships speci-
fying how facts and decisions combine to generate new facts. Alterna-
tive decisions or policies are compared and one is chosen according to
some specified rule. This description is general enough to include not
only the more traditional approaches but also decision analysis (where
the present is frequently taken as an undecomposed single fact and pos-
sible futures are decomposed into sequences of choices and events with
associated subjective probabilities) and expert systems (where the rules
by which facts combine to ultimately produce a decision usually take
the form of "if ... then .•. " inferences). Decision support systems gen-
erally dispense with the rules for choosing a decision, leaving that up
to the human user, but still depend on facts, and relationships for mod-
eling the future so as to answer various "what if" questions. When, in
any sense, the problematic world is decomposed into facts, rules, and
relationships in the course of addressing a problem, we shall say that
the decision is based on calculative rationality.
It is my contention that only beginners, experienced decision mak-
ers when facing entirely novel problems, and modelers of structured
problems where what constitutes the relevant facts, rules, and relation-
ships is objectively determinable, should employ calculative rationali-
ty. Experienced decision makers facing unstructured problems do not,
and should not, adopt this calculative methods of problem describing
and solving. To show that an alternative exists, and that it uses a
kind of holistic pattern recognizing capacity not modelable in terms of
calculative rationality, I shall briefly describe what I see as the five
stages of the human skill acquisition process.
To develop this model I studied the skill-acquisition process of
airplane pilots, chess players, automobile drivers and adult learners
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of a second language and observed a common pattern in all cases. The
reader need not merely accept my word, but should check to see if a
similar pattern can be detected in the process by which he or she ac-
quired various skills. After I developed this description, a group
of research nurses who had acquired considerable data about the acqui-
sition of nursing skill found that my model fit very well with their
data. The results of this study may be found in the book From Novice
to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice, by
Patricia Benner (Addison-Wesley, 1984).
When I am finished, I hope that you will understand that there is
a mode of understanding and acting that goes beyond calculative ration-
ality in that it employs no conscious, and I believe no unconscious,
decomposition of the problem situation into facts, rules, and relation-
ships. The skilled and experienced human, immersed in his or her world,
responds fluidly and almost instantaneously to his environment based on
perceived similarities with concrete prior experiences. This intuitive
behavior involves neither the solving of problems by comparison of al-
ternatives nor explicit thought about the future of the sort called
planning. Yet, observation of intuitive behavior discloses better per-
formance than produced by calculative rationality.
To set your minds at rest, let me acknowledge here that, when time
permits, the involved intuitive skilled performer deliberates about his
behavior in a detached manner that can be called rational because it
involves decomposition. But it is his or her intuitive understanding
that is examined and decomposed, not the problem itself. I call this
detached meditation about one's intuitive understanding deliberative
rationality, and offer this form of rationality, which I shall describe
at the end of my talk, as the sort of rationality that should be studied,
taught, and encouraged as preferable to calculative rationality. I have
thus far failed to find a role for computational procedures such as
mathematical modeling or decision support systems in buttressing delib-
erative rationality, but I hope one exists. It is not calculation, but
scientific problem solving, that I fear degrades decision making by ex-
perienced experts in unstructured situations and has hindered the growth
to full intuitive maturity of our bright young analytical managers.
I shall now describe the typical skill acquisition process of an
adult learning a new skill by instruction rather than by trial and
error.
Stage 1: Novice. Normally, the instruction process begins with
the instructor decomposing the task environment into context-free fea-
tures which the beginner can recognize without benefit of experience.
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The beginner is then given rules for determining actions on the basis
of these features, like a computer following a program. This is pure
calculative rationality. The beginning student wants to do a good job,
but lacking any coherent sense of the overall task, he judges his per-
formance mainly by how well he follows his learned rules. After he has
acquired more than just a few rules, so much concentration is required
during the exercise of his skill that his capacity to talk or listen to
advice is severely limited.
For purposes of illustration, I shall consider two variations: a
bodily or motor skill and an intellectual skill. The student automobile
driver learns to recognize such interpretation-free features as speed
(indicated by his speedometer) and distance (as estimated by a previ-
ously acquired skill). Safe following distances are defined in terms
of speed; conditions that allow safe entry into traffic are defined in
terms of speed and distance of oncoming traffic; timing of shifts of
gear is specified in terms of speed, etc. These rules ignore context.
They do not refer to traffic density or anticipated stops.
The novice chess player learns a numerical value for each type of
piece regardless of its position, and the rule: "always exchange if the
total value of pieces captured exceeds the value of pieces lost." He
also learns, among other rules, that when no advantageous exchanges can
be found center control should be sought, and he is given a rule defin-
ing center squares and one for calculating extent of control. Most be-
ginners are notoriously slow players, as they attempt to remember all
of their rules and their priorities.
Stage ~: Advanced beginner. As the novice gains experience actu-
ally coping with real situations, he begins to note, or an instructor
points out, perspicuous examples of meaningful additional components of
the situation. After seeing a sufficient number of examples, the stu-
dent learns to recognize them. Instructional maxims now can refer to
these new situational aspects recognized on the basis of experience, as
well as to the objectively defined non-situational features recogniza-
ble by the novice. Cultural background plays an important role in per-
ceiving and naming aspects. The advanced beginner confronts his en-
vironment, seeks out features and aspects, and determines his actions
by applying rules. This is still calculative rationality, except that
some inputs are intuited. The subjective probabilities of decision
analysis are examples of situational aspects. The advanced beginner
shares the novice's minimal concern with quality of performance, instead
focusing on quality of rule following. His performance, while improved,
remains slow, uncoordinated, and laborious.
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The advanced beginner driver uses (situational) engine sounds as
well as (non-situational) speed in his gear-shifting rules, and observes
demeanor as well as position and velocity to anticipate behavior of pe-
destrians or other drivers. He learns to distinguish the behavior of
the distracted or drunken driver from that of the impatient but alert
one. No number of words can serve the function of a few choice examples
in learning this distinction. Engine sounds cannot be adequately cap-
tured by words, and no list of objective facts about a particular pe-
destrian enables one to predict his behavior in a crosswalk as well as
can the driver who has observed many pedestrians crossing streets under
a variety of conditions. Holistic recognition based on experience goes
beyond rationality, which depends on decomposition and recombination.
But it is certainly not irrational, that is, contrary to calculative
thinking. Intuition accomplishes what formal description cannot.
With experience, the chess beginner learns to recognize over-
extended positions and how to avoid them. Similarly, he begins to recog-
nize such situational aspects of positions as a weakened king's side or
a strong pawn structure despite the lack of precise and universally valid
definitional rules.
Stage ~: Competence. With increasing experience, the number of
features and aspects to be taken into account becomes overwhelming. To
cope with this information explosion, the performer learns, or is taught,
to adopt a hierarchical view of decision-making. By first choosing a
plan, goal or perspective which organizes the situation and by then ex-
amining only the small set of features and aspects that he has learned
are the most important given that plan, the performer can simplify and
improve his performance. This is a more sophisticated form of calcula-
tive rationality.
Choosing a plan, a goal or perspective, is no simple matter for the
competent performer. It is not an objective procedure, like the feature
recognition of the novice. Nor is the choice avoidable. While the ad-
vanced beginner can get along without recognizing and using a particular
situational aspect until a sufficient number of examples makes identi-
fication easy and sure, to perform competently requires choosing an or-
ganizing goal or perspective. Furthermore, the choice of perspective
crucially affects behavior in a way that one particular aspect rarely
does.
This combination of necessity and uncertainty introduces an impor-
tant new type of relationship between the performer and his environment.
The novice and the advanced beginner applying rules and maxims feel lit-
tle or no responsibility for the outcome of their acts. If they have
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made no mistakes, an unfortunate outcome is viewed as the result of in-
adequately specified elements or rules. The competent performer, on the
other hand, after wrestling with the question of a choice of perspective
or goal, feels responsible for, and thus emotionally involved in, the
result of his choice. An outcome that is clearly successful is deeply
satisfying and leaves a vivid memory of the situation encountered as
seen from the perspective finally chosen. Disasters, likewise, are not
easily forgotten.
Remembered whole situations differ in one important respect from
remembered aspects. The mental image of an aspect is flat in the sense
that no parts stand out as salient. A whole situation, on the other
hand, since it is the result of a chosen plan or perspective, has a
"three-dimensional" quality. Certain elements stand out as more or less
important with respect to the plan, while other irrelevant elements are
forgotten. Moreover, the competent performer, gripped by the situation
that his decision has produced, experiences and therefore remembers the
situation not only in terms of foreground and background elements but
also in terms of senses of opportunity, risk, expectation, threat, etc.
These gripping, holistic memories cannot guide the behavior of the com-
petent performer since he fails to make contact with them when he re-
flects on problematic situations as a detached observer, and holds to a
view of himself as a computer following better and more sophisticated
rules. As we shall soon see, however, if he does let them take over,
these memories become the basis of the competent performer's next ad-
vance in skill.
A competent driver beginning a trip decides, perhaps, that he is in
a hurry. He then selects a route with attention to distance and time,
ignores scenic beauty, and as he drives, he chooses his maneuvers with
little concern for passenger comfort or for courtesy. He follows more
closely than normal, enters traffic more daringly, occasionally violates
a law. He feels elated when decisions work out and no police car ap-
pears, and shaken by near accidents and traffic tickets. (Beginners,
on the other hand, can perpetrate chaos around them with total uncon-
cern. )
The class A chess player, here classed as competent, may decide
after studying a position that his opponent has weakened his king's
defenses so that an attack against the king is a viable goal. If the
attack is chosen, features involving weaknesses in his own position
created by his attack are ignored as are losses of pieces inessential
to the attack. Removal of pieces defending the enemy king becomes sa-
lient. Successful plans induce euphoria and mistakes are felt in the
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pit of the stomach.
In both of these cases, we find a common pattern: detached plan-
ning, conscious assessment of elements that are salient with respect to
the plan, and analytical rule-guided choice of action, followed by an
emotionally involved experience of the outcome.
Stage !: Proficiency. Considerable experience at the level of com-
petency sets the stage for yet further skill enhancement. Having ex-
perienced many situations, chosen plans in each, and having obtained
vivid, involved demonstrations of the adequacy or inadequacy of the
plan, the performer sees his current situation as similar to a previous
one and so spontaneously sees an appropriate plan. Involved in the world
of the skill, the performer "notices," or "is struck by" a certain plan,
goal or perspective. No longer is the spell of involvement broken by
detached conscious planning. Intuitive understanding replaces calcula-
tive description.
What is remembered as prototypical situations and as appropriate
plans is strongly influenced by the instructional process, by the exper-
iences of the learner, and by the trained-in cultural background of the
individual.
There will, of course, be breakdowns of this "seeing," when, due
perhaps to insufficient experience in a certain type of situation or to
more than one possible plan presenting itself, the performer will need
to take a detached look at his situation. But between these breakdowns,
the proficient performer will experience longer and longer intervals of
continuous, intuitive understanding.
Since there are generally far fewer "ways of seeing" than "ways of
acting," after understanding without conscious effort what is going on,
the proficient performer will still have to think about what to do.
During this thinking, elements that present themselves as salient are
assessed and combined by rule to produce decisions about how best to
manipulate the environment. The spell of involvement in the world of
the activity will thus temporarily be broken, and calculative rational-
ity will be employed.
On the basis of prior experience, a proficient driver approaching
a curve on a rainy day may sense that he is traveling too fast. He then
consciously determines an appropriate lower speed based on such salient
elements as visibility, angle of road bank, criticality of time, etc.
(These factors would be used by the competent driver consciously to
decide that he is speeding.)
The proficient chess player, who is classed a master, can recognize
a large repertoire of types of positions. Recognizing almost immediately
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and without conscious effort the sense of a position, he sets about cal-
culating the move that best achieves his goal. He may, for example,
know that he should attack, but he must deliberate about how best to do
so.
Stage ~: Expertise. The proficient performer, immersed in the world
of his skillful activity, sees what needs to be done, but decides how to
do it. For the expert, not only situational understandings spring to
mind, but also associated appropriate actions. The expert performer,
except of course during moments of breakdown, understands, acts, and
learns from results without any conscious awareness of the process.
What transparently must be done is done. We usually do not make con-
scious deliberative decisions when we walk, talk, ride a bicycle, drive,
or carryon most social activities. An expert's skill has become so
much a part of him that he need be no more aware of it than he is of
his own body. Calculative rationality is no longer needed or present.
We have seen that experience-based similarity recognition produces
the deep situational understanding of the proficient performer. No new
insight is needed to explain the mental processes of the expert. With
enough experience with a variety of situations, all seen from the same
perspective or with the same goal in mind, but requiring different tac-
tical decisions, the mind of the proficient performer seems gradually
to decompose this class of situations into subclasses, each member of
which shares not only the same goal or perspective, but also the same
decision, action, or tactic. At this point, a situation, when seen as
similar to members of this class, is not only thereby understood but
simultaneously the associated decision, action, or tactic presents it-
self. As with intuitive proficient understanding, training, experience
and culture determine each individuals prototypical memories.
The number of classes of recognizable situations, built up on the
basis of experience, must be immense. It has been estimated that a
master chess player can distinguish roughly 50,000 types of positions.
Automobile driving probably involves a similar number of typical situa-
tions. We doubtless store far more typical situations in our memories
than words in our vocabularies. Consequently these reference situations,
unlike most situational elements learned by the advanced beginner, bear
no names and, in fact, defy complete verbal description.
The expert driver, generally without any awareness, simply slows
when his speed feels too fast until it feels right, which certainly
depends on his culture. He shifts gears when appropriate with no con-
scious awareness of his acts. Most drivers have experienced the dis-
concerting breakdown that occurs when suddenly one reflects on the gear
62
shifting process and tries to decide what to do. The smooth, almost
automatic, sequence of actions that results from the performer's in-
volved immersion in the world of his skill is disrupted, and the per-
former sees himself, just as does the competent performer using calcu-
lative rationality, as the manipulator of a complex mechanism. He de-
tachedly calculates his actions even more poorly than does the compe-
tent performer since he has forgotten many of the gUiding rules that he
knew and used when competent, and his performance suddenly becomes halt-
ing, uncertain, and even inappropriate.
The expert chess player, classed as an international master or a
grandmaster, in most situations experiences a compelling sense of the
issue and the best move. Deliberation of a sort that we shall describe
below then follows. While the quality of this deliberation may separate
one grandmaster from another, we have performed an experiment that shows
how little it contributes to overall skill level compared to intuitive
understanding. International master Julio Kaplan was required rapidly
to add numbers presented to him audibly at the rate of about one number
per second while at the same time playing 5-second-a-move chess against
a weaker, but master level, player. Even with his analytical mind com-
pletely occupied by adding numbers, Kaplan more than held his own against
the master in a series of games. Deprived of the time necessary to see
problems, construct plans, or deliberate about his intuitions, Kaplan
still produced fluid and coordinated play.
Having seen how involved, holistic, intuitive behavior gradually
replaces and outperforms calculative rationality, in the space remaining
I shall describe the sort of detached, decomposed, deliberation that can
improve still further the performance of the intuitive expert. I shall
illustrate the process with respect to chess, but of course it is equal-
ly applicable to managerial decision making and policy setting.
Few if any situations in chess or life are seen as being of exactly
the kind for which prior experience intuitively dictates what move or
decision must be made. Certain aspects of the situation are generally
slightly, yet disturbingly, different from what would make one com-
pletely comfortable with acting based on prior experience. The master
chess player deliberates about these differences, searching for a move
that keeps all intuitively desirable options open while decreasing this
uneasyness. Failing this, he seeks to modify slightly the intuitively
suggested move so as to take account of these differences.
A second focus of deliberation is the overall strategy being pur-
sued. While a master player never calculates a best strategy by a for-
mula applied to decontextualized features of the position as might a
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merely competent player or a very sophisticated computer program, he
always experiences his position as having certain salient strengths and
weaknesses due to positional issues that prior experience causes him to
see as important. These issues gradually evolve and change as moves are
made, however, so this organizing perspective, while an indispensable
asset to intuitive understanding, holds as well the potential for dis-
aster. Maintaining a perspective in the face of persisting disquieting
evidence is called tunnel vision and can sometimes be avoided by a type
of detached deliberation. By focusing on aspects of a situation that
seem relatively unimportant when seen in terms of a certain perspective,
it is possible that another perspective, perhaps that of one's opponent,
will spring to mind. Should this happen, blunders caused by completely
failing to anticipate an opponent's move can be avoided.
To experience this ability to change a perspective by focusing on
a non-salient element until it becomes salient, consider the figure be-
low.
/ /
V /
You probably see it as a three-dimensional cube with a certain face pro-
jecting out of the page toward you. Now focus your attention on the
corner of the cube behind that particular face. Most likely, a face of
the cube containing that corner suddenly became the face closest to you,
and you saw the cube from a new perspective, with the face that origi-
nally stood out now being in the background. (If you saw the figure
only as a pattern of rather unrelated lines on a flat page, you saw it
as a beginner perceives his skill domain, before he attains competency
and imposes a perspective.) Most real situations don't switch as easily
as this cube since they frequently have only one interpretation consis-
tent with past experiences. Tunnel vision is refusing to see a switch
when it is potentially there and when the new perspective better ex-
plains recent past events and better dictates future actions.
Deliberation about the relevance and adequacy of those past ex-
periences that are presumably producing current intuitive understanding
can prove helpful. One can ask: Is what would normally appear to be
the best move or strategy still the best in view of the time pressures
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of this particular game or one's standing at present in this particular
tournament?
And even if typical past experience passes this test and is deemed
still relevant, might there be a better move or decision than what ex-
perience brings to mind? Chess masters sometimes sense opportunities
beyond what they can spontaneously see in a position, presumably be-
cause much better results would be anticipated in several similar posi-
tions which, while not enough like the present one to trigger an intui-
tive move, are still similar enough to produce a sense of opportunity.
So calculative rationality evolves, with concrete experience, into
holistic intuitive understanding, which, in turn, is tested, shaped,
and fine-tuned by deliberative rationality. Except for completely novel
or structured problems, reduction of understanding to calculation and
reason based on facts and relationships describing the problem repre-
sents a regression that substitues an illusion of detached scientific
clarity for involved wisdom and good judgment. If decisions must be
negotiated or justified then the proper vocabulary is that of delibera-
tive rationality, e.g., perceived historical precedence, salient issues,
similarities and differences, unfulfilled expectations etc. Vague, im-
pressionistic, groping toward communicating the wisdom embodied in a
lifetime of concrete experiences is far more productive than precise
explanations using abstract and outgrown facts, rules, and relationships.
Wise practitioners have always known this, but scientific managers and
management scientists seem to overlook this human reality.
THE CULTURE OF DECISION MAKING
Martin H. Krieger
Program in Science, Technology and Society, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Life goes on. Every once in a while we seem to be able to
isolate particular events, isolable not only in principle but in
practice too. For example, there are situations in which we say that
we are making a decision or that a decision has been made. Such
decision events are nexuses, and they may also be turning points. I
want to describe two kinds of isolable events--little and big
decisions--and then describe a variety of situations--economy, law,
rites of passage, heroic action, judgment, and entrepreneurship--
which make use of them. My motivation is to enlarge our notion of
decisionmaking: to include both religious conversion and consumer
choice, both transcendent struggle and deliberate planning.
One kind of discrete isolable event are acts or steps which are
independent of each other yet which are commensurable. The events are
meant to be combined into larger sequences of action. Those larger
sequences are then taken to be the addition of smaller events, with
byways that reverse each other canceling out (just as in arithmetic +X
and -x cancel). Markets and the marginalist analysis of decision
theory are the best known realizations of this model.
Mathematically, there are a variety of devices for doing the
arithmetic (besides the arithmetic of real numbers), including the
calculus, probability theory, and equilibrium analysis. The calculus
provides for a way of thinking of continuous addable changes, changes
that add up as long as there is continuity. The fundamental theorem
relates the changes to the sum, the derivative to the integral: and it
is the property of Riemann sums that how you do the addition does not
matter. Probability theory might be described as the study of
independence (of events) and its perturbations (as in Markov chains).
And so it provides ways for adding up events. And equilibrium analysis
is again about the addition of small changes (say in the excitation of
normal modes, or in marginal changes off equilibrium), their net effect
sometimes being independent of the order in which they are made. In
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each case, each little decision is unto itself, dumb, nicely combinable
with others (although the modes of addition, as in stochastic
integrals, may be curious at first). If there is little overlap among
each of the decisions and each decision is ahistorical, the little
decisions have many of the features of the billiard balls or the
particles of the physicist. If there is hierarchy and lots of
interaction of the decisions, then we may have something that is more
like organization and systems analysis. And in between there are
models of satisficing and negotiation.
My characterization of little decisions is of course quite rough.
But I think it captures the general tone of the programme we engage in
when we are trying to find a set of little decisions that will explain
what people do. Now, for example, one might also have little decisions
in a legal framework, so I think that the picture of discrete isolable
acts or steps is not restricted to voting, economy, or physics.
(Rather, it is about liberalism.) The great problem for this
programme is how do you find good separable individuals and a
reasonable mode of addition or combination so that it all adds up. Put
differently, how do you create a suitable level of "alienation" so that
the events are isolated, and a suitable mode of interaction so that
they work together so as to get a harmonious whole.
The other kind of decision might be termed "big," for they
involve relatively large-scale transformations marked by a single
crucial event. There cannot be subparts or sub-events that analyze and
so smooth out the big decision, for then it would no longer be simply
big--but rather something big that is made up of little decisions.
Moments of religious conversion, of turning in transcendent or
revolutionary struggle, and of reversal or commitment in war,
narrative, or myth are supposed to be big decisions--at least as they
are related in canonical accounts.[See Krieger, 1981, Part II] Think
of Augustine's conversion, national revolutions, or major corporate
commitments (as in IBM's development of the 360 line, or Boeing's of
the 747--where one is "betting the company"[Newhouse]). Big decisions
are presented as discontinuous, irreversible, and as preemptive moves.
They are commitments to a way of life. They mark history, and so they
are stigmatizing.
There are physical models that might simulate some big decisions:
for example, phase transitions (freezing), cracking, buckling, and
random walks. In each case a small change in a parameter (say
temperature, pressure, load, or initial choice) will result in large
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changes in the state of the system. These models suggest two facts
that haunt all big decisions. First, from another point of view they
may be seen as ·continuous,· and also analyzable, as composed of
molecular small decisions. One might have to invent ingenious new
modes of smoothing (as in averaging over ground state symmetries in
physics, or in bifurcation theory, or say by looking at a different
scale of time, space, or in a larger dimension), or new ways of adding
things up (as is done in the block spin story of renormalization group
accounts of freezing). But still big decisions, those isolated crucial
events, can be articulated. A secular biography of Augustine or a more
dispassionate account of revolution points out earlier failed attempts,
Thermidors, regressions, historical rewriting, and so forth. None of
this denies the truth of big decisions, for in their own terms they are
big and discontinuous. But there are other terms, other modes of
explanation they are subject to. Conversely, the discrete little
events that make up little decisions are almost always constructed to
add up "right." They are set up to do big work. Rational economic men
are given just those properties needed for the general equilibrium
market. Electrons in crystal lattices are individuals in the special
sense needed to account for macroscopic crystal behavior. None of this
denies the truth of little decisions. But they are subject to an
account of how their alienation from each other (and their dumbness and
additiVity) is a social creation.
I have been employing a version of the story of parts and wholes.
Individual notes in a piece of music make sense in terms of how they
appear in the corpus of musical works, yet still they are individual.
And whole pieces of music are composed of notes, yet those pieces
surely have an integrity of their own. I have also been rehearsing an
argument in historiography, about the necessity of "events" in
history-writing, and that necessity being related to the fact that
history is written narratively. Just as there is an attempt in physics
to "smooth out" big changes by showing how they are composed of many
little ones or are typical of a general form, so too in history there
is a dialectical play between a history composed of great decisions and
one of ordinary events taking place alongside a larger trend.
Now in actuality there really are big and little decisions.
Building a rapid transit system nowadays is a big decision, but buying
a thirteenth pencil is a small or little one. "Shall I eat a peach?"
is a big decision, but the thirty-seventh dam might well be conceived
of as a little one. It all depends on the situation, and it is to
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those situations that I now want to turn.
As we shall see, decisionmaking may well be a matter of steering
and information management, but it also may be a matter of legal
interpretation, of a rite of passage, of heroic action, of reflective
judgment, or of entrepreneurship. We set up situations in which each
of these decisionmaking practices will make sense. So, for example,
steering is more possible in a reasonably smooth and homogeneous world:
legal interpretation is sensible in one filled with tabus: rites of
passage suit transformations among opposed states: heroic action is
needed when sacrifice must be justified: reflective judgment suits
times when we want to demand agreement from others: and,
entrepreneurship is needed when we must attribute a decision to a
single individual even if he is acting in a much larger supporting
social framework.
A Culture of Decisionmaking
The play of big and little decisions takes place in an
encompassing culture of decisionmaking. The culture consists of a set
of decisionmaking practices, such as markets and sacred tabus. The
practices must work together if each is to make sense, yet each is
enacted as if it is the only one that is going on, and so in effect
denying any other practice. Markets ignore but do not violate the
tabus on what is to be traded: tabus ignore how markets may indirectly
trade what is taken as sacred. [NOTE: This section is excerpted from
a larger paper on the culture of decisionmaking.J
Schematically (see Table I), the culture of decisionmaking
consists of a set of practices, which use technologies to organize and
-automate- their operation, which have ideologies that justify them,
and which feature particular phenomenological details of the world.
For example, marginalism uses the calculus as its technology: it takes
the local nearby here-and-now features of the world as crucial: it is
preoccupied with steering as the major problem: and, it sees the world
as modular, smooth, and objectively distant.
I now want to briefly review each of the practices.
The prevalent model of decisionmaking is that of marginalism, a
practice of small and smooth changes, of partial derivatives from
equilibrium states, of mostly uncorrelated and relatively independent
events, and of probabilities in a universe of reasonable possibilities.
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In marginalism the world changes smoothly, and you can backtrack as
well. At each point you figure out what to do next by looking locally
around you. And there are rules, those of the calculus and of
probability theory, for doing that looking around in such a way that
the sum of your choices is best. Things add up. And if the world is
composite, a marginal change in a component will make sense in terms of
and be consistent with the whole.
A very different practice is needed if the world is not taken as
smooth but as "balkanized,n broken up and divided, and marked by tabus
and difficult-to-bridge separations. Such is the case in a dogmatic
orthodoxy, or in family relationships, or in a large project thought to
be quite risky. There is falsity and truth, incest and allowed
relationships, waste and prudence. It is a world of untouchable (or
tabued) and touchable parts. One has to master the law: the structure
of forbiddenness and allowedness: and, also, the means of sacrifice and
redemption, the ways of restoring order when there is transgression.
Yet despite its division, this world has a wholeness and connectedness.
It is not rearrangeable and arbitrary, as the world seems to be in
marginalism. It is resistant to plasticity. This world is orderly and
traditional. One knowledgeably figures out how to live according to
the law, and how to deal with the inevitable violations.
Marginalism makes sense just because there are some things that
are untouchable, that are not to be traded or exchanged although they
may be sacrificed or canonized. Mama or Papa are ontologically and
morally different from guns or butter.
The untouchable world is stable, albeit multiply bifurcated by
tabu and the like. We can imagine the untouchable world violated but
not reconciled, a world in the middle, on the marge: a world of the
~ between relatively stable polar situations. For example, say we
are in the middle, rather than before or after a big decision, or we
have a mixture of properties, rather than polar black or white. The
gap is a world of mixture and crisis and tumolt and flux, and here
decisions appear as not so fully encompassed by the law as they are in
the practice of untouchability. Chance and fluctuations seem to playa
very large role in how things turn out. Still, such a world has
patterned modes of transition, such as in bank rescues, which always
take place on weekends, in comedy and tragedy, which have an archetypal
moment of revelation, and in phase transitions, which are of a
universal form--all transitions leading to reconciliation and
stability. The practice of decisionmaking is a play between such
patterns of ritual and transformation and otherwise un tempered chance
and fluctuations.
The culture of decisionmaking, as I have described it so far,
incorporates crucial features of big decisions. Big decisions do have
marginal aspects and may even be the "sum" of little ones: they violate
what is untouchable and lead to sacrifice and redemption: and, they
transit a mediating gap between a before and an after.
Marginalism, untouchability, and gaps are decisionmaking
practices that address themselves to the world in which you find
yourself. But you have a "transcendent" role in such a world, and that
decisionmaking role may also be described in terms of practices.
One may be an actor, perhaps heroic, who expresses his will in an
epical struggle with the world, subject perhaps to tragedy, even blind
to the consequences of what he does. For example, that is how New York
City's park-builder Robert Moses is presented in Caro's biography.
Such an actor initiates by inseminating the world with his power.
Through his will he violates what has been otherwise taken as
impossible, so the actor "gets things done." Such an actor is often
presented in contrast to a manager or housekeeper or
maintainer--although the actor's effectiveness depends on there being a
managed world, a world to fulfil and work out his acts, a world where
the garbage is removed and where peace and home are provided for. If
there is Odysseus, there is also Penelope and Telemachus.
Opposed to, but mutually dependent on the actor, there is the
spectator, engaged in the practice of judgment or criticism.
Disinterested, not involved, the spectator-judge will demand that
others agree with his judgments--although the others may differ and
offer judgments which they demand he agree with. What is crucial is
that the demands are rational, founded in evidence and argument.
Disagreement is meant to lead both to mutual appeals and to rational
argument. For there is a community, and an appeal is an appeal to its
shared or common sense. So it is an appeal that intrinsically lays
claim to others' potential allegiance.
Judgment is not only impartial, it is also justifying--putting
everything in order. It makes sense of the world. In aesthetic terms
it is about the unity of a work of art: in religious terms the
justification is a provision of God's grace. But not everything goes
or works, is rational or appealing to others, or makes sense as a
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possibility. There is resistance--practical, rhetorical,
conceptual--some of which is not to be overcome.
If in their decisions actors make the world so, spectator-judges
take it as something. Theirs is a world that is given order through
their acts of valuation. Just what the world is like and how it is
taken is an achievement, not at all obvious or easily achieved.
The last practice I want to discuss is entrepreneurship, a
meeting-ground of action and judgment. The entrepreneur creates
things, and by finding a market for them he makes them valuable. The
entrepreneur's world is ordered through both will and valuation, but
that ordering is contingent. It is not determined ahead of time. It
is the nature of that contingency that is of interest.
Entrepreneurs are often said to "deserve" their rewards. The
rewards are deserved because the entrepreneur takes risks and evidences
his skill in dealing with the (chance) unknown. And so he receives an
extraordinary return on what we come to call his investment. An
important function of this description of entrepreneurship is to
justify these rewards or returns to the entrepreneur.
To justify ownership and the consequent exclusion of others from
your property, there must be a social invention called risk-taking,
where risk is understood in a probabilistic sense. Unlike biological
sport or Fortune as models of contingency, in risk-taking the chances
are presumably equally accessible to all, and each chance is presumably
independent of the others. That you rise to the risk, take it, and
then succeed, marks the returns as rewards for you. If
entrepreneurship is seen as risk-taking, then one can assign a rate of
return to it. And so it is an investment. Time is no longer
biological or the narrative time of storytelling, but objectified
calendrical time. Time becomes a commensurable realm in which
comparable prospective projects can work themselves out.
Entrepreneurial endeavor becomes a matter for the alternative
allocation of resources.
Actually, the successful entrepreneur systematically links
payoffs and probabilities, so that expectation values are not simply
products of the two, but nonlinear products. Careful control and
anticipation of contingency are the mark of a good entrepreneur. And
large investments will make it more likely that an outcome turns out as
desired. Investments are strategic, and are meant to alter the future
probabilities as well as the payoffs.
Once projects become investments, then heroic action is tamed and
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become prudence, and critical judgment is no longer about qualities and
becomes financial. Heroism is identified with success (rather than
virtue). Its reward is not eternal fame but transitory wealth. Virtue
becomes skill, Fortune becomes risk, and acts of appropriation becomes
ownership. Entrepreneurs have made Fortune their own. And in a
perverse way, the entrepreneur's world comes to be a marginalist world.
Conclusion
Let me summarize the view of decisionmaking that I have presented
here. First of all, decision themselves are remarkable events,
isolated as events through social, political, and cultural
arrangements. The decisions may be little, meant to be added up so as
to recover the larger sequence of life. Or they may be big decisions,
meant to mark that sequence with turning points, separating before and
after the big decision. One might model little and big decisions using
mathematical and physical pictures, or narrative, legal, and mythic
ones. The second problem is to set up a situation (or find a suitable
description of what is going on) in which decisionmaking is possible.
I described a half-dozen such situations or practices, each of which
depends on the others to make up for its limitations. Their
interdependence suggests we might think of them as a culture, each
practice giving an account of all the others in its own terms. In
actuality some practices are much more suited than are others to the
kinds of decisionmaking we are engaged in.
Thinking in terms of big and little decisions and in terms of
decisionmaking allows us to consider, at one time, mathematical and
religious models and legal and heroic ones. Together they provide an
account of those moments when we may act as if we are making a
decision. So not only does life go on, but it goes on in segmented and
marked and rational ways.
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DIFFERENT DISSOLUTIONS OF THE MAN-AND-WORLD PROBLEM
Laszlo Zsolnai 1 and Istvan Kiss2
1 Karl Marx University ofEconomics, Budapest, Hungary
2 Bureau for Systems Analysis of the State Office for
Technical Development, Budapest, Hungary
Naturally, there is only one peal wopld but people are not directly
living in this single real world. J. Ortega y Gasset wrote that "man
must ever be grounded on some beliefs, and that the structure of his
life will depend primordially on the beliefs on which he is grounded".
Beliefs, "always constitute a system insofar as they are effective
beliefs". (ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. 1963: 283-284). According to this
we can say that belief systems are those media by which people are
able to live in the real world.
Belief systems are imaginary pictures about the real world, or more
exactly, hypothetical ontologies, i.e. assumptions on basic structure,
characteristics, and processes of the real world. For this reason
belief systems define certain possible woplds.
The classical and well-known formulation of possible worlds by D. Lewis
is as follows: "I believe that there are possible worlds other than
the one we happen to inhabit [ ... ]. It is uncontroversially true,
that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do
you, that things could have been different in countless ways. [ ... ].
I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called
'ways things could have been'. I prefer to call them 'possible worlds'."
(See Lewis, D. 1973: 84-85).
We think that each possible world accepted by a certain group of people
is in a strong interaction with the real world. (See Figure 1). This
interaction can be schematically summarized by a cyclical process which
consists of four steps:
(i) People make their actions following their beliefs in the real
world;
Some changes occur in the real world caused by people's actions;
People's perceptions of real changes are influenced by their
beliefs;
(iv) Some changes occur or not in people's belief systems.
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REAL
WORLD
people's
actions
FIGURE 1: Interaction between a possible world and the real world.
[In this schematical model we have disregarded the motivations and/or
the causal background of people's actions.]
Each belief system must dissolve the Man & World problem. We use the
term 'dissolve the problem' in R.L. Ackoff's sense. According to this
"problem dissolvers idealize rather than satisfice or optimize."
(ACKOFF, R.L. 1981: 21). The expression 'Man & World problem' is
close to the concept of 'image of man'. Authors of the excellent book
'Changing Images of Man' have used "image of man (or of humankind-in-
the-universe) to refer to the set of assumptions held about the human
being's origin, nature, abilities and characteristics, relationships
with others, and place in universe." (MARKLEY, O.W. and HARMAN, W.W.
(eds.) 1982: 2). In our intentions 'Man & World problem' refers to
the confused and fuzzy game among Man, Nature, and Society. The es-
sence of this problem is, how can we locate Man into Nature and how
can we locate Man into Society?
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In every historical period of human history there were some relevant
and effective belief systems of mankind, consequently there were dif-
ferent interactions among different possible worlds and the real world.
(See Figure 2). In our time the situation is the same. E. Laszlo's
characterisation of interexistent belief systems of present-day man-
kind is as follows: "the Christian vision of universal brotherhood
governed by man's love for God of all men and for his fellow human
beings. There is Judaism's historical vision of an elected people in
whom all the families of the earth are to be blessed. Islam has a
universal vision of an ultimate community of God, man, nature, and
society. Hinduism envisions matter as but the outward manifestation
of spirit and urges attunement to cosmic harmony through the varied
paths of yoga. Buddhism too, perceives all reality as interdependent,
and teaches man to achieve union with it through rejection of the
drives and desires of a separate ego. Confucianism finds supreme
harmony in disciplined and ordered human relationships, and Taoism
finds such harmony in nature and naturalness. The African tribal
religions conceive of a great community of living and the dead, to
which each person belongs unless he wilfully creates imbalances
between the seen and unseen forces in and around himself.
To those rejected religious beliefs and look instead to secular values
and ideals, liberal democracy offers a vision of a free society where
all may do as best suits their wishes and temperament, and where each
can find the best chances of happiness. Communism, in turn, proposes
the ideal of egalitarian society where there is no exploitation, and
where each receives benefits according to his true needs. (See Laszlo,
E. 1978: 29).
Different belief systems and different possible worlds are esseniially
incommensurable in themselves. We can transcend this incommensurabil-
ity when we reconstruct the dissolution the Man & World problem of
different belief systems. In this way we can confront them with each
other. We shall try to illustrate this inquiring of belief systems
by the example of two systems of economics.
Currently there are many different belief systems in the field of
economics, the Western, Socialist, Islamic, Buddhist, and Hindu
(Gandhist) economics. There are also different dicrections of Alter-
native economics, ecological economics, bio-economics on the one hand
and human economics, ecomomic ethics on the other hand. We think,
however, today the Western and the Buddhist economics represent the
two absolutely different economic belief systems.
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FIGURE 2: Different possible worlds and the real world.
Different dissolutions the Man & World problem of economic belief
systems are connected with the dimensions as follows:
(~) Man's attitude towards Nature;
(S) type of Man's consumption;
(y) relationship between Man and Society;
(0) ethical motive of Man's economic activity.
Dimensions (a) and (S) refer to the question, how can we locate Man
into Nature. This is the one side of the Man & World problem. Dimen-
sions (y) and (0) are connected with the other side of this problem,
how can we locate Man into Society.
Radical critics of Western economics have already discovered the latent
and tacit assumptions of Western economic thinking. E. Fromm wrote
that "The Great Promise of Unlimited Progress - the promise of domina-
tion of nature, of material abundance, of the greatest happiness for
the greatest number, and of unimpeded personal freedom - has sustained
the hopes and faith of the generations since the beginning of the in-
dustrial age". (See FROMM, E. 1976: 1). He has continued: "The
failure of the Great Promise, aside from industrialism's essential
economic contradictions, was built into the industrial system by its
two main psychological premisses: (1) that the aim of life is happi-
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ness, that is, maximum pleasure, defined as the satisfaction of any
desire or subjective need a person may feel (radical hedonism);
(2) that egotism, selfishness, and greed, as the system needs to gener-
ate them in order to function, lead to harmony and peace". It is a
well-known fact that the basic cause of western Man's destructive
attitude toward nature lies in Judeo-Christian traditions. From this
point of view Man is ordered to dominate and rule Nature, his mastery
over Nature is rightful, and Nature has no significance beyond that of
a quarry for exploitation by Man. (See EHRLICH, P.R. and EHRLICH, A.N.
1972: 351; SCHUMACHER, E.F. 1973: 93).
Based on the radical critics of Western economic thinking, we can con-
sider the dissolution of Western economics the Man & World problem as
follows:
w(a) aggressive attitude toward Nature, Man's domination over it;
W(S) hedonistic consumption;
W(y) individualism;
W(o) selfishness.
These basic features form a very closed and strongly interrelated
system. For example, 'Man's domination over Nature' is a necessary
condition of 'hedonistic consumption'.
E.F. Schumacher, in his well-known book 'Small is Beautiful' has pre-
sented an excellent summary of Buddhist economic thinking. Buddhist
economics accept the principle of non-violence toward Nature. From
the Buddhist point of view "men are men, and animals are animals, and
men are far the higher. But he does not deduce from this that man's
superiority gives him permission to illtreat or kill animals. It is
just the reverse. It is because man is so much higher than the animals
that he can and must observe towards animals the very greatest com-
passion, be good to them in every way he can". (See SCHUMACHER, E.F.
1973: 89). In Schumacher's opinion "Buddhist economics [ ..• J sees
the essence of civilisation not in a multiplication of wants but in the
purification of human character". (See SCHUMACHER, E.F. 1973: 46).
"The optimal pattern of consumption, producing a high degree of human
satisfaction by means of a relatively low rate of consumption, allows
people to live without great pressure and strain and to fulfil the
primary injunction of Buddhist teaching: 'Cease to do evil, try to
do good'. As physical resources are everywhere limited, people satis-
fying their needs by means of a modest use of resources are obviously
less likely to be at each other's throat than people depending upon a
high rate of use". (See SCHUMACHER, E.F. 1973: 48-49).
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Finally, the Buddhist way of economic activity tries to transcend the
egocentredness of economic actors and to consider the local communities
as superior units of people's economy. (See SCHUMACHER, E.F. 1973: 45
and 49).
According to Schumacher's reconstruction of Buddhist economics, we can
find the dissolution of Buddhist economic belief system the Man & World
problem as follows:
B(n) non-violent attitude toward Nature, Man's accommodation to it;
B(S) restricted consumption;
B(y) collectivism;
B(o) altruism.
Like in the case of Western economics, these basic features are also
interrelated. For example, if we accept the principle of non-violence,
then we must accept the 'restricted consumption' too.
Table 1 shows the different dissolutions of Western and Buddhist eco-
nomics the Man & World problem.
Western economics gives a radical anthropocentric approach to Man &
World problem while Buddhist economics presents a radical desanthro-
pocentric one. The basic value-choice of Western economics can be
expressed by the Latin concept 'homo mensura'. This means that Man
is a single measure of every entity of the World. The basic value-
choice of Buddhist economics can be summarized by the concept 'mensura
natura' (also in Latin). This means that Nature is a single measure
of every entity of the world. Dissolutions of Western and Buddhist
economics the Man & World problem are contrary to each other.
Gy. Lukacs, the famous marxist philosopher, has declared that there
are not any innocent world-view or belief systems. A certain belief
system cannot absolutely but partially transform the real world.
These real world transformations are destructive and/or constructive.
If a belief system destroys and/or develops a certain segment of
the real world, this is not indifferent for those people who live in
other belief systems, because only one real world exists. Different
possible worlds are interexistent through their interrelated real
world transformations.
Different dissolutions the Man & World problem are natural and nec-
essary. But it does not mean that we accept the doctrine of philo-
sophical relativism. We do not think that all belief systems are
equally right or equally false. In our opinion the healthy plurality
of belief systems and possible worlds means that all belief systems
and possible worlds which are able to satisfy certain basic value-
criteria have equal rights to being.
TA
BL
E
1:
W
es
te
rn
v
e
r
s
u
s
B
u
dd
hi
st
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
a
c
c
o
r
d
in
g
to
M
an
&
W
or
ld
pr
ob
le
m
W
es
te
rn
B
u
dd
hi
st
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
(et
)
M
an
's
a
tt
it
u
d
e
a
g
g
re
ss
iv
e
a
tt
it
u
d
e
n
o
n
-
v
io
le
n
t
a
tt
it
u
d
e
to
w
a
rd
N
at
u
re
to
w
a
rd
N
at
u
re
,
M
an
's
to
w
a
rd
N
at
u
re
,
M
an
's
do
m
in
at
io
n
o
v
e
r
it
a
c
c
o
m
m
o
da
ti
on
to
it
(13
)
ty
p
e
o
f
M
an
's
h
ed
o
n
is
ti
c
c
o
n
s
u
m
pt
io
n
r
e
s
tr
ic
te
d
c
o
n
s
u
m
pt
io
n
c
o
n
s
u
m
pt
io
n
(y
)
r
e
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
in
d
iv
id
u
al
is
m
c
o
ll
ec
ti
v
is
m
be
tw
ee
n
M
an
a
n
d
S
o
ci
et
y
(Q
)
e
th
ic
a
l
m
o
ti
ve
o
f
s
e
lf
is
h
n
e
ss
a
lt
ru
is
m
M
an
's
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
a
c
ti
v
it
y
~
82
We would like to propose two discriminational criteria to evaluate
belief systems and possible worlds. We think that a certain dissolu-
tion the Man & World problem must be human centered and must not be
counter-ecological. We are sure it would be indispensable that people
who live in different belief systems and possible worlds accept 'being
human centered' and 'being not counter-ecological' as absolute and un-
questionable values.
We think that the axiological and evaluational approach of belief
systems and possible worlds is right and fruitful. First of all, it
needs axiological studies which define the above-proposed fundamental
values, both conceptually and operationally. Secondly, it needs evalu-
ational studies which are complex evaluations of different belief
systems and possible worlds in themselves and in their past and future
changing processes. We think that the main features of the current
belief systems and possible worlds of humankind is not enough human
centered and/or is rather counter-ecological. We cannot imagine that
it would be possible to create or establish some new belief systems
and possible worlds for humankind. In our opinion, instead of this,
we need to try to transform or to change the current belief systems
and possible worlds of humankind toward their more human centered and
less counter-ecological versions.
How to dissolve these problems might be challenging for IIASA as well.
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RATIONALITY AND EQUIVALENT REDESCRIPTIONS
Douglas Maclean
Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University ofMaryland,
College Park, Maryland, USA
I
In an essay on risk perception, Kenneth Arrow writes: "The concept
of rationality has been basic to most economic analysis."l Arrow has a
specific conception of rationality in mind, a major implication of which
is the expected utility hypothesis. This hypothesis says that a ra-
tional individual assesses alternative choices in terms of expected
utility -- the aggregated, probability-weighted utilities of each al-
ternative's possible consequences -- and then chooses the alternative
that maximizes this amount.
The theory expressing this conception of rationality tradition-
ally has been regarded as both a theory that explains human behavior
and one that can help guide and correct it, a theory that is both pre-
dictive and normative. The history of the subject reflects strong rea-
sons why the theory of choice should have this dual character. As James
March points out, "For a variety of historical reasons, ... [w]hether
one considers ideas about choice in economics, psychology, political
science, sociology, or philosophy, behavioral and normative theories
have developed as a dialectic rather than as separate domains. ,,2
A normative theory of choice gains credibility from its predictive
and explanatory power, for although empirical success itself may not
constitute much of a normative argument, the theory of rational behavior
is less likely to be found objectionable if rationality turns out to be
widespread. The theory could then be interpreted as an idealization of
cornmon behavior. But if, on the other hand, the normative theory turns
out to be incompatible with the best established behavioral theory, then
the verification of the normative theory will depend entirely on the in-
trinsic plausibility of its axioms, and that appeal must be quite strong,
strong enough to make us overcome our charitable reluctance to conclude
that our actual behavior is systematically irrational.
I will argue that the conception of rationality that Arrow claims
to be basic to economics is on shaky ground. The normative status of
the utility axioms has never been entirely above suspicion, primarily
because these axioms generate some well-known paradoxes. They pre-
scribe certain choices, that is, which seem to fly in the face of
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intuition and common sense. Recently, moreover, the predictive claims
of utility theory have come under strong attack. Tversky, Kahneman,
and other psychologists have carefully studied actual choice behavior,
and their findings show rather conclusively that people violate the ex-
pected utility hypothesis frequently in systematic ways, and often in
quite simple choice situations. 3 People do not maximize expected utili-
ty; they do not act as if they were maximizing expected utility; and
when their deviant behavior in the light of the theory is explained to
them, most people stick to their choices and reject the axioms. 4 Ap-
parently, as Paul Samuelson once put it, most people choose to satisfy
their preferences and "le t the axioms satisfy themselves." S This re-
search opens the door for competing behavioral theories to explain risk
perception and decision making. From psychology we now have prospect
theory,6 and from anthropology a cultural theory,? both of them incom-
patible with expected utility theory and making plausible claims to
being predictively superior to it.
We appear to be at an interesting juncture in the historical dia-
lectic of theories of choice. The behavioral and the normative have
come apart.
II
If we assume that expected utility theory cannot draw support by
claiming explanatory or predictive powers, then the burden of proof is
squarely on the shoulders of those who defend the theory as a normative
account of rationality. The weak link in the theory is well known, so
I can describe it briefly. Then I will consider three attempts to de-
fend the theory and explain why they do not succeed.
The axioms of expected utility theory can be thought of as ex-
pressing three assumptions about rational preferences over risky pros-
pects. The first, completeness, says that all alternatives can be com-
pared and ordered. The second is a consistency assumption, which in-
cludes transitivity of preferences. Neither of these assumptions is
trivial, and I believe that the objections several philosophers have
made to completeness, which implies that a rational person cannot have
incommensurable values, especially deserve more attention than they
have received. 8
But all the attention has been focused on independence, the
third assumption. The importance of the independence assumption
(which is usually defined by more than one axiom, in Luce and Raiffa's
system, for example, by independence and substitutivity together)
can be expressed in different ways. It implies, for instance,
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that a rational person's preferences are strongly separable, in the
sense that if he is indifferent to any two outcomes or prospects, then
his preferences will not be affected when one is substituted for the
other in any decision problem. The assumption implies that all rede-
scriptions of a decision problem that preserve the same opportunity set
the same set of alternative choices over probabilities and outcomes
are equivalent and will not affect the ordering of a rational per-
son's preferences. Most generally, perhaps, the independence assump-
tion conceives of rationality as an orientation toward alternative
choices that is independent of the contexts in which the alternatives
present themselves.
The most famous paradox generated by the independence assumption
was first published by Maurice Allais in 1953. 9 It has been reproduced
in many variations. The following example of the paradox, I think, pre-
sents it in a way that shows most dramatically how the independence
assumption can conflict with common intuitions. lO It consists of two
choices involving Russian roulette with a six-shooter. In the first
case, you are playing with four bullets in the chamber, and you are
asked how much you would pay to have one bullet removed. How much would
you pay, that is, to reduce your risk of dying by 1/6, from 2/3 to 1/2?
(Assume that you can leave no inheritance if you die.) In the second
choice situation, you are playing Russian roulette with two bullets in
the chamber, and you are asked how much you would pay to have them both
removed. How much would it be worth to you to eliminate altogether a
1/3 risk of dying?
Many people, including those of us who are skeptical about whether
expressions of willingness-to-pay in such cooked up examples mean any-
thing at all, nevertheless feel pretty confident that removing two bul-
lets and eliminating the risk is worth a lot more than removing just one
of four bullets and reducing the risk. But according to expected utili-
ty theory, we are being irrational if we feel this way. Surprisingly,
the independence assumption implies that we should be willing to pay
exactly the same in both cases, because they are equivalent. How would
somebody defend a rationality condition with such counter-intuitive im-
plications? How does the argument go? Let us see, as we turn now to
consider the first defense of the independence assumption and expected
utility theory.
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III
The first argument was originally produced by Howard Raiffa and has
been repeated recently by David Lewis. ll It claims that the two Russian
roulette cases can be shown to involve the same decision problem that
is, the same prospects or opportunity set -- in different contexts. Once
you see the problem separated from the different contexts (eliminating
the "irrelevant alternatives"), you will see the equivalence and be for-
ced to bring your preferences in line, by agreeing that you should pay
the same amount to remove, in the one case, one bullet, and in the other
case, two.
Thus, we can redescribe the cases in the following manner, without
changing the overall prospects. Think of both Russian roulette games as
being played with two six-shooters, not one, which will be fired success-
ively. (Make the time interval between firings short enough so as not
to introduce different anxiety or dread factors.) The chamber of the
first six-shooter contains either no bullets or three. You have no con-
trol over this. We can think of this six-shooter as giving us the con-
text of our decision problem, for it determines an element of risk that
is outside the scope of alternative choices. The second revolver has two
bullets in the chamber, and you must decide how much you would pay, if
you survive the first stage of the game, to remove the two bullets.
The defense of independence now takes the following form. It should
make no difference to you whether you make your decision before the first
trigger is pulled or afterward. Whether that revolver has three bullets
or none in its chamber, therefore, should not influence your choice.
But if there are three bullets, the problem is identical to the first
case (you are paying to reduce a 2/3 risk of death to 1/2), while if
there are no bullets, it is identical to the second (you are paying to
remove a 1/3 risk of death). Hence it is rational to regard them as the
same problem.
Now, I do not find this argument at all convincing. To be sure,
your overall prospects of survival are unaffected by the timing of your
choice, but the appropriate description of your decision can change.
One perspective opens up the possibility of acting to remove the risk,
a possibility that is unavailable from the other choice perspectives.
These possibilities, moreover, are relevant to some reasons for acting
or choosing, though not, of course, to other reasons. For example,
they do not affect the reasons that derive from our interest in sur-
viving (or, in purely monetary versions of the example, from our interest
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in wealth), but they are relevant to how we explain ourselves to others
and to the justification of their judgments of us. Where the risk in-
volves a loss of something other than life, these perspective-relative
differences are also important in determining the feelings of regret,
elation, disappointment, and so on, that we can expect to have afterwards.
It would be unreasonable to ignore any of these factors. In such ways,
therefore, the context or perspective of choice partly determines the
nature of our acts.
The presence of the first six-shooter in the redescription of the
decision problem might serve to remind us that even if we remove a
particular risk, we can never remove our risks altogether. Whenever
we decide to pay to remove two bullets, other guns might, for all we
know, be pointed at our heads. For that matter, I might survive the
game only to be run over by a truck on my way home. These are risks,
to be sure, but for certain purposes they simply do not matter. We would
not be blamed, for instance, for suffering consequences like these. Nor
could we be held responsible for them. Our responsibilities and duties,
not to mention our reactions and feelings, do not exactly follow the con-
tours of overall changes in risk prospects, but they are central to our
reasons for acting and the reasons we give by way of explaining our-
selves.
If we are rational, then, we will often have to take into account
much more than overall prospects or expected utilities. Sometimes this
can lead us not to take up some more detached or context-independent
perspective on a problem but to appreciate instead the implications of
having the perspective we find ourselves naturally to have. Some re-
descriptions of a choice situation, then, although equivalent in the
sense of not altering the probabilities or outcomes, will nevertheless
have to be rejected for social or moral or even psychological reasons,
because they are inappropriate or they distort the problem.
Whether we are winning or losing can be more important than where
we end up. I might gain a windfall and then gamble it away; or I might
have my wallet stolen and then win back what I lost in the lottery. The
result is the same, but of course there is all the difference in the
world. The ordering of events will determine my own reactions, and it
will justify different judgments about me that others might make. Why
do men and women who have "made it" in capitalist societies so fre-
quently continue to drive themselves hard well into old age? It seems
reasonable to suppose that they have discovered that winning can be
much more satisfying than wealth.
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Perspective is also a determinant of responsibility. What might
be good reasons to want something to happen may not provide a person
with a good reason to act to bring it about. Thus, we might know that
the world would be a better place if some person were dead and that
killing him is the only likely way to make him dead soon, yet knowing
this does not necessarily give any of us a good reason to kill him.
This shows how reasons can change with the mere shifting of perspec-
tive, a shift that does not alter anything about what economists call
"the opportunity set."
One of the paradoxes of deterrence also trades on this shift. We
would, of course, most prefer worlds where deterrence is not necessary,
but next best are the worlds where deterrence works. So we might all
have reasons to want among us a credible threatener, and this could mean
that we need a person who is known to be morally unscrupulous, who will
carry out punishment even when no good can come of it. But though all
of us might endorse such reasoning in the abstract, or from a detached
perspective, none of us might be able to apply it, because our reasons
for acting do not permit the cultivation of an amoral character. This
paradox of deterrence is generated by the inability of either perspec-
tive rationally to dominate the other. Examples like these, which show
the importance of shifting perspectives, merely illustrate a point made
by Tversky and Kahneman, that "the adoption of a decision frame is an
ethically significant act. ,,12
The argument for the independence assumption amounts to identify-
ing rationality with a detached point of view, one that sees things
sub specie aeternatatis. It looks at choices in a timeless and context-
less way. Detachment often begets greater wisdom and knowledge, of
course, but we cannot entirely identify rationality with that point of
view. We have our own reactions also to consider, and our relation-
ships to others and to their judgments. We have our moral responsi-
bilities, and most important, we have to be able to identify ourselves
with our choices. A complete account of rationality, then, will not
be the same as a detached one, for as the philosopher Thomas Nagel
observes, "Each of us is not only an objective self, but a particular
person with a particular perspective; we act in the world with that
perspective, and not only from the point of view of a detached will,
selecting and rejecting world-states.,,13
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IV
The second argument defends the independence assumption by drawing
analogies to logical extensionality and to visual perception. Arrow
claims, "A fundamental element of rationality, so elementary that we
hardly notice it is, in logicians' language, its extensionality.,,14 His
explanation of how rationality is extensional is, unfortunately, quite
brief. He says only that rational choice "depends on the opportunity
set from which the choice is made, independently of how that set is
described. ,,15 Tversky and Kahneman, who demonstrate how the framing of
choices determines preferences, suggest a similar analogy to visual per-
spective. They write: "Veridical perception requires that the perceived
relative height of two neighboring mountains, say, should not reverse
with changes of vantage point. Similarly, rational choice requires that
preferences between options should not reverse with changes of frame.,,16
References to opportunity sets and analogies to vision notwithstand-
ing, it is not at all clear what it means to compare rationality with
veridical perception or to call it extensional. Mountains exist inde-
pendently of viewers, and the truth about relative mountain heights can
be ascertained independently of perceptions and vantage points. Thus,
the truth of 'A is taller than B' is logically independent of the truth
of sentences like '5 believes that A is taller than B' or 'From this
perspective it appears that A is taller than B.' In these latter sen-
tences, 'A is taller than B' appears in non-extensional contexts, i.e.,
contexts in which the substitution of logically equivalent proposi-
tions is not truth-preserving. The criterion for veridical perception,
therefore, is that 'It appears that A is taller than B' is true only if
A is taller than B. Mountains, that is to say, have an extension that
is independent of and determines the truth of viewers' perceptions of
their heights.
How are we supposed to apply this analogy to rational choice?
Should we say, perhaps, that a preference for A over B is rational only
if, in some sense that is objective and independent of choosers, A is
better than B? That might make the analogy work, but decision theorists
tend to be fiercely agnostic about such normative judgments, opting in-
stead for preferential sovereignty. Besides, as our previous discus-
sion suggests, any satisfactory objective normative analysis of ra-
tionality would have to include contextual elements. So it looks like
this argument turns in a very small circle.
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What the extensionalists must have in mind is something like this.
Two different descriptions are extensionally equivalent or are descrip-
tions of the same problem if we can all agree upon reflection that they
describe the same set of choices. And, of course, if they do describe
the same choices, then rationality requires that we make the same de-
cision in each case. But we can only hope that arguments about ra-
tionality will result in such agreement; it cannot be assumed as the
basis of those arguments. The empirical data showing that most people
violate the independence assumption in systematic ways strongly suggest
that what counts as a redescription and what counts as changing the
problem is the central issue. By assuming independence, then, the ex-
tensionality argument for rationality begs the question.
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The third argument I will take up defends expected utility theory
by putting forward a ~odified account of it that attempts to avoid these
objections. 17 Instead of rejecting the familiar behavior that deviates
from expected utility theory, the strategy of this argument is to modify
the theory to model that behavior more closely. It gives up the assump-
tion that people do or ought to choose solely to maximize the expected
utility of outcomes, by adding an attribute to the utility function that
measures the regret or delight people feel in having made the choices
they made.
Regret theory, as this new-fangled decision theory is called, wea-
kens the independence assumption by limiting the possible equivalent
redescriptions of a decision problem. No longer is indifference assumed
to hold over the same expected outcomes. In the revised theory, it also
matters what one gains or loses, or what one gives up to get there. Re-
gret theory assumes people are made happy or sad not only by what they
receive, but also by the choices they make. This regret factor is
measured as the difference in utility between what a person gets as a
result of her choice and what she would have gotten, had she chosen
differently.
The primary motive behind regret theory is to modify utility theory
in order to make it a better behavioral or explanatory theory of human
choice. The appearance of regret theory serves to confirm March's ob-
servation about the historical dialectic between the behavioral and the
normative. As the empirical evidence against utility theory adds up,
the pressure to modify the theory is felt. Normative theories of
rational choice do not stand up well against our behavior. I do not
mean to suggest that regret theorists have all made a radical break
with tradition. They are modifying utility theory, not abandoning it.
Some regret theorists resist adopting regret theory as a normative
theory of choice. They maintain a certain skepticism about the be-
havior they are trying to model, calling it, for instance, "normal, if
not economically rational.,,18 They may not be willing to concede yet
that anything other than consequences ought to be a source of utility
or a reason for acting.
Regret theory is more interesting, however, if we also take it as
a normative theory of rationality. For one thing, it incorporates some
features of the context of choice, which I claim is a good thing to do.
Regret and delight are measured from the reference point of a decision
maker, which means that the perspective from which choices are made is,
to some extent at least, being taken into account. Moreover, regret
theory resolves some of the paradoxes of utility theory that directly
challenge the independence assumption, including Allais's paradox.
Nevertheless, regret theory does not fully succeed in the end, even as
a descriptive theory.
We can best see this by comparing regret theory with Tversky and
Kahneman's prospect theory. Prospect theory explains the pervasive and
systematic and, on expected utility theory, paradoxical -- features
of how people perceive risk and make decisions in a way that is incom-
patible with utility theory. Prospect theory makes three basic claims
about risk perception and the psychology of choice. One is about how
people assign decision weights or probabilities to risky prospects. We
will ignore that part of the theory here. The other two claims bear
directly on the role of context or perspective. First, people evaluate
prospects not in terms of assets or independently described consequences,
but as gains and losses, and they evaluate gains and losses differently.
They show risk aversion toward perceived gains and risk-seeking be-
havior to avoid losses. This is the part of prospect theory that re-
gret theory can model.
But prospect theory makes another claim, about the determination
of the neutral reference point from which gains and losses are measured.
A central claim of prospect theory is that the reference point is de-
termined not by the prospects but by how the prospects are framed or
described. Regret theory must assume that this point can be determined
by the prospects alone, and it usually assumes that the reference point
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is the decision maker's asset position at the time of choice. The fram-
ing phenomenon turns out to be an essential component of the psychology
of choice which cannot be captured by regret theory or, so far as I can
see, by any modificaiton of expected utility theory.
VI
Tversky and Kahneman are quite concerned about the framing that is
confirmed by their research, especially, as they claim, the ease with
which decision frames can be manipulated by alternative redescriptions
of a problem, causing people to take up different perspectives from which
they view gains and losses. This is why Tversky and Kahneman embrace
extensionality as a requirement of rationality. The arbitrariness of
decision frames, they believe, is a major source of preference rever-
sals and other sorts of irrational decisions.
It is undeniable that decision frames can often be manipulated, as
advertising and public relations experts are well aware. But I believe
we must be cautious about how we generalize about human thinking pro-
cesses from decision experiments carried on in the artificial settings
of psychological laboratories. In the real world, all sorts of factors
help to determine a person's perspective or decision frame, and many of
these factors might be defensible and non-arbitrary. One of the cen-
tral problems for decision theorists in the future, I would think, would
be to sort out differences in the framing phenomena and to ask which
heuristics, descriptions, and other factors that cause people to take
up the perspectives they do are reasonable, and which ones are arbi-
trary and manipulable. Making this distinction will help us understand
better the division between rational and nonrational decisions.
There is much work to be done, then, but I don't see this kind of
work coming out of the tradition of classical utility theory. I expect,
rather, that it is more likely to emerge from research into decision
making and risk perception that looks explicitly at the contextual de-
terminants of choice perspectives. This means looking further into the
nature and reasonableness of reactive attitudes, such as regret, dis-
appointment, and delight, but also looking more at the social determi-
nants of perspective, including shared meanings and values. We might
well expect, therefore, that the next breakthroughs in decision theory
will come from the social sciences that begin with the assumption that
contextual features determine a person's decision frame and what count
as reasons from that perspective, and that reasons are tied as much to
the concrete peculiarities of social values and social interactions as
to concepts like utility and asset positions.
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II. FRAMEWORKS FOR RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

INTRODUCTION
This section presents a group of papers that discuss existing for-
mal frameworks for rational decision making. Two of them are not avail-
able for the proceedings: a paper by James Vaupel on the classical
prescriptive framework, and a paper The program- and goal-oriented
approach to management: recent developments, perspectives and appli-
cations to urban planning practice by Victor Volkovich, Yuri Dubov
and Alexander Schepkin. The second paper would have been of particular
interest because it represents a specific formal framework for decision
making motivated by the culture of planning and developed mathematic-
ally by Glushkov, Pospelov, Irikov and others for over a decade. It
is markedly different from both the classical utility maximization
framework and the bounded rationality and satisficing framework. How-
ever, some brief comments on this framework are given in the paper by
Wierzbicki.
This group of papers was followed by a plenary discussion. The
main result of the discussion was the agreement that the different
axioms underlying the various formal frameworks of rationality are the
results of a holistic and intuitive abstraction of deeply rooted basic
values characterizing the various cultures. These should therefore be
re-examined and re-evaluated from a broader comparative perspective.
In other words, the very concept of rational action is not value-free
and must be re-interpreted as we move from one cultural setting to an-
other. The paradoxes that result from any formal framework for rati-
onal decision making fall into two groups. One group comprises the
paradoxes that point to deficiencies of the theory or axioms within a
given culture; the other group comprises the paradoxes that point to
inconsistencies in the basic values of the culture itself. From this
perspective, it becomes clear that the time is ripe for a much broader
investigation of the premises of rational decision making.
In the first paper in this group, Back from prospect theory to
utility theory, Raiffa makes a spirited defense of the framework of
expected utility maximization. Given its cultural background, the ex-
pected utility theory is one of the most advanced formal frameworks for
rational decision making. Thus to abandon it would be to write off a
large intellectual investment and we should think rather about the
possibilities for more sophisticated use and for constructive ways of
extending it, for example, by including the impact of context in some
more formal way. But if these possibilities turn out to be empty then
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abandon it we must. On the other hand, the discussions at the meeting
have shown that it would be sensible to abandon the concept of the
"normative" character of expected utility theory (a better word, sug-
gested by Raiffa, is "abstractive"). Since the axioms of any formal
framework are culturally conditioned, giving them a "normative" charac-
ter implies a strong value judgement indeed. For example, the axiom
of independence (of irrelevant alternatives, of reformulation, of con-
text) implies a very individualistic stance and would not fit comfort-
ably into Hindu culture, say, where categories of humankind and their
interdependencies predominate.
The paper by Wierzbicki, Negotiation and mediation in aonf~iats.
II: Piura~ rationa~ity and interactive decision processes, considers
the question of how we can expect agreements to be reached in cross-
cultural negotiations if the parties involved have widely differing
cultural and abstractive perceptions of rationality. A number of prin-
ciples, including the principle of limited knowledge and interactive
learning, and the principle of cultural respect, are put forward as
a means of dealing with this issue. An extended formal framework for
rational decision making (including some aspects of utility maximiza-
tion, bounded rationality and satisficing, and goal- and program-
oriented management) called the quasi-satisficing framework is also
proposed.
Discussions about this paper at the meeting centered on the issue
of conflict escalation in repetitive games with multiequilibria out-
comes. Here quasi-satisficing selections of these equilibria made by
players guided by adaptively formed aspiration levels may be incom-
patible with each other, leading to conflict escalation.
The paper On the structure, stabi~ization and accuracy of decision
processes by Tietz describes recent developments in the behaviorally-
oriented, bounded rationality and satisficing framework. The paper
analyzes a decision process, stressing the roles of goal- and aspira-
tion-setting, satisficing behavior in the selection of decision rules
and the stability aspects of such processes, and finally turns to the
question of accuracy in aspiration-based decision theory.
Some of the concepts discussed in this paper were drawn on in
later parts of the meeting, particularly in the interactive decision
support and experimental sessions.
The paper Uses of experimenta~ games by Rapoport discusses the
intricacies of the "social traps" that can result from certain variants
of simple two-person games. The analysis of such social traps shows
that formalized individualistic minimizing rationality cannot be de-
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fended in any situation more complex than a zero-sum game; formalized
collective rationality gives quite different, and typically superior,
prescriptions of behavior in such situations. Several games (such as
Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, Top-dog - Underdog, and even some appar-
ently conflict-free games) illustrate the differences between forma-
lized individualistic and collective rationalities. Experimental
results show that on average about 50% of players are "individualists",
who would exploit the other side's cooperative behavior, and about 50%
are "collectivists", who would nevertheless try to cooperate. This is
true even for players who come from cultures generally regarded as in-
dividualistic. A specific "non-naive" cooperative strategy with swift
retaliations for noncooperation (called "Tit-for-tat" and devised
earlier by Rapoport for repetitive Prisoner's Dilemma games) has proven
to be very successful in many experiments, including computer tourna-
ments. It succeeds, not because it can beat a consciously noncoopera-
tive strategy, but because noncooperative strategies lose more by beat-
ing each other. From several such examples, Rapoport suggests that
experimental games may have a high educational value by illuminating
the possible consequences of individualistic and collectivist attitudes
in situations that involve social traps.
For instance, in the discussions it became apparent that the prin-
ciple of "strength through weakness" that emerges from these repetitive
experimental games comes close to a basic principle that is recognized
as evolutionarily advantageous in most societies: the best self-serv-
ing behavior in the long term is "non-naive" altruism. This principle,
though common knowledge in everyday life, seems to have got squeezed
out of international relations. Many participants were in favor of
somehow putting it back in again.
M. Thompson
A. Wierzbicki
BACK FROM PROSPECT THEORY TO UTILITY THEORY
Howard Raiffa
Littauer Center, J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
The Empirical Reality: What to Do About It?
People, both smart and dumb, often do not behave the way normative
theorists say they should behave. But what is even more frustrating,
some (otherwise) smart people, who know how they should behave accord-
ing to some impeccably beautiful normative theory, like the maximiza-
tion of sUbjective expected utility (SED) -- you can clearly see my
biases -- nevertheless, do not always follow those guidelines.
Well, what should we do about this state of affairs if we want to
help people make better, wiser decisions? We can:
(a) Abandon the (normative) theory (heaven forbid!)
(b) Modify the theory.
(c) Apply the theory in a more sophisticated manner.
(d) Give therapy to deviators.
There are lots of researchers who gleefully want to do (a) and
(b). In this paper I shall concentrate on (c) and Cd). But some com-
mentators who have already heard what I am about to tell you have opined
that my suggestions for (c) really are tantamount to embracing (b) and
advocating (a). That's going too far!
Back in the 1950s when someone like Allais or Ellsberg concocted
an ingenious example that showed that people violated the fundamental
axioms of the SED theory, I exploited such observations. I argued that
if people, in making intuitive Choices, always satisfied the norms of
the SED theory, then there would be no raison d'etre for teaching people
how to choose wisely. Just do what comes naturally! The trouble is
that after I had my say, some misguided souls still did not see the
light. There are lots of people who fully understand the normative
ideas of SED analysis but who refuse to adopt these principles in their
own important decision making. In short what I am going to argue is
that in some cases some important psychological concerns of the decision
makers are inappropriately ignored and these concerns should be addres-
* I am indebted to my· colleague, Professor David Bell, for many insight-
ful comments that have been incorporated in this paper.
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sed openly. But also I am going to argue that sometimes therapy is the
appropriate remedy.
Some Examples Where Deviations Should Not be Tolerated
Many behavioral decision theorists that I know who really want to
abandon the SED theory would nevertheless join me in labelling certain
behavior really "irrational." The examples I have in mind have to do
mostly with the probabilistic side of the ledger. Let me illustrate a
few of these. There are gambler's fallacies: the dice are running hot
and I am now on a lucky streak; or, I better quit now while I am ahead
or the law of averages will catch up with me; or, a social bridge player
will graciously give up his or her hot seat to some forlorn player who
has been doing miserably. In such cases we invoke the wise observation
that "a die hath neither memory nor conscience." But it is not easy to
teach this lesson. A lot of people are swayed intellectually by such
rational interventions but emotionally they feel, deep down, that these
dice are in fact friendly or unfriendly.
Some other examples: SUbjects will often assign a higher probabil-
ity to the joint event (A and B) than to A alone, the so-called conjunc-
tion fallacy. Most serious observers agree, that's just an oversight
or error. There are loads of examples where there is confusion about
conditionality: p(AIB) is mistaken for P(BIA). An expert is asked for
an assessment of A given B, and he thinks about all those cases where A
prevails and reflects about what proportion are B's. We fail students
in exams for such behavior. We don't modify the theory. People forget
about base rates in assessing probabilities. People employ strange
heuristics in updating probabilities, like: How can you infer anything
about a population of 220 million from a random sample of 1000? We apply
educational therapy in such cases and we are sparse in g1v1ng recommen-
dations to those for whom the therapy does not take hold.
Some Examples Where Deviations are Sometimes Tolerated
But now let's move a bit towards a murkier area. Mr. Jones prefers
A to B, B to C, and insists that he prefers C to A -- an intransitivity.
Such actions can be rationalized. But should they be tolerated and
should normative theories be amended to accommodate such behavior?
Mrs. Smith prefers A to C, prefers B to C, but can not make up her mind
between A and B, and therefore chooses C. Mr. Henry prefers the freedom
to choose an alternative from the set ~,B} rather than from the set
~,B,C}. If one is worried about reversing oneself later on, we might
arbitrarily restrict one's later choices. These examples seem to con-
tradict the rational tenets of most willful-choice theories but by
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reconfiguring the consequences, by adding in effort of analysis and
search costs, such behavior can be accommodated in normative theories.
But the question is: how far should we go?
Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (K & T, henceforth) in their paper, "Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," brilliantly portray what's
wrong with the SEU theory as a descriptive or predictive theory. They
systematically codify behavioral departures from the normative SEU model.
I have replicated many of their experiments with my own students and I
obtain similar and sometimes even more dramatic departures from normative
theory.
At the Harvard Business School my colleagues and I train -- better
yet, we indoctrinate -- all students how to use the (prescriptive) the-
ory of utility to make managerial decisions. If our students were to
be subjects in the K & T experiments, then their responses, we believe,
would strongly depend on the setting of the experiment: if administered
in the course where they had been taught (brainwashed (?» utility the-
ory, they would not exhibit the inconsistencies of K & T subjects; if,
however, the experiment were slightly masked and it were given in a
course in marketing or finance, then we suspect that these very students
would be prey to the same inconsistencies as the K & T subjects. This
is a painful admission to make. It doesn't mean that we are wrong in
trying to influence our students how to think about risky choice, but
that we do not do a good enough job in getting them to think about fun-
damentals. We teach them to use utility theory in too mechanistic a
fashion and if they do not use the formalism they do not think hard
enough about their choices.
I now would like to discuss some informal attempts I have made to
get subjects to change their minds or to think more deeply about choices
they have made that are inconsistent with SEU theory. In some cases my
therapeutic interventions have convinced some of these subjects that
they have made choices that are not appropriate for their deeply held
basic feelings and they actually reverse some choices. In other cases,
all I succeed in doing is making some subjects uncomfortable. Who says
therapy is easy. In other cases, I conclude that the subjects are right
in registering so-called inconsistencies, and the theory is wrong or
that the theory is being applied in too gross and insensitive a manner.
Illustration 1
The subjects of the K & T experiments were Israelis and the payoffs
were in Israeli pounds. When I discuss these problems I'll talk about
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dollars instead. I am convinced that non-indoctrinated U.S. students
(with dollar payoffs) behave roughly the same.
K & T start out by contrasting behavior in two choice problems:
Problem 1: Choose between
$2500 with probability .33
A: $2400 with probability .66 B: $2400 for certain
$0 with probability .01
1.00
line means: of 72 subjects, 18% chose A over Band 82% chose
N = 72
(The last
B over A.)
Problem 2:
(18%)
Choose between
(82%)
$2500 with probability .33 $2400 with probability .34
C: $0 with probability .67 D: $0 with probability .66
1.00 1.00
N = 72 (83%) (17% )
Both problems involve the same payoffs: $0, $2400 and $2500. If
the subjects were to use utility theory -- which they did not -- then
there is no loss of generality if we let u($O) = 0, u($2500) =1 and
u($2400) = x where 0 < x < 1. It is not difficult to see that*:
if x < 33/34
if x > 33/34
if x 33/34
then A.( Band
then A '7 Band
then A - Band
C < D
C >- D
C - D.
So we see that the majority choice of A~ B and C 7 D is inconsistent
wi th utility theory. Some would now say, "So much the worse for util-
ity theory." But wait! Now let us think hard about problem 1.
Most subjects I imagine choose B because with B that $2400 is
certain (and certainty is lovely if it involves a sure gain) and with
A they risk not getting that $2400; furthermore $2500 is so close to
$2400 that $2400 and $2500 are practically the same. In debriefing
sessions I might ask a sUbject: "What would happen if B were held fixed
and A were modified by pushing the upper prize up from $2500 to $2600
to $2700 ... to $3000 .,. to $4800 to ... " By doing this I would
want the subject to concentrate attention on the difference between
$2400 and $2500. I might ask: "Would you feel differently if in A you
had a choice between a prize of $2500 or a prize of $2400 plus a $100
* A -< B is read: "A is less preferred than B." And so on for> and
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gift certificate in a store you could designate?" The purpose of this
line of questioning is to focus attention on the difference between $2400
and $2500.
For those that would pick B over A I might ask: "Would you still
pick B if the probabilities in A were changed from (.33, .66, .01) to
(.333, .666, .001) or to (.3333, .6666, .0001)? Have you thought hard
enough about the probabilities .33 and .Ol?" By this line of question-
ing, I am not in any way arguing that it is wrong to choose B over A
but that first impulses should be checked when there is a certainty on
one side and an uncertainty on the other side.
I would continue my probing. Let's put in an urn 100 balls that
are all labelled with $2400 and let's suppose that 66 are green and 34
are orange. Imagine that you are going to pick one ball at random. Now
in problem 1 the question is whether you would be willing to relabel
those orange balls by adding $100 to 33 of them and sUbtracting $2400
from one of them. Certainly this choice should depend on the number of
orange balls, but should your choice in any way depend on the number of
green balls? If not, is not the essence of the problem the same to you
if we get rid of those green balls altogether? This line of attack is
designed to get you to think about what the essence of your choice prob-
lem really is.
Now let's go back to the urn with 34 orange balls, each labelled
$2400 and now let's label the 66 green balls with the value $0 instead
of $2400. Now we ask about modifications of the 34 orange balls. In
the choice between C and D you are asked whether you would be willing
to add $100 to 33 of the orange balls and subtract $2400 from 1 orange
ball. This is the exact same modification you were asked to consider
before but now the 66 green balls are labelled $0 instead of $2400. In
this case does the problem depend on the number of green balls? If not,
you can get rid of those distracting green balls as before and the es-
sence is: would you be willing to modify the 34 orange balls as proposed?
If we have an urn with 34 orange balls and some green balls, then
K & T have shown that it is important to most sUbjects to know something
about the number and prizes on the green balls in judging proposed mod-
ifications of the orange balls. That's strange. Why does this happen?
I think for some sUbjects it has to do with regret. Suppose you, the
reader, are the subject. If you choose C and get $0, then you do not
have much regret because D could also have yielded a $0 prize. Let's
examine this more closely. Suppose C were conducted with 33 orange
balls labelled $2500, one striped orange ball labelled $0 and 66 green
balls labelled $0. If now you drew the striped ball, you would know
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that the choice of D would have produced $2400. How would you feel
now?
A sUbject might respond, "When you offered me the choice between
C and D there were no colored balls. If I chose C and got a $O-ball I
would be unhappy but I would not feel regret. I suppose that I would
feel regret if you colored the balls and I happened to pick the striped
orange ball. But still not as much regret as if I got the $0 prize in
choice A."
I think that it is not unreasonable for a subject to worry ex ante
about the regret that he might feel ex post. That cognitive concern is
part of his reality. But, in my opinion, concern for regret is often
overdone. It becomes a dominating concern when it should often be only
of minor concern.
I would continue my probing. "In the choice of A in problem 1, you
say that you would feel terribly uncomfortable if you drew a $O-ball.
How serious is this concern? Would you be willing to pay $100 to mirac-
ulously eliminate this regret from your mind?" Let's say that for the
subject the stimulus [-$50 without regret] is of equal discomfort to
[$0 with the regret he would feel for having chosen A and obtained a
$O-ball]. Schematically he should be indifferent between the two choices:
-$50 without regret
$2500
$2400
.33
.66
.01$0 with regret.01
,.....__.3_3__ $2500
Jt- .;,;.6;,;;6__ $2400
A
How much should the subj ect be willing to pay ex ante to remove the
regret feeling if it arose ex post? The regret feeling if it arises ex
post is worth a penalty of $50. Hence the fair actuarial insurance
value is only .01 x $50 or $.50. So let's say he would pay $1 or even
$2 ex ante to make a contract with Mr. Fixit who can miraculously remove
all traces of regret in the subj ect I s mind should it arise ex post. Not
a big deal.
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Illustration 2
Let's push on. K & T next contrast the choices in problems 3 and
4.
Problem 3: Choose between
A:
$4000 with probability
$0 with probability
.80
.20
1.00
B: $3000 with certainty
N = 95 (20%)
Problem 4: Choose between
C: $4000 with probability .20
$0 with probability .80
1.00
N = 95 (65%)
D:
(80%)
$3000 with probability
$0 with probability
(35%)
.25
.75
1.00
If we implement C and D by considering 100 appropriately labelled
balls in each of two urns and if we then delete 75 balls labelled $0
that are common to the two urns, urn C would contain 20 balls labelled
$4000 and 5 labelled $0, and urn D would have 25 labelled $3000. Hence
we immediately see the essential equivalence of problems 3 and 4. The
problem to be understood here is why B was so compelling in problem 3
but D not so compelling in problem 4. As K & T illustrate, problem 4
can be depicted as in Fig. 1.
_.....;.;1/_4__ 3000
1/5
_"",;,;"",;,;--4000
3/4
'-----'--- 0
,-.....;.;4/....;;5__ 0
FIGURE 1 Problem 4.
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Now contrast the choice in Fig. 1 with the choice in Fig. 2
~ 0
~...;.;4/....;;5---4000
A
Problem 3
,.--~---------"
I B 3000\
I \
\
I
/
\ 1/5 0 /
\ /
'-------------
1/4
Start
FIGURE 2 Problem 4*.
Notice that the dotted sUbproblem in Fig.2 is just the problem stated
in problem 3.
Now suppose that you are like the majority of K & T sUbjects that
prefer B over A in problem 3 and Cover D in problem 4. Now I would
ask you about how you feel about being perched at the start of Fig.l or
at the start of Fig.2. The diagrams look different but if you choose
D in Fig.l and B in Fig.2 you will be exposed to the same probabilistic
payoffs; if you choose C in Fig.l and A in Fig.2 you also will be ex-
posed to the same probabilistic payoffs. If you do not quite feel sure
whether you would rather be perched at the start of Fig. I or 2, then how
much would you be willing to pay to go from your inferior to your supe-
rior starting position? We hope that on reflection you would agree
that the options in Fig.2 are just as desirable -- no more, no less
as in Fig.l. But now how should you choose in Fig.2? If you get to
node Y you have a choice of a certainty of $3000 (with choice B) and a
choice of an uncertain payoff (with choice A). If at Y you agree that
you prefer B, then should you not be willing at the start of Fig.2 to
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say, "I am willing to announce now that if chance leads me to a choice at
Y, I will choose B." If you so assert, you are saying that in problem
4 you prefer Dover C.
"But wait" you may say, "I chose B over A in problem 3 partly be-
cause with B I had a certainty of $3000. There was no uncertainty in-
volved. When you embed problem 3 in an uncertain context, as you do in
Fig.2, then I already am engaged in a gambling context. In that envi-
ronment with the realization that I am already gambling -- I evi-
dently want to shift from B to A."
This reasoning seems a bit strange to me but I assure you that if
you feel this way, you are not alone. I would continue my probing.
Suppose now you are perched at the start of Fig.2 but now we let the
probability of going from node X to node Y be p instead of 1/4. Should
your choice at node Y, if you arrive there, depend on p? When in prob-
lem 3 you had the choice of B or A, did you take into consideration the
peculiar set of chance events that led you to be offered that choice?
I think not. So on reflection would you not want to argue that your
choice of B versus A at node Y does not depend on p and that you would
be willing to announce this conditional choice at node X (assuming there
are no time lags), and that if you were to announce B over A in problem
3, you should also announce Dover C in problem 4?
Another way of forcing a subject to think more deeply about these
issues is to pose the problem this way. "Suppose that tomorrow one
student will be chosen at random from a pre-specified population and
given the choice in problem 3. You might be that student. Think about
what choice you would make if you were selected?"
In discussing this problem with the student the next day, I might
ask: "Did it make any difference to you in deciding between B and A in
problem 3 just how many students were in the pre-specified population?"
Most students respond that it did not even occur to them to worry
about that. In other words, in Fig.2 the probability at node X did not
enter into the consideration of their choice.
I have a confession to make: In experiments with ~y students, my
ingenious protestations did not always prove to be ingenious enough.
Yes, they were dazzled (and perhaps confused) but many remained uncon-
vinced; if the chips were down, they would behave just as before.
Illustration 3
I can be briefer with the next example offered by K & T.
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Problem 5: Choose between
$6000 with probability .45 $3000 with probability .90
A: $0 with probabili ty .55 B: $0 with probability .10
1.00 1.00
N = 66 (14%) (86%)
Problem 6: Choose between
c: $6000 with probability .001 D: $3000 with probability .002
$0 with probability .999 $0 with probability .998
1.000 1.000
N = 66 (73%) (27%)
After reducing both these problems to their essentials (i.e. by
getting rid of common balls), we see that the crux of these choice
problems is: Would you rather get ($3000 for certain) or get (a 50-50
lottery on $6000 or nothing). Stated this way risk-averse individuals
should prefer B over A and Dover C. Why, then do 73% of the subjects
choose Cover D? K & T state, "In this situation (problem 6) where
winning is possible but not probable, most people choose the prospect
that offers the larger gain." I concur, and I would not be surprised
if a majority of sUbjects would accept C even if the $6000 were re-
duced to $5000 or if the probability in option D were raised from .002
to .003.
What to do about this? First people have to learn that small prob-
abilities are treacherous. We suspect that there is a tendency for peo-
ple to think in the following terms: "The only way I can win with D is
to be extremely lucky. I just am not going to win unless it's my time
to be rewarded by Providence. And if it is my time, I might as well
get $6000 as $3000." This type of reasoning is somewhat mystical and
people just have to learn to guard against these fuzzy-minded tenden-
cies. I conj ure: "Don 1 t jump to conclusions with small probabilities
because it's easy to make stupid errors."
Illustration.4
The Reflection Effect
Now let's follow K & T and consider prospects where losses are
involved and where sUbjects flip-flop: they are risk-averse in the pos-
itive domain but risk-seeking in the negative domain.
The negative counterparts of problems 3 and 4 are exhibited on the
following page.
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Problem 3': Choose between
A:
-$4000 with probability
$0 with probability
.80
.20
1.00
B: -$3000 with certainty
N = 95 (92%) (8%)
Problem 4': Choose between
C:
-$4000 with probability .20
$0 with probability .80
1.00
D:
-$3000 with probability
$0 with probability
.25
.75
1.00
N = 95 (42%) (58%)
If in problem 4' we think of 2 urns, each with 100 appropriately
labelled balls, and then delete the common 75 balls labelled $0, then
we see the essential equivalence between the two problems.
Now let's look at problem 3' more closely. Suppose that you are
like 92% of the sUbjects and prefer A to B. Presumably this means that
if you were forced to take B and were then given the opportunity to im-
mediately switch to A, then you would want to make the switch. If you
had B in hand your asset position would be reduced by $3000. In this
case if you switch from B to A you are saying the following: from the
vantage point of being $3000 poorer, you would stake losing an additional
$1000 for a .2 chance of regaining that $3000 loss. Looked at this way
a lot of sUbjects, we believe, would have second thoughts about moving
from B to A. But still one can give many reasons why you might want to
go from B to A. For example, a loss of $3000 might mean that you cannot
buy that new car you've been saving for and a loss of $4000 instead of
$3000 just means a little more inconvenience. Or perhaps you might have
to explain a sizeable loss to your spouse or parent or companion and
it's just as embarrassing for you to account for a $3000 loss as a $4000
loss. Or perhaps with a loss of $3000 ~ou will have to borrow money
from a bank or friend and borrowing $3000 is almost as uncomfortable for
you as borrowing $4000. We can give other rationalizations why you
might want to switch from B to A but then in all these cases we think
that these reasons should also lead you to prefer Cover D in problem
4'. If a loss of $4000 is not so different to a loss of $3000 for
you, why take that added 5% chance of a loss by choice of Dover C?
Why do so many subjects choose A over B? Another example might
help illustrate the reasons. Three miners are trapped and are sure to
die (analog of B) unless a rescue attempt is made. A fourth miner
could attempt the rescue but the odds are 4 to I that all 4 will be
killed rather than all 4 will be rescued (analog of A). It's terrible
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to take a sure loss without fighting back. The decision for a rescue
attempt might be made even if the odds against were 9 to 1 rather than
a mere 4 to 1. Now contrast this situation with: three miners have a
1/4 chance of dying (analog of D) and a rescuer can reduce that chance
from 1/4 to 1/5 but he also runs a chance of losing his life in addition
(analog of C). The feeling now goes that as long as there is hope that
the miners will come out safely (with D) why stake the life of an addi-
tional person for a small decrease in the probability? Certainly from
the point of view of the decision maker who might be concerned about
his own accountability, as well as for the lives of the miners, there
would be great pressure on him to choose B over A and Cover D. Part
of the reason is the public pressure on the decision maker. In problem
3' how can he not do anything? If the fourth fellow also dies, at least
he tried. In problem 4' if he sends in that fourth fellow and he also
dies, he might be held accountable for risking another life needlessly;
if all 4 survive, then maybe the three would have survived without the
rescue attempt. So even if C results in a good outcome the decision
maker cannot take the full kudos -- unless in this last case it becomes
unambiguously clear ex post that the three miners would have definitely
been doomed without this noble intercession. It should be clear from
this discussion that this formulation of the problem brings in the no-
tion of ex ante concern for ex post accountability and it highlights the
notion of potential regret. Some of these features, but to a lesser
extent, are also involved in the K & T problems with monetary losses.
If accountability to others and regret are major concerns, then these
concerns should be recognized by incorporating them into the description
of the consequences. If that were done, then, for example, the $O-out-
come with choice A in problem 3' would be far different than the $0-
outcome with choice C in problem 4'. And in terms of these enriched
consequences a choice of A in 3' and D in 4' would not be inconsistent
with the (prescriptive) utility axioms. It should be noted, however,
that a decision maker, accountable to others, may resist formalizing
his own personal accountability and regret because that's not what a
courageous, noble decision maker should be thinking about. That deci-
sion maker might feel that these private thoughts are better left pri-
vate rather than brought out for pUblic display.
Fig.3 depicts the miners' problem. If p = 1, the analog is problem
3'; if P = .25, the analog is problem 4'.
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CHOICE
The trapped miners are
not in real danger
but it's
too late
but they
could be
saved
Attempt Rescue
Odie
(satisfaction
of trying)
4die
(regret for ex-
tra death but
satisfaction
of trying)
Odie
(elation!)
Do Not Attempt RflSCUe
Odie
(guilt for
not trying)
3die
(strong guilt
for not trying)
3die
(strong guilt
for not trying)
FIGURE 3 The problem of the miners.
The External and Internal Kibitzer
Imagine someone is doing a standard decision-tree type of analysis
in a marketing setting. Imagine that at the tip of the tree a typical
consequence can be described in terms of: a net cash flow, a good-will
loss (some unsatisfied customers), and a change of market share of a
few percent. Certainly an analysis that just considers the net cash
flow position (without even worrying about post-tax considerations) and
that ignores good-will and share of market would be naively inappropri-
ate. As a minimum the analysis should not only look at post-tax con-
cerns (especially if different outcomes will be taxed differently) but
impute an after-tax adjustment to account for goodwill loss and the
change of market share. That's standard fare.
Now let's change the problem. Suppose that at the tip of the tree
the consequence can be described by an (after-tax) monetary flow, x,
and by a stream of snide or congratulatory remarks by a kibitzer --
a business partner, a spouse, a righteous friend. Certainly if you
were the decision maker, stuck with this external kibitzer, you would
want to think of the whole consequence, and this includes what the ki-
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bitzer might say and keep on reminding you about. Just as in this pre-
vious example, you might want to adjust outcome x to reflect the role
of kibitzer.
But now what happens if the kibitzer is internalized? You are a
divided self. You know when you make your cboice, that you cannot pre-
vent yourself from having ex post regret, disappointment, elation, envy,
guilt, and so on. Shouldn't these cognitive concerns be treated just
like an external kibitzer? Actually it's sometimes easier to get rid
of the external kibitzer than the internal one. Well, I say, if it's
an important part of your reality, it should be part of the description
of your consequence.
Let me conclude with two observations. First, psychological con-
cerns can get out of hand; they can be pathological. A sUbject may need
therapy to get these concerns under control. Second, in formal analyses
we often ignore these cognitive concerns and assume that they do not
exist or are not appropriate to acknowledge. But then we may not want
to be led by such an analysis since it is abstracting too much away from
our reality. We could try to cost out these concerns. How much would
you be willing to pay to wave that magic wand that gets rid of that
regret or disappointment? I have found in a few cases that some sub-
jects who are bothered by regret (say) realize, after they confront it
openly, that they would not pay much to get rid of it. It looms large
because it is unattended. In these cases confrontation may become the
therapy.
If a researcher is trying to understand behavior, then there is
power in simplicity. You can explain almost anything ex post if you have
enough degrees of freedom to play with, and the introduction of regret,
disappointment, envy, elation, guilt, etc. would allow an empirical
observer to rationalize almost any behavior. But there would not be
much predictive power in such a descriptive theory. But the same ob-
servation does not apply in prescriptive applications. The analyst can
query the decision maker about what are his or her real concerns and if
these cognitive concerns loom large, they can be incorporated into the
analysis.
In a seminar I gave a skeptical analyst opined that she is worried
that she may regret that she has acknowledged her regret. That's a
good place to quit.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In many multi-actor decision situations the parties involved do not share the same
perception of rationality, the same basic values or the same information. This could be
because the actors come from different cultural backgrounds (Thompson, 1984). Yet
even quite culturally diverse actors can achieve agreement if they recognize their diver-
sity, are willing to learn and exchange information, and agree on the legitimacy of some
negotiation procedure or on some principles of fairness for use in mediation. These con-
cepts seem difficult to formalize; yet, as shown later, formalization or abstraction is an
important part of the cognition process, and thus necessary for a deeper understanding
of the problem.
This paper attempts to formalize these concepts by recogniZing the existence of
plural rationality, comparing several formal frameworks for rational decision making and
considering the possibility of combining them Work on the formalization of mediation
processes begun in the first part of this paper (Wierzbicki, 1983b) is continued.
2. PLURAL RATIONALITY
2.1. 1he roLe oj valu.e ju.dgment in dBcision a.naLysis
Following Weber (see, e.g., Weber, 1968), many decision theorists take it for granted
that any serious scientific analysis must be value-free - although any actions based on
this analysis are typically value-dependent. In order to better understand this apparent
paradox we must return to some reservations made by Weber himself. He admits that any
concept or assumption used in scientific analysis, and indeed the choice of subject itself,
might be infiuenced by value-judgments. However, he considers these reservations to be
minor. On the other hand, the development of the theory of cognition after Weber has
stressed the very basic dependence of concepts on language and thus on deeply rooted
cultural values. On this basis, it should not appear surprising that the very concept of
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rational behavior might be quite different in different cultures. Therefore, Weber's pos-
tulate of value-free science must be understood as a methodological ideal worth striving
for, but typically achieved to only a limited degree. These reservations, although not
really minor, do not imply a totally relativistic attitude; some values, such as global
responsibility, tolerance, the pursuit of truth, understanding, and learning are upheld
throughout the community of scientists. Therefore, our purpose should be to u.nder-
stand plural perceptions of rationality rather than to judge them
2.2. The dialectical triad oJ cognitive processes
Much attention has recently been paid to the distinction between the descriptive,
normative (a better word might be abstractive, see Raiffa, 1984) and prescriptive schools
of decision analysis. This is a very important distinction, since every process of human
cognition involves observation and description, then abstraction (in order to identify the
important features of the observed phenomenon), and finally prescription (in order to
test or utilize the acquired knowledge). Individual researchers attach different impor-
tance to these stages, some concentrating on abstraction, others on observation and
critical analysis, and yet others on tests and utilization. However, we could equally well
speak about passively empirical, theoretical, and actively empirical stages; most sciences
treat these three stages as iterative steps necessary for progress, in the sense of the
dialectical triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Examples abound: empirical
knowledge of the limited speed of light motivated Einstein to work on relativity theory,
and the theoretical understanding acquired in this way prompted not only observations
of the deflection of solar radiation by Mercury, but also many other experiments of an
even more active nature.
A mature science uses all these three stages of research. Therefore, we cannot use
this distinction as evidence of plural rationality - although it is true that a number of
perceptions of rationality with different emphases have been developed. As decision
analysis matures, however, we might expect these three stages of research to be
accepted as equals.
2.3. Several abstractive Jrameworks Jor rationality
When trying to classify various methods of rational decision making, we must first
distinguish between holistic and analytical ways of making a decision. The holistic
approach is based on the decision maker's reaction to the situation as a whole; it is not
necessary to identify elements or information before making the decision (Dreyfus,
1984). Purist decision theorists may question whelher such a method of decision making
is rational at all, since heuristic assumptions and intuition could playa significant role.
This leads us lo the question of what we mean by "rationality". A broad concept of this
type can be restricted by the development of mathematical theory that analyzes only
chosen aspects of the concept (e.g., catastrophe theory). However, such a restriction
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might be detrimental to the development of an applied science; hence, we prefer to use
the word 'rationality' in its broader, more conventional sense. A rational decision does
not have to be based on all the available information, nor does it have to be optimal. It
should only take into account the possible consequences of the decision and be intended
not to be detrimental to the interests of the decision maker. As a reasonable comprom-
ise, we can define various degrees of rationality: su.per-rationality (ability to deal with
the paradoxes of rationality), optimizing rationality, satisficing rationality, procedural
rationality (Dobell, 1984), and so on. Using this broader definition, an adaptively formed
decision rule or procedure can lead to quite rational decisions; the effectiveness of vari-
ous decision rules is a very interesting subject for study (Rapaport, 1984). Moreover, it
can be argued that most day-to-day decisions are made in a holistic way (Dreyfus, 1984)
and even that the holistic approach is often superior in the long run, as shown by com-
puter tournaments of repetitive prisoners' dilemma games.
However, decisions based on inadequate experience or involving new issues often
require an analytical approach to decision making, Le., a systematic evaluation of possi-
ble alternatives and related outcomes before making a decision. Several frameworks for
analytical decision making have been developed: very loosely and without implying any
value judgment, we can say that the utility maximization framework originated from a
study of ideal markets and Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' concept, while the satisficing
framework is based on a description of decision processes in large enterprises. Less well
known is the goal- and program-oriented action (management) framework (programno-
celovye upravlenye) developed in the USSR by Glushkov (t 972), Pospelov and Irikov
(t 976) and others from a study of planning decisions.
1he utility mruimization framework has the strongest theoretical and mathemati-
cal foundations, and is therefore widely accepted as a reasonable framework for analyti-
cal decision making. However, this framework leads to paradoxes both in theory and in
empirical testing. Some of the paradoxes imply that maximizing behavior cannot be con-
sistently rational in any non-zero-sum multi-actor situation. Others imply that one of
the cornerstones of utility theory, the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
cannot be justified either by empirical verification or by deeper analysis. Here we shall
consider only one of many possible arguments. The analytical approach to decision mak-
ing is typically adopted when a somewhat novel situation presents itself. Thus, the deci-
sion maker must first learn from the analysis, and we learn mostly by making mistakes or
by considering alternatives that are later classified as inferior. A decision maker may
therefore change his utility function after analyzing inferior alternatives; this process
could be considered a necessary element of analytical decision making, thus violating
the above axiom (which implicitly equates inferior with irrelevant). There are two ways
of incorporating this argument into utility theory. One is to say that the decision maker
has a potential utility function which he does not perceive at the beginning, but which
slowly reveals itself during the decision process. However, this leads to the question of
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how we know when the decision maker has learned enough to recognize his potential
utility function. The other way is to modify the axiom and to admit that the utility func-
tion is basically non-stationary, that it changes as the decision maker learns. This possi-
bility will be pursued further in subsequent sections.
The satisficing framework (Simon, 1958, and others) grew out of an empirical criti-
cism of the maximizing framework: most real decision makers (managers, engineers,
customers, etc.) do not actually optimize because they do not have the time or informa-
tion. Instead they form aspiration Levels that they try to achieve by making "good
enough" (satisficing) decisions. This framework also has some mathematical foundations,
ux:>stly oriented towards prescription. These include goal programming techniques
(Charnes and Cooper, 1977) and related theoretical developments such as the theory of
the displaced ideal (Zeleny, 1976). However, the mathematical foundations of this frame-
work have not been developed consistently, mostly because of the unclear nature of the
role played by optimization. The original criticism of optimization has lost some of its
strength with recent advances in computer technology and other fields. Ways of dealing
with uncertainty and lack of information have also been improved. Thus, optimization
can certainly be used as a tool to help people make decisions; the issue is whether it
should be used as a goal, as a description of human behavior.
Other things being equal, a decision maker would typically try to exceed an aspira-
tion level if this requires no additional effort and has no obvious disadvantages. He
might have a different attitude to maximization above and below his aspiration leveL but
he would still have some tendency towards maximization. Thus the assumption that
overachievement is generally undesirable (as accepted in such formal expressions of
satisficing behavior as goal programming) is not justified in practice.
On the other hand, the fact that people do form aspirations and use them to guide
their decisions has since been confirmed by extensive experimental and theoretical
research (see, e.g., Tietz, 1983). Therefore, we shall describe human decision-making
behavior as quasi-satisficing, by which we mean that the decision mafcer has a tendency
towards ma.:cimization, but might, for some good reason, lose this tendency after attain-
ing his (ad01Jtively formed) aspiration levels. This direction of research has been pur-
sued by the present author (Wierzbicki, 1980, 1982, 1983a,b, 1984a).
'[he program- and goal-oriented action (management) framework assumes that
some goals or programs (aspirations) have greater priority and must be reached; the
question is how to allocate or increase resources, overcome obstacles, and modify other
aspirations in order to achieve these high-priority goals. Although its mathematical for-
malization was largely developed in the Soviet Union, this framework is a good model of
the rational, purpose-oriented behavior of many groups throughout the world - for exam-
ple, social action groups in the United States (Umpleby. 1983). Formally, this framework
is not inconsistent with utility IIIIlximization (we could always use the high-priority goals
as constraints and maximize utility over the allocations of resources and efforts), but in
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actual fact it represents quite a different approach which is more closely related to
satisficing methods (suitably modified goal programming techniques could be used to
model goal- and program-oriented action). However, this framework can also be incor-
porated into the quasi-satisficing model if we assume that some aspirations are hierarch-
ically dominant and less adaptive than others.
2.4. Postulates oj plural rationality
If even the formal frameworks for decision making refiect different culturally-based
methodological perceptions of what is rational, how can we ever expect to reach agree-
ment in international negotiations? Evidently, there must be something more to reach-
ing agreement than we have considered so far. We shall try to capture the essence of
this additional factor in the form of four postulates oj plural rationality:
(a) '!he postulate oj limited k:nowledge and interactive learning. When negotiating,
one should never assume perfect knowledge or rational expectations; rather, one should
accept that one's own knowledge is limited, be humble about one's own ignorance, and be
prepared to learn interactively from others with the aim of establishing a commonly
acceptable information base. Any formalization of decision processes in a situation
involving plural rationality should stress the interactive learning aspect.
(b) '!he postulate oj cultural respect. Learning situations involving plural rational-
ity must be based on respect for the cultural values and perceptions of the other partici-
pants. In particular, any formalization of decision processes in such situation:; should
admit parallel interpretations in terms of the different perceptions of rationality of the
participants. Nobody should take his own perception of rationality for granted. For
example, the conunon holistic perception of the world as a zero-sum game ('if he wins, I
lose') and the mini-max perception of uncertainty ('prepare for the worst') can both lead
to a dangerous escalation of conflict in such situations.
(c) '!he postula.te oj legitimate organization. In situations involving plural rational-
ity, some agreement on the institutional or organizational aspects of a given situation is
a necessary prerequisite for obtaining mutually acceptable solutions. For example, if
one side in bilateral negotiations insists on a leading position (in the Stackelberg sense,
for instance) and the other side does not accept this, there is no chance of any agree-
ment. Thus, the organizational structure of any multi-actor situation should not be
taken for granted, but carefully specified and agreed upon.
(d) '!he postuLate oj Ja.ir mediation. If a mediator or mediating technique is to be
used in a situation involVing plural rationality, the principles of fairness on which such
mediation would be based should be carefully specified and agreed upon.
The role of these postulates will be illustrated later in the paper.
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3. TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS OF DECISION-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
A unified framework based on the assumption of quasi-satisficing behavior has
already been introduced in earlier papers by the present author. Here we present a sum-
mary of earlier findings and some new results that stress the usefulness of such a frame-
work in plural rationality situations.
As is usual in analytical decision theory, we assume that two spaces are given: the
space of decisions (actions, alternatives) denoted here by Ez ' and the space of outcomes
(objectives, attributes) denoted by Eq . Both spaces are assumed to be normed, although
not necessarily finite-dimensional, since we could include objectives which change over
time or probability distributions. The set of admissible decisions ~ C Ez may be defined
by listing its elements (discrete alternatives), by implicit relations (constraints in
mathematical programming) or by some other means. A completely specified though not
necessarily deterministic mapping J : Ez -> Eq is assumed to be given. This mapping
defines the set of attainable outcomes Qo =J (Xo ) cEq. The essence of analytical deci-
sion theory is to find ways of selecting decisions that correspond to specific desirable
outcomes q E Qo .
To do this, we assume that the elements of the space Eq have a partial preordering ~
which has some natural interpretation (in terms of increasing gains, decreasing losses,
improving quality, etc.). In most cases, the space Eq can be defined such that the partial
preordering can be represented by means of a positive (closed, convex, proper) cone
DCEq :
q'~ q' ¢:::;> q' - q" ED. (1)
We could strengthen the preordering relation by defining q"<. q' as
q' - q" E: D=D\ (D n -D), or strengthen it even further by taking q'~< q' as
q'-q" EJ) =int D (if the cone D has an interior). We could also weaken the preordering
relation in various ways: for example, generaliZing the concept of proper efficiency
(Geoffrion, 1968), we could introduce an £-neighborhood Dc =!q EEq : dist(q,D) ~ £lI q lll of
D in Eq , and define q"~r: q' as q' -q" E D£, q"~ C q' as q' -q" E Dc = Dr:\ (Dr: n -Dr:) , and
q"..li. c q' as q' - q" E J) £ =int D£ (the cone D£ always has an interior for positive £ even if
D does not). If a decision maker is strictly satisficing (over-achievement is as bad as
under-achievement), then the concept of partial preordering is not needed and the dis-
lance or metric implied by the norm suffices: he would select the outcome that is closest
to an aspiration level q E Eq . However, if a decision maker wishes to maximize his objec-
tives (as in lhe utility framework) or at leasl has a tendency towards maximization (as in
the quasi-satisficing framework), the selected outcome q should be nondominaled (or
efficient), Le., belong to the set:
(2)
also consider the (larger) weakly nondominated set
and the (smaller) e-nondominated set
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For analytical purposes, we can
Qi: =!g E: Qo : Qo n (g + J)) =l/ll
Qoe =!gE:Qo: Qo n(g + De) =rflj·
Now, the utility framework assumes that the actual selection is made by maximizing
(over Qo ) a utility function u : Eq -. R1 which is given by the decision maker, and which
is not subject to any modification due to learning or changing context (this reservation,
though not usually made explicit in utility theory, is nevertheless implied by its axioms).
In contrast to this, the quasi-satisficing framework assumes that the selection is guided
by aspiration levels, ij E: Eq , which are established in the course of a learning process; a
plausible model for the development of aspiration levels might be
(3)
where qt is an observed (although not necessarily accepted) outcome and iit is the
aspiration leveL. Starting from an aspiration leveL ii, the actual choice is made, as in
the utility framework, by trying to maximize over outcomes q E: Qo a quasi-utility func-
tion (calLed an achievement function) s : Eq XEq -. R1 of the form s (q ,ij), which depends
erpLicitLy not only on the outcomes but also on the aspiration Levels.
The underlying axioms and properties of various achievement functions have already
been analyzed by the present author (Wierzbicki, 1982, 1983a, 1984a). In addition to the
requirement of order preservation or monotonicity (which results in the selection of
nondominated outcomes, as in utility theory), achievement functions should also have
the property of order representation:
!q E: Eq : s (q ,ii) "" OJ =Soq =ii + D, for all ii E: Eq (4)
or, since an order-representing function cannot be strictly monotonic (and thus could
have weakly nondominated outcomes as maxima), at least order appro:rimation: for some
1:>0
ii + Dc!q E: Eq : s (q ,ii) "" 0 I =Soq c ij + De' (5)
which is compatible with strict monotonicity and hence nondominated outcomes. The
property of order approximation reflects the fact that a decision maker typically
attaches different weights to over-achievement and under-achievement, and his quasi-
utility or achievement function is thus usually nondifferentiable at q =ii (although
differentiable approximations of achievement functions, obtained by modifying require-
ment (5), are also possible (Wierzbicki, 1984a)). However, the property of order appro:ri-
mation has an important theoretical consequence: if the aspiration Level is c-
nondominated. q e: Qoe, then the decision maker does not need to consider other out-
comes when mari.mizing an order-approzimating achwvement Junction s(q,ij), since
itlf mazimum. 01ler q e: Qo wilL be attained at q = ij (Wierzbicki, 1982). This is nol only a
121
constructive necessary condition for £-nondoroinance (which also holds for nonconvex
Qo)' but also implies that the decision maker has full control of e-nondominated out-
comes, Le., can select any of them merely by changing his aspiration levels without
modifying the achievement function. Thus. aspiration levels are sufficiently strong to
describe the dependence of the decision maker's preferences on context and learning.
If Eq = R" and D = R~, then a suitable form for an achievement function might be:
(6)
where X> 0 is a parameter related to the parameter £ used above. Ideally. a standard
aspiration-induced scaling of outcomes should be incorporated into (6):
(7)
where 'ii = ('ii l'· ... 'iii.· .. ''iin,) is a scaLing point - a utopia or ideal point composed of the
maxima of individual objectives. or any upper bound point accepted by thB decision
maker as a reference for forming aspirations (ih < 'iii implied). Achievement function
(7) has two important properties. First. the parameter X (more precisely. the value of
x(l .. -X-)) characterizes the weight or importance of average over-achievement com-
n -1
pared to the worst possible under-achievement on some standard scales. Second, the
standard scales are chosen to reflect the average weighting of the various outcomes
implied by the choice of the aspiration point compared to the scaling point. If the deci-
sion maker chooses a smaller value for 'iii - g, than for 'iii - gi' this means that he
prefers outcomes with 'iii - qi smaller than 'iii - qi' This is reflected by the weighting
coefficients 11 ('iii - gi) and 11 ('iii - gil' which should be interpreted as averages since
the function s(q.g) is nondifferentiable and they determine the direction in which its
points of nondifferentiability lie.
In the above sense, an achievement function can be interpreted as a rough approxi-
mation to any utility function. including nondifferentiable and nonstationary functions.
Operationally. information about the more specific properties of a utility function is con-
tained in the aspiration levels or their position relative to a scaling point.
Now we can consider the question: does the quasi-satisficing framework encompass
the different perceptions of rationality described in the previous section? We shall first
show that this framework is not incompatible with plural rationality postulates (a) and
(b).
This framework is in fact constructed to satisfy the postulate of limited knowled,ge
and interactive learning. Consider a decision situation in which several decision makers
decide La share some knowledge about the substantiv8 aspects of 8 problem. Suppose
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that this information includes a characterization of the sets of admissible decisions and
attainable outcomes; the space of outcomes might contain more than the actual out-
comes of concern and we do not need to assume, at this stage, that any information
about the ju.dgmental aspects of the problem is shared. With a formal, substantive model
of Xo ' J and Qo ' the decision maker can first define his own partial preordering (identi-
fying his outcomes of interest, deciding whether to maximize or minimize or even
satisfice them), possibly choosing a subspace of, or even enlarging, the space Eq . He
could then use a technical device based on the maximization of an achievement function
to obtain a nondominated outcome q and the decision x corresponding to any given
aspiration level q (Lewandowski and Grauer, 1982), In this way, he can learn about the
implications of various decisions, the properties of the nondominated boundary of the set
of attainable outcomes Qo ' and adjust his aspirations accordingly. He does not require
all the available information about the problem when first approaching it; he only needs
enough information to define his own outcome space with its preordering and his initial
aspirations. Any further information could be supplied by another decision maker (shar-
ing information), by experts, or by the substantive model itself.
In single-actor situations, this learning process can actually lead to a final decision.
Turning now to the postulate of cultural respect, we shall show that the quasi-
satisficing approach can be used by decision makers following any of the formal frame-
works for rational decision making described in the previous section.
Strict satisficing assumes that over-achievement is as undesirable as under-
achievement. However, since the partial preordering of the space of outcomes depends
only on the decision maker, he can choose a positive cone that contains only zero for any
outcome component that must be satisfied strictly. For all such components Qo = Qo'
and the requirements of order approximation (5) simply state that an achievement func-
tion should topologically approximate the norm of the outcome space. The form of such
an achievement function could be
(8)
which is a negative weighted sum of the L1 and L.. (Tchebyshev) norms; alternatively, we
could use separate variables and scaling factors for under- and over-achievement, thus
obtaining a variant of the goal programming technique. Thus, strict satisficing and goal
programming can both be regarded as special cases within the quasi-satisficing frame-
work.
The changing of aspirations in the quasi-satisficing framework leads to the following
proposition:
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Proposition 1. Assume that Qo eRn is such that (g + D) n Qo is bounded and convex Jor
any g ERn. Let q(g) = arg max s (q ,g) be uniquely determined, where s (q ,g) is a
qlEQ.
strictly order-preserving and order-approximating Junction Jor some f: > O. Consider a
process oj aspiration Jormation:
(9)
oo
where at .... 0, L: at = "". '!hen the process converges to gooE Qo with qUi..) = goo·
t=o
The proof (Wierzbicki, 1984b) is a modified version of quasi-gradient convergence
arguments. The proposition can be understood as stating that a decision maker following
the learning process (9) ends up by choosing a nondominated outcome and the
corresponding decision. A theorem with a similar interpretation but quite different
assumptions (consistent modification of preference cones) was given by Volkovich (see,
e.g., Volkovich, 1984).
The goal- and prograro-oriented action framework assumes the hierarchical domi-
nance of certain outcomes or aspiration components. We can always assume
Eq = Eql X Eq2 , where q 1 E Eq 1 denotes the (lexicographically) dominating outcomes and
q2 E Eq2 all other outcomes. Let gl be a goal in the space of dominating outcomes, and be
attainable if Qo n Q1 ~ rp, where Q1 = !q E Eq : q 1 = gil. and let D = D 1 X D2, where
D 1 = 101 cEq 1 , D 2 e Eq2 . Choose any strictly order-preserving and order-approximating
functions sl: Eql X Eql .... R1 and s2: Eq2 X Eq2 .... R1 ; from the argument given above, sl is
topologically equivalent to the norm of q 1 _gl in Eq I. Let p(q) denote the indicator func-
tion of the set Q1 (equal to 1 if ij1 = q 1, and 0 otherwise). Then the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 2. If the goal ij1 from the pair (gl,ij2) E Eq is attainable, then
If, additionally, (gl,q2) E QOE , then
(gl,g2) E Arg max (sl(q 1,ij1) + P(q)'s2(q2,g2)) .
qlEQ.
Ifq1 is not attainable ands 1(ql,gl) = _ll q 1_ij 1I1, then
Arg max (sl(ql,gl) + P(q)'S2(q2,g2)) eArg min II q 1_ g111.
qe:Q. qlEQ.
(10a)
( lOb)
(lOc)
The proof is elementary, being based on the properties of achievement functions given
above (Wierzbicki, 1984b). However, the function maximized in (10) is discontinuous
(this is generally the case for functions that scalarize lexicographical orderings). Thus,
for practical applications it might be useful to assume that goals gl have some nexibility
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and to use achievement functions either of the form s'(q ,g) = s l(q l,gl) + pos2(q2,g2) or
of a form similar to (7):
Here p is a small positive constant reflecting the importance of achieving aspirations ij2
relative to aspirations gl. In both cases, however, goal- and program-oriented action can
be considered as lying within the quasi-satisficing framework.
The utility maximization framework could be analyzed in its original form. without
including the effects of learning, nonstationarity and the possible nondifferentiability of
the utility function. However, this can be considered as a special case of the following
more general situation: a decision maker has a utility function which might be
nondifferentiable and which he does not perfectly recognize; he might make mistakes
when comparing given alternatives; he might change his preferences in time; but he is
learning, and hence the nonstationarity and his mistakes vanish with time. The range of
these assumptions appears formidable, but recent results obtained by Yastrembski and
Michalevich (1980) and Ermoliev and Gaivoronski (1982) can be reformulated to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 3. Consider a sequence lu t ~t=o of utility functions, u L Eq -- R l , where
Eq cR", with one of the following properties: either
(a) u t (q) -. u (q) uniformly on Eq (uniform cardinal convergence), or
(b) de =sup lut(q) _ut+l(q)1 -- 0 (cardinal convergence), or
qE.t.t
(c) l1t -- 0, where:
(12a)
and
(12b)
(ordinal convergence).
Suppose that the utility functions u t are convex a.nd uniformly bounded on Eq , that
they are strictly monotonic but not necessarily differentiable, a.nd that, for all ij E: Eq ,
the sets (ij +D) n Qo are bounded and convex.
Suppose that the utility junctions chara.cterize a. ma.ximizing decision maker who is
aided by a modified qua.si-sa.tisficing framework in the following iterative procedure
(where s(q,ijt) represents the negative (Eu.clidean) norm -lI q _qtll):
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(i) given some iit. compute qt =q(qt) =arg max s(q,qt);
qEQ.
(ii) select a vector t;t from the uniform distribution on the unit cube in R" ;
(iii)select a vector t from the uniform distribution on the unit ball in R" ;
(iv) present alternatives iit = qt + att:' and qt = iit + fJt~ . qt = iit - fJt~ to the decision
maker for comparison. If u f (qt) > u t (iit ). then qt +l = qt ; if u t01t ) > u t (iit ). then
qf+l =qt ; in both cases return to step (i). setting t:t +1. If neither of the aLterna-
tives is preferred. return to step (ii) without increasing t.
1/. additionally. the coefficients at and fJt satisfy the foLLowing conditions:
(1) at .... O.fJt .... O.fJt/at .... 0. I;fJt =00;
t=o
(2) if (b). then del fJ t 0 ;
(3) if (c). then I:J.tl fJt 0 ;
then u(qt) .... max u(q) in case (a). ut(qt) - max ut(q) .... 0 in case (b). and
qEQ. qEQ.
}n! II q _qtll .... O. where Yt = Iq E Qo : u t (q) ~ u t (q) for all q EQo l. in case (c).
qEY,
The proof of this proposition is a simple modification of the proof given by Ermoliev
and Gaivoronski (1982).
Clearly. if instead of a sequence fu t It=o we consider a fixed utility function u. the
theorem would hold with obvious simplifications. However. by considering a sequence of
utility functions. we allow the decision maker to make mistakes (interpreted as momen-
tary changes in his utility) and take into account the fact that he might learn as the ses-
sion proceeds. Requirements (b). (c) and (2), (3) specify only that he must learn in time
to suppress mistakes. i.e .• faster than the coefficients fJt of this procedure converge. The
coefficients at are needed only to deal with the possible nondifferentiability of the utility
function (if it is differentiable, we can take at = 0).
Proposition 3 has an important interpretation in the quasi-satisficing framework:
this framework can be used consistently by any decision maker following the principle
of utility marimization. and the aspiration levels iit are su.f!lcient (in. the form of a
sequence of achievement junctions s (q .iit ) ) to approximate any monotonic utility
junction. In fact, Proposition 3 could be modified by somewhat stronger requirements:
if the decision maker could specify the directions of change of his aspirations ("t that. on
average. belong to the subdifferential of his utility function. he could guide the changes
in his aspirations himself and not rely on random perturbations and pairwise comparis-
ons (in this case. more general classes of achievement functions could also be used).
Thus. we can say that the quasi-satisficing framework satisfies the postulate of cul-
tural respect. at least with regard to the three culturally-based formal frameworks for
rational decision making considered here.
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4. MULTI-ACTOR DECISION SITUATIONS IN A QUASI-SATISFICING FRAMEWORK
The postulate of legitimate organization means that a decision theorist should first
check what the actors in a decision situation consider to be a legitimate organization or
procedure in their case; he might suggest some models of such organizations, but should
not try to impose such an organization upon them. Many different types of legitimate
organizational structures are encountered in practice (see, e.g., Wierzbicki, 1983b).
many of them involving hierarchies. Hierarchical decision structures have not received
much attention as yet, although many specific problems have been investigated in con-
siderable detail - examples include the theory of single-objective hierarchical optimiza-
tion and control, (Findeisen et aI., 1980) and the theory of single-objective hierarchical
games (Germeer, 1976). The question is which of the analytical frameworks for rational
choice would be most suitable for an analysis of decision making in such organizations,
in particular negotiation and mediation processes in hierarchies. The results presented
above seem to indicate that the quasi-satisficing framework might be the best-adapted to
this purpose.
However, we shall limit our attention here to two basic types of nonhierarchical
multi-actor decision situations. One, typically analyzed in decision theory or the theory
of cooperative games, is the case of group decision making or concentrated decisions:
there are many actors, but either the nature of the problem or a legitimate agreement
require that the final decision should be joint. For example, when allocating shared
resources, there should be no possibility that the actors involved would try to implement
minority decisions. When developing a transportation system, the legitimacy of concen-
trated decisions depends upon the financing scheme and agreements: if the financing is
decentralized, actors could implement minority decisions, but they could also agree that
the only legitimate decisions are those made jointly. The other type of decision situation
we shall consider is concerned with distribu.ted decisions and is typically the subject of
game theory: each actor is legitimately entitled to implement his own decisions whether
the others agree or not. Even in this case, however, the actors may have di1Yerent
rights. If, for example, one actor has sufficient authority to assume the role of a leader
and the others accept the role of followers. a legitimate hierarchical organization
develops; however, we shall consider here only the case in which there is no legitimate
hierarchical structure.
Both concentrated and distributed decisions are important in international negotia-
tion and mediation: the first when reaching multilateral or bilateral agreements on joint
benefits, the second when avoiding confiict escalation through unilateral action. The
usefulness of the quasi-satisficing framework in both cases was demonstrated in the first
part of this paper (Wierzbicki. 1983a). If some actors adopt the strictly maximizing per-
ception of rationality and their model contains multiple noncooperative equilibria then
conflicts can escalate. In contrast, when choosing (quasi)-satisficing multiple game
equilibria it is possible to display constructive, hidden destructive, strictly maximizing
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or openly destructive behavior; only constructive choices can help to de-escalate
conflicts. while the others typically contribute to conflict escalation. These concepts
can be used to construct formal models of mediation processes for the de-escalation of
conflicts by unilateral action; similar concepts can be used for mediation in multilateral
agreements.
The postulate of fair mediation means that the proposed mediator should be
accepted as impartial by all parties involved. In order to achieve this. it is advisable to
specify in advance a set of principles of fairness which apply to a given case. The con-
cept of fairness has more of a historical and cultural meaning than an absolute interpre-
tation: something that is fair does not in principle Javor any side (althou.gh it might
have this effect) and is accepted as such by all sides. A particular rule for fair media-
tion. proposed first by Raiffa and then by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) for single-
objective games, was analyzed in the first part of this paper. Unlike most concepts of
cooperative game solutions. it can also be extended to multiobjective games. Here we
concentrate on the development of this mediation rule through the analysis of various
types of control coefficients.
4.1. Conflict coefficients in mu.ltiobjeetive optimization or cooperative games
Consider a decision situation with several outcomes which can be treated as maxim-
ized objectives. or a cooperative game in which the objectives of various players are to
be maximized; then Eq = R" and D = R:. Consider the bounds on the individual objec-
tives obtained by successive maximization of each objective separately:
The upper bound (utopia. ideal point) is then defined by:
q = (ql' ....q......q~) ; q. = q'<i) = max q.u>
" •• , , l~j~" '
and the lower bound (nadir point) by:
(13a)
(13b)
::: ¥ ::: :::
q = (ql· .. ··qi' .. ·'q") ~. = min q.(j) .
, l~j~,,' (13c)
If we lake tJ.qi = qi - iii as the scaling factor. we can deflne the Tchebyshev distance of
any outcome q e: Qg from the ideal point as follows:
(14a)
This distance is then minimized according to the Raiffa mediation rule:
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(l4b)
Now let us introduce a nonlinear transformation of this distance such that the result of
this transformation, c ='!(d), called the conflict coefficient, will be c = 0 if d = 0, c = 2 if
d =1, and c =1 if the nondominated set is contained in a hyperplane (Le., is linear), in
which case it is easy to show that d(Jrn. = (n-1)/n. This transformation makes the
conflict coefficient independent of the dimensionality of the outcome space:
c =r(d) =2d + n(n -2) d(d -1).
n -1
( 15)
(The idea of this nonlinear transformation was suggested by Tornasz Kreglewski.)
We have chosen the simplest quadratic function here. since the requirements do not
specify the transformation uniquely. We shall call c(J =t(d(J) the absolute conflict
coefficient for a given solution, and cCl\7l. = t(dCl\7l.) the minimum absolute conJIict
coefficient. The properties of the latter are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Let Eq =R", D =R~, and sets (ii + D) n Qo be bounded Jor aU ij E: Eq .
1hen cCl\7l. =0 iff qE: Qo' 0 S cCR71. S 1 if Qo is convez; cCR71. =1 if (;0 is contained in a
hyperplane; and 1 < cCl\7l. S 2 indicates that Qo is nonconvez.
The proof is elementary. Now consider some modifications of the concept of the
conflict coefficient. A lower relative conflict coefficient is obtained if we accept some
attainable aspiration point ij E: Qo as the status quo point and lower bound, and define the
relative bounds as
(l6a)
(l6b)
the scaling coefficients as tJ.q;, =ii;, (ij) - 9;, (ij) , and take
(l6c)
(l6d)
The minimum lower relative conflict coefficient has properties very similar to those
described in Proposition 4. However, the relative conflict cr can be much greater than 2,
thus indicating the possibility of conflict de-escalation. It might therefore be used by a
mediator when starting from any status quo point.
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Similarly, it is possible to define the upper relative conflict coefficient by accepting a
nonattainable but component-wise attainable aspiration point q E: q - R~ as an upper
bound.
4.2. Conflict coefficients in noncooperative games
When trying to characterize conflicts in noncooperative multi-equilibria games, it is
useful to introduce conflict coefficients corresponding to noncooperative (Nash) equili-
bria rather than to nondominated (Pareto) solutions. Let QN = J (N) be the image of the
set N of multiobjective Nash equilibria in the outcome space (Wierzbicki, 1983b) and
assume that each player selects his strategy by choosing some equilibrium from this set.
Typically, the resulting overall strategy is not an equilibrium strategy, and the
corresponding outcomes are much worse than expected. Take these outcomes as the
status quo point and lower bound, q, and define the relative bounds as in (16a), (l6b)
(substituting QN for Qo)' the scaling coefficients as described earlier, the relative dis-
tance and conflict coefficient as in (16c) and the minimum relative distance and conflict
coefficient as in (16d) (substituting QN for Qo )' Examples of conflict escalation given by
Wierzbicki (1983a) show that the value of the conflict coefficient can be much greater
than 2 because the disequilibrium point defined by the incompatible choices of equilibria
may be far from the Nash set. Such a numerical measure of conflict might be useful in
convincing players of the need for de-escalation.
The characterization of the point that results in the greatest possible conflict poses
an interesting theoretical question; one possible answer is to relate this point to openly
destructive choices of equilibria. Another open question is whether these destructive
choices are necessarily of Stackelberg type when adopted by all players. In a multiobjec-
live game, however. the definition of both deslructive and Slackelberg-type decisions
depends on the achievement or utility functions assumed by one player lo characlerize
lhe others; lhus the above theoretical questions could be studied more easily in single-
objective games with multiple eqUilibria.
5. CONCLUSIONS
While we cannot say that any analytical framework for rational decision making is
universal, the quasi-satisficing framework discussed here represents a first step in lhis
direction. This framework, laken logelher wilh the concepl of quasi-satisflcing selection
of game equilibria and the idea of a conflict coefficienl, can also be used lo increase our
underslanding of conflict escalation processes and lhus help us to prevent conflicl esca-
lation by mediation or negotiation.
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ON THE STRUCTURE, STABILIZAnON AND ACCURACY
OF THE DECISION PROCESS
Reinhard Tietz
University ofFrankfurt. Frankfurt, FRG
1. LIMITED RATIONAL DECISION MAKING BASED ON ASPIRATION LEVELS
For an improvement of human relations within and between nations
a better understanding of interactive human decision making is needed.
In economic research concerned with decision making there are two
contrasting approaches: the classical theory of the absolute rational
decision maker, who maximizes his utility function, and the behavior
oriented theory of the limited rational decision maker, who searches
for a satisfying alternative.
Both theories have their own domain of application. The first, as
a static theory, has a simple structure, but a complicated evaluation
part reduces the applicability in differentiated situations. The se-
cond theory has simple evaluation rules but, as a dynamic process
theory, it has a complicated structure that makes case-specific modi-
fications necessary. The first theory has a unique solution concept
and allows a manifoldness of utility assessments. In addition to that
evaluation manifoldness, the second theory allows a manifoldness of
solution processes. This point of view takes into account the limita-
tions of the human abilities to perceive, to memorize, and to compute
information.
The human limitations limit the scope of applicability of theo-
ries t.hat assume strict rational behavior. If there are many decision
alternatives with many characterizing dimensions, the decision situa-
tion is too complex for a maximizable utility function to be estab-
lished. Only when the complexity is reduced by neglection of some
aspects does the decision problem become soluble. This step of simpli-
fication is not a part of the traditional maximization theory but has
to be made outside this theory. A realistic descriptive theory of
decision making, however, should include rules of simplification.
A realistic theory that describes each single step of the decision
process of limited rational decision making is of interest for explana-
tion of observed behavior and for the prognosis of future behavior. In
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addition, a realistic theory delivers the interfaces for methods of
decision support, which will be the more successful the more they use
natural points of the decision process as interfaces to the human
thinking. Since aspiration levels are used as such a tool in multi-
criteria decision support systems (WIERZBICKI 1984), it may be useful
to consider aspiration-oriented decision making also under behavioral
aspects (cf. TIETZ 1983b).
An important step of simplification is the use of an aspiration
grid which divides the continuous decision space into a few aspiration
ranges. For such an aspiration grid only few discrete aspiration le-
vels for potential situations have to be formed. The aspiration levels
may serve as operational subgoals. They may be ordered in the direc-
tion of preference. Since in most decision situations a goal is the
more difficult to attain the more preferable it is, the attainability
direction is opposed to the preference direction. The difference be-
tween two adjacent aspiration levels varies with the attainability of
the upper one (TIETZ 1975, pp. 47 f.).
The exploration of the process of human decision making is the
more successful the more steps of the decision process are revealed
and can be observed. This is the case in bargaining situations in
which the i n t r a personal decision process has to be interrupted
by phases of i n t e r personal communication. Since the bilateral
negotiation is one of the simplest interpersonal relations it is
often used as an experimental paradigm. The progress of the theory
of bargaining, seen as an aspiration-oriented decision process, is
based on bilateral negotiation experiments (SAUERMANN 1972, 1978;
TIETZ 1983a).
The decision process has a hierarchical structure. The result of
the decision process depends on the sequence in which criteria are
applied as "decision filters". This contrasts with the simultaneous
solution approach of the traditional decision theory. In addition,
the bargaining and decision variables may form a hierarchy by their
importance.
For the stability of human, economic, or political relations it
is of great importance that both sides see the bargaining results as
fair solutions of conflicting interests. Otherwise, often-changing
partnerships would result; this would reduce the general level of
trust and would increase the decision cost. The "aspiration balancing
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principle" is an important fairness principle for negotiations.
Agreements should allow each bargaining partner to reach nearly the
same aspiration level (TIETZ/BARTOS 1983).
In order to come to a fair agreement balanced in aspiration le-
vels, the negotiators have to follow fair decision rules already du-
ring the bargaining process. The "aspiration securing principle" is
such a decision rule. It postulates that a concession of the opponent
is rewarded by the negotiator only if the opponent guarantees or
"secures" to the negotiator as aspiration level at least as high as
the negotiator's last offer does to the opponent (TIETZ 1975, p. 51;
TIETZ/WEBER 1978, pp. 66 f.).
The comparison of the secured aspiration levels determines also
which negotiator starts the concession process. Because of the dis-
crete character of the aspiration levels, such rules result sometimes
in ambiguity. For a definite decision to be made, additional decision
filters, e.g., the comparison of "tactical reserves", have to be
tested. The coincidence of such filters determines the situational bar-
gaining strength of the first concession maker. The more filters se-
lect the same person as concession maker the weaker is his bargaining
position and the larger are the concessions he must make in order to
come to a fair agreement (TIETZ 1976).
2. DECISION MAKING AS A CYBERNETIC PROCESS
An attempt to generalize limited rational decision making as a
cybernetic process is presented in Fig. 1 (cf. TIETZ 1982; KIRSCH
1970171). The decision process can be seen as consisting of subpro-
cesses or phases which may overlap each other. The arrows stand for
forward influences and feedbacks, which occur also within subproces-
ses.
The goal formation process (G) leads to the formulation of goals
within an organization. It may result in the formation of aspiration
levels, which serve as operational subgoals. The phase of information
gathering and processing (I) includes the search for information rele-
vant to the decision. The information is condensed to causal models
of the environment. These "inner" models serve to build expectation
and to make conditional forecasts. In the planning process (P) the
decision maker searches for decision alternatives. The alternatives
are evaluated by the goal system, which may be simplified by the use
of aspiration levels.
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Fig. 1: The recursive decision process
G goal formation process
I information gathering and processing
P planning process
5 selection process
C control process
In the selection process (5) one or more favorable alternatives
are selected which fulfill certain criteria as given by aspiration
levels. Possibly, the selection process includes a coordination with
other decision makers by means of negotiations. As long as not exactly
one alternative remains after the selection process, feedbacks occur
to the proceeding phases G, I, or P, which have to narrow or to widen
the range of selection.
Finally, the control process (C), in which the level and the
degree of aspiration fulfilment are realized, influences the phases
G and I. For subsequent decisions, phase G adapts the goals and aspi-
ration levels and phase I improves the "inner" model.
After this short description of the phases of the decision pro-
cess, we may ask which parts we can identify in the classical decision
theory and which we are missing. First of all, feedbacks do not occur,
neither between nor within the subprocesses. No goal formation process
(G) is needed, since the goal variable is the utility, which is to be
maximized. If, in the extreme case, all the information is available,
no information processing is needed. However, there are some newer
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approaches regarding the search for information and its costs. From
the planning process only the evaluation part for utility assessment
remains. In addition, we may have the probability assessment, which is
made simultaneously for all alternatives. The selection part consists
of the calculation of the maximum of the utility function. The control
process we are missing entirely. There are extensions of the strict
rational theory with additional aspects (cf. e.g., LESOURNE 1977,
pp. 43 ff.). Nevertheless, the decision making itself does not become
a network of processes with feedbacks but at best has a linear sequen-
tial structure.
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DECISION PROCESS
Both extremes, the maximizing simultaneous approach and the satis-
fying process approach, have their domains in which they may be appli-
cable and appropriate. However, the reality of the decision process
may lie somewhere in between. An overview on possible influences on
its structure is given in Fig. 2.
The number and the organization of the decision makers (field 1)
influence the decision interdependence (2) and the objective complexi-
ty of the decision situation (5) with indefinite signs of the influence;
the simplest economic situations are, as everybody knows, the extreme
cases of monopoly and pure competition. The length and the variety of
chains of causal relations (3), which form the causal network and fi-
nally influence the outcome of the decision, have a positive influence
on the objective complexity (5). They also influence the relevant
volume of information (4). The irregularity of the former development
(6), positively influenced by (3), (4), and (5), influences, together
with (5), the uncertainty of expectations (8). The aspects (5), (6),
and (8) increase the subjectively perceived complexity of the decision
situation (9). The higher the problem-oriented cognitive capacity of
the decision maker (7), the more will this complexity be reduced. The
relative importance of the -decision problem (10), e.g., the proportion
between a purchase and the decision maker's income, has positive im-
pacts on the subjective complexity (9) and on the fineness of evalua-
tion on the preference scale (12). This fineness has to be the more
reduced the more the situation is perceived as complex (9) and the
less decision time is available (11).
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Whether decisions, especially in the information, planning, or
selection processes, are made more sequentially (15) or more simul-
taneously (16), depends on the subjective complexity (9), the avail-
able decision time (11), and the simplicity (13) and the number (14)
of decision criteria used. The degree of hierarchy of the decision
structure (17) is influenced by these variables. Finally, the needed
decision effort (18) depends on this degree and on (12), (13), and
( 14) •
Although simultaneous cognitive information processing (16) may
be seen as a type of sequential processing with many inner loops, the
distinction between simultaneous and sequential processing seems to be
appropriate. This view is based on the postulation that the results of
this "quasi-simultaneous" processing should be consistent and indepen-
dent of the chronological order of considerations. These qualities are
not postulated for a sequential processing in the sense of a limited
rational theory.
The order of the criteria applied during the decision process is
deduced from the task of corning to a solution with an appropriate
decision effort. Especially, in interpersonal relations, simple cri-
teria are used prior to more complicated ones for the reduction of
complexity; they need less computational effort and are better suited
to coordinate expectations of both sides, since they are more promi-
nent and more salient (SCHELLING 1960, pp. 53-80). The simpler the
criteria are, the less selective they are, the more of them are needed,
and the higher becomes therefore the degree of hierarchy of the deci-
sion structure.
The art of decision making may be seen in the ability to decom-
pose by simple rules a complex decision problem into simpler subpro-
blems and to establish an appropriate chronological hierarchy to
handle and to solve them. Rationalized decision making is a compromise
between simplification and accuracy.
4. THE STABILIZATION OF BEHAVIOR- AND DECISION-RULES
To develop a descriptive theory of limited rational decision
behavior, we have to consider the following aspects. Instead of the
unique rule of utility maximization there are many suboptimal rules
thinkable which could lead to satisfying results. To construct a
realistic theory we have to search for observable regularities of
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behavior. Regularity of behavior means that there exists an equili-
brium of behavior- and decision-rules. This concept may be subsumed
under a general idea of equilibrium in a modified definition:
A rule equilibrium is a situation in which the decision maker(s)
has (have) no reason to change his (their) rule(s).
There is no reason to change the rules as long as they have proved to
be good. The rule equilibrium is a prerequisite of a decision equili-
brium normally used in economic theory.
Besides simple decision rules, there may be rules which decide on
the application of other rules; thus we may distinguish lower- and
higher-order rule equilibria. It is more a philosophical question than
an observable fact, whether humans sometimes or always behave in such
a higher-order rule equilibrium. Independently of this question, a
prerequisite for testing a descriptive theory of a certain order is
that a rule equilibrium of at least the same order prevail in reality.
In other words, the possibility of observing or testing a theory or
parts of it depends on the degree of intensity and stabilization of a
behavior- or decision-rule (or of the whole decision process) used by
one or more decision makers (intra- or interpersonal degree).
The most important influences on this stabilization degree (1)
are shown in Fig. 3. They are:
(2) the degree of communication,
(3) the suitability of a behavior- or decision-rule
to coordinate expectations,
(4) the benefit of a rule, or the degree to which a
rule proved to be useful,
(5) the relevancy in the sense of a functional suitability,
(6) the strategic suitability,
(7) the fairness of the rule with respect to other
decision makers,
(8) the frequency of handling the decision problem before,
(9) the experience with the decision problem and with the other
decision makers,
(10) the stage of development and stabilization of the
"inner" model of the environment.
The more a decision rule is stabilized (1), the more it becomes a
habit (12), unless an important decision problem (11) is to be sOlved.
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An unexperienced decision maker has a flat frequency distribution
over the decision rules used for a certain topic. The distribution
becomes more and more concentrated on the most suitable rule during
the stabilization process (Fig. 4).
experienced d-m
decision
rules
unexperienced
d-m
most
suitable
decision
rule
Fig. 4: The frequency distribution of decision rules of
experienced and unexperienced decision makers
5. ON THE ACCURACY OF A DISCRETE BARGAINING THEORY
One possible simplification of complexity is the thinking in dis-
crete alternatives rather than in a continuum of possibilities. It is
an interesting question how accurate discrete theories may be if their
prediction misses the correct result by not more than the smallest
possible error. The smallest possible error depends on the point of
the decision process at which real behavior differs from theory. The
decision maker's ability and/or willingness to differentiate the deci-
sion situations varies within the decision process.
In the context of an aspiration-oriented bargaining and decision
theory the following steps of considerations may be helpful to formu-
late some hypotheses on the accuracy. These aspects can outline only
tendencies and are not yet implemented in a bargaining theory.
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(1) The average niveau of decision b
The average niveau (b) of the problem which is up for decision
influences the numeric accuracy in general. Although considering con-
stant relations between accuracy measures and the level of decisions,
we do not postulate an analogy to the law of WEBER/FECHNER (cf. e.g.,
LUCE/GALANTER 1963).
(2) The global decision area g
The global decision area is that area in which the decision maker
believes the solution can be found. This area is limited by the human
capacity of information processing. To limit this area is reasonable
behavior, too.
Assuming a constant relation between the area g and the niveau of
the decision b, one may write
g b
c
(5.1 a)
where c E Nand N is the set of natural numbers. The weaker formula-
tion
g=g(b, ... )
allows also for additional influences.
(3) The number of aspiration levels n
(5.1 b)
The number of aspiration levels of an aspiration grid, formed
during the planning phase of the decision process, is limited to
n(n EN). This follows from the limited human ability of imagination.
Before negotiations one cannot imagine more than about four or five
different situations with different behavioral consequences.
(4) The aspiration range r
The aspiration range (r) is the range between two adjacent aspi-
ration levels. Whereas the upper and the lower aspiration levels are
distinct points, the alternatives within the range are not distin-
guished by preference and attainability considerations made during the
planning phase. In addition, the decision maker is unable to project
too many different situations into the same range; we assume that his
ability is limited to the number dEN.
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Combining the foregoing points, we can write the average aspira-
tion range r as follows:
r = ~ for n > 1,1)
n-1 ' (5.2a)
or less accurately
r = r (g,n, ... ) (5.2b)
(5.3)(n-1) d + n = (n-1) (d+1) + 1 .
The number of distinguished situations within the global area g is
then
An additional limitation of the aspiration range is given by
attainability considerations (a). The closer two adjacent aspiration
levels are the more attainable the upper level is felt to be. Then the
individual aspiration range r amounts to:
r = a r (5.4)
with 0 s a s n-1
(5) The prominence standard p
The use of prominent numbers follows from the limited capacity
of memorizing and transfering information. The prominence principle,
first discussed by SCHELLING (1960), simplifies interpersonal and
intrapersonal communication. There are certain numbers, that, together
with their multiples, are used more often than others. These numbers,
which seem to be preferred by the decision maker as prominent, are
called prominence units. One can try to establish a prominence order
within a sample of observations (VIDMAJER 1977, TIETZ 1984). We may
define the prominence standard p as the most preferred prominence
unit. 2 )
One can assume that the prominence standard p is more or less
strongly connected with the aspiration range r through the number of
distinguished situations d:
(5.5a)
or p p(r,d, ... ) (5.5b)
1) n = 1 is equivalent to g = 0 and r = O. (5.1) would then not hold.
2) A more precise definition of p is given in TIETZ 1984.
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(6) The threshold of perceptibility ~
If two values differ not more than the threshold of perceptibi-
lity ~, the just-noticeable difference, they are regarded as equal:
x = y , if Ix-yl < ~ • (5.6)
The use of a threshold is not only suitable for the assumption of
limited human perceptional capacity (LUCE/GALANTER 1963), but also
serves simplification.
With regard to decision making it is reasonable to choose this
threshold as a prominent value. Thus one can write:
~ = ~' with kEN. 1) (5.7)
It is an interesting question, whether the following relation between
the threshold and the niveau of the decision can be found empirically
or
b
k· (d+1 ) (n-1 ) • c
1 -k p(r(g(b, ... ),n, ..• ),d, ... )
(5.8a)
(5.8b)
(7) The smallest possible error e and the accuracy f
Obviously, a theory predicting an aera is less accurate than a
point-predicting theory. But an area-predicting theory has a greater
chance to cover reality.
As an example of such an area theory, the aspiration balancing
principle of negotiation postulates agreements by which both partners
reach nearly the same aspiration level (cf. TIETZ/BARTOS 1983). That
means the difference is not greater than one aspiration range r. Thus,
the accuracy f amounts to
f = + r (5.9)
The smallest possible error which can be made within this theory would
occur when each partner's estimation of the opponent's reached aspira-
tion level deviates just by e = r. Thus, the accuracy regarding this
error amounts to
f
e
~ 2 r . (5.10)
1) In a wage negotiation experiment we found values of p = .5% and
~ = .05% wage increase, thus k = 10 follows. Cf. TIETZ 1975; 1978,
esp. footnote 15 on p. 439.
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An example of a point-predicting theory is the market-negotiation
theory of CROESSMANN (CROESSMANN/TIETZ 1983). This theory allows only
price concessions of 1, 2, or 3 price units. 1 ) Thus, one can conclude
that the prominence standard p is equal to one price unit. In this
process theory the aspiration levels of both bargaining partners are
compared already during negotiation according to the aspiration secur-
ing principle. The possible two consequences of the result of this
comparison are that the first counterconcessions are made with 1p or
2p.2) If at this point the negotiator in estimating the opponent's
secured aspiration level makes the smallest possible error of e = r,
then the final bargaining result will differ from the theory not by r,
but by p. The accuracy is then
f
e
± p • ( 5 . 11 )
These tentative considerations show that the judgment of the
accuracy of discrete theories has to be made with regard to the smal-
lest possible error. Besides a point-predicting theory, we need a
sequence of related theories, derived by taking into account the pos-
sible errors which could be made during the decision process. This
follows from the concept of limited rationality, since even goal-
oriented behavior is not always perfect.
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USES OF EXPERIMENTAL GAMES
Anatol Rapoport
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario. Canada
The distinction between a descriptive Dr predictive theory on the one hand and a pre-
scriptive or normative one on the other is sufficiently clear. Still there is a region
of overlap between them. Generally speaking, a descriptive theory deals with what
is and a prescriptive one with \/hat ought to be. But "ought" can be understood in
two senses: in terms of a value system and in terms of an idealized situation. Ques-
tions of value do not enter the realm of physical science. Nevertheless we can speak
of normati ve theories of physical phenomena in the sense of our expectations of what
we should observe under idealized conditions, such as in perfect vacuum, thermodynamic
equilibrium, etc. In fact, since physical theories consist for the most part of
mathematical models of physical phenomena, they are, strictly speaking, normative
theories, dealing with how things "ought" to behave under idealized conditions, rather
than with how they actually behave. What makes physical theory also descriptive (and
predictive) is the circumstance that the mathematical models are often very good
approximations to reality, so that "what is" turns out to be quite close to "what ought
to be."
In the social sciences, in spite of what proponents of "value free" science main-
tain, values are frequently incorporated into theory and to that extent theories become
normative. But even if values do not enter models of social phenomena explicitly, the
theories retain a strong normative component, because the idealizations (without which
no theory can be constructed) are usually considerably removed from reality. Des-
criptive theories in the social sciences are seldom based on models, and predictive
theories derive their predictive potential from inductive rather than deductive rea-
soning.
Such is the situation in decision theory. The distinction between a normative
and a descriptive (or predictive) decision theory is quite sharp. The values that
enter normative decision theory revolve around the concept of rationality and of
utility. Normative decision theory purports to prescribe to an actor how he is to
choose among a set of alternatives if utilities can be assigned to them and if he is
rational. A descriptive theory would purport to describe how actors actually choose
among al ternati ves in a given situation. An area of overlap between "what is" and
"what ought to be" would exist, if the existence of actors sufficiently similar to
rational actors governed by sufficiently consistent utility assignments to alterna-
tives could be demonstrated. Those of us who have worked in the field know how
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difficult it is to exhibit a rational actor with consistent utilities on a sufficiently
strong scale. For this reason, decision theory must remain divided in two branches:
a normative theory, logically elegant and providing opportunities for utilizing
sophisticated mathematical apparatus, and a descriptive theory, heavily dependent on
masses of data, forcing the investigator to face the problem of making sense of them
and of finding a basis for some semblance of generality.
Points of Contact between Normative and Predictive Decision Theories
The gulf that separates normative and descriptive dp.cision theory is narrower in
some areas vf investigation and wider in others. I would venture to say that the
two theories come closest wher.e the concept of rationality can be most clearly defined
and where utility can be most naturally linked to observable quantities. Such an area
is that of risky choices iterated many times, where utilities are expressible in
money. Gambling and insurance come immediately to mind.
In this way, a connection can be established between a prescriptive and a predic-
tive decision theory. If the decision of a "rational actor" in a given situation can
be specified, then such a decision can be used as a base line with which actual
decisions of real actors can be compared. And so a measure of rationality can be
established for a given actor in terms of the discrepancy between his decisions and
the prescribed "rational" decisions. Corroborated hypotheses about the presumed
causes of the discrepancies can be put at the foundation of a predictive theory.
This is one way in which experimental games can be used, for example as so-called
"games against nature" involving a single decision-maker in a chancy environment or
a pair of decision-makers playing a zero-sum game.
If the payoffs in a decision problem are not naturally measurable quantities, such
as money, or if the decision problem involves monetary payoffs but occurs only once,
the situation is more complex. Here a predictive theory necessitates a preliminary
establishment of a utility .function on the outcomes of decisions. Except when an
ordinal utility scale suffices, the problem of determining a utility function can be
quite difficult. Note that it will not do to define utility tautologically, as it
were, as "that which is maximized by a rational player." For in that case, the
establishment of a utility function is based on the assumption that every actor is
rational at least in situations used to determine his utility function. To be sure,
such a function, once determined, could be used in further experiments to predict
decisions. The difficulty is that in many instances a utility function satisfying
certain apparently innocuous consistency criteria cannot be established to begin
with. The investigator who is interested not in an actor's utility function per se
but rather in his decision behaviour is left with no choice but to by-pass the utility
problem altogether and work with the actual payoffs used in the experiments, for
instance, money. But then he must give up the idea of formulating a prescriptive
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theory (since he does not know the actor's utilities, if any). He must confine him-
self to mere descriptions of behaviour in experimental games. If he is lucky, he
may detect regularities in patterns of such behaviour which may suggest the beginnings
of a predictive theory.
Social Traps
This approach seems to be the only feasible one in situations that transcend the con-
fines of games against nature and of two-person zero-sum games. The most salient
situations of this sort are so-called "social traps." Here the concept of "rationality"
is no longer unambivalent. To be of use as a reference point in decision analysis,
it must be refined. In particular, individual, better said, individualistic and
collective rationality must be clearly distinguished, since the prescriptions of the
two kinds of rationality in social trap situations conflict. In fact, a social trap
is defined as a situation in which "rational" pursuit of own interest by each player
results in an outcome that no one is satisfied with in the sense that the participants
would unanimously prefer another attainable outcome.
In studies involving social traps, the problem of utility measurement and of
quantitative comparisons between actual and optimal outcomes assumes a secondary
importance. In fact the absence of an unambivalent defini tion of a "rational outcome"
(without further qualification) often precludes such comparisons altogether. The
more interesting questions are those related to the players' choices between individu-
ally rational and collectively rational courses of action.
For instance, in the well known Prisoner's Dilemma game, a typical question to
be answered by experiment is that of relative frequencies of choices of the "coopera-
tive" (collectively rational) and of the "defecting" (individually rational) strategy.
Maximization of real numbers does not enter this picture, since the distinction between
individually rational and collectively rational outcomes requires the payoffs to be
given, as a rule, on scales no stronger than the ordinal.
Cardinal payoffs can be introduced, but whether utilities are linear functions of
the payments (e.g., money) is not important, because the behaviour of subjects in
such experiments is not compared with some ideal standard, representing rationality
in terms of the maximization of utility. Rather, variations of subjects' behaviour
correlated with some imposed variation of the payoffs (whatever be the wherewithal
of payment) are interesting in their own right.
Prisoner's Dilemma
As an example, consider the game called Prisoner's Dilemma, shown in its general
form as a symmetric game represented by Matrix 1.
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R, R 5, T
T, 5 P, P
Matnx 1
Player 1, called "Row" chooses between C1 and Dr' Player 2, called
"Column," chooses between C2 and D. The first entry in each cellis the payoff to Row, the second t~ Column. Prisoner's Dilemma is
characterized by the inequality Ti > Ri > Pi >5 i (i=1,2).
In experiments with this game it is found that when the game is played just once, some
subjects choose C, others D. If the game is repeated many times, the same subject
sometimes chooses C sometimes D. Thus, the frequency of C choices becomes a naturally
prominent dependent variable. The cardinal values of T, R, P, and 5 can be used as
independe!1t variables. No a priori hypotheses based either on assumed "rationality"
of players and so on some maximization procedures suggest themselves. At this stage
a theory of such a game can be only descriptive. On the.basis of observed regulari-
ties, however, predictions might be made about how frequencies of observed C choices
will vary with each of the independent variables. Indeed, it is found that frequencies
of C choices increase with Rand 5 and decrease with T and P. This finding, being
strongly expected on common sense grounds or in terms of some conditioning learning
model (in iterated plays) is for this reason not very interesting. However, it would
be interesting to know which of the payoffs has the greater effect on variations of
frequency, since the answer is difficult to guess on a priori grounds and also because
the answer can be interpreted in psychological terms.
One can, for example, ask which is numerically larger aC/oT or 3C/35, where C is
the frequency of C choices. As has been said, both derivatives are observed to be
negati ve. The first can be interpreted as a measure of the "temptation" to try to
obtain the largest payoff. The second can be interpreted as a measure of the "fear"
of getting the "sucker's" (i.e., the lone cooperator's) payoff. Given sufficiently
large volumes of data, this question could be answered quite reliably (i.e., with
sufficient statistical significance) for a given population of players. Given even
larger masses of data, the question can be answered for different populations, e.g.,
men or women, people in various social categories, of various cultural backgrounds,
and so on, who would thereby be psychologically differentiated. It is these oppor-
tunities that brought experimental games, especially the best known of them--Prisoner's
Dilemma--to the attention of social psychologists.
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The Game of Chicken
As has been said, Prisoner's Dilemma is a prime example of a social trap. There are
others. Consider the so-called game of "Chicken." If the payoffs are labeled as in
Matrix 1, Chicken is characteri zed by inequalities T >R >S >P, so that the worst
payoff for both players is in the lower right hand corner of the payoff matrix. Since
it is the smallest payoff, its numerical magnitude is not restricted by the inequality
that defines the game. It can be a huge negative number. An example is shown in
Matrix 2.
DCOJ OJ
1, 1 -10, 10
10, -10 -100, -100
MatrIx L
The game of Chicken with large punishment for double defection
(both players choosing D).
The game could also be called "Brinkmanship" or a game of pre-emption. The
definition of a game in normal form demands that the players choose their strategies
simultaneously, i.e., in ignorance of each other's choice. If the rules specify that
one of the players must choose first and the choice is made known to the other, the
matrix representing simultaneously chosen strategies no longer represents the normal
form of the game, for in that case, the second player's strategies must be defined
as conditional on the first player's choices. For example if the original game is
a 2 x 2 game (two players with two strategies each), then requiring one player to
choose first and to make his choice known to the other would make four strategies
available to the second player. In the case of the two games just considered, these
would be: (1) Choose C regardless of the first player's choice; (2) Choose the same
as the other; (3) Choose the opposite of what the other chooses; (4) Choose D regard-
less of how the other chooses.
Since, however, we are discussing experimental situations suggested by the theory
of games rather than formal game theory, let us ignore this implication of non-simul-
taneous choices. In particular, let us assume that in the game of Chicken, one of
the players can somehow manage to choose his strategy first and to make his choice
known to the other. He then has the opportunity to "pre-empt. " The pre-emption refers
not to a "pre-emptive strike," much discussed in strategic circles, but to a pre-
emptive threat, emphasized by prominent civilian strategists of the American defence
community, in particular, by Thomas Schelling and by Herman Kahn. The latter gave a
picturesque description of a pre-emptive threat in the context of the game of Chicken
as it was actually played by spirited American youngsters in the 1950's. Possibly
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the game was inspired by the then publicized concept of "brinkmanship," advanced by
Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.
One way of playing chicken is for two drivers to rush at each other straddling
the white line that divides the directions of traffic. If neither driver swerves in
time, both are kilJed in a head-on collision. According to Herman Kahn, who used this
game as a model of international relations, a way to insure a win is to yank one's own
steering wheel off and to throw it away. If the driver of the other car sees this, he
will know that now the first driver could not swerve even if he wanted to. Consequent-
ly, the opponent must swerve (if he does not want to die) and, in doing so, is labeled
"Chicken" (American slang for "coward") conceding victory to the reckless driver. This
strategy is sure to work if the opponent is "rational," in which case the reckless,
that is the "irrational" driver wins. Indeed the advantage of being thought crazy has
been frequently pointed out in strategic circles.
The absurdity of Kahn's recommendation becomes obvious when one takes into account
that his advice applies equally to both players. In fact, Kahn recognizes this when
he says in the very next paragraph of his book On Escalation (Kahn, 1965), that it
may happen that just as the creatively reckless driver yanks his steering wheel off,
his opponent is inspired by the same idea. Thus, "showing resolve" can have disastrous
consequences.
Strategic vs. Non-strategic Approaches to Game-theoretic Models
Social traps (of which the game of Chicken is also an example) are traps precisely
because conventional strategic analysis provides no satisfactory way out. By conven-
tional strategic analysis I mean an analysis oriented toward optimization of decisions
by one party. This is overwhelmingly, perhaps exclusively, the point of view under-
lying all strategic analysis in which present day decision-makers are interested in.
I am referring to the decision-makers in the so-called "Man's world," predominantly
the world of business, competitive politics, and war. Social traps are either excluded
from the conceptual repertoire of the actors in that world or else are subjected to
the same sort of analysis that is relevant to games against nature and to two-person
zero-sum games, namely strategic analysis directed toward discovering optimal strate-
gies that can be recommended to a single actor. The late Yuri Germeier, in his book
~ ~ nieprotivopolozhnymi interesami (non-antagonistic games) has made this orienta-
tion quite explicit. He says specifically that his analysis is conducted from the
point of view of one of the players involved in a game, whom he calls "dieistvuyush-
chaia storona," that is, "the actor." As a resul t, the most salient problems raised
by the analysis of social traps assume a secondary importance or are by-passed alto-
gether. It is to restore the saliency of these problems, in particular their glaring
relevance to the horrendous dangers with which humanity is currently faced that some
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investigators in so-called "peace research" have turned to experimental games. The
principal objectives in this programme is not that of training decision-makers to
make "optimal" decisions, as is the case in most business games and in all war games
used for training purposes. The objective is, rather, to see how people behave in
social trap situations and to use these findings in educational programmes aimed at
promoting enlightenment in areas where obscurantism, hand-me-down conventional wisdom,
and dangerous delusions have been entrenched.
Experimental Techniques
Let us return to Prisoner's Dilemma, which, as has been said, is the best known and
most explored social trap game. Experiments with this game can be conducted in three
formats: (1) the one shot game; (2) the iterated game with two bona fide players; and
(3) the iterated game with one bona fide player and one "stooge." Each format brings
out a different aspect of the game. The dilemma is most salient in the one-shot
format. One would think that if the game is iterated many times, a pair of players
might eventually "learn" to cooperate. The purpose of the one-shot experiment is
actually to exclude the effects of learning and the effects of interaction. The
question raised is what the subject will do, when he must make a single decision, where
he understands that one of his available strategies is dominant and thus governed by
the sure-thing principle, while the other is collectively rational and, if adopted by
both players, leads to a Pareto-optimal outcome.
Difficulties in conducting one'shot experiments are those of cost effectiveness.
It becomes costly in time and money to recruit a pair of subjects, to schedule them,
to deal with the "no show" problem, to spend a half hour or so to instruct them in
the rules of the game, to explain the implications of their decisions, and for all
that trouble to obtain at most two bits of information: the choices of one or the
other strategy by each of the players. In the iterated game this problem does not
arise since the same two subjects can provide much more information. As we have
seen, however, the iterated game brings in effects of learning and interaction, which
it is desirable to exclude in observing behaviour of people in a social trap when it
is presented in its crassest form.
In attempting to make single shot experiments more cost effective, my colleagues
and I at the University of Toronto designed a procedure where each subject indicates
his decision in many different 2 x 2 games, each played with no announcement of the
outcome. Specifically, each subject is given a booklet containing hundreds of game
matrices, each with a different strategic structure. He/she is assigned the role
of one of the players and is asked to indicate his/her choice of strategy, having
been told that each of his/her choices will be matched at random with that of another
subject in the role of the co-player and that they will be paid in money in accordance
with the payoffs indicated in each matrix when they bring the filled out booklets
back to us.
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In a way, the procedure proved to be highly satisfactory, since there was no need
to bring the subjects into the laboratory, the "no show" problems did not arise, and
the subjects could take all the time they wanted to think about their decisions.
Another problem, however, arose. There were strong indications that the subjects,
faced with the task of making several hundred decisons, simply adopted an across-the-
board decision rule, for example, the maximim or maximization of expected gain, as-
suming equiprobability of the co-player's choices, or something of this sort. Thus,
it was the subjects that could be categorized according to the (inferred) decision
rule they used. We, however, were interested in categorizing the games according
to their strategic structure.
A neat solution of the problem of conducting one-shot experiments cost-effectively
was found by D. Hofstadter (1983). He conducted his experiment on one-shot Prisoner's
Dilemma by mail. Obtaining some financing from Scientific American, where his results
were subsequently published, he could make the game worthwhile by paying off in dollars
instead of in pennies as has been usual in laboratory experiments. Hofstadter sent a
letter to 20 of his colleagues, explaining the rules of Prisoner's Dilemma and soli-
citing their decision. He told each prospective player that his response would be
matched with each of the others' and that he would be paid the total amount thus
obtained. Specifically, each of twenty players would get $3.00 for each C response
and nothing for each D response if he chose C. If he chose D, he would get $5.00
for each C response and $1.00 for each D response. If we denote the number of C
and D responses respectively by C and D, the situation can be depicted thus, where
U
c
and Ud are payoffs to a C player and to a D player respectively:
U 3C
c
Ud 5C + D = 4C + N
If the game is presented in this way, the dominance of Dover C is glaring. Yet
it is in everyone's collective interest to choose C, since U
c
increases linearly with
C. To be sure, Ud also increases linearly with C. However, if everyone played C,
everyone would receive 3C = 3N dollars, while if everyone played D (i.e. C = 0),
everyone would receive 0 + N = N dollars.
Experimental Results
Assuming that a choice of C reflects a higher degree of social awareness (i.e., aware-
ness of collective interest), Professor Hofstadter's disappointment with the result
of his experiment is understandable. Out of his twenty subjects only 8 chose C. This
result, however, is in line with several results obtained in one-shot Prisoner's
Dilemma games in different experimental situations. Roughly 50% of naive subjects
choose C. Far from disappointing, I find this result rather encouraging, since it
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demonstrates that individualistic rationality, the solid rock on which all classical
economics and most of operations research rest, does not, at any rate not yet com-
pletely dominate the consciousness of ordinary people. Apparently, confronted with
a Prisoner's Dilemma game, quite a number of them look to see which outcome is most
advantageous to both players and choose accordingly.
It can be argued, of course, that many naive subjects choose C not because they
are socially sophisticated but because they are strategically naive. They have not
internalized the idea of strategy and erroneously assume that they are in a position
to choose an outcome. There may be something in that argument. Let us see what a
pair of strategically sophisticated players would do if they had to play Prisoner's
Dilemma 100 times, the outco~e of each play being announced. Elementary strategic
analysis shows that the individualistically rational thing to do is to play D all
100 times. This is so, because whatever be the first 99 outcomes, the outcome of the
hundredth play is a foregone conclusion. Neither player has any cause to fear retalia-
tion for choosing D and hence can choose D with impunity. He should be motivated to
do so because D gets him more than C regardless of how the co-player chooses on the
last play. But if the outcome of the last play is a foregone conclusion, the next-to-
the-last play becomes the "last play" and the analysis leads to the same result. The
number of plays does not matter so long as it is finite and known to both players.
It follows that a pair of strategically sophisticated players will attain the DD out-
come (which is worse for both than the CC outcome) whether the game is played 100
times or 1,000,000 times. The implication of this result in evaluating the nature
of strategic sophistication in the "games" played in the international arena should
be obvious. Unfortunately it is effectively obscured by the primacy of strategic
thinking.
Experiments with iterated Prisoner's Dilemma show a very different picture. In
long sequences of iterated plays, the unilateral outcomes Cl D2 and C2Dl eventually
become rare. Typically, both players "lock" in on either CC or on DD. The former
have learned that "cooperation pays" and reap the benefits thereoff. The latter are
caught in a social trap, like both superpowers, and suffer the consequences. Neither
dares to break out of the trap. "Unilateralism" is anathema to the strategists of
both sides. To play C while the other continues to play D amounts to rewarding the
other for his adamance and being punished for one's attempt to initiate cooperation,
hence unacceptable in the world where "realism" is a deeply entrenched component
of conventional wisdom. It is interesting to observe that in iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma experiments, initiatives of this sort are reciprocated about one third of
the time on the average which attests to some (but not enough) awareness of collective
interest in those contexts.
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which both players are bona fide subjects has been
the format most frequently used in the laboratory. The questions of interest in this
context are mostly about the dynamics of learning in situations with dual control.
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The third format mentioned above is an experiment with only one bona fide subject
in an iterated game, the other being a "stooge," i.e., a programmed subject. Here
the center of interest is the real player's response to the other's strategy, which
now plays the role of the independent variable. As an example, consider an experiment
where the stooge uses one of the following five strategies in a long sequence of
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. (1) The completely uncooperative strategy, i.e., uncon-
ditional D; (2) The 50% responsive strategy, i.e., one that always "punishes" the
subj ect' s D with D on the following play but "rewards" the subject's C 50% of the
time; (3) "Tit-for-tat," which always rewards the subject's C and always punishes
the subject's D; (4) The 50% retaliatory strategy, one that always rewards C but
punishes D with probability 50%; (5) the completely cooperative (100% C) strategy
(Chammah, 1969).
The Fesults of that experiment are interesting. As expected, the unconditionally
uncooperative strategy elicits very little cooperation from the subjects -- about
6% C responses, respresenting probably some futile attempts to get out of the social
trap. More interesting is the average frequency of cooperation in response to the
unconditionally cooperative strategy, namely 50% C responses. This mean frequency,
however, is rtot modal. The distribution of the C frequencies in a population of sub-
jects is strongly bi-modal: about half the subjects respond with full cooperation
to the stooge's unconditional cooperation, but the other half fully exploit the
unconditional cooperator.
Most cooperation is elicited by the Tit-for-tat strategy, about 75% C responses
on the average. The psychologically interesting aspects of this result is that the
players who play against the Tit-for-tat strategy are almost never aware of this.
At any rate, they do not give the correct answer to the question, "What do you think
was the pattern of choices used by your co-player?" The high level of cooperation
elicited by the Tit-for-tat strategy can be attributed to simple instrumental con-
ditioning: the cooperative response is immediately rewarded; the uncooperative one
punished. What the subjects do not realize is that the co-player is a mirror image
of themselves, that it is really they themselves who completely determine the behaviour
of the co-player. The relevance of this observation and of the unawareness of the
mirror image in international relations should be obvious to present day diplo-military
strategists, but unfortunately this circumstance is also obscured by the hegemony
of the strategic orientation.
Tit-for-Tat: Strength through Weakness
The idea that a strategy in playing iterated Prisoner's Dilemma could reflect to a
greater or lesser degree an awareness of the problems set by this game crystallized
in a contest arranged by Professor Robert Axelrod of the University of Michigan
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(Axelrod, 1984). In the first contest of this sort 15 computer programmes were en-
tered with the understanding that the contest would be a "round robin," that is,
every programme would be matched with every other submitted programme (including
itself) and the programme that got the largest total payoff would be declared the
winner.
That contest was won by Tit-for-tat. The results were announced and a second
contest was arranged. This time there were 63 entries from six countries submitted
by persons active in a large variety of disciplines. Tit-for-tat was submitted again
and again won.
This may seem somewhat surprising if one assumes that the success of Tit-for-tat
in the fi rst contest stimulated contestants to submit programmes designed to "beat"
Tit-for-tat. Whether they were so designed or not, the fact is that Tit-for-tat did
not "beat" a single one of the submitted programmes when matched with each of them
in turn. It did, however, get once again the highest score for the simple reason
that the "smart" programmes, which did beat Tit-for-tat in one-vs-one encounters had
also to be matched against each other, whereby they reduced each other's scores. One
would assume that the obvious "moral" in this story, namely that "in weakness there
is strength" makes no impression in the "defence communi ties."
What Can Be Learned from Experimental Garnes
This brings me to the central point I hope to make in this presentation, the answer
to the question of the value experimental games for decision theory. Their principal
value is educational but in a way different from the way most simulation games are
used educationally in business or military circles. Almost invariably, the format
of simulation games provides for the conception of strategically optimal decision.
That is to say, optimality is considered from the point of view of each participant
as an individual in the sense of representing a single set of interests. The object
of the training is that of inculcating the participants with strategic sophistication.
As can be seen from the examples of experimental games discussed here, these serve
a different purpose. The center of interest is the limitation of individualistic
rationality in most conflict situations, specifically in conflict situations that
transcend the format of the two-person zero-sum game in which maximization of utility
accruing to one of the players (and therefore minimization of the opponent's utility)
can be defended as a principle of rationality. This is not true of social traps.
But the hegemony of zero-sum game mentality is itself a social trap. It is the sort
of mentality that makes the defence communities of both superpowers a horrendous
threat to civilization and perhaps to humanity itself. The two-person zero-sum game
mentality embodies the cardinal principle of strategic thinking in the military
profession, expressed in the maxim, "Not the preferences or intentions but the
capabilities of the opponent" should guide the design of strategy."
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The educational value of experimental games is in the way they shed light on the
limitations of this view of "strategic sophistication." The object is not to "train"
the participants in techniques of effective decision-making, which is the objective
of practically all business and military simulation garnes, but rather to enlighten
the participants, to stretch their conceptual repertoires and so (one hopes) to make
at least some of them immune to the lures of social traps.
Social psychologists have been attracted by the experimental potentialities of
Prisoner's Dilemma because of the way it illustrates the dialectic opposition between
individual and collective rationality, between competition and cooperation or between
conflict and conflict resolution, if you will. It is, in a way, unfortunate that
because of these opportunities, the attention of social psychologists using experi-
mental games as a research tool has been riveted on this particular game. If one
approaches experimental games from an opposite point of view, as it were, not from
the point of view of finding a game to fit a particular social situation but by
investigating the strategic structures of the simplest games systematically in the
abstract, as it were, and only then looking for social situations that may be modeled
by the various structures, one gets a much better idea of the richness of this ap-
proach.
Assume that the payoffs of a 2 x 2 game are given only on an ordinal scale and
that the four payoffs of each player are strictly ordered. Then the strategic struc-
ture of each of the 2 x 2 games can be defined in terms of a pair of inequalities
expressing the preference orderings of the respective players for the outcomes. It
turns out there are 78 strategically inequivalent 2 x 2 games (Rapoport and Guyer,
1966). If the payoffs are only weakly ordered, the number of inequivalent games
is 732 (Guyer and Hamburger, 1968).
So far we have mentioned only two such games. An idea of how entirely different
motivational pressures can operate in a 2 x 2 game can be gotten by analyzing the
game shown in Matrix 4.
0, 5 5,
°
-2, -1 -1, -2
Matnx 4
The Top Dog-Underdog Game
In this game, both Rowand Column have dominating strategies. Individual
rationality, therefore, dictates the outcome Sl S2' Moreover, the outcome is Pareto-
optimal, so that the paradox noted in Prisoner's Dilemma does not arise. Other prob-
lems, however, arise instead. In a long sequence of iterations one could expect that
Row will not be satisfied in obtaining 0 as his payoff play after play, while Column
159
gets 5. From Row's point of view, it would be "fair" if Column alternated between
52 and T2, while he, Row, would continue to play 51' In this way Row would also get
the benefit of positive payoffs. The question now arises what is a "fair" distribution
of Column's choices between 52 and T2. Another question is what, if anything, Row can
do about the situation if Column refuses to "share" and if explicit communication is
not possible. For example, does it make sense for Row to "strike" by switching from
51 to Tl , thereby "punishing" Column (but incidentally also himself) in the expectation
that Column, in order to forestall further "strikes," will shift to T2' thus giving
Row the opportunity to effect outcome 5l T2 and obtain the largest payoff? After this,
Column has the power to re-establish the status quo at 5152, What will happen then?
Answers to questions such as these cannot be obtained from a normative theory. The
best we can hope for is a descriptive theory which might develop into a predictive
theory if enough of "relevant" independent variables can be singled out, be they
cardinal payoffs, cultural background OT personalities of players, dynamics of learning
in iterated plays, strategies prescribed to a programmed player or what not.
With regard to the latter, two interesting questions suggest themselves immedi-
ately. 5uppose the programmed player is Column (who is "top dog" in this asymmetric
game) and he uses ti)e "adamant" strategy--unconditional 52' How frequently will Row
resort to "striking," i.e., switching to Tl if the tactics appear to be futile? How
persistent will he be in sticking to Tl , if Column never yields? Again, consider Row
(the "underdog") as the programmed player, to whom 51 has been assigned as the uncon-
di tional strategy. What will be Column's response to this unilaterally "pacifist"
strategy? Will he exploit the "underdog" to the hilt, sharing nothing, or will he
share voluntarily and, if so, how much? There is experimental evidence in answer
to the latter question. Again as in the population playing against the unilaterally
cooperating player in Prisoner's Dilemma, the distribution is strongly bimodal. About
half the subj ects in the role of "top dog" exploit the "underdog" fully. The other
half share. Of these a large majority share 50%. No one has ever been observed to
give away more than 50%. lrtcidentally the Nash solution of this game regarded as
a cooperative game is 40% for the "underdog" and 60% for the "top dog."
Of considerable psychological interest is the game shown in Matrix 5.
20, 20 -10, 10
10, -10 5, 5
This is a so-called "no conflict game." I f the payoffs represent the actual uti li ties
of the players, it is in the interest of each to choose C, since each gets the largest
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payoff in CC. If, however, the concrete payoffs (e.g., money) do not represent the
actual utilities, the situation is different. Suppose, for example, Row values his
relative advantage over Column more than the absolute magnitude of his payoff. Then
Row is motivated to choose D. The same applies to Column. If both choose D, DD
results to the disadvantage of both. This social trap is somewhat similar to Pris-
oner's Dilemma but is not identical with it. In Prisoner's Dilemma, strategy D
dominates C. In Matrix 5, this is not the case. Can we conclude that if the payoffs
in Matrix 5 represent the players' actual utilities, the Pareto-optimal outcome CC
will obtain? Not necessarily, because the outcome depends not only on the utilities
of the players but also on their perceptions of each other's utilities or motivations.
For suppose the payoffs .do represent the true utilities but one of the players suspects
that the other is competitively oriented. Then he will assume that the other will
choose D. hence he himself must choose D "in self-defence," as it were, to avoid
getting the worst payoff. Nor is this all. Even though a player may not attribute
the competitive orientation to his co-player, he may imagine that the other attributes
such an orientation to him. If so, he must suppose that the other will play D not
because he is competitively oriented but because he believes that the other believes
that he himself is oriented. In this case the player who attributes this belief
(rightly or wrongly) to the other must play D.
Now the most important result of game theory, sometimes called the Fundamental
Theorem provides an escape from this vicious cycle of "He thinks that I think that
he thinks ... " reasoning by introducing the concept of mixed strategy. This concept
provides a rationally defensible solution to all two-person constant sum matrix games.
But it does not eliminate the paradoxes inherent in social traps.
Concluding Remarks
The uses of the experimental games described above depart radically from the uses of
so-called "gaming." In both approaches, the major goals are educational. However,
the knowledge that is supposed to be imparted by gaming is quite different from the
knowledge that one might hope to be generated by the so-called "mixed motive" games.
In the former case, knowledge is supposedly translatable into strategic skills. One
learns how to play effectively, whereby effectiveness is almost always measurable in
terms of "how well one does." Predominantly, "rationality" in this context is conceived
as individualistic rationality. That is, a particular actor, be he a person, a firm,
or a nation, is supposed to optimize the outcome of a process involving interactive
decisions from his own point of view. To be sure, processes of this sort may involve
the formation of coalitions. But this simply means that several actors coalesce into
one. The coalition becomes an actor, who does better or worse depending on his
strategic skills.
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The knowledge one hopes to impart by the use of the simplest experimental games
is of a different sort. One is supposed to learn not how to play effectively but
what happens when actors are motivated in different ways. One is supposed to see
the situation not through the eyes of some player but from a more detached position,
the position of someone watching the whole process of interactive decisions and
drawing conclusions about what sort of creatures the decision-makers are, how they
are motivated and how their motivations and the implementations of the goals so
generated or so perceived affect them all.
If this sort of knowledge has a normative as well as a descriptive aspect, the
prescriptions must be addressed to all the participants collectively, not to each
participant separately. The hope is, of course, that also the individual participants
may thereby become somewhat wiser in the light of the insights imparted by the detached
point of view.
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III. GROUP DECISION MAKING

INTRODUCTION
This section contains several papers dealing with the issues of
group decision making and negotiation. Not all of the papers pre-
sented at the meeting have been included - papers by Michel Balinski
on discrete proportionality, Rod Dobell on examples of group decision
processes taken from Canadian government, and Subhash Narula on pre-
emptive hierarchical programming problems, were unfortunately not
available.
The paper Ptausibte outcomes for games in strategic form by Shubik
presents an in-depth analysis of the assumptions underlying various
game-theoretical concepts. It is shown that the applicability of such
concepts depends very much on the context and the conditions under
which a game is played. There is a small subclass of games (including
zero-sum games and mass market games) in which history, personality
and institutions might not matter - in all other cases they do. Lan-
guage and time, survival values, psychological limits and sociopsycho-
logical phenomena can all exert a significant influence on the plaus-
ible outcomes of games.
Further discussions at the meeting led to the conclusion that the
plausible outcomes for games with nonunique equilibria tend to be dis-
equilibrium results (this would occur if each player selected a course
of action corresponding to a different equilibrium); a special equi-
librium selection process is therefore needed to achieve a compatible
combination of nonunique equilibria.
The paper Game and bargaining sotutions for group decision prob-
tems by Fandel deals with the applicability of various solution and
bargaining concepts in organizational group decision-making situations
where a unique Pareto-optimal decision must be obtained. The author
concludes that the Nash bargaining solution and the Contini-Zionts
bargaining model might provide a suitable basis for organizational
group decision making.
The paper Interactive group decision making by coatitions by
Isermann presents an interactive decision support system for group
decision making by coalitions. The system employs a mediation pro-
cedure and is based on adaptive increases in the lowest acceptable values
of the coalition members' criteria. This paper reflects some of the
more recent trends in the application of group decision theory to the
design of decision support systems.
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The paper On the roLe of dynamics and information in internationaL
negotiations: the case of fishery management by Kaitala and Hamalainen
reviews the applications of dynamic game theory to fishery management.
It points out that the real players in such a game can have quite
different perceptions of rationality (related to different planning
horizon, for example) and that such games typically have multiequi-
libria properties. Thus, the purpose of negotiations is to encourage
some shared perception of rational fishery management and to prevent
conflict escalation, which can lead to the overexploitationof resources.
Finally, an essay MacromodeLs and muLtiobjective decision making
by Peschel stresses the role of aggreqated macromodels of evolutionary
type in problems involving many agents.
This group of papers was followed by a discussion. The conclu-
sions were that research into such aspects of group decision making as
uncertainty, dynamic processes, negotiation and mediation processes
and decision support, should be intensified.
A. Wierzbicki
PLAUSIBLE OUTCOMES FOR GAMES IN STRATEGIC FORM
Martin Shubik
Department ofEconomics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
1. INTRODUCTION
This is the first in a projected series of papers on solutions to
games in matrix and extensive form. The predominant solution concept in
the literature is that of the noncooperative equilibrium put forward
by Nash (1951).
The major virtue of a noncooperative equilibrium is that it satis-
fies a form of circular stability or self-fulfilling prophecy. If i
thinks that j will follow his noncooperative equilibrium strategy then
i's best response is to select his noncooperative equilibrium strategy
and vice versa.
The well-known Prisoner's Dilemma game provides both an easy
example and considerable experimental evidence that the noncooperative
equilibrium strategies are frequently selected.
II
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2I
1 5,5 -1,6 1 5,5 -63,60 1 5,5 -5,20 1 bl ,b2 dl ,a2
2 6,-1 0,0 2 50,-45 0,0 2 20,-5 0,0 2 a l ,d2 c l ,c2
(a) (b) (c) (d)
TABLE 1
This work relates to Department of the Navy Contract N00014-77-C-05IB
issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR
047-006. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the posi-
tion or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the Government,
and no official endorsement should be inferred.
The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, nonexclu-
sive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Government
purposes to pUblish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, dispose
of, and to authorize others so to do, all or any portion of this work.
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Four versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma or linear Prisoner's Dilemma"
[l(c)] are shown in Table 1. The games portrayed in lea) and l(b) have
a unique equilibrium point with payoffs of (0,0) arising from strate-
gies (2,2), Game led) also has a unique equilibrium point if
a l > b l > C l > dl ; a 2 > b 2 > c 2 > d 2 ; a l + d l < 2b l and a 2 + d 2 < 2b 2 ,
In game l(c) a i + d i = 20 - 5 > 2b i = 15 has one pure strategy equilib-
rium point like the others plus a correlated mixed strategy equilibrium
where the players play (1,2) or (2,1) with equal probabilities if they
can precommit.
Even limiting ourselves to the 2 x 2 matrix game it is easy to con-
struct games with 1, 2, 3 or 4 pure strategy equilibria. Table 2 pro-
vides examples.
II
I 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 5,5 4,3 1 2,1 0,0 1 3,6 4,6 1 6,8 3,8
2 3,4 2,2 2 0,0 1,2 2 3,6 0,0 2 6,4 3,4
(a) (b) (c) (d)
TABLE 2
In Game 2(a) there is a jointly optimal pure strategy equilibrium
at (1,1) yielding (5,5). Game 2(b) has two pure strategy equilibria
and a mixed strategy equilibrium where I uses a mixed strategy of
(2/3, 113) and II uses (1/3, 213) and the expected payoff to each is
(2/3, 213). If they could correlate their strategies so that they could
play (1,1) and (2,2) each with 1/2 they could obtain a payoff (3/2,3/2).
Game 2(c) has a class of equilibria where I uses his first strategy
and II mixes with probabilities (p ,l-p) where 0 .2 p ~ 1; and simi-
larly II uses his first strategy and I mixes with (p,l-p) where
0.2p~l.
In game 2(d) any mix for either player will be an equilibrium
strategy. All four pure strategy pairs form noncooperative equilibria.*
Table 3 shows games with equilibria which dominate others.
In 3(a) there are three pure strategy noncooperative equilibria
at (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3) with payoffs (10,10), (5,5) and (1,1).
Game 3(b) has the same equilibria. However, in game 3(a) the safety
* Frequently we shall use the abbreviation NeE for noncooperative
equilibrium.
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1 2 3 1 2 3
1 10,10 0,0 0,0 1 10,10 -6,0 -6,0
2 0,0 5,5 0,0 2 0,-6 5,5 0,-6
3 0,0 0,0 1,1 3 0,-6 -6,0 1,1
(a) (b)
TABLE 3
level associated with any equilibrium is zero but in game 3(b) the
safety level associated with (1,1) is -6 but the safety level with (2,2)
is zero.
We may observe from the above examples that the NCE mayor may not
be unique, symmetric or Pareto optimal.
Table 4 illustrates that the existence of an NCE is not perturbed
by considerable changes in the structure of the payoff matrix. A matrix
of general size m x n is illustrated. Suppose that a.· is the largestlJ
element in the row i and b ij is the largest element in the column j.
Then regardless of any changes made to the mn - m - n + 1 elements
which do not appear in either row i or column j the pair of strategies
(i,j) form an equilibrium pair with payoffs (a .. , b .. ).lJ lJ
1 2 j n
m
1
2 II
I
I
I
I
I
I
i --------aij,bij --------
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
TABLE 4
The changes in the payoffs elsewhere may create new NCEs whose
payoffs could dominate the payoffs (a .. ,b .. ) but even this would not
lJ lJ
disturb the stability of (i,j) as an NCE unless stability conditions
beyond that of self-fulfilling prophecy are specified.
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2. WHAT DO WE WANT OF A SOLUTION?
2.1. Normative or Behavioral Solutions
Traditionally game theory solutions have been divided into normative
and positive or behavioral solutions. The first set of solutions are
prescriptive. Rational people are advised to behave in a particular way,
or to accept certain axioms of behavior as a guide. For example the
value proposed by Shapley (1955) offers axioms for fair division.
Various bargaining procedures have been axiomatized.
The core (see Shubik, 1982, ch.6) has been suggested as a solution
which satisfies subgroup rationality for all sets of players in a game.
In contrast with the core and Shapley value, much of the discussion
concerning the noncooperative equilibrium solution has stressed best
response as being a reasonable way to behave in situations with no direct
communication. Furthermore some evidence can be mustered that under-
graduates, or engineers or others tend to play one-shot Prisoner's
Dilemma games in such a way that the NCE is a reasonably good predictor
(see Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Yet although this is true there is
overwhelming evidence that as the entries in even a 2 x 2 matrix are
varied, the briefings manipulated and a host of other factors controlled,
the NCE as a predictor leaves much to be desired (see Rapoport et a~ .•
1975).
In contrast with a behavioral defense of the NCE, Harsanyi and
Selten (1982) offer a resolutely normative argument for the "rational
selection of a single equilibrium point."
2.2. The Game and Rational Players
Without going into detail, there are four major game representa-
tions used in most investigations. The various solutions which have
been suggested, in general, are related to one or possibly two of these
representations. Underlying each is a large set of implicit and explicit
assumptions. In essence the parts of Schelling's perceptive book (1960)
which criticize game theory are in fact devoted to a critique of the
inappropriate use of game models for the study of some strategic prob-
lems where certain implicit and explicit assumptions do not apply.
The four major representations of a game of strategy are:
1. The finite extensive form
2. The strategic or normal form
3. The cooperative or coalitional form
4. Some variant of an infinite extensive form.
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The cooperative form is not a process model. Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944) explicitly abstracted any considerations of cost or
timing of bargaining in their discussion of the characteristic function.
Edgeworth (1881) in his discussion of bargaining did the same. In
essence the cooperative form is noninstitutional. There is no way one
can deduce the specific form of the rules of the game from the cooper-
ative form.
All three other representations noted are process oriented. The
two extensive form representations spell out moves and information.
The strategic form suppresses a great deal of structure but nevertheless
explicitly reflects the rules of the game.
None of the representations are able to treat adequately the role
of language. In many aspects of human behavior there is a delicate
interplay between words and deeds. Items such as contract, threat and
bluff depend upon this interplay and the strategic modeler is faced with
the problem that in many of the strategic situations of society the
r~les are not rigid but depend upon the broader context in which the
game is embedded.
The first three representations noted address situations with a
well-defined beginning and end. Board games or card games fit nicely
into this category. But many aspects of politics, economics and life
in general do not. There is no definite end, and the beginning may be
lost in history. The fourth game representation, which allows for the
possibility of games of indefinite length, opens up the possibility of
considering neither normatively cooperative nor noncooperative solutions,
but quasi-cooperative solutions whose stability is due to the assump-
tion that there will be enough time left to settle accounts.
Associated with the cooperative form are the value, core, stable
set, nucleolus, kernel and bargaining set solutions. Associated with
the finite extensive form and strategic forms are many variants of
noncooperative equilibrium and minimax solutions. The infinite horizon
extensive form opens up the possibility of defining and describing many
quasi-cooperative and behavioral solutions.
Underlying virtually all of formal mathematical game-theoretic
analysis is an extremely austere nonsocialized abstract model of the
intelligent, calculating rational decisionmaker. Without passion, the
homo ludens of much of game theory is a colorless, sexless, classless,
ageless calculating device who knows what it wants and what constitutes
its set of strategies. The assumption of external symmetry made ex-
plicitly or implicitly states that any feature distinguishing Player
A from Player B must be formally modeled in the game otherwise all
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features are assumed to be the same. Thus when the game theorist is con-
trasted with the social psychologist we find that the former tends to be
concerned with predicting the outcomes resulting from situations involv-
ing identical individuals with different resources and positions while
the latter tends to consider outcomes involving different individuals
who may start with the same resources.
Much of game theory has been devoted to suggesting what an individ-
ually rational, intelligent, nonsocialized, calculating, consciously goal-
oriented individual should do when confronted with a well-defined game of
strategy.
How successful or useful this approach is cannot be answered with-
out reference to context. Hence we turn to an explicit consideration of
both the context and purpose of the models.
3. WHAT ARE THE CONTEXTUAL ASSUMPTIONS?
3.1. Noninstitutional Statios
Much of the success of modern economic theory and political science
has been in the investigation of situations involving faceless crowds
of individual agents. In particular the attractiveness and apparent
power of the modern theory of the price system and mass markets comes
from the attenuation of much personal interaction. The essence of de-
centralization is that individuals need not think about other individ-
uals, but plan their actions against a mechanism called the market.
Personality is irrelevant, individual power except to inflict self-harm
is nonexistent and special information is of fleeting worth.
Under the appropriate assumptions a large array of different models
and solutions all lead to the mass market price system (for a survey see
Shubik,1984). It is possiole to construct game models in both strate-
gic and cooperative form and have the NCE, value, core and other solu-
tions predict the same set of outcomes in what appears to be a virtually
institution-free context.
Unfortunately what may hold for a mass market under special cir-
cumstances does not hold if there is even one agent of substantial size.
The various structures of the mechanism influence outcome, and the
possibilities for individual signaling and threat may appear.
3.2. Finite Process Models
If one is to understand the structure of strategic interaction
even for as few as two individuals the salient features of the game
must be spelled out. The extensive form does this in detail and the
strategic form does it in a somewhat aggregated manner via the concept
of strategy.
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In the context of a society, polity or economy the construction
of a game in extensive form requires the implicit specification of the
institutions and laws of the society. They are described in the rules
of the game. Thus when we try to model trade as a game in extensive or
strategic form we can start to identify the basic features which dis-
tinguish and describe markets, banks, clearing houses and other economic
institutions.
When the situation to be modeled is a diplomatic negotiation, a
vevolution or a mass march we tend to find that our lack of substantive
knowledge and the difficulties encountered in sorting out psychological,
socio-psychological, economic, legal, political and other factors make
the task of specifying a plausible extensive form difficult and even of
dubious worth. The perceptive essay or even a simulation may provide
better tools for analysis.
Because of the difficulty in constructing extensive form models
of many "soft science processes" we run the danger of gross over-
simplification in order to force them upon our methodological Procrustean
bed. In particular it is for this reason that we must approach all
interpretations of results from simple experimental games such as the
Prisoner's Dilemma with great circumspection.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) in the first chapter of their
book warned that the construction of game theory dynamics might pose
considerable difficulties. They stressed that they felt it desirable
to explore the statics first. They stressed a cooperative theory.
But in doing so not only did they suppress the dynamics; they also
removed the description of the rules of the game by the device of using
the characteristic function.
Before one tries to develop full dynamics, the description of the
game in strategic or extensive form provides an understanding of the
structural bounds on play. The strategic form which by the device of
the strategy collapses the finite extensive form into a matrix or one-
shot game suppresses much of the structure, but not as much as the coali-
tional form. The noncooperative equilibrium solution applied to a game
in strategic form may be regarded as a static solution. All move si-
multaneously -- beyond that time plays no role and the path of play is
irrelevant.
3.3. The Infinite Future: Markovian Dynamics
The von Neumann-Morgenstern theory deals with games with a specific
beginning and finite end. The analogy with tormal games has already
been notea. If we wish to construct models which appear to be better
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approximations of many societal, political and economic processes we
need to extend the horizon to an indefinite future. The cost of doing
so is to complicate the concept of solution and change the mathematical
requirements.
Two natural classes of model which have been considered are re-
peated games with a stochastic ending or with a discounted payoff. The
repeated matrix game offers experimental possibilities in either of
these forms. An attractive candidate for a solution to a stochastic
game (see Heyman and Sobel, 1984) is an NeE involving strategies which
are only dependent on the current state.
When we consider applications of stochastic games, however, we
must ask what phenomena can be best represented. I suggest that in
virtually all applications there are several important distinctions which
should be made. They are:
Two person: face-to-face
Two person: anonymous
Two institutions
One individual and an institution
Few individuals: face-to-face
Few individuals: anonymous
Many individuals: anonymous without group identity or affiliation
Many individuals: anonymous with group identity or affiliation
The formal models most amenable to analysis are two-person games
and many-person games. It is hard to justify, except on an ad hoc
basis, the assumption that in situations involving two individuals inter-
acting over time anonymity is reasonable and history and personality do
not matter.
Fortunately for the applications of duels and antagonistic games,
the assumptions are justified in general. Furthermore, if we believe
that the assumption of a mass market with no large agent is justified
in economic analysis, then the dynamics of such a market may be studied
as though it were a collection of individuals each facing his own dy-
namic program.
In virtually all other instances history, personality and institu-
tions appear to matter. These cannot be ignored even by the experimenter
using the simplest of matrix games. The players bring their personal-
ities, mindsets, socialization and training with them, and both these
and the initial briefing must be taken into account.
Partially in jest, partially seriously, John Kennedy of the Depart-
ment of Psychology at Princeton noted that given control of the briefing
an experimenter should be able to get virtually any results he wants.
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3.4. The Infinite Past: History Matters
In experimenting with as simple a game as that shown in Table 5,
some individuals acting as Player 1 select the first strategy and others
1 2
Player
1
2
2,1
0,0
0,0
1,2
TABLE 5
select the second. Each easily supplies a rationalization; one of the
variety "strategy one is best for me", the other "I think my opponent
may be greedy hence I am safer playing strategy two in order to get some
payoff. "
A briefing telling all players that their competitors are greedy
and stubborn appears to influence the outcome.
How are we to control or initialize the initial expectations or
sUbjective probabilities of players concerning the nature and behavior
of their competitors? One way of doing this is by the initial briefing
and this may involve telling a player that he has taken over from a
previous player while his competitor is still the same. The new player
is then supplied with a history of k .periods of play. For example, one
briefing for the game in Table 5 might be: "During the last 100 periods
(2,2) has been played all the time." Another briefing would be "(1,1)
and (2,2) have been played alternately for as long as we can remember
and (1,1) was played last time."
How far back into history we want to go or need to go appears to be
a matter of understanding the problem and its context. It is not merely
a problem in methodology or mathematics. It is here that revenge, na-
tional pride and other factors regarded as irrelevant, irrational or
uninteresting in an economics-oriented decision theory appear.
3.5 - Does Language Matter?
One school of thought has it that a "barking dog never bites" and
"sticks and stones will break my bones but names will never hurt me."
Another school takes threat, slander, innuendo and promises seriously.
Many of the examples in brinksmanship and bargaining used by Schelling
(1960) depend delicately upon words as deeds. Sometimes deeds are best
interpreted as part of the conversation. Someone is shot with a foot
over the border just to convey the message that we mean that we do not
want anyone to cross the border.
176
Formal game theory does not provide us with a way to encode speech
and gesture as moves. In a mass market you cannot argue with the tape,
but in a thin market you can argue with the sellers. In a disarmament
conference words and gestures are part of the play.
We do not know how to code language into strategies. But at least
in experimental games we can introduce a limited set of messages as
formal moves. For example, consider the game portrayed in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
We may interpret the first four moves as messages from Player 2 to
Player 1 concerning what he intends to do if Player 1 selects 1 or 2.
They can be read as:
If PI selects 1 then ~; if PI selects 2 then ~.
We might also include a fifth alternative in which no message is
sent. If we include this then the total number of strategies available
to P2 is 5 x (2)10 or 5,120.
Griesmer and Shubik ran a pilot study of a game with this structure
in 1962 but I am not aware of the results of any systematic study of
games with messages.
It must be noted that in a two-person, constant-sum game, language
plays only a psychological role. The only words are deeds. In mass
societies individuals can still send simple signals to large groups by
wearing badges, campaign buttons, concentration camp numbers or uniforms.
Even with large numbers there are many binary interactions between two
individuals who have to find out if they are friend, foe or neutral.
4. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE SHOPPING LIST
In this section a sketch is given of some of the factors we need
to consider when we try to apply strategic analysis to a host of differ-
ent conflict and cooperation scenarios.
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4.1. Historical, Biological, Chronological and Ordinal Time
Cooperative game theory is timeless. This is one of the major rea-
sons why interpreting experiments based on the characteristic function
is so difficult. If negotiations take several hours this expenditure
of effort may influence perceived payoffs.
The finite game in strategic form is timeless. All players have
one (possibly enormously complex) move and all move simultaneously.
The finite game in extensive form has ordinal time. Moves are
sequenced but there is no measure of elapsed time. In essence the game
tree is event oriented. Actions and the sequencing of actions count,
not the time involved.
Yet chess championship games have time limits. Furthermore we
frequently wait for decisions to mature or tempers to cool or even for
time to heal wounds and to soften or obliterate some memories.
Repeated games or stochastic games tend to be represented with
a fixed clock. Each period measures some unspecified ~t and there may
be many periods. When a discount factor is introduced, as is the case
for busin~ss games and many economic models, the (usually fixed) time
period is a quarter or a year.
A key factor distinguishing many problems in the behavioral sciences
is the length of time involved in a process. Elapsed time appears to be
related to whether decisions or acts are instinctive, consciously thought
through, unconscious or habit guided. Qualitatively new problems have
been posed by the existence of nuclear missiles, where decisions to loose
mass destruction must be made by a handful of individuals in less time
than most people need to decide to buy a new lawnmower.
The bias of many economists and operations researchers has been
towards decision problems lasting for a relatively short time, say a
few weeks to a few years. In this zone many environmental factors,
habits, customs and laws can be regarded as constant. The decision-
making takes place within the arena of the economy and for the most part
concentrates on conscious decisionmaking.
Decisions to marry, have children, commit suicide, kill, declare
war, found the National Socialist party, go on a hunger strike, move the
tribe westward from the Urals, or die at Massada all may have some ele-
ment of conscious economic decisionmaking to them. But there is more:
the time scale, scope and context of each is significantly different
from the others. The will of a group or a species or a set of genes to
survive may be measured on an even longer time scale and may depend far
more on instinctive than calculated decisionmaking.
To be more specific, how long does it take to form trust, respect
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and consistent beliefs in individual and international relations? How
long does it take to destroy them and rebuild them? It has been said
that "if your friend betrays you once it is his fault, if he betrays
you twice it is your fault." Is this merely a matter for ordinal time
Bayesian updating or is a more complex process description called for?
4.2. Players and Population
One of the most powerful and useful assumptions in the construction
of game-theoretic models is the assumption of external symmetry. All
personal attributes not specified are assumed to be the same. For many
problems the model of the player without personal attributes acting as
a principal in an institution-free environment may be a reasonable
approximation. But for virtually any political or international stra-
tegic problem the players are fiduciaries acting through bureaucracies.
We use phrases such as "the Russians want" or "the State Department
intends." It is easy to deal with such phrases in rhetoric or in essay
form but it is extremely difficult to produce useful formal models of
the State Department as a player with preferences.
In the literature of operations research we can find titles such
as "Solveable Nuclear Wars" (Dalkey, 1965) or "The Statistics of Deadly
Quarrels" (Richardson, 1960). The simple model or special statistic
serves to call attention to and provide analysis for a special and pos-
sibly important point. But nuclear wars are not solveable and deadly
exchanges may be grossly misrepresented by body counts. How usefully
we can represent whole nations as actors depends heavily upon the ques-
tion at hand.
The basic distinction concerning individuals is whether they are
acting as principal agents or as fiduciaries for others. But in the
study of strategic behavior the simplification made regarding what con-
stitutes a player is critical. Political scientists study "the games
nations play." Are institutions actors or should we model them as games
within games, set in a larger context? At the very least we need to
distinguish the individual, the informal group, the formal group, vari-
ous institutions and nations.
One possible modification to the assumption of external symmetry
among the players is to consider a population with different arrays of
attributes such as hawk or dove. Then, as has been considered in bio-
logical models, we might interpret mixed strategy equilibria as arising
from chance encounters with different behavioral types. The recent
work of Axelrod (1983) is oriented in this way.
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4.3. Preferences
Much has been written about individual preferences. Only three
points are stressed here. The first concerns how to describe preferences
for organizations or institutions if they are to be treated as players.
The second point appears to be of importance both in the context
of political and economic life and in military matters. This is the
distinction between personal risk and risk taken on when acting as an
agent or fiduciary for other people's money and lives. The eoonomic
theory of agency attempts to explain the behavior of agents strictly in
terms of economic organizational structure, which provides the structure
of incentives. Yet the socio-psychological and sociological features
of loyalty, honesty, morals, responsibility, pride and other factors
appear to play an important role in determining the behavior of generals,
civil servants and corporate presidents. The responsibility assumed in
sending troops into battle does not appear to be usefully portrayed
primarily in terms of economic analysis.
The third point is that in my opinion not enough stress has been
laid upon the importance attached to survival in individual preferences.
4.4. Psychological Limits
The survey on decisionmaking and decision theory of Abelson and
Levi (1983) provides a relatively comprehensive coverage of some of the
problems seen by the psychologist in analyzing decisionmaking. These
include limits to memory, limits to calculation, faulty perception and
the importance of problem representation in influencing decisions.
Possibly the most important open question at the core of strategic
analysis is how individuals form sUbjective probability estimates and
how they update them. The experimental evidence that they do not appear
to use Bayesian updating does not invalidate the logic of Bayes, but
suggests two hypotheses. Individuals may be somewhat less than logical
and could benefit from training. The way individuals often use new in-
formation is not merely to update and modify old information, but to
reorganize their perceptions of the causal structure of the system being
considered.
4.5. Socio-psychological and Other Criteria
In our search for solutions we need to ask what considerations must
be taken into account. How rich must the models be to account for the
phenomena we feel to be of critical significance in a process. For ex-
ample, in much of economic theory evaluation and judgment are taken as
given, or if there are two individuals with equal resources and risk
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preferences the one who has less uncertainty concerning evaluation will
perform better. Yet the best securities analysts do not appear to be
the. best investors. Perception and calculation do not appear to be the
same as perception, calculation, commitment and decisiveness. Yet even
in economics it is precisely where the numbers are few and the stakes
are high that factors such as the courage of one's convictions count.
It is a monument to the success of economic theory that so much
can be squeezed from the parsimonious assumptions of given preferences,
many rational actors, initial wealth and technology. But it appears
that, in spite of the economic components to society, politics and war,
the parsimony of economic theory is not sufficient to provide good ex-
planations elsewhere.
The informal list presented in Table 6 indicates some of the fac-
tors which are regarded by different social scientists as relevant to
decisionmaking. Many of the words, such as loyalty, hope, faith, are
catchall names for a highly complex set of attributes. Yet when we try
to explain strategic behavior there is some context in which each item
noted is a factor of consequence. Revenge and envy may not enter into
consideration when buying a pound of bacon; but they do when the deci-
sion is made to continue a vendetta.
The shopping list is clearly even larger -- for example, health
and demographic features (such as a species' innate drive to reproduce)
have not been included. The overall psychological concerns on percep-
tion and cognition are only partially covered.
An important constructive use of theory and gaming experiments is
to isolate why and where intuitively important concepts fit into our
models and explanation of behavior. Thus we may take a concept such as
revenge or envy and ask what is the simplest game in which we would be
able to attribute motivation to such factors. It is with this in mind
that I suggest that the very success of much of game-theoretic thought
and experimental gaming may come from their apparent lack of success in
being able to identify a solution of high predictive value for how indi-
viduals will playa one-shot or many-period, two-person matrix game.
There is no paradox and no pessimism to this observation. We have
a language, a methodology and the possibility to perform some experiments
of interest. The noncooperative equilibrium and minimax solutions do
not appear to be particularly useful as predictors in general, even
though they may be quite good in certain contexts. Our problem is to
find better solutions and to justify or explain the influence of differ-
ent contexts.
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4.6. A Caveat on Purposeful Modeling
Good modeling calls for (1) clarity of purpose, (2) parsimony, (3)
relevance and (4) analytical feasibility. Analogy and example can offer
considerable aid in gaining insight. But they can also be devices to
mislead by false analogy and special or pathological example. In the
context of game-theoretic reasoning these dangers are easy to illustrate.
It is well-known among social psychologists that the running of a simple
game with the same mathematical structure in each instance but with dif-
ferent scenarios will lead to different behavior (see the Ph.D thesis
of R. Simon, 1967). It is also clear that whole books and hundreds if
not thousands of articles have been devoted to the Prisoner's Dilemma
game with little discussion of how typical or valuable an experimental
game it is and how generalizable are results obtained from experiments
using it.
Experimental games may only reflect a few of the factors in command
and control systems for nuclear weapons. These systems may manifest a
competitive decision structure which is quite different to that in pol-
itical conflict and certainly in competition in mass markets.
Game theory offers abstract models for the study of conflict and
cooperation. But the abstraction sufficient to illustrate mass markets
may not stretch to mass warfare, murder or even to a Potlach. The devel-
opment of solution concepts for context-free games played by hypothet-
ically personality-free players is a useful exercise in normative game
theory but it is not the only approach. Even at the philosophical level
individuals are at best idealized as machines with some finite capacity,
and hence there are basic problems to be faced in even defining individ-
ual rational behavior.
4.7. Death, Triumph and Disaster
Prior to discussing matrix games, one further basic warning is in
order. When using matrix games even as analogies in the discussion of
topics such as war or diplomacy, or any situation involving high or low
risk and matters of vital importance, the very basis of justification
for assigning expected sUbjective valuation of outcomes is in question.
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) have suggested a n function for subjective
probabilities which is not well-behaved at the extreme ranges, over-
estimates low probabilities and underestimates high probabilities.
The act of formulating an abstract matrix game and presenting it
to experimental subjects without a detailed discussion of what the ab-
stract von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities mean to the players
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hides many of the key problems in understanding the linkages between
psychological socio-psychological and cultural phenomena and the abstrac-
tions of game theory.
5. THE SEARCH FOR MEASURES
The remarks here are confined to games in matrix form played by
individuals acting on their own behalf. Do we have a reasonable theory
as to how they will be played if they are played only once?
The question being asked here is considerably less ambitious than
any of the burning questions concerning military, political or organiza-
tional behavior. As a start it is not even at the level of complexity
of "do Russian, Chinese, English and American students play matrix games
differently?"
There are only a few postulates that can help us to determine the
probable outcome of a game when the noncooperative equilibrium is non-
unique. There have been many attempts to formulate such postulates,
but most of them do not give satisfactory answers. Nash suggested that
the following conditions should be satisfied (1) best response; (2) equaL
vaLue; (3) interahangeabiLity of strategies. But we can give simple
examples of games where none of these conditions can be satisfied. We
might add another condition: (4) a probabLe equiLibrium shouLd be seLea-
ted from those NCEs whiah are nondominated by other NCEs. However, this
condition does not necessarily have any predictive strength. Another
possible condition might be: (5) the other pLayer wiLL seLeat any of his
NCE strategies with equaL probabiLity. However, this assumption cannot
be justified on socio-psychological grounds. Socio-psychologically, we
can state: (6) in a symmetria two-person game, the onLy soaio-psyahoLog-
iaaLLy neutraL NCE is a symmetria one. In non-symmetric games, inter-
personal comparisons might be very important, and hence there is a large
difference between the following two assumptions: (7a) aardinaL but not
aomparabLe utiLities are assumed, i.e. games are Left unahanged by Linear
transformations of utiLity saaLes; and (7b) aardinaL utiLity saaLes and
interpersonaL aomparisons are assumed. Thus, socio-psychological phe-
nomena appear to be quite important, which is strongly supported by the
experimental evidence.
The mathematical and philosophical shopping list for extra criteria
has been summarized in Table 6. A few general observations can be made
on the possible formalization of socio-psychological phenomena. Several
approaches are described in the literature; however, for example,
Harsanyi in his work both on games with incomplete information and his
tracing procedure (see Harsanyi, 1975) as well as in his work with Selten
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on the selection of a unique NeE (see Harsanyi, 1982) is resolutely
non-psychological and non-socio-psychological. Another general point is
that the literature usually stresses conscious individualistic behavior
with little attention to such phenomena as concern for others, compas-
sion, greed, spite and revenge, etc. A possible means of formalizing
some of these aspects would be to average outcome utilities with weight-
ing coefficients interpreted as measures of concern for the welfare of
others. In repetitive games, such phenomena as envy and revenge could
also be illustrated and possibly formalized.
6. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
The development of economic game theory, especially for mass markets,
has been to some extent an essay in the study of strategic decisions in
which psychology and socio-psychology are of minimal importance. Much
of the search for solution concepts for n-person games has had a nor-
mative bent based upon the abstraction of the culture-free, personality-
free, society-free, rational individual.
A cogent argument for utilizing this model of the decisionmaker is
that it is analytically easier and better defined than models with lim-
ited capacity and perception. In spite of the rhetorical attractiveness
of Simon's "Satisficing man" there is a Will-o-the-Wisp quality to at-
tempts to produce formal models and to define the meaning of rational
behavior for the decisionmaker as a finite device interacting with other
finite devices. We are forced to raise many of the basic questions posed
in artificial intelligence and must confront the possibility that, as
soon as we postulate individuals who can never know as much as society as
a whole, cultural norms and societal conventions become necessary de-
vices to code into manageable size the vast body of data, information
and knowledge which the single individual cannot master.
My suggestion is that the time is ripe for the development of
context-specific theories of decisionmaking, with stress upon the dis-
tinctions and links between estimates of exogenous and endogenous uncer-
tainty and the actual taking of responsibility for decisions. In partic-
ular, the use of context-free game-theoretic models in the study of
international relations, arms control and other areas for negotiation
must be done with great circumspection. The use of simple analogies
may obliterate or distort or distract from our understanding of the
process at hand.
In parallel with the emphasis upon context, the very pathological
simplicity of the matrix game provides an experimental device for the
to blend strategic behavior with behavioral
as managers running idiosyncratic agents who
The manager is strategic but some of his
limited in their choices.
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posing of questions and design of experiments not in game theory alone
but also in the array of other behavioral aspects associated with strat-
egic decisionmaking.
I suspect that the way
bias is to consider players
they do not fully control.
agents may be behaviorally
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GAME AND BARGAINING SOLUTIONS FOR
GROUP DECISION PROBLEMS
Giinter Fandel
Fernuniversitiit Hagen, Hagen, FRG
Decision processes in organizations can formally be described as group decision pro-
blems, i.e. as decision problems with several decision makers and different utility
functions. Game and bargaining approaches have to be taken into account as solution
methods. They are characterized by the actual decision rule which describes, or rather
determines, the decision behaviour of the group members. For this rule certain require-
ments are set up, the fulfilment of which gives information, how far the presented ap-
proaches are useful for determining optimal decisions in groups.
1. Introduction
When in the beginning of the fifties SIM::N (1952/1953), for the first time,systerrati-
cally tried to analyze decisions in organizations with a view to concluding fran this
to the necessary quantitative solution instrurrents, it had rashly been expected that
the fonnal foundations of an organization theory with respect to business administra-
tion would be created very soon. In view of the developrents which have in the rrean-
time taken place in the fields of garre and bargaining theory, and considering the
knowledge obtained from the theory of multiple criteria decision making it seems rea-
sonable today to make another attempt to find out how far quantitative economic con-
cepts of this kind can be used for or contribute to the formulation and solution of
decision problems in organizations, looking at these organizations as groups of inde-
pendent decision makers with different utility functions. Thus, cooperative garres with
or without side payrrents as well as non-cooperative garres corne into consideration. As
to the application of the theory of bargaining to decision problems in groups, two
qualitatively different procedures have been developed, narrely the approaches based
on the garre theory and the concessive rrodels of bargaining formulated on the basis of
spontaneous elements of behaViour.
2. Description of the Decision Situations in Groups
For the formal description of group decision problems let
:JN be the set of the natural nurrbers,
JR be the set of the real numbers,
n E[N] = {1, ... ,N} be the decision makers - units or persons - in the group,
NE ])I and N~2,
A C JRN be the set of decision alternatives a = (a1 , ... ''i<) of the group, and
1BB
U c lR N be the set of utility vectors u = (u1' ••• '~) of the group which develop as
a napping of A under the irdividual utility functions un = un (a), nE[N],
of the decision makers, that is to say U = u (A) .
In order to obtain a reasonable econanic and natherratical fonnulation of the problem
let us further assume that the set of decision alternatives A is oonvex, bounded and
closed, and that the utility functions u , nE[N], are concave, oontinuous and diffe-
n
rent f ran each other, that is to say, u 'f u I is true for n, n I E[N ] and nt-n I in parti-
n n
cular. Without loss of generality we further suppose that every decision maker n oon-
troIs one and only one decision c:x:rrponent an of a vector a, where anEA
n
and aEA =
A1x•..~; An designates the set of decision alternatives of the n-th decision maker.
'!hen the group decision problem oonsists of choosing alternatives aEA or, equi-
valently, in determining utility vectors uEU that the decision makers will regard as
solutions to their decision process. 'lhe camon decision rule of the group rrembers
detenni..nes the choice of such aEA or uEU. '!his rule can at the sane t:iIre serve to
characterize the solution approach used. In this oonnection, the notion of decision
rule rreans an operation Q: lRN _ lR N, which for each utility set UclRN chooses a sub-
set ~U, and thus for each decision set AClR N a subset of decision alternatives ~
with u(~)=ru. LQ = {u'EUlu'=Q[u(a) ],aEA}can be designated as set of the Q-optirral
solutions to the group decision problem.
For practical reasons the solution ru of the decision problem is to fulfil the fol-
10Ning requirements:
(A1 )
that is to say, there Im.1St exist at least one solution to each decision problem.
(A2)
that is to say, only such utility vectors will be suitable for solutions which can
be obtained by oorresponding feasible decision alternatives.
Designate M(U): ={uEUI~u}, where the utility vector u indicates the utility level
un = rrax nEn un (an,an), an = (a1,··· ,an- 1, an+1,··· ,~), (an,an)EA and nE[N]
an an
which the irrlividual decision makers can at least obtain within the group, then let
(A3) ru c M(U).
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Thus postulate (A3) requires the solutions to be individually rational (LUCE/RAIFFA
19~&, pp. 192/193).
Let P (u) = {uEU Iw~u/lwt:U => w=u} be the set of all Pareto-optimal utility vectors of
u. '!hen, the solution is to satisfy the oondition
(A4) LQ C P(U) ,
that is to say, consider efficient results only.
(AS) LQ is a one-elerrent set
insures the uniqueness of the solution.
'!he conditions (A1) - (AS) allCM a c::ament on the quality of the solution proposals
still to be presented, that rreans, a c:::ament with resf€Ct to their contribution to the
optimal decision in organizations. In this connection, existence, feasibility and in-
dividual rationality of the solution are quite obvious postulates derived fran plausi-
bility assurrptions. Fran the econanic point of view the requirerrent of Pareto-opti-
reality corresporrls to the use of synergic effects which can errerge in groups due to
the joint effort of several IreITi:lers. Under the conditions (A1) - (A4) the necessity
of a tmique solution results fran the follCMing fact: If there exist several Pareter
optimal solutions then sare decision makers will profit rrore fran one result vector
than fran another, and vice versa, so that with interests conflicting, a final solu-
tion to the decision problem has not yet been foum. Furtherrrore, uniqueness is ne-
cessary for a stable or equilibrated decision behaviour of the persons involved
(HARSANYI 1963, p.219; FRIEI:MAN 1971, p.7).
3. Organization-theoretic Notions of Solution
'!he organization-theoretic notions of solution which have been historically developed
in the literature are attributable to the effort to restrict the utility set U already
ex ante by eliminating obViously bad result vectors, without at the sarre tirre deter-
mining tmique solutions or even definitely establishing the decision rule of the orga-
nization.
a) SIM:N (1952/53, p. 42ff.) designates the set
~ = V(U) = {uEUlu(a)~u, aEA}
as viable solutions.
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Here u , nE[N], irrlicates the utility of the n-th decision !reker, which he can also
n
obtain without being a rrember of the organization, for example by joining another or-
ganization. 'l11e decisions made by the organization ITn.1St yield at least these utility
levels in order to insure the existence of the organization. The fulfi1IIent of the
postulates (Al) - (AS) by the viable solutions is dependent on the special location
of u and is realized if and only if UEP(U) holds, hence is located on the efficient
border of U. Generally, ha.vever, the viable solutions, if they exist, will be neither
Pareto-optimal nor unique so that, as a rule, this notion of solution is not suffi-
cient for determining an optilllal decision in the organization. 'l11e solutions which
will be considered in the follCMing are always asSlIDEd to be viable.
b) 'l11e Pareto-optimal solutions result fran
LQ = P(U),
hence are described by the efficient border of the utility set U. Unless for special
problem structures this border consists of one point only, the Pareto-optilllal solu-
tions will violate the postulate of uniqueness (AS), and, as a rule, not definitely
solve the organizational decision problem.
c) By individually maximal solutions SIM:N (1952/53, p.42fL) understands
N
LQ = leU) = U I (U) with I (U)n=l n n {uEUju = max u (a)} , nE[N],n aEA n
that is, they cx:nprise all result vectors which imply a maximal utility for one de-
cision !reker. Evident!y, the individuallY maximal solutions need not be pareto-opti-
mal, that is to say, the notion of solution underlying I (U) is generally incanpa-
tible with postulate (A4). Furthenrore, with interests of the organization rrembers
conflicting, I (U) nonnally is not a one-elerrent set, so that in this case also the
uniqueness postulate (AS) is Violated. Thus, I (U) is not generally acceptable as a
solution to the organizational decision problem.
d) A solution llI3.y be called organizationally maxilll3.1 if
LQ = {u=u(a), aEA} with u~ u (a) for all nE[N] ,n
aEA n
that is to say, if there exist decision alternatives which maximize the utility of all
organization rrenberssilllultaneously. 'l11e existence of such a solution is very strongly
dependent on the particular problem structure and, therefore, cannot generally be
assurred, so that (Al) need not be fulfilled. If, ha.lever, there exists an organizatio-
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nally maximal solution, then it fulfils all postulates (Al) - (AS). But in this
case, analogous to a perfect solution (GEXJFFRICN 1965, p.2) in decision situations
with multiple objectives, there no longer exists an organizational decision problem.
'!he properties of the organization-theoretic notions of solution dealt with are sare-
tines unsatisfactory with respect to the requirements (Al) - (AS), which can nainly
,be ascribed to the fact that they largely dispense with the formulation of a decision
behaviour camon to all organization rrentJers. Approaches taking this requirement into
account in different ways will be discussed !!'Ore thoroughly in the follaNing section.
4. GaIle- and Bargaining-theoretic Contributions to the Solving of Oqanizational
Decision Problans
4.1 Garre-theoretic Solution Approaches
a) For two-person cooperative ganes without side payments NASH (1953, p.136fL) has
indicated an axianatically founded solution which can be extended to N persons and
is then characterized as follaNS:
* NLQ = {u ED! II
n=l
N
(u*-t ) = max II [un(a)-t
n
), tED}.
n n aEA n=l
In this expression tED designates a disagreement vector - which is not Pareto-optirral -
fran the interior of D; t nay be given definitely by the rules of the gane, or be de-
tenninable by threat strategies (HARSANYI 1963, p.195fL) of the players. '!he optirral
solutions u* are then characterized by the fact that they maximize the product of all
utility increases with respect to the disagreerrent vector tED for the decision makers
involved. C'bviously, this so-called cooperative NASH solution satisfies the require-
rrents (Al) and (A2), as well as postulate (AJ) after the construction of t. CAl account
of the strictly monotonically increasing and strictly convex goal precept which follaNS
fran the underlying axians, the u* are Pareto-optirral and with the possible unique
choice of the disagreement vector tEO also unique, that is to say, they satisfy the
conditions (A4) am (AS). '!hus, as a whole, the cooperative NASH concept is well sui-
table for solving group decision problems. Furtherrrore, it has the properties which
are desirable for utility-theoretic considerations, that the solution u* is invariant
with respect to linear utility transforrrations, symretric with respect to the decision
makers am independent of irrelevant decision alternatives.
b) For solving of N-person cooperative gameswith side payments and transferable utilities
SHAPLEY (1953) has formulated the value (j)(v) of a game. Being defined on the characteristic
function v which describes the game it assigns the payoff (j)n (v) to each of the decision
makers nE[N] at the end of the game. In this connection v:P[N]-lR is a mapping of the
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power set of [N] into the real nUllbers, and for each coalition S, SEP[N] or S~N,
v(S) inlicates the cx::mron payoff under transferable utilities, which it can obtain
by the maximin strategy at the expense of the coalition N-S of the other players:
S N-S - - S N-S
un(a,a ), for all S::;N, a=(a,a )EA; (1 )
N designates the coalition consisting of all group decision nakers. Because of the
axianatic requi.rerrents which, accordin;J to SHAPLEY, the rrathematical structure of cp
has to satisfy it can be shONl1 that there exists a unique function cp describing the
value of the gane for each player nE [N] and readin;J as follONs:
cp (v)
n
= L
SeN
(S-1) ! (N-S) !
----- [v(S)-v(S-{n}) ], nE[N],
N!
S= JlSII and N= IINII. (2)
(3)
'!he solution correspondin;J to the SHAPLEY value can be fonnally represented as fol-
lows:
With regard to expression (1) existence and uniqueness of the solution u* fallON di-
rectly fran fonrula (2). Pareto-optirrality of u* is guaranteed by the axianatic con-
struction of cp, since the maximal payoff which can be jointly obtained for all players
will be distributed fully to them due to the solution vector u*, that is to say,
~ u* =v(N) holds. u* continues to be inlividually rational since the function cp
n=1 n
satisfies the conditions cp (v»v({n}) for all nE[N]. '!he feasibility of u* is ascri-
n -
bable to the classification of the considered gane by admitted side payrrents and
transferable utilities, since the utility set is then characterized by
N
U = {ul L
n=1
and u* ED holds because of Pareto-optirrality. '!hus, in case of a possible equivalent
rrappin;J of the group decision prd:>lem by the gane situation discussed here, all requi-
rerrents (A1) - (AS) for its solution are satisfied, so that in this sense the SHAPLEY
value can serve as a concept of solution. Its workability in real cases, ho.vever, is
questionable due to the fact that it can only be used for solvin;J ganes with trans-
ferable utilities in whidl side paynents take place. Under practical aspects these
assurrptions are critical and clearly limit the efficiency of the SHAPLEY value with
respect to the solution of decision prcblerrs in organizations.
c) SHAPLEY himself has i.nj icated a way which allows the extension of his solution
idea to cooperative ganes without side payments; thus it is made IlDre attractive
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for the application to organizational decision problems. As oprx:lSed to the concept of
value of the garce this proposal is referred to as evaluation of a garce (SHAPLEY 1964;
SHAPLEY/SHUBIK 1969). 'Ihe startirY:J pJint for derivirY:J the SHAPLEY evalution once llOre
is the characteristic function v which, hONever, is nON given by the rnappirY:J v:
P[NJ-lR S, SE[N], since there are no side payrrents. It assigns to each cnalition SeN
- S - --
a subset v(S)elR , S= lISI!, of feasible payoff vectors. 'Ihe sets v(S) are subsets of
the utility set U=V(N)elRN, that is to say, V(S)~(N) for all SeN; they are assurred
N - -
to be convex, closed and nonempty. Its vectors u =(un)nESEV(S) result frcm the pro-
jection of eorrespJrrling uEU into lR S, and consequently contain just as many eat'I{Xr
nents as there are nembers in the cnalition S. In order to ext.errl the SHAPLEY appro-
ach represented in b) to garre situations of this kind the follONirY:J procedure is taken
for detenn:ining the SHAPLEY evaluation:
1• By rescalirY:J the utility functions of the decision makers by a vector
(4)
the utility set U=v(N)of the cooperative garre without side payrrents will be
transfo:rned into the utility set U'=v' (N)={U' IU'=(A1ul' .•• '''N~)=:>A, u<, uEU}
of another ocoperative garre without side paynents, where
- S;; S S S - -- S
v' (S)={u' lu' = >A ,u <,u Ev(S)}, SeN and A =(An)nES (5)
holds.
2. 'Ihe cooperative garce without side payrrents with the transfonned characteristic
function v' is nON treated as a corresp:mdirY:J cooperative garce with side pay-
ments and transferable utilities. 'Ihe latter then pJSsesses the characteristic
function v" (S) .
3. On the basis of v" carput.e the SHAPLEY value
(j)(v")=u
according to (2).
(6)
4. If nON uEU'=v' (N) holds, that is to say, if there exists a u*El)=v(N) with the
property
(j)(v")=u= >A,U*<, (7)
then u - and consequently u* - can be obtained also without drawirY:J on side pay-
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rrents. U*EU which, after rescaling the utility functions, corresponds to uEU'
on retw:ning to the original cooperative gaIlE without side paynents is to
be regarded as the solution of this gaIlE, that is to say, let
L = {u*EUI >A,U*< = (j)(v")}.Q
A'U* is referred to by SHAPIEY as the evaluation of a gaIlE if and only if A
and u* satisfy the requirerrents (4) and (7).
'!he SHAPIEY evaluation A'U* fulfils the existence postulate (A1) for any finite N-
person cooperative garre without side paynents (SHAPIEY 1964); according to its con-
struction the appropriate solution vector u* will then also 00ey the requireIrents
(A2) - (A4). As opposed to the SHAPIEY value, in this case the uniqueness is dep:m-
dent on the possible unique choice of the scaling vector A, so that the fulfi1IIent
of (AS) cannot generally be insured. Precisely this deficiency, however, gives rise
to the strongest objections as regards the practical use of the SHAPLEY evaluation
for solVing organizational decision problems. An additional difficulty is the fact
that the relative utility positions of the decision makers shift in the solution
vector u* when the relative utility weights are changed by the choice of A (FANDEL
1979, p.52). '!herefore, in higher-dimensional problems it is hardly any longer pos-
sible to predict in which way solution u* will behave in case of variation of A if
there exist several evaluations A'U* for a cooperative garre without side paynents.
d) Extending the m:i.nima.x eriterion developed for hJcrperson zerosum garres NASH (1951)
designates the set of equilibrium decisions a* in C'Ct11"OCl11 N-person non-cooperative garres
as their solution. '!his socalled non-cooperative NASH solution fonnally reads as fol-
IONS for the considered group decision situation
NASH has sh= that each non-cooperative gaIlE of this kind possesses at least one
equilibrium vector a*EA. Such equilibria are at the sarre tirre feasible and individu-
ally rational. As opposed to these positive staterrents with respect to the postulates
(A1) - (AJ) the requirerrents (M) of pareto-opt.:ilnality and (AS) of uniqueness cannot
nonnally be insured for the non-cooperative equilibria (WCE/RAIFFA 1958, p.106ff.;
SHUBIK 1960). '!herefore, the non-cooperative NASH concept cannot generally be conside-
red to be a satisfactory approach to the solution of group decision problems.
e) In order to ccne fram nonefficient equilibria in non-cooperative garres to such
equilibria with Pareto-opt.:ilnal utility vectors FRIEJ:l.1AN (1971) starts fran the for-
nulation of a supergarre ronsisting in the infinite periodical repetition of a given
nOJ:mal garre. 'II::> deal with it, a new class of non-cooperative supergarre equilibria is
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introduced by definition, first assuming that the nonnal garre possesses only a (oon-
efficient) equilibrium cEA. In this connection for each decision maker nE[N] a super-
game strategy a~ on the basis of a decision vector a' EA which strictly daninates the
nonnal equilibrium c with respect to the utility - that is to say, for which uta')
»u(c) holds - may be constructed as follcws:
{ a~, if an'T=a~, , n1'n', T=1, ... ,t-1, t>l,a =nt c
n
otherwise.
a'AllCJ.oling (8), the supergame stategy a = (a ' , a ' , ... )
librium if it fulfils the condition
(8)
represents a noncooperative equi-
~ t-1 - ~ t-1L." u (a'»u (a',b )+L." u (c) for all nE[N].
t=l n n n n n t=2 n n
(9)
"n designates the discount rate of the decision maker n; it is constant for all peri-
ods t. u (a',b )=rnax{u (a',a ) la EA }, nE[N], indicates the maximal yield which he can
nnn nnn nn
achieve at the expense of all other players by deviating once fran a'. Since condition
(9) after splitting, applying the sum fo=la and regrooping, is equivalent to
u (a'»u (c)+(l-a )[u (a',b )-u (c)) =u+(a'), nE[N], (10)
n n nnnnn n
the class of the non-cooperative supergarne equilibria can nCJ.ol be described in the uti-
lity space by the following set U~' cU:
a' +UG ={uEUlu(a'»>u (a') and u(a'»>u(c), a'EA}. (11)
If (10) is transformed into (12)
"n1-~ [u (a')-u (c)]>u (a',b )-u (a'), nE[N], (12)~ n n nnnn
n
it can be seen that the supergarne strategy aa=(a,a, ... ), resulting fran the infinite
repetition of a strategy aEA of the nonnal game daninating the equilibrium c belongs
to U~', if for each decision maker the single net gain obtainable by deviating fran
a - right hand side of the inequation (12) - is smaller than the cash value of the
permanent utility losses to be expected on account of the reaction of the partners -
left hand side of the inequation (12). According to (8) any other supergarre strategy
an for player n is weakly daninated either by a~=(an1,an2"") or a~=(bn,cn,cn"")'
4-
Now, in order to particularly mark a Pareto-optimal aa in the sense of (8) as solu-
tion among the equilibria of the supergame, FRIEIl-1AN proposes that the tenptation to
deviate fran a* is to be equally large for all players, that means
* * * 0' * *:ru={u EUlu =uta )EP(UG ) and vn(a )=Vn , (a ) for all n, n'E[N]} .
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(13 )v (a*)
n
The tanptation to deviate v (a*) is defined by:
- n
-* *un(an,bn)-un(a )
, nE[N].
u (a*)-u (c)
n n
The existence of such a decision alternative a * is not generally guaranteed since the
set u~' - and thus also LQ - can becerne empty ac=rding to =ndition (10) in case of
small discount rates (that is high time preferences) of the decision makers. For suf-
ficiently high discount rates, however, the fulfilment of p:>stulate (Al) can be in-
sured. In this case a* will also satisfy the requirenents (A2) - (A4). The uniqueness
of the solution,' however, cannot be guaranteed at the same time (FRJ:EI1I1AN 1971, p.
8 ff.), which means that on account of a p:>ssible violation of (AS) the FRIEIMAN
=ncept can be used for solving the group decision problan in special cases only.
4.2 Bargaining- theoretic Solution Approaches
a) The N-person bargaining rrodel developed by HARSANYI (1963) is based on the idea to
generalize the <XXJperative NASH solution (NASH 1950 and 1953) which has been =ncei-
ved for tv.o-person decisions. As opp:>sed to the determination of solution described
in 4.1 a) the N-person decision in the HARSANYI medel, however, must first be de-
cernp:>sed into a set of tv.o-person subgames between all p:>ssible pairs n and n' fran
[N] ac=rding to the mathanatical =ncept of the theory of bargaining. Allowing for
their interdependence the resulting subgame will then have to be formulated so mutu-
ally =nsistently with respect to the partial =nditions of solution that subsequently,
the total solution of the group decision problan can be cernp:>sed of than in the form
of an equilibrium strictly taking tv.o-person subgames as a basis.
Let the function f(u)=O describe the efficient border P(U) of the utility set U in
parametric form, and let it be differentiable. With the analytic properties of the
=operative NASH solution for the tv.o-person decision problan the optimal total solu-
tion to the general N-person bargaining problan
(14.4)
* * NLQ={U EUlu =u }
which in the HARSANYI medel has successively been cernp:>sed of the solutions to tv.o-
party subgames can then be characterized by the following systan of necessary =rrli-
tions (HARSANYI 1963, pp. 214/215):
Nf(u )=0 ; (14.1)
N N
cn=fn(u )=3f/au
n
lu; nEN; (14.2)
S SO S ,0 I
un=un(a ,a ); nES, SeN, S =N-S; (14.3)
t 1t L (-1 )s-r+l uRn; nES; S5N, s= 11511 >1, r= II RII ,.
n ReS
nER
197
(14.5)
(14.6)
Conditions (14.1), (14.2), (14.5) and (14.6) are expressive of the fact that for a
consistent construction of the bargaining result according to the a:q:Jerative NASH
concept, the criteria of optimality of the total solution must be of prirre ilnportance
for all nro-person or t\ro-party subganes, too. A=rding to (14 . 3) the utility of the
decision mak~ n in the coalition S is dependent on the choice of optimal threat
strategies as and a
Slo
by the nro coalitions S and S' . When he joins this coalition
his disagreement payoff, however, according to (14.4) will consist of the cumulated
utility increases achieved by him in all subcoalitions ReS of which he was a nember
previously.
The optimal solution i of the problem (14.1) - (14.6) which, in its fonml1ation,
tries to make the rrost perfect use of the NASH axians for t\ro-person cooperative
ganes with respect to the theory of bargaining in general, fulfils the requirerents
(A1) - (M). Difficulties, h<JlNever, in unrestrictedly accepting u*=uN as optimal
solution to the organizational decision problem may arise from the fact that the
disagreement payoffs are variable on account of threat strategies, so that the solu-
tion uN need rot necessarily be unique. '!his violation of (AS) is, however, avoid-
able by uniquely presetting t S •
n
Other bargaining-theoretic awroaches on the basis of the cooperative NASH concept
have been fonml1ated by LEMAIRE (1973), MIYASAWA (1964) and ISBELL (1960). Further
gane-theoretically founded solution pro{XJsals with regard to the bargaining problem
which start out from systems ofaxians different from those of NASH may be found in
KRELLE (1975).
b) As an alternative to such gane-theoretically founded approad1.es of the theory of
bargaining CXlNI'INI and ZIONI'S (1968) have conceived a concessive bargaining rrodel
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in which the solution to the group decision problem is simultaneously detennined by
agreerrent of all group rrembers. This agreerrent is reached under threat of an i.rrposed
solution yEU by means of a process of concession which is continuous with respect to
time and leads to the solution
Here z(t) designates the decision makers' aspiration levels at time t, declining in
the course of the process of concession. At the beginning let z (0)=0., that is to say,
let the aspiration levels tally with the individual utility maxima of the group at
time t=O. The concession behaviour of the decision makers which is achieved tv the
threat of an i.rrposed solution is described by the following system of conditions:
{
k (t)<O, ifLQ=¢andzn(t»Yn'
dZ
n
(t) /dt= n
o otherwise,
nE[N] . (15)
( 16)
Consequently, every decision maker is ready to make concessions only as long as no
feasible solution has been found and his aspiration level remains above the payoff
which would be yielded to him in case of the i.rrposed solution. If one of the condi-
tions does no longer apply, then the concession rate k
n
(t) will become equal to zero.
In order to insure according to the fOstulate (A1) the existence of a solution, that
is to say LQ#IJ, the functions k
n
(t) are subjected to the following additional suffi-
cient conditions that for every k
n
(t) there exists a t~, O~t~<=, with
t'
n
- J k (-r)dT=U -y, nE[N].
n n n
o
Thus, even if the condition LQ=¢ in (15) is neglected the concession path z(t) for
a finite t'=rrax {t~lnE[N]} would at any rate have at least to lead to the i.rrposed sol-
ution yEU as stationary solution. With the existence the feasibility requirerrent (A2)
is at the same time fulfilled by the solution u*. The individual rationality (fOstu-
late (AJ)) of u*, however, is not autanatically given; it is rather dependent on the
clever choice of the i.rrposed solution y. Sufficient for the guarantee of individually
rational solutions is y<::u. Pareto-optimality and uniqueness of the solution u*, as
well, cannot generally be insured without additional conditions. CXJNTINI and ZICNrS
have sho.vn that (M) and (AS) are fulfilled if the utility set is strictly convex. It
is also sufficient if for the location of the i.rrposed solution yEU n(y)nR(U)cp(U)
holds with n(y)={uEJRNIUZy} and R(U) as border of the utility set U (FANDEL ~979, p.
115) .
It is evident that the concessive bargaining rrodel developed by CCNI'INI and ZIONTS can be
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used for solving the group decision problem on certain additional conditions only, the
existence of which must always be separately examined. Nevertheless, this concept
with its spontaneous elements of behaviour - expressed in concession rates - may by
all means be regarded as a practic~riented alternative to the axianatically fourrled
solution approaches. '!he question, ha.vever, in hew far the concession rates of the de-
cision makers can rationally be accounted for, remains still to be answered. '!his pr0-
blem will be treated in the next section concludi.rB this paper.
4.3 On the Rationalizing of the Concession Behaviour
It is unsatisfactory, that so far there are only two-person concepts available for ra-
tionally elaborating the concession behaviour characterized according to (15) (FANDEL
1979, p.120fL). '!heir ability to give information about the solution of the group de-
cision problem is limited correspondingly; yet, they indicate possibilities of deve-
loprent with respect to elaborating the rational foundations of the concessive bargain-
ing rrodels urrler the aspect of their usefulness in practice.
MJst of the approaches can be reduced to the idea of the bargaining theoran developed
by ZEUTHEN (1930, chapter 4). According to this theoran the concession behaviour for
jointly detennining a Pareto-optimal solution vector u*EP (V) depends on the subjective
probabilities of conflict which can maximally be accepted by the UNo bargaining part-
ners; the farner result fran the Pareto-optirral proposals arrl counterproposals which
are made by the two players in the course of the process of concession. At the begin-
ning let u1 and u2 , u1#U2, be the proposal arrl counterproposal of the first and the
second decision maker, respectively. Let uEU represent the disagreerrent or conflict
point, and let V'={UEUJU?u}. '!hen the following conclusions can be drawn with respect
to the first decision maker:
1. He can definitely achieve the utility u~ if he accepts the counterproposal u2 of
the second decision maker (action 1).
2. If, ha.vever, he rejects u2 persisting in his proposal u 1 (action 2) the expected
value of his utility will be u1rr+u~ (1-rr), where rr indicates the probability that deci-
sion maker 2 will risk a conflict.
'!he subjective conflict prabability P1 which is maximally acceptable for decision
maker 1 and with which he is just able to keep up his proposal then results from the
indifference between the two actions indicated, that is to say, if one has
1 2 1-
or P1=(u1-u1)/(u1-U1) (17)
Correspondingly, for the second decision maker one obtains:
200
(18)
Accxm:ling to ZElJIHEN row a cxmeessioo is made by the decision maker nE {1,2} far whan
P~n,l pn,pn,>O and n,n'E{1 ,2}, nt!n' , (19)
holds, that is to say, by that decision maker who is not able to cope with a greater
prcbability of cxmflict than his bargaining partner. '!he concession cx:nsists of a new
proposal (e.g. 0.2 instead of u2) which causes the probability of conflict maxillIally end-
urable to becane greater again than that of the cxmtrahent, thus forcing the latter to
make cxmeessions for his part. '!his process is iteratively cxmtinued until a camon
agreenent solution u*EP(U') is obtained. If, allowing for the expressions (17) and (18)
oondition (19) is transfomed into the equivalent inequation
(20)
far N=2, 1t can be seen that the rationalizing of the concession behaviour in the bar-
gaining theorem by ZEUTHEN is identical with the axians of the oooperative NASH so-
lution (see section 4.1 a». '!he E!!d:leCldi.ng of a ooncessioo behaviour thus rationali-
zed in the system (15) of the bargaining rredel by a:NI'lNI and ZIONrS is quite obvious
now if there the process 1s diseretized by proposals and oounterpro~als un (t) EP (U' ) ,
nE{1,2}, at t:irIes t, t=o,1,2, •.•. Using the old synbols 'I.e then have: y=U, z (0)=0. =
max {u luEU' }=un(O) and n n
n n
o otherwise,
n,n'E{1,2} and nt!n',
with (15' )
k
n
(t)=u~(t+1 )-u~(t) and un (t+1)with the p=perty that no uEP(U')
2 2
exists with u >un (t+1) and IT (u -u » IT [~(t+1)-u ],
n n =1 r r =1 r
nE{1,2} and tE{0,1,2, ... }.
'!he extension of the thus described rational ooncession behaviour according to (20)
or (15 ') to N persons, N>2, is obvious, but 1t can no longer fornally be concluded
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from the bargaining theorem by ZEU'IHEN (condition 19). 'Ihe above remarks shew, heM-
ever, that the oorrbination of game-theoretic axians and concessive bargaining llDdels
whidl are based on spontaneous elements of behaviour may yield valuable suggestions
for the solving of group decision problems.
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INTERACTIVE GROUP DECISION MAKING BY COALITIONS
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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses some aspects of group decision making by coalitions.
In Section 2 we analyse and illustrate efficiency concepts with regard to group
decision making. Section 3 - which is the main part of the paper - is devoted
to the design of an interactive decision support system for group decision mak-
ing by coalitions. Thi~ interactive decision support system is not based on the
assumption that individual or collective preference systems can be represented
by preference functions.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we explore some of the difficulties inherent in attempting to
determine a compromise al terna tive for a multiple objective planning =del with
respect to multiple decision makers (DMs). In the course of a collective decision
process intrapersonal as well as interpersonal conflict situations have to be mas-
tered by the DMs involved in the collective decision process. The intrapersonal
conflict situation of each individual DM may be characterized by the impossibili-
ty to achieve all his or her objectives simultaneously: some alternative provides
an acceptable criterion value for one criterion but unsatisfactory values for the
remaining criteria whereas other alternatives provide acceptable criterion va-
lues for some of the latter criteria but fall behind acceptable criterion values
with respect to other criteria. The interpersonal conflict situation arises as
the criterion values which are accepted by the indivudial DMs lead to the se-
lection of alternatives which are mutually incompatible.
Many decisions in both the public and private sectors are made via majority
voting. In these situations an agreement on an alternative is not demanded from
all DMs involved in the collective decision process but from a defined majority
of DMs. This majority forms a coalition of J out of K DMs. If an unani=us agree-
ment on an alternative is necessary then all K DMs form this coalition. Thus the
structure of collective decision processes where all DMs have to agree on an al-
ternative may be regarded as a special case of collective decision making via
majority voting.
Attempts to characterize a welfare function for the coalition of J ~ K DMs
and then to maximize this welfare function might be considered a reasonable ap-
proach to resolve the collective decision problem. However, such a social wel-
fare function does not generally exist, as shown by ARROW (1). KERSTEN et al.
(8,9) propose a collective decision support system for a linear multiple object-
ive planning =del with respect to several DMs which is based on the assumption
that the individual DMs' preference systems can be represented by a linear uti-
lity function. WENDELL (12) views the collective decision process as a majority
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voting game. He implicitly assumes that each individual DM has stable preferen-
ces in the course of the whole decision process and that his preference system
can be represented by a utility function with specified properties. However, our
own experiments support the hypothesis that the formation of the individual DM's
valuation system is neither =mplete nor definite at the beginning of the de-
cision process (cf. e.g. (3,7)). Rather the formation of the DM's implicit valu-
ation system develops in the course of the decision process and it was observed
in our experiments that the formation process of the individual DM's valuation
system is attended by =nsecutive IlDdifications of one or IlDre objectives. Thus
we shall desist from designing a decisi.on support system which is based on the
prior assumption that the individual DM's valuation system can be represented by
a scalar-valued utility or preference function. Our approach is keyed to an in-
teractive collective decision support system which provides for both. resolving
intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict Situations. The structure of the col-
lective decision support system will be based on the concept of mediation (11).
In some recent papers by GRAUER and WIERZBICKI (4.13,14) we also find the con-
cept of mediation integrated in a collective decision support system.
The structure of the collective decision support system we are going to pre-
sent will become subject of an empirical investigation. In the course of this
empirical inquiry we want to test the suitability of the proposed structure with
regard to resolving practical multi-DMs decision problems.
2. MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE PLANNING MODELS WITH RESPECT TO MULTIPLE DECISION MAKERS
We assume that K DMs are members of a committee which has to select an al-
ternative x from a set of alternatives X. Let k = 1•... ,K be the index set of
the DMs. Each alternative is to be evaluated in terms of its performance on se-
veral criteria. Let i = 1, ... ,Ik be the index set of the finite number of attri-
butes the k-th DM considers relevant with regard to the current decision problem.
We assume that each DM k 1, ••• ,K can give ordinal or cardinal scores zki (x)
for each alternative x E X on each attribute i = 1 ••.. ,Ik . Without loss of ge-
nerality we assume that for each attribute i each DM k prefers higher scores to
lower scores. Let Zk(x) = (~1 (x) ••. "zkI (x))T be the vector valued criterion
k
function of the k-th DM. Then the multiple objective planning IlDdel with respect
to a commi ttee of K DMs may be formulated as:
"maximize" zl (x)
"maximize" zK(x)
s. t. (1)
x E x.
In the sequel we shall assume that all DMs involved in the collective decision
problem agree that (1) adequately represents the problem under consideration.
As long as all K DMs have to agree on a final compromise alternative this
alternative which is to be unaniIlDusly chosen from the set of alternatives has
to be an efficient alternative. x* E X is called efficient alternative for (1),
if and only if, by definition there is no alternative x· E X such that
zk(x') ~ zk(x*) for all k = 1, ..•• K
and zk(x') ;::~(x*) 1) foratleastonekE {l, .•.• K}.
1)
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Let XE denote the set of all efficient alternatives for (1). Thus ~ contains
the set of nominees for a compromise alternative which is to be unanimously se-
lected by all K DMs of the committee.
As soom as in the course of the collective decision process the concept of
unanimity is repleaced by a majority concept the above efficiency concept is no
more appropriate (5, pp. 17). Let KJ ; {kl, ..• ,kJ } c [l, .•. ,K} be a coalition
with J DMs (K/2 < J ~ K). Obviously, an alternative on which all members of a
coalition KJ have to agree has to be efficient with respect to all objective
functions of the members of KJ but no more with respect to the objective funct-
ions of the other DMs who are not merrbers of the coalition KJ . x* E X is called
KJ-efficient alternative for (1), if and only if, by definition there is no al-
ternative x' E X such that
zk(x') ~ zk(x*) for all k E KJ
and
Let XE(KJ ) denote the set of all KJ-efficient alternatives for (1). Each
x E ~(KJ) is a nominee for a compromise alternative which is to be unanimously
selected by the J members of the coalition KJ .
A further useful efficiency concept with respect to collective decision
making via majority voting is the concept of J-efficiency. Let J > K/2. x* E X
is called J-efficient alternative for (1), if and only if, by definition x* is
KJ-efficient for at least one coalition KJ C [l, ... ,K}. Let ~(J) denote the set
of all J-efficient alternatives for (1). Hence XE(J) contains the set of nominees
for a compromise alternative which is to be unanimously selected by at least J
out of K DMs. In other words: X (J) contains the set of nominees for the J-majo-
rity core (cf. e.g. (10». E
3. OUTLINE OF AN INTERACTIVE COLLECTIVE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
3.1 Mediation of Interpersonal Conflicts
The complexity of the collective decision process calls for a structure of
of the decision support system which provides for an alternation of individual
and collective decision stages. Typically the criterion values that one DM re-
gards as acceptable at the end of an individual decision process would result in
selecting an alternative which is different from those alternatives which other
DMs would like to see implemented. Let (Z~l""'Z~I ) be the vector of criterion
k
values which has been accepted by the k-th DM at the end of the R-th stage of
his individual decision process,
th f h R ('be e set 0 alternatives w ich meet the criterion values zki ~
and let KJ be a coalition of J DMs (K/2 < J ~ K). If
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then an alternative which is mutually acceptable by all members of KJ exists.
When negotiating problems of comparable complexity the negotiating indivi-
dual DMs often join a mediator in a joint-problem-solving quest for a reasonable
compromise solution. The mediator may accumulate information from each indivi-
dual DM in a balanced way and provide analytical, problem-solving skills in or-
der to help the DMs to solve the joint problem (lll. The mediator concept will
be a substantial component of the structure of the collective decision support
system we are going to present in this section. The collective decision process
will be decomposed into individual decision phases where the individual DMs en-
gaged in the collective decision process try to resolve the intrapersonal con-
flicts subject to constraints which have been imposed by the mediator in order
to facilitate a commom agreement. If an agreement on a compromise alternative
has to be reached by a coalition K
J
the role of the mediator may be even more
comprehensive as the composition of the final coalition K
J
as well as the com-
promise alternative on which the members of K
J
agree become the main issues of
the collective decision process.
Typically, a coalition may not be known at the beginning of the collective
decision process, and in the course of the collective decision process some DMs
may leave a tentative coalition while others may want to join a coalition. In
order to facilitate the formation process of a coalition K
J
the mediator may
consider a tentative coalition ~ c {l, ... ,K} of L 2 J DMs during the initial
stages of the collective decision process and successively reduce ~ to some
appropriate KJ as the collective decision process terminates.
The negotiation process within a coalition is easier to support if no DM
involved in the collective decision process has to renounce the full realization
of the accepted criterion values. The mediator may therefore offer to the indi-
vidual DMs only a proportion a ki of the true criterion values zki in the course
of the individual decision process and hold out a prospect of further increases
of criterion values in the course of the collective decision process. During the
initial stages of the collective decision process the values of the a ki should
not be close to 1 in order to allow for a "smooth" process of negotiations.
3.2 Structure of the Decision Support System for the Individual Decision Maker
The collective negotiation process is easier to support if no DM involved
in the collective decision process has to renounce the full realization of the
currently accepted criterion values. Thus the mediator should be prepared to
suggest joint imporovements to the currently accepted criterion values in order
to facilitate the collective decision process. This can be accomplished if the
individual DMs are offered only a proportion of the true criterion values.
Let
~o
zki : max {zki (x) I x E X} (i : 1, •.• , I k ; k : 1, ••• , K) ,
n denote the current stage of the collective decision process and ~ denote a
subset of {l, ... ,K} with L > J DMs.
Moreover, let y be an optimal solution for
min y
/
-0
s.t. zki(x) zki + y ~ 1
Y > 0
x E X
i 1 , ••. , I k ; Y k E ~
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With y> y be fixed by the mediator the initial "feasible" set for the L DMs en-
gaged in the collective decision process is (with n = 1):
For n > 1 the "feasible" set for the L DMs will be constructed in a different
way. Let r be the stage-index of the interactive decision process for the k-th
DM and R denote the final stage for given n. Moreover let (z~l' ... 'Z~I ) Vk E: KLk
be the vectors of criterion values a~cepted by the L members of ~ in stage (n-l)
of the collective decision process, B be an optimal solution for
max B
iS.t.Zki(x) RBZki ~ 0
x E: X
and Bn ~ min {1, el be fixed by the mediator. The "feasible" set in stage n> 1
of the collective decision process is:
(i = 1, ... , I k ; V k E: ~)}.
Recall that the value of B provides the mediator with some information about the
potential mutual agreement within the tentative coalition ~.
In the course of the interactive decision process of the k-th DM at the be-
ginning of each new decision stage r (see also (2)) one or more vectors of cri-
terion values (z~1' ... ,zr ) are presented to the k-th DM. The DM is asked whetherkIk
r(i) he or she dislikes all currently presented criterion values zki (i = 1, ... ,
I k ) and thus wants to terminate the decision proces without accepting any
currently offered vector of criterion values;
(ii) he or she accepts all criterion values of a presented vector of criterion
r r
values (Zkl' ... 'ZkI
k
);
(iii) he or she accepts some criterion values of a presented vector of criterion
r r
values (zkl' ... ,zkI ) and wants to continue the interactive decision pro-
k
cess by stating lower bounds on some criterion values and/or reconsidering
lower bounds on criterion values fixed in earlier stages of the decision
process. Based on the DM's response the system which generates vectors of
criterion values to be proposed to the k-th DM is updated and new criterion
r+ 1 r+l
vecters (z kl , ... , zkI ) are generated by the system on the basis of the par-
k
tial information provided so far by the k-th DM about his or her preference
system.
In order to describe the individual decision process in more detail we in-
troduce the following notation:
- n : = a {z () x E: xn }zki m x ki x
"'Y
zki current lower bound on the criterion value zki (x) which has been
fixed by the k-th DM in the course of the first (r-l) stages of the
interactive decision process.
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current index set of those criteria for which the k-th DM has not
yet specified a lower bound ~~i in the course of the first (r-l)
stages of the interactive decision process.
a~i proportion of the true criterion value zki (x) which is revealed to
the k-th DM by the mediator in the n-th stage of the collective de-
cision process.
The applied model which generates the criterion-vectors to be presented to the
k-th DM in the course of his individual decision process reads:
min y - £ Z (x)
ki
-n
s.t. zki (x) / zki + Y ~ for all i E: D~
for all i I( D~
(2)
with £ being a sufficiently small but positive scalar. Let xr , yr be an optimal
solution for (2). Then the criterion values zr, ~akn, Zk,(Xr ) (i ~ 1, ... ,Ik )kl l l
are presented to the k-th DM in stage r of his individual decision process.
The interactive decision support system for the individual member k E: ~ is
outlined as follows:
Step 1 : Initialization
Step 2 : In order to generate a proposal for the k-th DM we determine an optimal
solution r r (2 ) cri terion values r n rx , y for and present the zki ~ a ki zki (x )
(i 1, ... ,Ik ) to the DM.
Step 3: If r ~ 1 go to Step 5 ; otherwise go to Step 4.
~rStep 4: Does the k-th DM want to modify one or more lower bounds zki in order to
provide for more attractive values for the criterion values zki (x)
r(i E: Dk )? If "yes", go to S,tep 9. If "no", go to Step 5.
Step 5: Does the k-th DM accept the criterion values Z~i for all i 1, ... ,I k ?
If "yes", go to Step 12. If "no", go to Step 6.
Step 6: Does the k-th DM accept for at least one i E: D: the cri terion value Z:i?
If "yes", go to Step 7. If "no", go the Step 13.
_r r r
Step 7: The k-th DM is asked to specify zki < zki for at least one i E: Dk which
imposes a lower bound on zki (x).
rStep 8: Actualize Dk and program (2). Go to Step II.
~rStep 9: The k-th DM is asked to reconsider the lower bounds zki and specify ac-
1 , ~r (l'.r Dr)tua lzed val ues fo r zki '" k'
Step 10: Actualize program (2).
Step 11: r :~ r+1 and go to Step 2.
Step 12: r : ~ R. The k-th DM continues the collective decision process with the
R R
acceptance of the criterion values (zk1'" "zkI ). Stop.
k
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Step 13: The multiple objective planning model does not
terion values for the k-th OM. If the mediator
{ n .i E 1, ... ,Ik} actualize the parameters a ki ln
Otherwise set KL : = ~ .... (k} . Stop.
provide acceptable cri-
increases a~i for some
(2) and go to Step 2.
3.3 Structure of the Mediator-Supported Collective Decision Process
At the beginning of each stage of the collective decision process the OMs
involved in the collective decision process determine simultaneously an acceptable
R R
vector of criterion values (zk1, ... ,zkI) in the course of an interactive de-
k
cision process as outlined in Section 3.2. As the formation of a coalition in
the course of a collective decision process may have to be supported by the me-
diator we shall first indicate how the mediator may be assisted in identifying
those OMs which - on the basis of their currently accepted criterion values
(z:l' ...• z~I ) - may be regarded as potential members of the coalition. With re-
k
spect to the formation of a coalition 3 cases have to be distinguished:
(i) KJ is not known at the beginning of the collective decision process:
1. Determine Xl with ~ := (l •...• K}
2. Let the OMs 1 •... ,K* < K terminate their individual decision process
b . .. ( R R) . IY acceptlng a crlterlon vector zk1" ..• ~Ik . A tentatlve proposa
for L ~ J nominees for a coalition K
J
is generated by means of the pro-
gram
K* I k
max e + E L: L: Ak zki (x)k=l i=l
s. t. zki (x) R Ak >0- S zki i
k
1, , Ik ;
1, , K* (3)
* x E XK
L: Ak > Lk=l
Ak E {O. I} *k = 1 •••• ,K
with E being a sufficiently small but positive scalar. Let x. B, Xl' ... '
XK* be an optimal solution for (3). Then a tentative proposal for the
composition of ~ :=> KJ would be ~ := (k E (1, ...• K} \ Xk = I}. Note
that x is a KL-efficient solution for (1).
(ii) K
J
is known and a stable coalition in the course of the collective decision
process: No support by the mediator is necessary.
(iii) KJ is not stable in the course of the collective decision process:
1. Each OM who may be considered to become nominee for membership in the
coalition is asked to determine an acceptable criterion vector (z~l' ... '
R n
zkI ) with respect to X .
k
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2. Let L 1 be the index set of those DMs who in all cases will be members of
the coalition and L2 be the index set of those DMs who may be considered
to become members of a coalition and have terminated their individual de-
, , b ' " ( R R)c~s~on process y accept~ng a cr~ter~on vector zk' , ... ,zk . A tenta-
~ I
k
tive proposal for L > J nominees for a coalition KJ may be generated by
means of the program
I k
max 8 + £ I:1 2 I: \ zki (x)kEL UL i=1
s. t. zki (x) 8 R Ak > i = 1, a •• , I k ,- zki 0 (4)
V k E L 1 U L
2
x E X
I: Ak 2: L
kEL 1UL 2
Ak V k E L
I
\ E {o, I} V k E L2
with £ being a sufficiently small but positive scalar. Let x, 8, ~k
(k E L 1 U L2 ) be an optimal solution for (4). Then a tentative proposal
for the composition of ~ would be ~ := {k E L I U L2 I Ak = I}. Reoall
that x is a KL-efficient solution for (I).
In the course of the collective decision process the mediator controls the
process of approaching a KJ-efficient alternative which has to be mutually ac-
cepted by the members of a coalition KJ . The formation of a coalition is adjust-
ed to the degree of unanimity with respect to the current values of the criterion
vectors (Z:I' ... 'Z:I ). The value of ~ in program (3) and (4) expresses which
proportion of (Z:I'.~.'Z:Ik) the marginal member of ~ can realize if the re-
spective alternative x is unanillDusly accepted by all k E ~. Other members of ~
may realize a higher proportion than S. The more DMs are inoluded in ~ the
smaller will be the optimal value of 8 in (3) and (4), respectively. If 6 ~
then no member of ~ has to renounce the full realization of the currently ac-
d " ( R Rcepte cr~ter~on values zkl'··· ,ZkI
k
).
Recall that the parameters (l~i which state the proportion of the true cri-
terion values to be revealed to the k-th DM in stage n of the collective decis-
ion process are to be fixed by the mediator. The optimal solution x for (3) or
n -(4) provides the mediator with an approximate upper bound for a ki : Let 8ki be
the maximal value for 8xci such that
holds.
R
zki > 0
R
zki (x )
i = 1, ... , I k
n-l
we obtain 8ki (lki as an approximate upper bound for
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The mediator-supported collective decision process has the following structure:
O. Initialization
1. Set n := n+1. Determine Xn and a~i (i = 1, .•. ,Ik ; k E KL ) and ask the DMsR
which are members of ~ ~ KJ to select an acceptable criterion vector (zk1'
R
z ) in order to continue the collective decision process .
... , kI
k
2. Have at least J DMs terminated the decision process with the selection of a
.. ( R R) f II II 3 If "no", 6cr~ter~on vector zk1'.'.' zkI
k
? I yes, go to . go to .
n3. Is X "small" enough to propose a KJ-efficient alternative to all DMs cur-
rently engaged in the collective decision process? If "yes", go to 4. If "no",
go to 5.
4. Set L = J. Solve program (3) or (4) and propose a KJ-efficient alternative x
with (zk (~) , ... ,zk (~)) to the members of KJ .1 J
If all J DMs accept this proposal the collective decision process <terminates.
Otherwise go to 5.
5. Solve program (3) or (4) with L 2; J and go to 1.
6. Ask potential nominees for membership in KJ to select an acceptable criterionR R
vector (zk1""'z ) and go to 7.kIk7. Have at least J DMs terminated the decision process with the selection of a
criterion vector (z~l, ... ,z~I)? If "yes", go to 3. If "no" increase the
current set Xn or increase k some values of a~i (i E {l, ... ,Ik}, k E {1,
..• ,K}) and go to 1 or terminate the collective decision process.
It is hoped that the presented structure of a mediator-supported collect-
ive decision process produces a compromise alternative which is mutually accept-
ed by the members of a coalition K if the DMs behave constructively. An empi-
rical analysis will provide the ne~essary information about the suitability of
the proposed structure.
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ON THE ROLE OF DYNAMICS AND INFORMATION IN
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: THE CASE
OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT
Veijo KaitaJa and Raimo HiimiiUiinen
Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
1. Introduction
Fishery resource management is an intrinsically dynamic problem where
current harvest decisions affect the possibilities of harvesting in
the future. Moreover, in the case of two or more harvesting agents,
the harvesters face a complicated dynamic game problem the solution
of which depends on the behavioural strategies adopted (cooperative
or non-cooperative management, myopic or foresighted optimization
etc). Decision making in such an environment means negotiations and
bargaining on the management strategies as well as on the planning
horizon considered. These questions will be discussed in Section 2.
In Section 3 we will illustrate problems which are related to the
practical negotiation policies in international fishery management.
2. On dynamic interactions and negotiations
2.1. A model framework for resource management
Consider a two-agent resource management problem, where the resource
dynamics is described by a differential equation model of the form
x (t) = G(x(t» - hI (t) - h 2 (t) , x(O) =xo ' (1)
where the dot (.) denotes the time derivative. The state variable
representing the n substocks of fish in different fishing grounds is
denoted by the vector x = (xl' ••. ,x
n
). The function G(.) includes
the resource growth and the interdependence of the subfisheries on
each other. The harvest rate of agent i in substock j
total harvest is given by vector hi (hil, ... ,h in ),
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harvest rates are assumed to depend on the stock, x j ' and on the
related fishing effort, E .. , and
1)
( 2)
The instantaneous revenue flow to an agent i from the fishery,
R. (x,h.,h.), depends on the stock, and on the harvest rates. Over a
1 1)
fixed time interval [O,T], the total net revenue for an agent i is
J T TJ -so te J. R.(x,h.,h.)dt, i,j=1,2, itj , (3)i 0 1 1)
where si is the discount rate of agent i. The agents represent
countries or independent fishing fleets of different nationalities.
The interest in mutual negotiations among the agents arises due to
the agents' interdependence through the resource dynamics (eq. (1»
and to the joint interests in the marketing (eq. (3». Moreover,
another type of possible interdependence is the crowding effect
because the effort of one fleet can affect the harvesting of the
other fleet. These interdependencies make a resource exploitation
problem a dynamic multiagent decision making problem (see e.g. 3,4,
6-10, 14,15,17-20,25). The consequences of different behavioural
patterns of the agents can be effectively analysed by the theories of
dynamic games and bargaining.
In the analyses of the resource management and negotiation problem
each agent needs to make a decision about the following questions all
of which are closely related to the problem's dynamics:
1) Resource's growth law and each others utility functions
(models (1) - (3».
2) The time horizon of planning.
3) Framework for cooperation:
a) What happens in the case of no agreement, what is the
status quo?
b) Practical and credible ways of quaranteeing cooperation
over the whole planning horizon.
The modelling of the exploitation dynamics (1) - (3) is not a simple
problem. In practice, such a modelling process is based on extensive
field research and data collection carried out by national fishery
research institutes. Only very seldom one could expect to find a
generally accepted stock model. The population models tend to change
following the improvement in the understanding of the fishery.
214
When the planning time horizon is considered, the possibilities
available can be roughly divided into three categories: myopic
decision making, decision making over a fixed and finite time
horizon, and decision making over an infinite time horizon. The
planning horizons of the agents need not always be the same (for a
development of this topic, see (10». For clarity, we shall restrict
our treatment to myopic decision making and agreements made over an
infinite time horizon.
2.2. Myopic decisions
Myopic decision makers are either unwilling (e.g. infinite discount
rate) or unable to take into account the development of the resource
in the future. A myopic agent i optimizes the current instantaneous
revenue flow due to the harvest
Ma x R. (x, h . , h .) , i J'
1 1 J 'hi
1,2, i t- j. (4)
Necessary conditions for myopic interior solutions
cooperative optimization problems are
of non-
(5)
Thus, on each stock level x(t) the agents face a static decision
making problem, which changes over time due to changes in the
resource stock. However, the future growth potential of the resource
is not taken into account in the current decisions.
The agents can also agree on cooperation in a myopic sense. In this
case the myopic cooperative solution is obtained by solving the
problem
(6 )
and bargaining over the weight ul at each time instant. Usually the
solution of (6) differs from the non-cooperative solution of (4).
The agreement will then depend on the current value of the state,
x(t). Moreover, a myopic cooperative agreement is vulnerable to
cheating in the same sense as the dynamic solution (see discussion
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below). Since myopic decisions do not depend on the future growth
potential of the resource, threats cannot be used to support the
agreements in the same way as they can be used in dynamic
optimization.
2.3. Dynamic bargaining
The analysis of multiagent decision making is complicated due to the
nonuniqueness of the possible rationality concepts of the agents,
even when each agent has a single decision criterion. Besides the
choice between cooperative and non-cooperative agreements, we usually
encounter non-unique equilibrium solutions depending e.g. on the
choice of decision or control variables (8,25). Moreover, cooperative
solutions are affected by the choice of the bargaining schemes (1) as
well as by the choice of disagreement solutions.
In mathematical economics optimization problems are traditionally
formulated over infinite time horizons (see e.g. (23) ). This
causes some theoretical difficulties. First, it may happen that the
integral to be maximized, such as the net revenues due to resource
exploitation, grow to infinity when time tends to infinity. This is
the case especially when discount rates are zero. For this reason,
new optimality concepts have been developed (5,12). Second, when we
apply the necessary conditions of the maximum principle for an
optimal solution of an infinite time horizon optimization problem (5)
the transversality conditions are not determined. We seldom find
explicit solutions, and the solutions need to be characterized by
their asymptotic properties (5,6,12,15).
Yet another set of difficulties is due to the fact that when a
bargaining agreement has been established in a dynamic game setting,
the related cooperative solution does not have an equilibrium
property in the original information structure (11). This appears
generally as a temptation to deviate onesidedly from the agreement,
i.e. cheating. A closely related problem to this is that of
sustainability. If an agreement is such that none of the agents has a
reason to require rebargaining during the game, it is sustainable.
However, this is not the case in general, since the outcomes of
bargaining depend on the initial state.
The first question that the bargaining agents have to answer is, what
will happen if no agreement can be reached. The outcome of this
no-agreement is called the status quo point. In many papers on
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fishery bargaining, open-loop (Nash) equilibria have been considered
as potential status quo policies (6,7,15). Although one would
consider only open-loop equilibria as status quo policies, the
problem of non-uniqueness of disagreement behaviour still remains left.
It has been shown (see e.g. (8,14,25» that a change in the property
rights or control variables also changes the status quo and hence the
outcome of the bargaining process. The choice of an open-loop
equilibrium solution to represent the status quo is not the only
possibility. For example, in the theoretical papers of Haurie and
Tolwinski (13) and Tolwinski (24) status quo has been described
through feedback equilibria and mini-max threat policies. In high sea
fisheries, a natural status quo is unregulated open-access
harvesting. In a duopoly case this problem can be considered as a
myopic non-cooperative problem (eq. (4». Under the assumption that
a status quo policy can be agreed upon and that both it and the
pareto-optimal solutions can be solved (analytically or by
computational methods) in a normal form, a single Pareto-optimal
solution can be picked up by applying some bargaining scheme to
determine the agreement (1,16,21,22). However, as was noted above,
in a dynamic game setting an agreement made in an open-loop fr~rk at
one time point leaves a temptation for each agent to deviate
onesidedly from the agreed policy during the remaining time period.
What can we then do to avoid cheating? In practice it is realistic
to assume that cheating can be detected after a finite time period.
(Under this assumption we must give up the open-loop formulation of
the problem and consider memory strategies.) One idea is to use
threats to eliminate the temptation to cheat. The purpose of a
threat of potential punishment (which is announced in advance to
follow cheating) is to quarantee that the total utility from the game
cannot be increased by cheating. Thus, the temptation to cheat
disappears, and the Pareto-optimal agreement has the equilibrium
property. This equilibrium solution also dominates non-cooperative
equilibrium solutions. For this reason, it should be emphasised that
in general there will not be any reasons for the agents to implement
the punishments. It has been shown by Tolwinski (24) and Haurie and
Tolwinski(13) that in dynamic games all the feasible solutions
(including Pareto-optimal solutions) can usually be transformed into
equilibrium solutions. This theory was then tested on fishery games
by Hamalainen, Haurie and Kaitala (6,7). These studies demonstrate
numerical results on the topic.
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3. Problems in international resource negotiations
International organizations make strong efforts in attempting to
establish guiding principles for the exploitation of marine resources
and for the resolution of conflict situations occurring in these
areas. There exist regional organizations which annually carry out
negotiations in order to determine catch quotas and other measures
for countries involved in particular fisheries. For example, the
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission has been founded for the
management of Baltic fishery resources. The commission includes
representatives from Denmark, Finland, FRG, GDR, Poland, Sweden and
the USSR. This commission negotiates each year an agreement, and the
negotiation procedure is supported by scientific research work
carried out in each member country.
Recently, United Nations published The Law of the Sea (17). Among
other things, the law tells the countries to enter into negotiations
and to cooperate whenever there is joint interest in the resources.
The following quotation is concerned with the high sea areas where
the access to the resources is free for all the countries: "States
whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different
living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with
a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the
living resource conserned" (17, Article 118).
The concept of bionomic equilibrium (used extensively in fishery
economies) predicts the exploitation of resources, which are open to
all the countries (for refs., see e.g. (2». The prediction is that
the total harvest of competitive fishing fleets and the stock growth
stabilize to a level where the economic rent of the resource is
dissipated. General understanding is that the practice of
competitive exploitation in open-access fisheries should be changed.
The Law of the Sea proposes the countries a goal for cooperation in
the following way: "In determining the allowable catch and
establishing other conservation measures for the living resources in
high seas, States shall: (a) take measures which are designed, on
the best scientific evidence available to the States concerned, to
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which
can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors, .•• " (17, Article 119). This
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statement needs some notes, that are related to the practical
establishment of cooperation.
First, cooperation does not necessarily mean pareto-optimality from
the economic point of view, since the maintenance of the population
does not require it. Thus some safe satisficing poli~ies could also
be well acceptable. One should note that non-cooperative equilibria
can also maintain the population at a biologically desirable level. In
many cases countries could prefer "safe" non-cooperation to risky
Pareto-optimal cooperation, which is vulnerable to cheating (6,11).
This can be the case especially when there are no effective ways of
implementing threats to support the agreements. The condition for
non- cooperation is, however, that it does not lead to the escalation
of the conflict, which would destroy the fish population or the
fishing fleets. Secondly, maintaining a population is a difficult
practical question in itself. The ecological and economic problems
are quite different. For example, we can have a herring stock which is
not subject to extinction in an ecological sense but it can be a
nonexisting stock from the economic point of view. Thirdly, the
concept of maximum sustainable yield can be understood as the maximum
harvest rate (e.g. in the sense of biomass produced) or as a maximum
economic rent available from the fishery. It has been clearly shown
that these two criteria give different management policies.
We shall conclude this section by considering multinational
management of coastal fisheries. According to the current
international jurisdictional practice and the Law of the Sea, every
coastal country has the right to establish an exclusive economic
zone, where it can utilize the resources by itself. However, if the
coastal country does not have the capacity to harvest or process
entirely the catch available, it should give other countries access
to the surplus catch (17). The international allocation of catch
constitutes a whole new set of problems since the conditions under
which it should take place is by no means clear. Moreover, in the
allocation of the surplus catch the countries should take into
account especially the requirements of the developing and land-locked
countries. For example: "Land-locked States shall have the right to
participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an
appropriate part of the surpluss of the living resources of the
exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same region ... "
(17, Article 69). Such land-locked and especially developing
countries do not usually have a fishing fleet of their own, which in
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this case should be rented from a third country.
There are over a hundred places in the world, where the coasts of two
countries are so close to each others that no open sea remains
between the exclusive economic zones. If a resource stock is divided
by the exclusive economic zones, both of the countries have a right
to utilize the resource in an optimal way. However, it has been
shown in ref. (8) that such a fldivided fisheryfl problem can have
several different but acceptable non-cooperative and cooperative
solutions, even if the countries use the same management criteria.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented dynamic control and game theoretic
views on the modelling and analysis of resource and decision dynamics
in international negotiations. In dynamic formulations of resource
management problems emphasis needs to be put on the choice between
different rationality concepts. Moreover, the ways of reaching
Pareto-optimal equilibrium agreements, which are not vulnerable to
onesided deviations by a contracting party, are of great impor-
tance.
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MACROMODELS AND MULTIOBJECTIVE DECISION MAKING
Manfred Peschel
Division ofMathematics and Cybernetics, Academy ofSciences of the CDR, Berlin, CDR
1. Macromodels
A macromodel should have the following features:
Both the structure and the function of the system should be
reflected in the mathematical properties of the macromodel.
A suitable formalization of a macromodel may be obtained using
abstract automata theory. Every module has a description of
the form
(z i)' (i i i)G z ,y ,p
Xi (i i i)F z ,y ,q
with inputs yi, outputs xi and states zi. A macromodel also
has overall inputs (controls) and outputs (global indicators).
All of the models considered (including macromodels) should be
robust against amplitude-bounded stochastic disturbances.
A macromodel should be based on a systems concept obtained
through some compromise between the following dialectical con-
tradictions: global/local; static/dynamic; discontinuity/
continuity; randomness/necessity; cooperation/competition;
autonomy/control.
Macromodels are usually highly nonlinear dynamical systems
with eigen-dynamics and eigen-preference~.
We snould not try to control a macrosystem against its eigendynamics.
The main use of macromodels is to forecast the behavior of a
system under specific control conditions. Reliable forecasting re-
quires good models of the driving forces ~evolution models), and can
be hindered by the presence of chaos or strange attractors.
2. The Significance of Evolution Models (especially Gro~th Models)
for Macromodels
Macromodels of evolutionary systems show growth and structural
development. Growth observed at a high level of aggregation can be
223
described using the evolon model (see Fig. 1) [:l].
x
t
FIGURE 1: The evolon model
One suitable description of an evolon is based on the hyperlogistic
differential equation
dx
dt
This is obviously a generalisation of the logistic growth function
(with k =w = £ = 1).
In evolutionary systems, structure is a precondition for growth;
conversely, growth is a precondition for structural development. The
feasibility of the evolon concept has been demonstrated for a number
of examples, including the growth of world population [2], the growth
of energy production [2], and the growth of European cities [3].
It seems that the Lotka-Volterra equations offer a promising
approach to the modelling of growth processes in macromodels. We have
the following
Structura~ demands: the structure consists mainly of chains and
cycles; and
Functiona~ demands: the function is based on elementary functions
following the rate-coupling principle, i.e.,
Fx dF =crt (In)
Based On these restricting demands,· we have proposed a Structure Design
Principle [4], which says that a macromodel described by a set of
ordinary differential equations can be transformed into the classical
Lotka-Volterra equations by introducing additional state variables
[5,6]. This means that a complex interaction structure (for example,
that of a macroeconomic model) can be reduced by the introduction of
virtual actors (additional state variables) into a set of binary inter-
actions (predator-prey interactions).
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A macromodel given by a set of Lotka-Volterra equations can be
reformulated by appropriate coordinate transformations
t.
X = II u lri r r
into the so-called Riccati representation:
duo
1
"""dt =
This representation demonstrates the universality of the concept of
Cobb-Douglas production functions (this is a more general form of the
version usually encountered in econometric models).
Under some special conditions the Lotka-Volterra equations exhibit
very interesting eigen-dynamics. To demonstrate this we shall write
the Lotka-Volterra equation in the following vector form:
dl; =
dt
where I;i = ln xi and G' j represents the column vectors. Let H denote
the operation of taking the convex hull. and assume that
o ~ H(G. j • j = 1.2•... ,n)
Then k = H(O,H(G. j , j = 1,2, ... ,n» defines a convex cone k which acts
as an eigen-preference cone (in the mUltiobjective optimization sense)
for the trajectories of the system. For every reference point 1;(0) the
trajectory of the system must enter the corresponding preference cone
k and remain within it for the forseeable future. This situation is
shown schematically in Fig. 2. Obviously the behavior of such a system
is quite similar to the behavior of the world according to the theory
of special relativity. except that we have to deal with the so-called
"light cone" instead of the cone k.
C,
FIGURE 2: Examples of preference cones k for given reference points
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Applying the Structure Design Principle to the evolon growth model
we obtain the following Lotka-Volterra description:
FXO = xl' F = d In/dt, Xo x(t)
Figure 3 shows the corresponding Lotka-Volterra structure.
FIGURE 3: The Lotka-Volterra structure of the model
The shift-cone construction for the case k > 1, ~ > 1 is illustrated
in Fig. 4.
~1
FIGURE 4: The shift-cone construction for k > 1, ~ > 1
From this it immediately follows that ~1 ~ _00. It can easily be shown
that for the case k > 1, ~ > 1 we also have ~2 ~ -00
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Important growth models can be constructed from exponential chains
based on the recursion
0,1,2, ...
It can easily be shown that the evolon model based on the hyperlogistic
equation does not obey such a chain expansion. However, it makes sense
to base a chain expansion on more aggregated base modules, namely
i = 0,1,2, ...
The problem then arises as to how to identify the best values for the
exponents k i . We use the following identification procedure (which
however is not always successful):
From the chain expansion we derive the following expression
FX iH.(t) = -
1 FX i
where Ai(t) = Fx i +1 /Fx i . The signs of the expressions Ai(t) are
clearly constant for all chain expansions under consideration.
We then have the following identification condition:
If sign Ai(t) = +1 and there exists a to such that Ai(tO) 0, then
k i = Min Hi (t) ;
If sign Ai(t) = -1 and there exists a to such that Ai(t O) = 0, then
k. = Max H . ( t ) .
1 1
This rule can be used for an evolon model based on the hyperlogistic
differential equation and leads in this case to the following result:
dxO k (B-X~)~dt = KXOx 1 , xl
dX 1 K (2~-1)/~ K1 -w~K
w+k-l
d"t l x l x 2 , , x 2 Xo
dX 2 _ K (w+2k-2)/(w+k-l)d"t - 2x 2 xl ' K2 = K(w+k-l)
Figure 5 shows the corresponding structure.
Obviously the hypercycle of order r = 2 in Fig. 5 can be replaced by a
chain formed by a repeating sequence of the pair of modules within the
hypercycle structure.
227
FIGURE 5: The structure of a hyperlogistic model of order r = 2
3. Links between MUltiobjective Decision Making and Macromodels [7]
There are a number of situations in which decision making can be
aided by the use of a macromodel:
when a number of decision makers with different objectives are
dealing with the same global macromodel;
when the whole system is decomposed into sectors coupled to-
gether, and different decision makers are responsible for de-
cisions in each sector.
It can be very useful to have decision support systems connected
to macromodels. These usually operate in the following way:
the users (decision makers) specify certain virtual control
actions;
the corresponding macromodel is run for one step of the virtual
control;
the outcomes are analyzed, reporting the consequences to some
or all decision makers.
The sequence above can then be repeated a given number of times. After
this, each decision maker appliea one real control step to the model or
the concrete system within the bounds of his particular responsibility.
We believe that operational gaming is important, especially when
this takes the form of a combination of a macromodel with a group of
decision makers as players.
From the methodological point of view all control sequences are
obtained through a multidimensional search process, in which (for
example) stochastic methods and evolution strategies are of importance.
All search processes rely on the following basic mechanisms:
mutation (generation of alternatives)
selection (evaluation of the alternatives).
This represents an application of Darwin's ideas to systems analysis.
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IV. INTERACTIVE DECISION SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION
During the past decade there has been increasing activity in the
field of interactive decision support. Research in this area can be
seen on the one hand as coming from management information systems and
on the other hand from optimization-based decision support. The con-
tributions in this section are mostly concerned with the second strand
of research, and focus on interactive multiple-criteria decision sup-
port systems. Such systems are based on the recognition that decision
making is not simply concerned with one simple objective such as profit.
They give the user the chance to explore the efficient solutions of his
mUlticriteria problem, confining his attention to the region in which
he seems most interested at any particular stage of the decision pro-
cess. Nakayama, in his contribution On the components in interactive
multiobjective programming methods, identifies the three main compo-
nents necessary for such a system: (1) preference information elicited
from the decision maker, (2) scalarizing functions and (3) numerical
methods for auxiliary scalar optimization. After discussing these
elements individually, the author presents a numerical method based on
the aspiration level approach.
The paper An integrated programming package for multiple-criteria
decision analysis by Grauer, Messner and Strubegger describes an ap-
proach based on the interactive mUltiple-criteria decision support
system DIDASS. The use of the system is demonstrated by three examples.
In the first example, three important objectives in energy planning
(minimization of costs, imported energy, and emissions) are optimized
using an energy model for Austria. The second application describes
the development of a model covering the main aspects of natural gas
trade in Europe, which by no means follows purely economic rules. In
the third example a system of models is presented which could help in
an analysis of the factors linking consumers, the economy, the energy
system and the government.
The paper A trajectory-oriented extension of DIDASS and its appli-
cations by Lewandowski, Rogowski and Kryglewski describes recent de-
velopments in DIDASS methodology and implementation. It outlines the
software written for trajectory decision analysis which is then demon-
strated by application to a flood control problem (see Section V) .
When implementing a new technology there are two critical resources:
investment and completion time, which constitute a two-dimensional
criteria space. Gorecki, Dobrowolski, Rys, Wi~cek and Zebrowski
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offer a supporting tool for this type of problem in their paper Deci-
sion support on the skeleton method - the HG package. The idea is
outlined and the software for the linear case is explained.
In his contribution A principle for solving qualitative multiple-
criteria problems, Korhonen describes a method which helps the decision
maker to find the most preferred ranking of alternatives evaluated on
the basis of several qualitative or quantitative criteria with a hier-
archical structure. It is assumed that the decision maker is able to
make at least pairwise comparisons between alternatives. The final
ranking of alternatives is achieved through the construction of the
preference strength matrix.
The paper A decision support system for planning and controlling
agricultural production with a decentralized management structure by
Makowski and Sosnowski describes some of the work carried out by the
authors within a project aimed at constructing a model of Polish agri-
culture. The authors outline linear sectoral models and give a de-
scription of the structure of the decision support system.
Unfortunately, for reasons of space, it was not possible to in-
clude all of the papers presented under this heading at the meeting
in the Proceedings. The Editors therefore regretfully decided to ex-
clude those papers with some overview character; however, the main
points of these papers are summarized below.
Some applications of multiobjective decision making methods on
finite sets, by J. Gouevski, B. Danev, G. Slavov and B. Mettev.
The paper summarizes some methods of multiobjective estimation and
choice of elements from a finite set and describes the computer im-
plementation and applications of such methods in Bulgaria.
About some methods and applications in multicriteria decision
making, by J. Ester.
The author gives an overview of the work done in this area in the GDR,
especially at the Technical University of Karl-Marx-Stadt. The over-
view includes computational methods and applications ranging from prob-
lems in the design of freezing systems for foods, through design prob-
lems in the textile industry, to multiple-criteria control problems.
Interactions in decision support systems: division of labor in
DSSs, by Z. Paprika and I. Kiss.
The authors present an analysis of decision support systems (DSSs),
taking the management of information as the first generation of DSSs.
On the basis of a comparison of six different DSSs, they draw some
conclusions about the future involvement of computers in the decision
process.
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RoLes and motivations in decision support systems of organiza-
tions, by J. Vecsenyi and A. Vari.
This paper puts forward the idea that the design of decision support
systems should be based not only on the characteristics of the decision
problem, and the available decision analytical tools, but also on the
social background of the whole decision-making process in the organi-
zational context.
Use of MIDA (a MuLtiobjective Interactive Decision Aid) in the
deveLopment of the chemicaL industry, by G. Dobrowolski, J. Kopytowski,
T. Rys and M. Zebrowski.
Even when narrowed to a single industry, the problem of industrial
development is very broad and complex, involving consideration of
socio-economic, technological, environmental and political phenomena.
The authors present a MUltiobjective Interactive Decision Aid (MIDA)
for tackling such a problem and apply it to the development of the
chemical industry.
Most of the contributions in this section served as introductions
to experimental sessions. Some of these sessions are described in more
detail in the next section.
M. Grauer
ON THE COMPONENTS IN INTERACTIVE MULTIOBJECTIVE
PROGRAMMING METHODS
Hirotaka J. Nakayama
Department ofApplied Mathematics, Konan University, Kobe, Japan
Interactive programming methods are composed of three main factors.
Le .• (1) preference information elicited from the decision maker. (2)
scalarization functions and (3) numerical methods for auxiliary scalar
optimization. In developing interactive programming methods, it seems very
important to make effective use of various devices in these three factors.
Above all. aspiration levels are promising as the preference information
elicited from the decision maker. since they are easy and intuitive to
answer. Moreover. the weighted Tchebyshev norm can be effectively used as
a scalarization function for obtaining a Pareto solution. In this paper.
we discuss each components in interactive multiobjective programming
methods.
2. Iateracti.e -.ltiobjecti.e Pro.r...iD••ethods for CAD
CAD (Computer Aided Design) is now applied to various fields of
industrial design problems. Dowever. the primary attention in CAD at the
present stage is paid to drawing by computers. but not to design itself.
On the other hand, interactive multiobjective programming methods have been
highly developed in recent years, and it seems that they can be effectively
applied to many industrial design problems. Dowever many practical problems
can not be so easily solved even if they are formulated as scalar
optimization problems, since they are highly nonlinear and nonconvex, and
sometimes have a large number of criteria functions. In particular, in
design problems of structures such as bridges, function forms of many
criteria, for example, stress and displacement, can not explicitly be
given, but are evaluated by some complex structural analysis. Similarly,
in camera lens design problems various kinds of aberration can be evaluated
only by a simulation of ray trace. These difficulties become more serious
in the formulation of mul tiobjective programming, because some number of
auxiliary sc~lar optimization are inevitable for obtaining a Pareto
solution. Therefore, in order to overcome the difficulties, we need some
device in the three components in interactive multiobjective programming
methods (i.e., preference information elicited from the decsion maker,
scalarization functions and numerical methods for scalar optimization)
respectively. We shall discuss this in the following in more detail.
Interactive
Programming
Method
preference
information
scalarization
function
numerical
method for
scalar
opt imiza tion
235
-- marginal rate of substitution
surrogate worth
pairwise comparison
weight
goal
ideal point f*
aspiration level 1
Lp-uorm
~ w.lf~-f.(xll
.L 1 1 1(l wilf:-fi(xlIPl1/p
max wilf:-fi(xll
augmented norm
penalty function
achievement function
proxy utility function
utility function
fuzzy membership function
recursive quadratic programming method
augmented Lagrangian method
penalty method
GRG
direct search method
• simplex method. complex method
nonsmooth optimization method
discrete optimization method
Fig. 2.1 Components in Interactive Multiobjective Programming Methods
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3. PrefereDce IDfo~tioD
At the early sta,e of development of interactive multiobjective
proarammina methods. Geoffrion-Dyer-Feinbera suaaested to use the well
known Frank-Wolfe method in an interactive way [2]: where the marainal rate
of substitution (MRS) of the preference of the decision maker is used as an
information decidina the search direction. As many researchers pointed out
[8]. however. it is very difficult to elicit MRS from the decision maker
due to the limitation of perceptual ability of human beinas. For example.
it has widely observed that human beinas can not recoani~e a small chanae
within some extent. Such a threshold of recoanition is called IND (Just
Noticeable Difference) £5]. Due to IND. it seems illlPossible to answer MRS
which corresponds to differentials in the usual calculus. Therefore. even
if the decision maker answered MRS. it should have been interpreted as a
difference approximation.
Of course. the difference approximation to aradients can be
effectively used in ordinary mathematical proarammina. when the exact
information of aradient can not be available. In ordinary mathematical
proarammina. as lona as the search direction assures to improve the
objective function. the converaence to the solution can be auaranteed by an
appropriate line search. However. this is not necessarily expected in
interactive proarammina methods, because IND in the line search makes
sometimes a termination at a wrona solution (Fia. 3.1). In Fia. 3.1. if
IND of the attribute X is xB-xA' in evaluation of MRS we can not access
further from the point B to the point A, which implies that MRS represents
the direction d. When the difference between A and C is within IND alona
the direction d. the decision maker answers A is most preferred alona the
direction. Namely. the optimi~ation process terminates at the point A,
which differs from the true optimum (if any) and possibly even from the
satisfactory solution. This example shows that a merely parallel
tansformation of ordinary optimi~ation .e~hods to interactive proarammina
can not produce a aood effect so lona as the characteristics of human
factors is not taken into account. MRS seems to be inadequate as the
preference information in interactive proarammina methods, because it is
too difficult to answer and its accuracy is questionable.
y
d
:- JNO-:
'---------;:-:---~-------------XXA XB
Fig. 3.1. An Example in which GDF-method does not work well.
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In the surrogate worth trade-off method suggested by Oaimes-Oall-
Friedman [4], the decision maker is required to answer the surrogate worth
as a score assigned to each sampled Pareto solution. In this case, the
burden of the dec ision maker is decreased ali tt 1 e in comparison to the
Geoffrion-Dyer-Feinberg method. Even so. since the evaluation of surrogate
worth includes that of MRS implicitly, it is difficult to answer surrogate
worths with a consistency in the whole decision process. Moreover, the
fact that the number of auxiliary scalar optimization is large in general
makes also the method difficult.
Pairwise comparison is relatively easy to judge for human beings. and
it can be effectively used in some cases with a few discrete alternatives.
Oowever, its Judgment is sometimes too local to be consistent and usually
requires too many number of similar questions which make the decision maker
bored.
These observations show that the optimization with respect to the
decision maker's preference can be real ized only in some 1 imited cases.
For many multiobjective programming problems in practice. the optimization
seems very difficult. Now we arrive at a question 'Is it really necessary
to make a decision by optimization 7'. O. Simon asserted that human
behaviors in many cases are based on ~A~i~!i~i~~ rather than
optimization. In cases that higher levels of criteria are more desirable,
the satisficing can be represented by a problem finding a solution to
i=l, •• ,r
where 1 is the aspiration level of the decision maker. It has been
ovserved that aspiration levels are very easy and intuitive to answer,
because other preference informat ions are something 'should be' wi th a
consistency, while aspiration levels are flexible with tolerance. and the
rigidity in their consistency is not required so much. In some
literatures. the aspiration levels are defined as one of goals. In the
early stage of goal programming. goals are defined as levels f which the
decision maker wants to attain, I.e. f(x) = 1. Recentl¥. it is also
extensively defined as the ideal level f· such that f i = max fi(x)U=l, •••• r>. or as the aspiration level f. I.e .• the decision maker wants
to find a solution x such that f(x) ~ 1.
Aspiration levels are recognized differently depending on people.
Optimists answer their aspiration levels close to the ideal value, while
pessimists answer them as if they were minimum allowable levels. Even in
intrapersonal judgment, they may vary over some range. Oowever. we can
utilize this characteristics of aspiration level in interactive
multiobJective programming methods as follows: The decision maker is asked
to change his aspiration level adaptively unless he agrees with the
suggested solution, I.e.,
where 1k represents the aspiration level at the k-th iteration. The
operator P selects the Pareto solution nearest in some sense to the given
aspiration level fk. The operator T is the trade-off operator which
changes the k-th aspiration level fk if the decision maker does not
compromise with the shown solution p(fk). Of course. since p(lk) is a
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Pareto solution, there exists no feasible solution Yhich makes all criteria
better than p(l ), and thus the decision maker has to trade-off among
criteria if he Yants to improve some of crtteria. Based on this trade-off,
a ney aspiration level is decided as Top(I). Similar process is continued
until the decision maker obtain an agreeable solution.
f.
J
allowable point)
f* (ideal point)
L..- ....L- f.
1
Fig. 3.2 Interaction Process in the Satisficing Trade-off Method
4. Scalarisatioa Paactioas
In the previous section, ye have seen that P is an operator Yhich
finds the Pareto solution nearest in aome sense to the aspiration level
1k. This can be done by using some scalarization function. The sense of
'nearest' strongly depends on yhat kind of the scalarization function ye
shall use. We impose the folloYing requirements on the scalarization
functions:
10 • They can cover all Pareto solutions.
20 • Solutions to the auxiliary scalar optimization should be Pareto
solutions.
30 • Solutions to the auxiliary scalar optimization should be
satisfactory. if the aspiration level is feasible.
Since our decision making solution is a satisfactory Pareto solution,
the Icalarization function should hold the property that ye can select any
Pareto solution by maximizing or minimizing it Yith an appropriate
parameter in order to shoy a Pareto solution as the decision making
solution yhatever the problem may be and yhatever the preference of the
decision maker may be. Further the solution to the auxiliary scalar
optimization for the scalarization function should be nothing but a Pareto
solution. because our aim is to find a (satisfactory) Pareto solution.
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Finally, if the aspiration level is feasible, then there el:ists a
satisfactory Pareto solution. Therefore, it would not make sense to show
the decision maker a nonsatisfactory solution when the aspiration level is
feasible. These observations make the above three requirements to be
reasonable.
Unfortunately, it should be noted, however, that there is no
scalarization function satisfyinS all these requirements: It is well known
that ll-norm can not necessarily yield any Pareto solution if the problem
is nonconvex. Even if we use lp-norm (l(p("'), we can not always set all
Pareto solution depend ins on the desree of nonconvexity of the problem. In
FiS. 3.1, we can see that the only norm (scalarization function) which can
yields any Pareto solution in any problems is the weiahted Tchebyshev norm.
However, the weishted Tchebyshev norm violates the requirement 20 • Namely,
the weiahted Tchebyshev norm produces not only Pareto solutions but also
weak Pareto solutions. For weak Pareto solutions, there exists another
solution which improve some criteria while other criteria beina uDchanaed,
and hence weak Pareto solutions seem to be inadequate as a decision .akina
soution. 'Ie can set a Pareto solution from a weak Pareto solution as
follows:
r
Maximize ~ ei
i=l
subject to
(P)
..
where x is a (wefk) Pareto solution. If all ei for the solution to (P)
are zero, then x itself is a Pareto solution. If there are some eilO,
then the solution x to the problem (P) is a Pareto solution.
Like this, we can set a Pareto solution from a aiven weak Pareto
soluiton by solvins an auxiliary optimization problem. However, in some
cases such as structure design problems and camera lens design problems it
is expensive to optimize such an auxiliary optimization. In order to avoid
such an additional scalar optimization problem, some researchers sugsested
to use some kinds of ausmented norms. ODe of typical examples is aiven by
(4.1)
For any 0(4("', the solution obtained by minimizins Sa is suranteed to be
a Pareto solution. However, it can be easily seen that the ausmented norr.
Sa violates the requirements 10 and 30 • (FiS.4.1) Observe here that
l",-norm satisfies the requirement 30 •
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Suppose that for any xeX
i=l, .•• ,r. (4.2)
If we set for a aiven aspiration level 1
i=l, ••• ,r (4.3)
then the solution x to the Min-Max problem
Minimize Max wilf~ - fi(x)1
l~i~r
over x EX (4.4)
is a satisfactory Pareto solution in case of 1 beina feasible, while it is
assured to be a Pareto solution even in case of I beina infeasible.
Proof: It is well known that the solution to the Min-Max problem
(4.4) is a weak Pareto solution. Bence, we shall show that if the
aspiration level 1 is feasible, then the solution i' to the Min-Max
problem becomes a satisfactory solution, namely, f(i)~I.
Let
and define the level set at I by
Further, settina
we have
L C S.
i ..l, ... ,r),
(4.5)
In fact, the way of aettina the weiaht Wi yields wilf~-lil"l (i=l, ••• ,r),
and hence for any yEL and i=l, ..•• r
wi Ift - y i I ~ wi <ft - Ii)'
which yields Yi~l i (i=l, .•. ,r).
& Now note that if 1 is feasible, then there exists a
fi(x)~li for all i=l, ••. ,r. Then
such that
. ..
.. Wi (f i - f i (x»
i w.(f~ - 11')'
- 1 1
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thereby
The relations (4.5) and (4.6) implies that the solution to
belonas to the set S.
(4.6)
Min p(f(J;»
xEX
f
augmented norm
weighted Tchebyshev
norm
f
augmented norm
Tchebyshev
L.....----....I.------.L..L..--f1
Fia. 4.1 Some Characteristics of the Weiahted Tchebyshev Norm
and the Auamented Norm
From the above discussion, the weiahted Tcheyshev norm seems very
attractive, in particular, in view of the fact that it satisfies the
requirement 30 • However, in cases where the auxiliary scalar optiwization
is too difficult to solve, the compensation for the requirement 2 , (Le.,
aettina a Pareto solution from a weak Pareto solution) is too expensive.
In this case, it should be noted that under relatively mild condition, the
auamented norm can aive a Pareto solution arbitraily close to the solution
to the minimization of the weiahted Tchebyshev norm. In fact, the
followina holds:
neore. 4.2
Suppose that all f1 (i=1, •.. ,r) are continuous. Let
Further let f(a) be the function value at the solution to
Minimize
and let f(O) be that of the Min-Max problem (4.4). Then
lim f(a) = f(O).
a-.o
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Proof: See, for example, [7].
Threfore, although the augmented norm violates the requirement 1 0 and
30 , it can be effectively used on behalf of the weighted Tchebyshev norm,
particularly in cases where the auxiliary scalar optimization is expensive.
Note that in order for the augmented norm to satisfy 3 0 in a sense of
approximation, it is necessary to make a positive paramerter a
sufficiently small. However, we can not know in advance how small is
enough. In some special cases, any positive a can not yield a desirable
solution (Fig. 4.1). This is the only drawback of the augmented norm.
Other scalarization functions have been suggested by utilizing the
well known penalty functions in ordin-ary mathematical programming, or as
achievement functions [3]. However, in nonlinear problems, it seems from
our experience that the weighted norm or the augmented norm are most
simple and convenient in view of the requirements 10 _3 0 • Unless we need to
find an optimal solution with respect to the decision maker's preference,
it seems redundsnt to use (proxy) utility functions as scalarization
functions. Goals or aspiration levels are originally fuzzy and flexible.
In DIDASS and the satisficing trade-off method, this characteristic is used
in such a way that the decision maker can change his aspiration level
adaptively according as the situation. In other words, the fuzziness of
the decision maker's judgment is treated implicitly in the interaction
with the decision maker. In these methods, therefore, we do not need to
invoke to membership functions in the fuzzy ana lys is. Util ity functions
and membership functions can be effectively used in cases that we want to
decrease the number of interaction and iteration for finding the solution
rather than in interactive programming methods.
5. Na.erical "thoda for Scalar Optt.izatioa
Both the weighted Tchebyshev norm and the augmented norm are
nonsmooth. How\ver, we can convert them into smooth ones: For example,
suppose that fi~fi(x) for all xEX. Then, as is well known, for the
augmented norm the following two minimization are equiuvalent:
(I)
(II)
Minimize
Minimhe
x, e
Max wilf~ - fi(x)1 +
l~i~r
r
e + a ~ wi(f~ - fi(x»
i=l
subject to
x£X
i=l, .•• , r
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Therefore. we can use the RQP method and other effective methods for
smooth optimization for solving the problem (II) which is equivalent to
(I). Another merit of transforming (I) into (II) may be seen in the
following theorem:
Theorea 5.1
Let (i.t) be a solution to the prob!em (II) and let r=(r1 •.•.• rr) be
the optimal Lagrange multipliers. If x is of the interior to the set I
and each f i has appropriate smoothness. then we have
1. i=l •..•• r (5.1)
<5.2)
Moreover. if the problem (II)!s convex. namely. if each f i is concave and
the set I is convex~ then for any xII
~ (ri+a)wi(fi(x)- fi(i»~o.
i=l
(5.3)
Proof: The re lations (5.1) and (5.2) immediate ly follow from the
well-known ~uhD-Tucker theorem for the Lagrangean
In addition. the well-known theory of convex programming provides that for
the solution (i.t) and r
r
from which the relation (5.3) follows by virtue of ~ r i =l.
i=l
From Theorem 5.1. the re I at ion (5.1) can be used to check whether or
not the obtained solution is optimal. The relations (5.2) and (5.3) are
helpful for the decision maker to trade-off. Decision makers tend to want
to improve the unsatisfactory criteria much more strongly than they agree
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to sacrifice others. In the original version of the satisficing trade-off
method [6]. the deision maker is asked both how much he wants to improve
unsatisfactory criteria and in return how much he can relax other criteria.
In the trade-off, he can utilhe the information of (5.2) and (5.3): Let
II be the set of indices of criteria which he wants to improve and let II
be that of criteria which he can relax in return. If he wants to improve
f by Af i (iEII).thenhemustrelu f j by Af j (jEIR) satisfying(/.3). Therefore, the decision maker consider his trade-off in his mind so
that the relation (5.2) may hold (Fig. 3.2).
In the recent revised version of the staisficing trade-off method,
however, he can use the assignment of sacrifice for f j (j E I R)
automatically set in the equal proportion to (ti+a)w i , namely, by
-1
Af. =-----J
where N is the number of elements of the set I R. By doina this, in
cases where there are a larae number of criteria, the burden of the
decision maker can be decreased so much. Of course, if the deicion maker
does not aaree with this quota Afj laid down automatically, he can modify
them in a manual way.
6. Ccnac11U1lal ....rb
We have discussed the components in interactive multiobjective
proarammina methods. The aspiration level, the weiahted Tchebyshev norm,
the auamented norm and RQP-like methods are observed very attractive as
these components. DIDASS and the satisficina trade-off method use them
effectively for findina a satisfactory Pareto solution. It is of course
possible to develop another methods incorporatina other components for
another decision rule. The important thing is to synthesize these
components effectively takina characteristics of the problem and the
decision rule into account.
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Appendix
For reference, we shall show in the following an example of the
interaction process in the revised version of the satisficing trade-off
method. The example is the same problem as the one that was illustrated in
[6]: A river basin in the middle-western part of Japan is modeled: there
are three branches in the upper-stream and one in the lower-stream. One of
three branches in the upper-stream is so clear that the treatment of used
water is not necessary. Each of other two branches in the upper reach have
its own treatment-plant which is supported by a local government in the
upper reach. Another local government around the lower reach takes care of
a treatment-plant in the lower reach. Under this situation, we have three
objectives to be minimized:
1) treatment cost in the upper reach
2) treatment cost in the lower reach
3) BOD concentration at the inflow point into the sea
(ppm)
Bere Xl' x2 denote the percent treatment to be used at the two treatment
plants in the upper reach, and x3 denote the one in the lower reach. Our
constraints are as follows:
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It is natural to consider that the two local governments are both
decision makers in this problem who share the cost for maintaining clear
water. However, suppose here that we have a central authority who is
responsible for the final decision.
One of resul ts of our experiment is as follows: The ideal point is
set as (ft, f!' f~) = (0.0, 0.0, 0.0). The initial aspiration level was
given by <11' 12 , 1~) = (700.0, 3000.0, 5.0).
******** PARETO SOLUTION BY MIN-MAX METHOO 1) ********
F ( 1)
F( 2)
F( 3)
PARETO SOL.
0.789060+03
0.338170+04
0.563610+01
ASP. LEVEL
0. 700000+03
0.300000+04
0.500000+01
LAG. MULTIPLIER
0.180870+00
0.489990+00
0.329140+00
00 YOU COMPPOMISE WITH EACH F(I) ? (Y/N)? N
******** CLASSIFICATION OF CRITERIA ********
PLEASE CLASSIFY THE CRITERIA INTO THREE GROUPS (I,R,A):
I: IF YOU WANT TO IMPROVE F( J)
R: IF YOU MAY RELAX F( I)
A: IF YOU ACCEPT F(I), AS IT IS
F( 1 ) ?
R
F( 2) ?
F( 3) ?
I
******** CONFIRMATION ********
CRITERI~ WHICH YOU W~NT TO IMPROVE
F( 3)= 0.563610+01
CRITERI~ WHICH YOU M~Y REL~X
F( 1)= 0.789060+03
F( 2)= 0.338170+04
CRITERI~ WHICH YOU ~CCEPT. ~S IT IS
NONE
SURE? (Y/N)? Y
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----- PLEASE IMPROUE
F( 3)= 3.563610+31
NEW ASPF= ? 5.3
SENSITIUITY( 3)= 3.658290-31
WHICH WAY DO YOU WANT TO USE FOR TRAOE-OFF. A OR M ?
A: AUTOMATIC
M: MANUAL
? A
NEW ASP. STATUS GUO PREUIOUS ASP.
-------------------------------------------------------------
F( 1)
F( 2)
F( 3)
3.873390+133
3.353990+34
3.533330+31
3. 789360+33
3.338170+34
3.563610+31
3.733330+33
3.333330+34
3.533330+31
DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS TRAOE-OFF ? (Y/N) Y
******** FEASIBILITY CHECK ********
NOT FEASIBLE --- AS LINEAR APPROXIMATION
WHICH 00 YOU WANT TO GO TO I, OR 3 ?
3: MIN-MAX PROBLEM
1: TRAOE-OFF AGAIN
? 3
******** PARETO SOLUTION BY MIN-MAX METHOO
F( 1)
F( 2)
F( 3)
PARETO SOL.
3.873930+33
3.351330+34
3.533490+31
ASP. LEUEL
3.873390+33
3.353990+34
3.533330+131
LAG. MUL TIPLIER
3.19133130+1313
13.5392130+1313
13.3133530+1313
00 YOU COMPPOMISE WITH EACH F(I) ? (Y/N)? Y
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1. INTRODUCTION
A number of recent developments (for example, the rapid deterioration of European
and North American forests, or the increasing conftict between the trade unions, indus-
trial managers and the government over issues such as unemployment, the national
debt, wages, etc.) have highlighted the severe shortcomings of the conventional model-
ing techniques (e.g., econometric models or technoeconomic approaches) used as a basis
for decision making.
Econometric models'describe the future development options of a system from an
analysis of its past behavior. However, this excludes the possibility of modeling the
response of the system to events that have never taken place before. In addition, it is
assumed that the parameters of economic development depend very strongly on events
that occurred in the past.
Technoeconomic models combine the technical and economic features of a system
into a consistent picture of its future development. In general they look for solutions
that are both technically feasible and economically optimal - however, they do not meet
the present need to include social or environmental objectives, such as the reduction of
pollutant emissions.
This paper describes a different approach based on the interactive multiple-criteria
decision support system DIDASS [1] and gives some examples of its use. In the first
example, three important objectives in energy planning are optimized using an energy
model for Austria. These objectives are minimization of costs, minimization of import
dependence, and minimization of SOz emissions.
The second application describes research currently underway at IIASA. The aim is
to develop a model that covers the main aspects of gas trade in Europe, which by no
means follows purely economic rules.
In the third example an integrated system of models is presented, which could, in
its final stage, help in an analysis of the factors linking consumers, the economy, the
energy system and the government (e.g., taxes).
Before considering the examples. however, it is necessary to outline the modeling
approach and describe the implementation of the computer codes.
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2. THE MODEL SKT
The set of models is based on the dynamic linear programming model MESSAGE II
[2]. The codes used in this interactive model system are MXG (the matrix generator of
MESSAGE II), an interactive linear programming solver based on MINOS [3], and CAP (the
post-processing program of MESSAGE 11), which allows interactive evaluation of model
results. All these codes are implemented on the VAX 111780 at nASA, and are accessible
via telecommunications networks.
2.1 The ModelllESSAGE II
MESSAGE II is an extended version of the nASA energy supply model MESSAGE [4],
which is described in some detail in a companion paper by M. Grauer [5]. (Readers are
advised to refer to this paper for details of both the model MESSAGE and the interactive
DIDASS package.) The main differences between MESSAGE II and its predecessor are the
following:
MESSAGE II allows modeling of the entire energy chain, from resource extraction via
central conversion (e.g., electricity and district heat production), energy transmis-
sion and distribution to on-site conversion (e.g., heating systems) and hence to ulti-
mate consumption (e.g., as heat, light, motive power).
MESSAGE II permits variable period lengths.
MESSAGE II can incorporate demand elasticity functions, so the model can react to
changing energy prices.
MESSAGE II allows user-defined constraints: the user can incorporate any additional
factors influencing the development of the energy system, such as pollution control,
restrictions on the use of resources other than energy (e.g., water, steel) or max-
imum import shares.
Depending on the LP-solver used, MESSAGE n can cope with mixed integer program-
ming and a non-linear objective function.
In addition. MESSAGE n supports conventional multiobjective optimization. That is,
variables other than those directly related to the costs of the energy system can be
included in the objective function and weighted accordingly. Such variables could be
used to penalize pollution or other activities. For a more detailed description see the
User's Guide to the Mo.tri.% Gi!nerator 0/ MESSAGE II [2].
2.2 Adaptation of MESSAGE II to the Reference Point Optimization Method
In order to avoid the rather time-consuming procedure of problem formulation as
described in [5] (generation of a matrix by MESSAGE. generation of additional informa-
tion by LPMOD and restructuring of the matrix by the pre-processor LPMULTI). MESSAGE
II was extended so that the restructuring step could be omitted. All constraints and
variables necessary for the reference trajectory optimization approach are generated
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during the matrix generation step, using dummy variables for the reference trajectories
and scaling factors. The correct values are then entered during the next step, as
described below.
2.3 The Interactive LP-solver IlIII
The interactive LP-solver is based on MINOS [3]. The routines described in [6J were
added and others (Driver, Minos) extended to call various additional routines so that the
necessary matrix manipulations can be performed (see Figure 1).
After the matrix has been read successfully, the user can enter the reference trajec-
tories. These take the form of a vector of targets for each objective, and can be inserted
into the matrix directly. If the "utopia" trajectories are not known for all goal trajec-
tories the user has to supply scaling factors (as in LPMOD). However, as it is useful to
know the "utopia" and "nadir" trajectories, and hence the range for decisions, the model
makes it possible to calculate these values. The "utopia" and "nadir" trajectories are
calculated by optimizing a weighted single objective for each time step of each trajec-
tory. The weights are set to 1 for the trajectory being optimized. to 1000 for the current
time step, and to 0.001 for the other trajectories. Then the best (utopia trajectory) and
the worst (nadir trajectory) values are determined for each element. The user is then
presented with the range of possible values and the solution of the dynamic problem for
each objective (i.e., each trajectory is optimized over the whole time horizon). Once the
reference trajectory has been defined, the scaling factors are calculated as the inverse
of the distance between the reference trajectory and the corresponding "utopia" trajec-
tory (see Figure 2 for a two-dimensional static example). This procedure avoids the arbi-
trary selling of scaling factors.
The actual problem is then solved by optimizing the single-criterion equivalent, an
objective defined by the reference trajectories and scaling factors.
The definition of this single-criterion objective was revised to provide a beller
reflection of the dynamic nature of the problem: it is now formulated for each time step
separately, and these single objectives then summed over all time steps.
In this case. the revised objective has the form:
- -
min [L(max Yi,t -Y;..t ) + l:L Y;..t -Y;..t] •
t i a;.,t ;. ,t ll;',t
where t is an index representing the time steps
i is an index representing the objectives
ii"t is the reference point corresponding to the value Yi,t of objective i in step t
aU is the scaling factor for objective i in step t.
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l1gure 1. The interactive solver (lMM).
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(mix)
J1gure 2. An example of a static problem with two objectives.
This reformulation is useful because in MESSAGE II the different time steps may be
related only very loosely, so that use of the (single) minimax criterion yields counter-
intuitive results.
After solving this problem, the present result can then be compared with those
obtained during earlier iterations, and the solution analyzed. In addition the user may
access the values of all constraints and variables interactively. If a detailed analysis of
the results is required, the solution can be printed and processed using the post-
processing program CAP [7].
Based on the analysis of the solution, the user may now change the reference trajec-
tories and solve the resulting new problem. The user also has access to the matrix and
can alter any element, bound or right-hand side interactively. In most cases recalcula-
tion of the "utopia" trajectories is then necessary.
The interactive procedure outlined above has the great advantage of reducing the
amount of time (in many cases by a factor of 100) otherwise necessary for input/output
operations. This reduction of the time between defining the reference trajectories and
investigating the solution makes this approach even more attractive. In addition, the
machine-independent interface to the user was improved by introducing an option which
displays bar charts for the different trajectories.
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3. APPUCATIONS
The following sections present some applications of the procedure outlined above.
The first describes an application to a model of the Austrian energy supply system, while
the second deals with a gas trade model for Europe. Finally, current attempls to develop
an energy /economy interaction model for Austria are presented.
3.1 SElIA: An Energy Model for Austria
The energy model described here is a relatively aggregated representation of the
present Austrian energy supply system and its possible future development. The
simplifications were mainly concerned with end-use, where, for example, the different
temperature requirements for industrial heat were ignored and the demand for liquid
fuel for transportation was supplied by a fixed mix of gasoline and diesel oil. Figure 3
shows the representation of the energy system studied. This model covers the years
from 1980 to 2000. with a resolution of four years up lo 1992 and eight years lhereafter.
The results of this model will then be used as gUidelines in another. more disaggregated.
model· that takes cost minimization as the decision criterion.
At present three trajectories are defined: minimization of total system costs;
minimization of energy imports; and minimization of S02 emissions.
Initially the dynamic optima for the single objectives were taken as reference tra-
jectories. This can be interpreted as meaning lhat every participant in the decision pro-
cess wishes to reach the highest possible value for his own objective, regardless of the
implications for the other objectives.
Figure 4 shows the resulting composition of primary energy consumption for the
year 2000. Simple cost minimization (case 1) yields an import dependence of roughly
60%, while the other two objectives. minimization of imports (case 2) and minimization
of S02 emissions (case 3), both result in a lower import dependence. The reason is clear
in case 2, while in case 3 the reduction in S02 emissions is achieved by increased use of
(domestic) hydropower. Use of natural gas is also considerably higher in these cases
than in case 1. The reason is the higher end-use efficiency and thus lower import
requirements associated with natural gas in case 2 (as well as the possibility of drilling
for extremely expensive (domestic) deep gas), and the low sulfur content of natural gas
in case 3.
In the multicriteria case (case 4), domestic energy production reaches a respectable
50%, while the share of natural gas (which is mainly imported and costly to distribute to
remote areas) is considerably lower than in cases 2 and 3, and almost the same as in
case 1.
"Currently under development.
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1 Cost Minimization
2 Minimization of Import
Dependence
3 Minimization of
Emissions of S02
4 Multiple Criterion Solution
- - - Domestic Energy
Hydropower
43
--
2
o
50
% of PE
100
figure 4. Shares of primary energy use in the year 2000 assuming different objective functions
in SEMA.
The difference between the system costs resulting from minimization of system
costs and minimization of SOz emissions is relatively small ("only" 4%, which amounts to
roughly $160 billion per year), while minimization of import dependence could increase
the cost by 20%.
In this case the multiple trajectory optimization approach can help to find a
compromise solution with lower costs than in case 2, with S02 emissions 12% less than in
the cost minimization case (but still nearly 80% more than the best possible reduction)
and with a high share of domestically produced energy.
3.2 GATE: A Gas Trade Model for Europe
The question addressed by this model is: How do different strategies in the various
European regions influence the gas trade between these regions and with the rest of the
world? To answer this question, Europe was divided into four regions, namely North,
Central. South, and East. Four gas exporting regions are also considered: the USSR, the
Norwegian North Sea gas fields, The Netherlands + Denmark, and North Africa. In this
conLext North Africa is just a synonym for the rest of the world, since projects such as a
gas pipeline from the Middle East or LNG imports from any conceivable exporter could be
included in this part of the model. Oil exporters were also included to give consumers
an alternative to buying gas. The oil exporting regions considered are the Norwegian and
UK North Sea fields, the USSR and others (including OPEC). The regions studied are
summarized in Table 1.
Each of the four European regions is then represented in a framework similar to
that shown in Figure 3, taking into account regional differences where necessary (see [8]
for a more detailed description). The gas exporters which are assumed for the purposes
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Table 1. The groups considered in GATE.
Energy consumers
North Europe
Central Europe
South Europe
East Europe
Gas exporters
Netherlands + Denmark
Norwegian North Sea
USSR
North Mrica (and others)
Oil exporters
UK North Sea
Norwegian North Sea
USSR
Others (e.g., OPEC)
of this study to have inexhaustible resources (namely the USSR and North Africa) are
modeled using simple ranges for price/production levels. In the case of The Netherlands
and the North Sea, the gas supply options are modeled explicitly as drilling technologies
and gas reserves in different cost categories. The oil producers were treated in a similar
way. The suppliers in the North Sea face high investment costs and declining availability
of resources, while the members of OPEC can continue their production without any
such problems.
The decision criteria chosen for this complex model are listed in Table 2. The
energy consumers generally wish to minimize the cost of their energy system. The gas
exporters wish to maximize their income, with The Netherlands and Norway also trying
to minimize their investment in infrastructure, while the USSR and North Mrica want to
minimize the amount of gas exported. The oil exporters have similar objectives to the
gas exporters.
Table 2. The objectives of the regions considered in the model.
Region
E'nergy consumers
Central, North, South, East Europe
East Europe
Gas exporters
Netherlands + Denmark, Norway
USSR, North Mrica
USSR, North Mrica
Oil exporters
UK, Norway
USSR,OPEC
Objective
Minimize the cost of the energy system
Minimize import dependence
Maximize profits
Maximize income
Minimize export volume
Maximize profits
Maximize income
The first runs with this model setup produced very promising results: three multiple
trajectory optimization runs, which differ in their scaling relative to a "base case". will
be discussed in some detail below. Figure 5 summarizes the results, Le., the gas imports
of western Europe in the year 2010, disaggregated by region of origin.
In a simple cost-minimization run (case 1), the gas resources in the Norwegian
North Seas count as domestic supplies, so that extraction is profitable even at high
costs. However, the multiobjective "base case" run (case 2) shows that the revenues
from such expensive sources of gas are not sufficient to cover the high investment costs.
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USSR
1 Cost Minimization
2' Base Case
3 Consumers Stronger
4 Producers Stronger
Figure 5. Gas imports of western Europe by region of origin. 2010.
This is emphasized by the ability of both the other gas exporters and the oil exporters to
undercut the price of Norwegian gas. A comparison between cases 1 and 2 also shows
that the oil exporters can - given their flexibility in pricing - keep the gas exporters out
of the market.
This situation becomes even more marked if the energy consumers become more
powerful (reflected in the model by a change in scaling), as in case 3. The consumers
replace the imported gas by domestic gas (the extraction of which is abandoned in the
base case) and an B% increase in oil imports. If, however. the producers' "bargaining
position" is strengthened by scaling (case 4), North African gas improves its position
quite considerably. Not only does it open a larger market for gas, but it also displaces a
signiflcant proportion of the Dutch share.
The variations in these results seem quite dramatic, and in the cases of The Nether-
lands and Norway they represent considerable changes. On the other hand, the
difference in the volume of gas reqUired between cases 3 and 4 is only 5% of the total pri-
mary energy use in western Europe.
A more complete description of these tentative model runs with GATE were
presented at an IIASA Workshop on Gas Issues in autumn 19B4. The participants at the
Workshop - particularly those from industry - rated this new approach very highly.
3.3 EnergyIEconomy Interactions: The Case of Austria
The energy /economy model described below is currently being developed to investi-
gate options for the future development of the Austrian economy. Although the model is
not yet complete, we include a preliminary description to demonstrate the capabilities
of our approach.
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The model consists of four modules running in sequence. These are:
a dynamic input/output (I/O) model, based on the vintage production theory
a dynamic energy supply model (SEMA. as described above)
an econometric consumer demand model
an interactive taxing and monetary redistribution accounting framework.
The I/O and energy modules are contained in a common linear programming model.
in which the industrial energy demand is determined from the activity of each of the
economic sectors considered in the I/O model. The energy demand is expressed as use-
ful energy needed per unit of output produced. In turn. the energy model demands capi-
tal and intermediate goods from the rest of the economy. Thus each of the technologies
included in the energy model must contain information about the structure of invest-
ment for new installations. The investment and intermediate goods needed by the rest of
the economy are endogenously determined in the I/O model.
Each of the economic sectors is represented by its intermediate and investment
demands as well as by other indicators (e.g .. labor demand. emissions. value-added pro-
duced. or a minimum demand for imported goods). The different economic sectors are
not represented as one activity but as a number of different activities having different
investment, primary and/or intermediate input structures. This leads to an I/O matrix
with more columns than rows. The mix of options actually used depends on the particu-
lar objectives considered. As proposed by the vintage production theory (putty-clay
hypothesis), the input structure of each installation is kept constant for the entire life-
time of the installation. This hypothesis is not. of course, valid for the variable factors
of production, such as labor and intermediate consumption of goods and services, but
holds for the relation between these factors. The overall economic structure varies over
time due to the changing mix of options offered and the varying utilization of the
different installations.
The final demand for the goods and services included in the model is determined
exogenously. From the model results one can determine the average and marginal
prices for all goods and services as well as the total GNP produced. "With this informa-
tion, and assumptions on government expenditure and exports. it is possihle to deter-
mine the household income. An econometric model (e.g., a linear expenditure model, or
translog functions) can then be used to estimate the final private demand for the chosen
consumption sectors. Using a bridge matrix, these demands may be transformed into
demands for goods and services as defined in the I/O model.
These three parts of the model are then solved iteratively until an equilibrium
between demand and supply is obtained.
The va and energy modules are solved using the reference trajectory optimization
approach as described above. This means that the objectives of different decision mak-
ers can be taken into account. These objectives could include environmental criteria
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(reduction of emissions). producers' interests (cost minimization. minimization of labor
force. etc.), political issues (balance of imports and exports. employment rate. etc.) and
private interests (increasing income and thus the consumption of goods and services).
The other modules provide interactive assistance in defining different strategies for
taxation. monetary redistribution and the like. The consumption module may be a
specific model. or the demand for the various commodities could be given completely
exogenously in order to investigate the effects of different behavioral expectations.
This model is clearly a useful tool for decision making. It requires different decision
makers to agree to a common framework which can then be used to arrive at a common
proposal for the future development of the economy. As with all models, it should not be
seen as a crystal ball for forecasting the future. but rather as a tool for investigating
various alternatives and determining the conditional expectations of possible future
events.
4. FINAL REMARKS
The interactive decision support system presented in the previous sections has been
shown to be useful in analyzing the power and consistency of energy and other linear
programming models. The possibility of an interactive sensitivity analysis helps to
reveal inconsistencies in the data quite rapidly. However, a truly interactive operating
system such as UNIX 4.2 is necessary. so that running programs can be controlled
remotely but also redirected to a terminal if necessary.
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A TRAJECTORY-ORIENTED EXTENSION OF DIDASS
AND ITS APPLICAnONS
A. Lewandowski, T. Rogowski and T. Kr~glewski
Institute ofAutomatic Control, Technical University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to describe recent developments in
DIDASS methodology and implementation. The DIDASS system, which is
based on the paradigm of satisficing decision making and the theory of
multiple criteria optimization, has been the subject of numerous
papers and reports. The principles of the method and selected appli-
cations were presented by Grauer et al. (1984).
The existing versions of DIDASS are oriented towards decision
problems in which the quality of a particular decision can be charac-
terized by a vector. In many practical problems, however, the system
behavior has to be described by a set of trajectories and the goal of
the decision maker is to ensure that these trajectories have the proper
shape. DIDASS methodology can be successfully applied in this case,
see e.g. Grauer et al. (1982), and standard software (Lewandowski,
1982~ Krtglewski, 1983) can be used for this purpose. However, the
existing software was not designed to be used for trajectory optimi-
zation. This causes some technical problems in the manipulation of the
reference trajectories and the interpretation of the results. For
these reasons a new version of DIDASS was developed which makes the
reference - traj ectory decision analysis much simpler. This paper de-
scribes both the new version of DIDASS and the application of this
software to a flood control problem.
2. TRAJECTORY - ORIENTED EXTENSION OF DIDASS (T-DIDASS)
The core of T-DIDASS consists of the standard software already
used in the non-trajectory version. The special feature of the new
version lies in the modified user-computer interface. The interaction
module was extended - new trajectory definition and trajectory inter-
pretation modules were implemented. These allow us to define any group
of performance vector components as a trajectory; the only restriction
is concerned with the name of the trajectory - all components of the
same trajectory have to be identified by a unique sequence of alpha-
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numeric characters. This must be taken into account when creating the
description file.
The syntax of the trajectory definition command is straightfor-
ward:
TRJ {Sequence of trajectory names}.
The traj ectory interpretation module is menu - driven. This module
makes it possible to display selected trajectories, and modify the
reference trajectory and other data (e.g. scaling factors) in a simple
way. Selected traj ectories can be plotted using low - resolution graph-
ics terminals. The structure of the extended system is presented in
Fig. 1.
Tr
DEFTRJ TRJ Standard DIDASS
command command user - computer
interface
A /~~' ,IrMENU
driverajeetory
file Iti" ~I' ~
,
DISPLAY PLOT
module module
.. r
,
UPDATE
module
Fig. 1. Structure of tbe trajectory - oriented extension of DIDASS
The basic difficulty is connected with the calculation of the
utopia trajectory. This is caused by the large number of trajectory
components - if there are N trajectories, each characterized by n com-
ponents, it is necessary to perform nN single optimization runs in
order to calculate the utopia trajectory. This is usually more than
in the non-trajectory case - in practical problems the number of runs
can vary between 10-1000. Therefore it is necessary to use some approx-
imation procedure.
Unfortunately there is still no proper approximation procedure.
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Some ad-hoc methods have been proposed; one of the most straightfor-
ward of these consists of the following steps:
divide the trajectory into m equal 3egments;
select a segment Si' 1 < i < m;
treat all of the components of the trajectory that lie outside Si
as free variables (this is easily done using standard DIDASS
mechanisms) ;
for all components within Si select a reference point equal to in-
finity;
repeat this sequence for all segments and all trajectories.
Using this procedure it is only necessary to perform Nonlm opti-
mization runs.
Nothing is known about the accuracy of approximation, so some
numerical experiments were carried out. These experiments show that
for nlm in the range 2-5, the approximation error varies between 0-30%.
In most practical cases this provides sufficient information about the
properties of the problem.
3. FLOOD CONTROL PROBLEM
The software described above and the DIDASS methodology were used
for decision support in a flood control problem. The structure of the
system under study is presented in Fig. 2. This is a simplified sub-
system of the upper Vistula river in Poland.
control
section.
inflow
forec:ast=========~----~
deciaiOf'l ====~I=~======t~=------1'\variables ;:
reservoirs
Fig. 2. Structure of the river network.
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The system consists of 3 general-purpose reservoirs supplying
water to the main river reach. The goal of the system dispatcher is
to operate the reservoirs (by speeding-up or delaying the flood peak
on each river) such that the flood peaks on the main river do not co-
incide. In other words, the flood peaks in the control sections on
the main river should be minimized.
It is evidently possible to formulate the above problem as a
single-criterion optimization problem. Computational experiments show,
however, that the resulting solution is usually not acceptable to the
system dispatcher. This is because the height of the flood peak is not
the only quality factor which must be taken into account. A number of
other factors, some of which are very difficult to formalize, also play
an essential role in the decision process. Therefore the system opera-
tor formulates his goals in terms of trajectory shape rather than per-
formance index. In addition, a natural ordering can be introduced in
the trajectory space - a small flood is evidently better than a large
one. Thus the DIDASS methodology seems to be an ideal tool for solving
this problem.
4. APPLICATION OF DIDASS METHODOLOGY TO A FLOOD CONTROL PROBLEM
The basic difficulty in applying DIDASS in this case is due to
the complexity of the flood transient model.
It is shown in the literature that this process can be described
with satisfactory accuracy by the following linear PDE of parabolic
type (Cunge, 1980):
( 1 )
This can be derived from the Saint-Venant equation. In the equation
above Qi denotes the water discharge in the i-th river reach. We also
have the following set of boundary conditions:
qa - inflow to the system,
ua'ub,u
c
- release of water from reservoirs
(decision variables).
The continuity equations in each node of the river must also be formu-
lated.
The differential equations describing the reservoirs are straight-
forward:
q. - U.
l l (2)
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where xi denotes the amount of water stored in reach i
qi denotes the inflow to the reservoir,
u i ' denotes the outflow from the reservoir.
In order to use DIDASS methodology to solve the problem, it is
necessary to formulate the discrete-time equivalent of the system equa-
tions and the corresponding LP problem.
Unfortunately it is not possible to use the finite difference
technique to transform the differential equations (1), (2) into their
discrete-time equivalents. Due to accuracy and stability limitations,
the maximum admissible discretization step for equation (1) is ~pproxi­
mately 15 minutes of real time, while the time horizon is equal to 360
hours. The 15 minute time step would result in an LP problem with an
unacceptable number of variables and constraints.
It is possible to overcome this problem by utilizing the super-
position principle and the linearity of the equations.
Let Qwi(t) denote the water discharge at the control point (Fig.2).
Because the system equations are linear the following decomposition is
possible:
Q .(t) = Q .(t) + Qa.(t) + Qb.(t) + QC.(t)Wl Wl Wl Wl Wl 0)
where Qwi(t) is the solution of the system equations with ua(t) = 0,
ub(t) = 0, uc(t) = 0, nonzero initial conditions and
predicted qo(t),
Q:i(t) is the solution of the system equations with zero initial
conditions, qo(t) = 0, ub(t) = 0 and uc(t) = O.
The other components of the formula can be defined in a similar way.
Making use of the following approximation
( 4 )
where
the solution is given by the formula
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where Q~ik(t) is the solution of the system equations under the same
conditions used to calculate Qa., but with u (t) = ~k(t).
Wl a
We are interested only in the values of Q
wi at discrete instants of
time, and therefore the above formulas can be represented in matrix
form:
(6)
where
The matrices Ai, Bi , ci can be derived from the above formulas. Inq q q
practice the simulation program is used to calculate the elements of the
matrices in (6); this can be done off-line because the parameters of
the system remain constant during the interaction process. The same
principle can be used for discretizing the reservoir equations (2):
where ~i = {xi(tk)}~=1
Equations (6) constitute the objective rows; equations (7) with
the additional constraints
~i min < ~i < ~i max
~i min 2 ~i < ~i max
(8)
constitute the set of LP constraints.
In practical applications the trajectories were calculated at 10
time points; the resulting LP matrix therefore consists of 60 columns,
30 objective rows and 60 bounds. The small size of the problem and
the low density of the matrix made it possible to solve the problem
using a microcomputer comparable with the IBM-PC.
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The structure of the DIDASS-based flood control system is pre-
sented in Fig. 3.
The system was demonstrated during experimental sessions at the
conference on Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Making;
selected numerical results are presented later in this volume.
Hydrological
forecasting
module
Flood tronsient
model identi-
fication module
Model
parameters & state
Trajectoryorien-
ted interaction
module
L.......;.F,;.;lo;.;o;.;d;..;.fo;;;r;.;e;.;c.;;a;;;st;........;. Multiple - cri teria
LP problem
generator
Tra jedory orien-
ted graphics
module
Trajec.tary
oriented
extension of
DIDASS
Fig. 3. Outline of the DIDASS-based flood control system
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The methodology presented in this paper can also be applied to
other systems governed by partial or ordinary differential equations.
The only restriction is that these equalities should be linear. A
specialized matrix generator for solving such problems is currently
being implemented.
Experience has shown that graphical presentation of the results
is necessary for successful application of the DIDASS methodology to
dynamic problems. The resolution obtained using a standard terminal is
not good enough, and we are therefore looking into the possibility of
using a microcomputer with high-resolution color graphics as a working
station for solving dynamic DIDASS problems. Work on the development
of such a working station is currently in progress.
This work was done jointly by the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, and the Institute of
Automatic Control, Technical University of Warsaw, Poland.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision analysis in the area of multiobjective resource allocation
calls for decision support based on specially devised software. Such is
the case presented here. The necessary condition for development of such
software is a thorough identification of decision environment so that
the following is assured:
- s9ftware is tailored to fulfil the demand of a decision process,
- a user obtains clearly defined decision analysis support and is con-
scious of its advantage and limitations (the prime goal of this
paper is to illustrate it).
Consider the following elements involved in the decision process:
a model of the system to which resources are to be allocated,
estimates of the availability of the resources,
a decision maker, who tries to attain a satisfactory concordance
between the first two elements.
It is assumed that for the moment the model is an adequate representa-
tion of reality. Meanwhile information about resources and expectations
~ a mixture obtained from various sources ~like forecasts, experts'
evaluations etc.) and therefore charged with uncertainty.
A step-wise process conducted by the decision maker should lead towards
attaining the concordance. A single step of this process consists in
validation of the resource estimates with respect to the model through
solving a multiobjective optimization problem (MOP) followed by an ap-
propriate analysis of results. Such a decision process was applied to
the development analysis in the chemical industry and was presented in
[ 1, 2 l. These papers also contain methodological remarks about the
arrangement of the whole decision process.
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Cost
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, describe the above process with the
help of a commonly understandable example. There are two critical re-
sources in the process of implementation of a new technology: investment
and completion time, which constitute a two-dimensional objective space
(see Fig. 1). Now we ask experts (or a decision maker) how they estimate
these two objectives. There cannot be an exact answer. This means that
they cannot locate the
desired point in the
objective space. In-
stead of that it is
Time
Admissible Demanded Set (ADS)
and Skeleton Set (S).
Fig. 1.
natural to get lower
and upper approxima-
tions of the resources
in question. Lower ap-
proximation on in-
vestment may result
from feasibility stu-
dies while the upper
one may represent the
decision maker's in-
vestment ability or
willingness. In the case of time, the lower limit may result from iden-
tification of market competition (the sooner the better~ while the up-
per one may represent an estimate of completion time. The above exam-
ple shows that all we can expect as a representation of the resources
availability in the objective space is a rectangle with uncertain
boundaries. Although preferences of the decision maker are expressed, of
course, by the choice of objectives and constraints in the model, it is
necessary to formulate an achievement function which can differ solu-
tions located inside the rectangle named an admissible demanded set
(ADS) (see Fig. 1).
The paper presents a software tool for supporting the decision maker in
a situation as exemplified. The package is based on the so-called Skel-
eton Method introduced by Gorecki [3] and then developed by Dobrowol-
ski et al. [1). The current version of the package deals with linear
models. An extension to nonlinear problem has been investigated in [6)
and the resulting procedures are to be embedded in a forthcoming imple-
mentation.
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THE CORE OF THE METHOD
This section contains only this information about the Skeleton Method
which is important for the implementation of the HG-package.
Definition 1.
The MOP under consideration is as follows H
min Fx
x E XO
( 1 )
(2)D
where:
bERm
A real valued m x n matrix,
F real valued k x n matrix.
Definition 2.
The (optimal) compromise set in the Pareto sense for the problem (1)
is denoted by Q •
Definition 3.
A set Dc Rk (a rectangular parallelepiped) constructed as a Cartesian
product of closed intervals as follows:
k 0
X [1., uiOj
i=1 ~
where:
l~, u~' i = 1, ••• ,k , are the coordinates of the points 1 0 , UO
respectively,
will be called an admissible demanded set (ADS).
10 , UO express lower and upper estimates of the availability of
resources, which are represented by the objectives in problem (1).
Definition 4.
The Skeleton SD of the set D is the set of points in D which
(i) belong to the set E of locally equidistant points
E 1sED: 3: p,q E c D, P " q: II s - p II = II s - q II ,.
min II s - z II
ZEd D
where II • II is the Euclidean nonn in Rk • d D is the,
boundary of D
(ii) fonn a broken line joining the edge points 10 u O .,
~ In the case of maximization of one of the objectives, the usual
trick sign inversion can be applied to satisfy the notation
of this section.
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The skeleton consists of 2k-1 seg-
2k-2 breaking points have to be
Construction of the skeleton S~
ments and in order to construct it,
computed.
1. Let us assign:
u~ - l~~ ~
2
i = 1, ••• ,k
2. Let us reorder the set of di , i = 1, ••• ,k so that a new index j
increases along with increasing values of d j , j = 1, ••• ,k.
3. Starting from 10 , U o the following equations allow for consequent
computation of pairs of opposite breaking points.
lj+1 l~ +
d
j
•
,
\i
~
u j +1 u j -
for i > j , j O, ••• ,k-2
i i dj +1
lj+1 l~ l (3)i ~ for i ,;;; jj+1 = u jui i
o
_-------71 U
The method of constructing the skeleton explains its interesting geome-
trical feature (see Fig. 2). Computation of a consequent pair of points,
using eq. (3) , may be in-
terpreted as a reduction of
dimension of the set D
together With its skeleton
SD • Then a reduced set is
also a rectangular paral-
lelepiped which has its
skeleton being an internal
part of the skeleton SD •
Consequently, also a paral-
lel projection of the sets
D and SD on any axes
plane gives a rectangle and
a skeleton, satisfying con-
struction as above.
Fig. 2. The skeleton in three-dimensional
objective space.
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Definition 5.
A concept of optimality: a point xo is called optimal in the sense
of the Skeleton Method if:
1. X
o
E XO is Pareto optimal;
2. Xo lies on the skeleton SD or locates as close as possible to SD
in the sense of scalarizing function as follows:
k k
few) min pmin wi I wi € L wi (4)
i i=1 i=1
where:
wi = (Fx )i - s i i = 1••••• k and s E SD
p ;;. k and €;;' 0 are parameters.
The scalarizing function (4) was proposed by Wierzbicki [51 • A ge-
ometrical interpretation of the optimality concept is rather obvious.
There are possible four mutual locations of the skeleton set SD and
the point X
o
belonging to the optimal compromise set Q
1. Xo is an intersection point of Q and SD and is a desired
solution;
2. There is no intersection between Q and SD and
(a) X
o
lies in D X
o
as an edge point of Q is a desired
solution;
(b) X
o
lies "under" D in the objective space and is an unattain-
able solution;
(c) Xo lies "above" D and is a surplus solution.
Due to features of the scalarizing function and a fact that the set Q
is a weak-convex. plane-wise surface. a case when Xo lies at the edge
of Q may be recognized by examination of values of wi' i = 1••••• k
in eq. (4).
AN APPLICATION TO DECISION ANALYSIS PROCESS
The intention of this section is to locate the method in the context of
a decision analysis process and to show what are its properties and im-
plications. A more extended discussion of this subject goes beyond the
scope of this paper and will be done separately.
We shall illustrate it with a case when ADS is attainable and for the
sake of simplicity the problem discussed below is two-dimensional.
Let us start with the following remarks and observations referring to
the Skeleton Method.
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1. The Skeleton Method opens a possibility to search for a solution of
the mUltiobjective allocation problem in the situation when resour-
ces are established as objectives and their availability is given by
lower and upper estimates. Due to uncertainty of the estimates the
method introduces a safety principle based on the skeleton property
of being eqUidistant from ADS boundary. The safety principle enables
also to scalarize the mUltiobjective problem and to find an unique
solut ion to it.
2. The safety principle implies that risk of taking the assumed esti-
mates into consideration is equivalent with regard to the lower as
well as the upper estimate.
3. The safety principle and consequently the assumed estimates consti-
tute a subjective factor in the Skeleton Method. Another formulation
of the safety principle may be of course considered but is not im-
plemented in the HG-package.
4. ADS is in form of a rectangle ~ With its skeleton located either
horizontally or vertically (the case of ADS being a square is a
neutral one).
5. We consider decision problems of resource allocation where the ob-
jectives represent either input or output or a combination of input
and output resources. Therefore we can practically distinguish three
types of the problems:
(i) Substitution analysis of the input resources;
(ii) Substitution analysis of the output resources;
(iii) Efficiency analysis (output vs. input or vice versa).
It naturally follows that the above cases represent optimization
problems: (min, min), (max, max) and (max, min) respectively. The
illustrative example used in the introduction belongs to the first
type of proLlems since it discusses possible substitution of time
and investment.
For further investigation let us focus our attention on the case of ef-
ficiency analysis. It may be done with the help of Fig. 3. This figure
shows that a solution obtained according to the safety principle (point
2) is different to a solution found as far as natural preference is
concerned (point 1). This natural preference is expressed in terms
of un!t per un!t of measurement of the resources in ques tion. The
~ In the multidimensional case ADS would be a rectangular
parallelepiped.
Oatpat
max
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max
IIlIKrt
min
Fig. 3. Influence of the safety principle: 1 - solution according
to natural preference; 2 - solution according to the safety
principle.
safety principle introduces a specific kind of preference and moreover
not the same for a vertical and horizontal location of the skeleton. In
the case of a vertical position we can see that the solution (point 2)
on the vertical section of the skeleto~ in comparison with the solution
at point 1, is burdened with preference to the input resource since it
is displaced in a direction favouring minimization. On the contrary, in
the case of the horizontal skeleton preference is given to the output
resource. The remaining sections of the skeleton are neutral with re-
spect to the problem of preference. The safety principle sustains natu-
ral preference in the case of locating a solution within these sections.
We can therefore formulate the following remarks and observations in the
course of the decision analysis supported by the Skeleton Method.
1. Estimates of the resources (for the given units of measurement) are
responsible for the size and the resulting vertical or horizontal po-
sition of ADS Which introduces through the safety principle a spe-
cific kind of preference.
2. The preferred resource is the one which is extremalised in a direc-
tion perpendicular to the non-neutral section of the skeleton.
3. Proportions of the estimates of resources and the resulting location
and shape of the skeleton imply a direction and the extent to which
preference of the resources will be introduced.
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4. Proportions of the estimates bring information about sensitivity of
the analysed decision problem with respect to the efficiency ratio
and scale of operation ~.
5. In the case when a solution could not be located on the skeleton the
nearest point to it would be chosen according to the safety princi-
ple. Therefore all the above considerations remain valid.
The above analysis can easily be extended to the remaining two cases
referring to the input and output substitution analysis. The interpre-
tation in terms of the resources will be obviously different.
All the above considerations can be generalized to the multidimensional
case though preference generated by the safety principle becomes more
complicated then. This extension together with discussion of methodolo-
gical indications for the decision analysis will be done in a separate
paper.
The essential point in the course of the decision analysis is that the
decision maker should be fully aware of properties of any method he in-
tends to use as an aid in a decision process. The considerations pre-
sented in this section exemplify the properties and implications of the
Skeleton Method.
Th~ SOLVING ALGORIThM
The algorithm searches for an optimal solution in the sense of defini-
tion 5. and consists in solving a sequence of the MOP's (see eq. (1))
scalarized by the function as in eq. (4). Each of the MOP's uses a dif-
ferent so-called reference point (described by's' in eq. (4)), which
is the consequent breaking point of the skeleton. The choice of a
breaking pOint is carried out in the course of iteration equation (3).
Each time, signs and values of Wi ' i = 1, ••• ,k in eq. (4) arechecked
in order that the mutual position of the actual reference point and the
optimal compromise set could be found out and finally the algorithm could
be completed.
1. j = 0 (index j corresponds to that in eq. (3))
2. Generating the scalarized MOP with s = lj
3. Simplex algorithm.
4. 11 wi";;; 0 ~ go to 5.~ stop "1".
M The former is the ratio of output/input, the latter is expressed
by magnitUde of output. A dual situation may also occur when input
is more critical for 8 decision process.
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5. Generating the scalarized MOP with s = u j •
6. Simplex algorithm.
7. II wi >, 0 then go to 8. else stop "2".
8. j j + 1
9. Calculation of lj, uj •
10. ~ j '" 2 lli!!
modification of the scalarizing function through fixing wj - 1
to zero in order to avoid driving out the solution of a sub-
space of Rk , which corresponds to the currently reduced
skeleton.
11. go to 1.
Remarks:
1. Such" jumping" choice of the breaking points brings about that a so-
lution obtained in each step of the algorithm is a Pareto-optimalon~
2. For j = 0 stop "1" and stop "2" are in effect when an unattainable
solution or a surplus one is found respectively. For j > 1 we have
a desired solution.
3. In the case of any stop of the algorithm it is possible to make out
the situation when a solution lies at the edge of the optimal com-
promise set. It occurs when non-fixed wi (in step 10.) are not
equal to each other.
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
The method of solving the MOP problems described in the preceding sec-
tIon has been implemented as an interactive computer package named HG-
package. The package contains three main modules: Input Manager, Output
Manager and Solver (see Fig. 4). The first two are responsible for com-
munication with a user, the third realizes the algorithm described in
the preceding section with MINOS [4] used as an LP-procedure.
Files used by the HG-package contain (see Fig. 4):
MRS file - (input) the model under consideration written in
MRS [4] format. All possible objectives are described
here in a form of rows of any type. RHS values of these rows
(if exist) are ignored.
DICTIONARY file - (input) a cross-reference map between MPS codes and
a real life description of the model.
I:~CTIOHA~;FILE
-------
.-----.r- :: -"
-------
I :~JECTI~:FILE
-------
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FILE
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FILE
Fig. 4. Functional Structure of the HG-package.
OBJECTIVE file - (input'output) information necessary for a definition
of a current scalarized MOP. There are parameters for the
scalarizing function, MPS codes of objectives with respec-
tive directions (min or max) of optimization, ranges of
ADS, and names of RHS and BOUNDS vectors. The file may be
supplied by the user or may be established as well With
the help of Input Manager.
SPECIFICATION file - (input) all necessary parameters for MINOS [4].
SAVE file - (OUput) solutions of the scalarized MOP in a real life de-
scription. Each time the user requires to save the current
solution, it is appended to the file.
STORE file - (output) information about the mutual location between
ADS and a solution. It is stored automatically for each
realized MOP.
SOLUTION file - (output) a solution in MPS (MINOS) form which may be
used for an advance analysis.
A session With the HG-package.
A session with the HG-package starts from Input Manager. At this moment
the user has the following possibilities:
- printing all possible objectives. This information is taken from
DICTIONARY file.
- formulation of the current MOP, it is: choosing a set of objective~
rhs vector, bound vector in MPS model and ADS data. If OBJECTIVE
file exists the above operations may be omitted;
279
- updating the current set of objectives, it is: changing the set of
objectives, updating the ADS data, adding a new objective and
deleting an existing one;
- saving an actual set of objectives in OBJECTIVE file.
All possibilities of Input and Output Manager are controlled by a sim-
ple command language. If it is necessary, a manual can be printed by a
special help command. When the user is sure that the problem is properly
formulated, he can qUit Input Manager and start Solver.
MPS file is then reformulated according to the currently considered MOP
and a resulting LP problem is solved by MINOS as many times as neces-
sary.
When the solving procedure is completed Output Manager is called and
the current MOP solution is displayed in the real life description. The
following possibilities are then available:
- displaying the solution in the real life description form,
- displaying the solution in a simple graphical form. For each pair
from the set of objectives a location of the skeleton of ADS and
the optimal solution is displayed,
- saving the solution in SOLUTION file,
- return to Input Manager and preparation of a new experiment,
- termination of the run of the package.
The solution in a numerical as well as a graphical form is cyclically
accessible as long as the user needs it.
CONCLUSIONS
The HG-package presented in this paper has been applied to the develop-
ment analysis in the chemical industry especially to the problem of the
comparative study of chemical technologies reported in [2]. Some
aspects of the comparative study have been demonstrated at an experi-
mental session and, consequently, will be described in the same volume.
Our experience gained with the above applications shows that the Skele-
ton Method has a practical value.
Implications of the subjectivity factor in the decision process using
the HG-package have been discussed in order to assure a concordance be-
tween decision support and a decision maker.
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A user's possibility of modelling another safety principle is taken
into account as forthcoming extension, although the significant concor-
dance mentioned above might be weakened.
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A PRINCIPLE FOR SOLVING QUALITATIVE MULTIPLE-CRITERIA
PROBLEMS
Pekka J. Korhonen
Helsinki School ofEconomics, Helsinki, Finland
1. Introduction
In many practical applications, the final choice from among discrete
alternatives is based on several criteria, which can be quantitative
or qualitative. By the term quantitati,e we mean that the
decision-maker is able to present his preferences over alternatives
on some cardinal (interval or ratio) scale. If we call a criterion
qualitative, we mean that the decision-maker can only express ordinal
preferences by stating which of a pair of alternatives he prefers
most. Very often the criteria are clustered in such a way that they
have a natural hierarchical structure. In any case, we can assume
that this kind of hierarchy can be constructed.
As a typical example, we can consider the problem of choosing a
computer. We can think that we have found a hierarchical structure
for criteria such that, at the lowest level of the hierarchy, we have
several concrete criteria (e.g. Response time in interactive mode,
Reliability, Disk units, Accounting aids etc.) , which have been
refined from the more abstract criteria at the upper level (e.g.
Global Performance, Hardware Performance etc.). The abstract
criteria are too abstract for evaluation. Therefore the
decision-maker needs help for aggregating evaluation information from
the concrete criteria into the more abstract criteria. The solution
of this problem has been considered more detailed in Roubens (1982)
and Korhonen (1984).
Our aim is to develop an interactive approach, which aids a
decision-maker to evaluate alternatives on any subset of criteria and
to compose information from different evaluations. Initially, the
decision-maker evaluates alternatives using the criteria at the basic
level. For any criterion, he can give a cardinal scale to describe
the strength of his preferencies or he can rank alternatives or he
can only make pairwise comparisons between alternatives. Based on
that information, we compute the "correlation matriX" to describe
interdependencies between criteria. The correlation coefficient is
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defined for the qualitative criteria, too. The correlation matrix
and the criteria hierarchy is the basic information used in
aggregation. We aggregate criteria into the next upper level using
the modified version of our interactive visual approach (see,
Korhonen and Laakso (1984». As a result, we obtain the correlation
matrix between the criteria of the next level and the strength of the
preference matrix for each criterion. The strength of the preference
matrix describes how strongly the decision-maker prefers one
alternative to another on each criterion. We continue until only one
criterion is left. Using the strength of the preference matrix for
that criterion, we produce the final ranking for alternatives using
the model of Bowman and Colantoni (1973). In addition, the strength
of the preference matrix can be given as a graph, where the directed
edges describe the directions of preferences and the weights of the
edges refer to the strengths of preferences.
Several approaches have been developed for solving discrete mUltiple
criteria decision problems: The traditional multiattribute utility
theory, (see, e.g. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Farquhar (1983», the
analytic hierarchy process (see, e.g Saaty (1980», the outranking
method (see, e.g. Roubens (1982) and Roy (1973», interactive
compromise programming methods (see e.g. Korhonen, Wallenius and
Zionts (1984), Zionts (1981», fuzzy-sets theory (see, e.g. Yager
(1981» and some others (see, e.g. Hinloopen, Nijkamp and Rietveld
(1983». However, most of them have been developed, primarily, to
deal with the problems of a small set of quantitative (or ordinal)
criteria.
A nice exception is an analytic hierarchy process developed by Saaty
(1980). That method is designed to operate on qualitative
information, which is transformed into a quantitative form. However,
if the number of criteria increases to a quite large extent, the
method requires quite a few pairwise comparisons. The analytic
hierarchy process is a useful aid in the problems, where we have to
find a cardinal scale for all basic criteria.
This paper is in five sections. In the introduction, we outlined the
problem and our approach. In section 2, we develop the basic model
and in section 3 we extend our model for qualitative criteria. In
section 4, we describe our approach and conclusions are presented in
section 5.
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2. Development of the Basic Model
Let us first introduce notation to concisely describe our problem
structure. We have n deterministic alternatives A j ,j=1,2, ••• ,n and
the hierarchy of criteria such that every criterion C~
,i=1,2, ... ,Pk at each hierarchy level k ,k=O,1, ... ,K - except at
the lowest (basic) level 0 - has been decomposed into a set of
criteria at the level k-1: c~ (C~+L C~+Z, ... , C~ilk»'
i=1,2, ... ,Pk, m = ri_1(k), when i > 1 and rO(k) = O. Thus rpk(k) =
Pk-1' Each criterion is associated with one and only one
criterion at the upper level. In this section, we assume that all
criteria C~ , i=1,2, ... , Po' are quantitative at the basic level. In
the next section we will generalize considerations.
In the sequel, for simplicity,we will use notation C to refer a
criterion and notation C= (C 1 ,C2, ••• , Cp ) to refer to its
decomposition into p criteria if it is not necessary to specify the
level or the index of the criterion. We try to improve readability
by avoiding the unnecessary use of indices.
suppose that the decision-maker evaluates alternatives using
considerations.
such that
separately.
known.
the value functions are additive
Vc specified for each criterion C,
the functions Vc to be explicitly
the following theoretical
that
in
assumenot
functions
only used
We suppose
do
value
We
areThey
internal
canWe
his
(2. 1 )
where b = ( b 1 ,b 2 , ... ,bp ) • and Vc = (v , v , ... ,v) Let yC1 C2 Cbe a vector representing the values of functl0n Vc on altErnatives Aj
,j=1,2, ••• ,n and let X = ( x 1 , x2 , ••• , Xp ) be a matrix describing
the values of functions v • Hence, we have y= Xb. We assume that
C
all value functions are to b~ maximized.
Because y is an aggregated scale representing all scales xi' it is
natural to assume that y is so compatible as possible with all scales
xi i=1,2, ••• , p. To measure the compatibility we use the
correlation coefficients r(y,xi)' i=1,2, ••• , p. Conflicts between x
variables lead to a multiple criteria formulation for determining y:
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max r(y,x i ), i=1,2, ••• ,p
subject to (2.2)
y Xb
b is finite
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the means of x
variables are
y'y =1, so Y Y = b'X'Xb
is 0,
scale
too.
o and xi'xi =1. Hence, it follows that the mean of y
Let R be the correlation matrix of X, R = X'X. If we
b'X'xi I: bjrji , where rji = r(Xj' xi). Thus, we can formulate
problem (2.2) for finding the most preferred weights b as follows:
max u = Rb
sUbject to
b'Rb=
(2.3)
The vector u, representing the correlations, is an objective vector
to be maximized. The vector maximum problem (2.3) has no unique
solution. Any nondominated (efficient, Pareto-optimal) solution u=Rb
is an acceptable and reasonable solution for the problem.
paper, we define the efficient solutions as follows:
In th is
Definition 1. Solution u=Rb is efficient (nondominated) iff there is
no other feasible solution U·=Rb· ~ u such that u· > u •
If u is dominated by •u , we denote u· > u.
Lemma 1. If x' A2 x > 0 for a p-vector x and a (pxp) positive
semi-definite matrix A, then also x'Ax > O.
Proof. By the spectral decomposition theorem A can be written as
A = GLG',
where L = diag(li) is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A, and G is
an orthogonal matrix whose columns are standardized eigenvectors.
Since
we see tha t x'A2 x = Y'L2 y = I:1fyf > 0, where y = G'x. Because A is
positive semi-definite, i Ifthen Ii ~ 0 and thus > 0 if and only if
Ii > O. Hence it follows that l:lfyf > 0 implies ~liYf > o. Q.E.D.
i ~
Lemma 2. (Farkas' theorem)
n-vector, then the statement
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If A is a (mxn) matrix and d is a
d'x< 0 for all x such that Ax < 0
is equivalent to the statement that there exists y> 0 such that
d = A 'v.
Proof. (see e.g. Zoutendijk (1976».
Tbeorem 1. The solution u=Rb of the problem (2.3) is nondominated iff
u e: C={U! u=Rb, b~ O}.
Proof. We first prove sufficiency. Let u = Rb be an arbitrary
solution, b'Rb = 1 and b > 0 and let us assume that the problem
(2.3) has a solution u+lIu dominating u, Le. u+lIu > u. Thus lIu~ 0
and having at least one strictly positive element. Hence it follows
that lIu'tJJ > O. Moreover, we denote !:Ju = RlIb. Then
(b + lib)' R(b + lib) = b' Rb + b' Rlib + lib' Rb + lib' Rlib
1 + 2b' Rlib + lib' R lib = 1 + 2b'!:Ju + lib' Rlib > 1 ,
because lIu'lIu = lIb'R 2 l1b > 0 implies lIb'RlIb > 0 by Lemma 1 and the
term b' fj,u ~ 0, because b > 0 and !:Ju ~ 0 by assumption. Hence, it
follows that we cannot find a solution u + !:Ju dominating u.
Because u was an arbitrary solution, u=Rb is a nondominated solution.
To prove necessity, we show that u=Rb is dominated if u t C. We
apply Farkas' theorem (Lemma 2) and denote d=u and A=R. If
u ¢ C={U! u=Rb, b~ O}, then there exists x such that u'x> 0 and RX~
O. Rx< 0, because u'x = b'Rx > O. By choosing fj,b = -x, we can see
tha t u' fj,b< 0 and Rlib> 0 and
when
(b + t fj,b) 'R(b + t fj,b) b'Rb + 2tb'RlIb + t 2 l1b'Rfj,b = 1,
t=O or t= -2b'RlIb/llb'RlIb> O.
Hence it follows that we can find the solution u+lIu=R(b+tllb) ,
fj,u=tRfj,b> 0, of the problem (2.3) which dominates u, (u+lIu» u. It
means that u=Rb is not a nondominated solution. Q.E.D.
Remark 1. All reasonable aggregated scales can be found by using
nonnegative weights.
Remark
any of
2. If
weights
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R is non-singular, a solution is always dominated, if
is negative. In this case b, b=R-1 u , is uniquely
determined.
The problem formulation (2.3) gives a general framework to find an
aggregated scale at any level. The variable Y has the same
properties as variables xi have, and therefore different y variables
Yj' j=1,2 •••• , Py. can be aggregated in a similar way into a new
variable z by solving the problem (2.3), where now R is replaced by
the correlation matrix RY, RY = y'Y, Y = ( 1'1' 1'2'
correlation matrix RY = (ri j ) can be presented
correlations between x variables as follows:
•••• Yp), The
by means of the
( 2 • 4 )
where Yi = Xib i and Rij is the correlation matrix of Xi and Xj •
Generally. the correlation matrix Rm at level m can be introduced
from the correlation matrix RO at level 0 as follows:
(2.5)
where a Pk-1 x Pk matrix Bk. k=1.2 ••••• m. is defined such that
b~ 0 0
0 b~ ••• 0
Bk (2. 6 )
0 0 0
0 0 b~k
The column vector b1 refer to criteria C~-1 i
r i _1(k)+2. • •••
C~ at level k.
and thus we can
ri(k). at level k-1 to be aggregated into criterion
We shall denote a Po x Pm - matrix B1B2 ••• Bm by Dm•
see that Dm aggregates the criteria at the basic
level into the criteria at level m.
3. Hodel for Qualitative Criteria
In this section we allow some criteria to be qualitative. We assume
that the decision-maker is able to make at least pairwise
comparisons on all criteria of the basic level. For describing
pairwise comparisons,
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we define an n x n - matrix Z(C) to
represent
criterion C:
pairwise orderings of the alternatives specified on
(3.1)
Notation Ai(C)
criterion C.
criterion C.
alternatives.
> Aj(C) means that Ai is ranked higher than Aj on
Matrix Z(C) is known as an ordering matrix for
It does not necessarily define a ranking for
If it is possible for the decision-maker to find a cardinal scale for
criteria, that information it is possible to take into account in the
approach. In case of cardinal information we define Z(C) matrices as
follows instead of (3.1):
where xi(C) refer to the numerical value of the criterion C on
alternative Aj • As in section 2, we denote by xi the values of the
criterion Ci and X = x1' x2' ••• , x p ) Now we define the
correlation matrix RO of criteria C~,i=1,2, ••• , Po, by formula:
where
i= 1,2, ••• , Po'
We can show that definition (3.3) leads to the Pearson's
product-moment correlation coefficient in case of quantitative
criteria.
Theorem 2. Let us suppose Ci and
evaluated on the cardinal scales
calcula ted by formula <3.3) , is
correlation of variables xi and Xj'
Cj are two criteria, which can be
xi and Xj' Then the correlation,
the Pearson's product-moment
Proof. For the terms EE zhm(Ci)zhm(Cj) and s2(Ci) in formula (3.3) we
can introduce the following expressions:
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E E zhm(C i)zhm(C j) = E E (xhi - Xmi)(Xhj - Xmj)
=2(n E XhiXhj - (E Xhi)(E Xhj»
and
Now we can see that the first term is the cross- product of the
variables xi and Xj multiplied by 2n and the second term is the
variance of the variable xi multiplied by 2n. By assigning the terms
to formula (3.3), we get the result immediately. Q.E.D.
Remark 3. If the decision-maker can rank alternatives on each
criterion and we define matrices Z(C) as in (3.2), where the values
of vectors x are ordinal numbers, it leads us to the use of
Spearman's rank correlations, because Pearson's correlation
coefficient calculated using ordinal numbers is Spearman's rank
correlation coefficiint.
If the ranking information is presented as in (3.1), so the
correlation coefficient r~j computed by formula (3.3) is Kendall's
rank correlation (cf., e.g. Siegel (1956».
We denote
and generally we define
Q(C) = EbiQ(Ci)' (3.5)
i
Because E Q2hm(C~) = 1, i=1,2, ..• , Qo' so we can see that
( 3 .6 )
The matrices Q(C) can be interpreted as the strength of preferences.
The elements Qij(C) of Q(C) describe how strongly the decision-maker
prefers Ai to Aj on criterion C. If Qij(C) < 0, so Aj is preferred
to Ai'
Let C be the highest-level criterion. We determine the final ranking
such that it is as compatible as possible with the preference
strength matrix Q(C). Let U (by Bowman and Colantoni (1973» be an n
x n - matrix representing any complete, asymmetric pairwise ordering
of alternatives (see, also Michaud (1983»
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1. if Ai > Aj. i = j
O. if Ai < Aj
uii = 1/2
Bowman and Co lan ton i have proved that matrix U defines a ranking if
and only if U is a solution to
u ij O. 1 i f: j (3.8a)
Uij + Uji = 1. for all i. j = 1 .2. ,. .. , n (3.8b)
uhi + Uij + Ujh < 2. for all i. j. h = 1.2. ... , n (3.8c)
uii = 1/2. for all i=1 •.••• n. <3.8d)
Now we can define the most preferred ranking as a solution to the
problem
max <3.9)
subject to constraints (3.8a-d).
As a solution to (3.9). we find the ranking maximizing the sum of the
strength of preferences. which are consistent with the ranking. i.e.
qhm(C) is included in the sum. if Ah is not ranked lower than Am.
Bowman and Colantoni's model (3.9) is also rational for quantitative
criteria. Le. matrices Z(C) are defined by formula (3.2).
Tbeorem 3. Let us assume that criterion Ck is aggregated from the
criteria C~. i=1.2 ••••• p using weights d= B1 B2 •.• Bk and let X = (
x1.x2 ••••• xp) presents the values of criteria C~ on alternatives. If
we have defined
so the solution U of the model (3.9) ranks the alternatives according
to the values of the vector y = Xd.
Proof. Without loss of generality. we can assume that the means of x
variables are 0 and xi'xi = 1. i=1.2 •..•• p. Hence we get
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Qhm(Ck) = LdiQhm(C~) = Ldi(xhi - x mi)/(2n) = (Yh - ym)/(2n).
i i
The objective function of the model (3.9) can now be given in form:
In neglecting constraint (3.9c), it is obvious that f will be
maximized, if we choose uhm = 1, when Yh ~ Ym and uhm = 0, when Yh <
Ym. Now we can see that u defines a ranking for alternatives and
thus also constraint (3.9c) is fulfilled. Moreover, the alternatives
are ranked according to the values of y. Q.E.D.
Remark 4. In the case of Quantitative criteria, the aggregated scale
for Ck can be found by computing the row (column) sums of matrix
Q(Ck). That can also be done if we have operated on an ordinal scale
like a cardinal scale.
In some problems it may be more convenient to consider only the
preference matrix Q(C), instead of ranking. For example Roy's
outranking method (1973) is a suitable approach for dealing with
matrix Q(C). However, a graph presentation for Q(C) is a practical
way of presenting to the decision-maker the information of the
strengths of preferences and not necessarily dependant on Roy's
method.
3. An Approach
We now present the approach in a step-by-step manner followed by
comments and detailed explanations after steps. In this section we
assume that R is non-singular.
Step 1. Ask the decision-maker to compare alternatives on criteria
C~, i=1, 2, ••• , po. The results of comparisons are presented on
either cardinal or ordinal scales when it is possible. In the other
case, ask the decision-maker to make pairwise comparisons between
alternatives. Build up matrices Z(C~) and Q~ and compute the
correlation matrix RO between criteria C~ as presented in (3.3).
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Step 2. Set k=k+1 and solve the problem (2.3) for each criterion C{,
i=1, 2, ••• , Pk for finding the weight vectors bf. Using these
weights, compute the preference strength matrices Qf as presented in
(3.5) •
Step 3. If Pk > 1, compute the correlation matrix Rk according to
formula (2.5) and return to step 2. In the other case, present the
final preference strength matrix Q(CK) multiplied by constant t as a
directed graph, where the directed edges describe the directions of
preferences and the weights of edges are the strength of preferences.
The constant t can chosen such that the largest strength of
preferences is 1. Solve the final ranking using the model (3.9).
In step 2, we suggest the use of the following interactive procedure
for finding the weight vectors bf for each criterion i. The
procedure is the modified version of our visual interactive approach
to solving the mUltiple criteria problem (see, Korhonen and Laakso
(1984». We intersperse comments between steps.
The modified visual interactive procedure
Step 1. Solve b = e"/(e"Re)1/2, where e = ( 1,1, ••• ,1) "and compute
u = Rb.
Thus we will find an efficient solution.
Step 2. Present u to the decision maker and ask which correlations he
would, primarily, like to increase. Let us I, Ie { 1,2, •.• ,p}, be
an index set referring to those correlations. Construct vector ~u
such that ~ui = 1, if i e: I and ~ui = 0, if i f1 I.
We use the vector ~u as a reference direction vector. If you so wish,
the strength of preferences can be taken into account in ~u,too.
Step 3. Compute (u + ~u) "R-1 (u + ~u) = s2 and construct
~u· = (u + ~u)/s - u = (u(1-s) + ~u)/s.
Now the vector u + ~u· is the solution of the model (2.3) (~b·
R-1Au·), because
Step 4. Denote s2(t)
problem:
=
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Denote the maximum value by t max •
The value t max tells us to what extent it is possible to go along the
curve (u + ti'lu·)/s(t), s2(t) = (u + ti'lu·)'R- 1 (u + ti'lu·), from the
current position u until the solution is no longer efficient.
Step 5. Present to the decision-maker the nondominated curve
(u + ti'lu·)/s(t), t:O -> t max ,
where
s2(t)=(u+ti'lU·)'R- 1 (U+ti'lU·) =1+2t(t-1)u'R- 1i'lu·
=1+2t(t-1)((1+u'R- 1i'lu)/s_1),
in the graphical mode using the graphical display as described in
Korhonen and Laakso (1984). Ask him to choose the most preferred
solution and denote the corresponding value of t
toi'lu·)/s(t o ) and return to step 2, if to > t.
decision-maker if he is willing to consider other
answer is "no", stop; otherwise return to step 2.
by to. Set u = (u +
If to = t, ask the
directions. If the
If the decision-maker prefers the solution with value t max ' we can
continue from this position by setting the corresponding i'lb i = 0 and
computing a new i'lu for transformed i'lb.
Using the above procedure we find the weight vectors Bk = ( b~,b~,
••• ,b~k) and can calculate the matrices Qf, i=1,2, ••• ,Pk. In step 3
we compute the correlation matrix Rk by Rk = Bk'Rk - 1Bk , if Pk > 1.
If Pk = 1, we have achieved the top level, and we can find the final
ranking to alternatives by solving the model (3.9).
In some problems it may be more convenient to consider only the
preference matrix Q(C), instead of ranking. For example Roy's
outranking method (1973) is a suitable approach for dealing with
matrix Q(C). However, a graph presentation for Q(C) is a practical
way of presenting to the decision-maker the information of the
strengths of preferences and not necessarily dependant on Roy's
me thod.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we have described a method, which helps the
decision-maker to find the most preferred ranking for alternatives,
which are evaluated on several qualitative or quantitative criteria
with a hierarchical structure. We assumed that the decision-maker is
able to make at least pairwise comparisons between alternatives on each
criterion. That information was used for computing the
intercorrelations between criteria, which is the basic information for
aggregation.
The interactive method helps to aggregate information from the criteria
of the basic level step by step until we reach the criterion of the
highest level. As a result, we find the matrix of the most preferred
preference strength matrix, which is used to find the final ranking by
means of the model of Bowman and Colantonio
The aggregation procedure is easy to implement on a microcomputer and
it is efficient. In the contrary, the solving of the model of Bowman
and Colantoni requires the capacity of a big computer even for quite a
small problem. However, a fairly good approximation for finding the
final ranking, and which is exact for quantitative criteria, is to
determine it by means of the row sums of the most preferred preference
strength matrix.
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A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR PLANNING AND CONTROLLING
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION WITH A DECENTRALIZED
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Marek Makowski and Janusz Sosnowski
Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy ofSciences, Warsaw, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents some work done by the authors as part of a pro-
ject aimed at the construction of a model of Polish agriculture [1].
The project has been undertaken by an interdisciplinary team composed
of researchers from the Systems Research Institute, the Institute of
Agricultural Economy, the Institute for Rural and Agricultural Develop-
ment, in close cooperation with the State Planning Commission and the
Ministry of Agriculture. The project represents a joint case study
performed with the cooperation of the Food and Agriculture Program and
the System and Decision Sciences Program of the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis. Due to limitations on the size of the
paper, only a brief outline is presented here. Details of the research
may be found in [1], [2] , [3] •
2. BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE PROBLEM
The institutional and technical context described below is crucial
for understanding the problem.
Poland has a centrally planned economy. Therefore basic decisions
(for example, on the annual socioeconomic plan, setting prices, inter-
est rates, taxes, control of foreign trade) are made by central author-
ities forming the decision center (the Sejm (Parliament), Government,
State Planning Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, the central commit-
tees of political parties and the main administrative institutions).
Polish agriculture has a diversified structure. It is composed of
about 3 million units (farms) which are independent in their economic
activity and self-managed. Over 70% of agricultural land is privately
owned. Under the new economic system cooperative and state farms also
enjoy independence in management.
The problem of direct versus indirect control of economic activi-
ties in a centrally planned economy within the context of Polish Agri-
culture is discussed in [1] and [4]. In current practice, profit-
oriented motives are used as the basic instrument for controlling
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agricultural production. The decision center is able to control both
the production pattern and use of inputs more efficiently by setting
prices and, if necessary, quotas than by any administrative measures
(e.g. setting production targets).
Keeping in mind the context summarized above, we used the following
approach to construct a decision support system for planning and con-
trol of agricultural production:
1. Producers are divided into 5 groups, each one (called a sector)
being composed of producers with similar technological and behavioral
characteristics. It is assumed that producers behave in a rational
way, i,e. given the prices of all products and inputs, the technolog-
ical constraints, and available inputs, the producers are assumed to
choose a production plan for each sector which would maximize their own
goal function. An LP model has been constructed and verified for each
sector (see Sec. 3).
2. The agricultural production model (APM) is composed of sectoral
models with appropriate linking conditions (see Sec. 4). The APM may
be used by a decision center to assess the overall agricultural poten-
tial. In other words, it is possible, for assumed resources (inputs)
and recognized overall goals, to determine a desired (and feasible)
pattern and level of production and use of inputs for each sector.
3. Having decided on an overall plan, it is necessary to determine
the economic instruments (mainly prices) that would enable parametric
control of agricultural producers (see Sec. 5). The set of prices
should ensure that while maximizing his own income each producer would
choose a production pattern consistent with overall plan adopted by the
decision center.
3. MODELS OF SECTORAL PRODUCTION
Keeping in mind the assumptions discussed in the previous section,
we construct sectoral production models in the following form:
For each sector i (i = 1,2, .. 5) find an activity level (production
pattern and use of production inputs) x.E Rn such that the producer's
l
income is maximized:
c • x. ->- max
l
A.x . .;;; b.
l l l
1 . .;;; x . .;;; h.
l l l
(1)
(2)
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where: c - given vector of prices for products and inputs,
Ai - matrix of fixed coefficients for technical constraints,
b i - vector of available local inputs and resources (land,
labour, etc).
Lower (if non-zero) and upper bounds for some activities may correspond
to the behavioral characteristics of the producers. Lower bounds might
be used for production targets for selected products, if required.
Upper bounds may also reflect limits on available resources or quotas
(see Sec. 5).
Sectoral models form the basis for constructing a set of admiss-
ible solutions for agricultural output as a whole. Therefore a lot of
effort has been put into the construction and verification of those
models by an interdisciplinary team.
4. THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PLANNING MODEL
Let us start by defining the admissible solution set for overall
agricultural production. The set is defined by sectoral technical con-
straints together with linking constraints and may be written as:
A.x. ..; b. i 1,2, .. 5 (4 )
l l l
5
L B.x. ..; d ( 5 )
i=l l l
where constraints (5) correspond to limitations on the availability of
production inputs for agriculture as a whole (the latter are defined
by vector d, whereas the matrices Bi are composed of elements which are
equal to one or to zero). Appropriate constraints (3) are also included.
The structure of the admissible set for 3 sectors is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Problems in agriculture are a specific feature of the current
situation in Poland because of the imbalance between the supply of
agricultural products and the demand for these goods. Food consumption
accounts for nearly 60% of the consumers' income. The shortfall in the
means of production (especially machinery and equipment, pesticides and
concentrated feeds) stands in the way of increased agricultural pro-
duction. Therefore, and due to the institutional context described in
Sec. 2, it is hardly possible to define a single objective that could
be used for the selection of a feasible solution for overall agricul-
tural planning. Usually it is necessary to deal with several objec-
tives, such as level of production of certain goods (others may be
aggregated), level of use of selected inputs, balance of foreign trade
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in competitive agricultural products, and agricultural incomes. The
set of criteria chosen (and its precise definition) depends on the
user of the model and on the particular purpose to which the model is
being put. Therefore a flexible software structure is necessary to
allow easy definition of the criteria set and easy modification of the
constraints set (selected variables may be either constrained or fixed
in different runs).
---'--1
Al I I,
--~
I A2 I
I II-- I
I I A3I I
,
B1 B2 B3 d
Figure 1. The structure of constraints for the overall problem.
The mUlticriteria nature of the problem makes it necessary to
choose an appropriate methodology. After examination of all possible
approaches the reference point (aspiration level) approach proposed by
A. Wierzbicki (see [5]) has been adopted.
The aspiration level approach is now widely known, and therefore
only a brief description will be given here. Let vector q
5
q = L Q.x.
i=l l l
(6)
be a set of criteria (matrix Qi contains fixed weight coefficients).
A decision center selects an initial aspiration level q (which may be
attainable or non-attainable) and may attach weight coefficients to
each criterion (weights not defined are assumed to be equal to one).
With the help of an achievement function (see [7]) the problem is con-
verted into the equivalent LP problem. The resulting solution is the
non-dominated (Pareto-optimal) point, in criteria space, which is
nearest (in the sense of a norm corresponding to a given achievement
function) to q if q is nonattainable (i.e. if the aspiration level is
too high) or is furthest from q if the aspiration level is too low.
The corresponding decisions are computed at the same time. Having
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obtained a solution, the decision center may change an aspiration level
and/or the weights attached to some criteria and repeat the procedure
until an acceptable solution is found.
5. CONTROLLING SECTORAL PRODUCTION
The problem can be formulated as follows:
Having decided on an overall plan for agriculture, find instruments
that make it possible to meet the following requirements:
1. The optimal sectoral plans (see Sec. 3) are consistent with
the overall plan.
2. Prices (the same for all sectors) are the main instruments
used to control sectoral planning.
3. Prices should fulfill additional constraints (resulting from
the requirement that the level of sectoral income be within certain
bounds, or to reflect some desired consistency within the price system,
etc).
4. If there are no prices which fulfill requirements 1 through 3,
it is permissible to introduce a quota for products. If a quota is
established, a fixed price is paid for a commodity only if the quantity
sold does not exceed the quota. If there is a production surplus, a
lower price may be paid. Constraints on inputs can also be introduced
if necessary or used instead of quotas. However, the objective is to
introduce as few quotas and/or limits as possible and - additionally -
there should be almost no reason for the violation of any such quotas
or limits.
Let us first examine a situation in which a set of prices that
fulfill requirements 1 through 3 exists. Assume that x., i = 1,2, ... ,5,
l
is a solution of the APM and A. are submatrices of A. composed of rows
l l
that were active in the solution considered. The conditions for opti-
mality in xi for sectoral problems can be formulated as follows:
c - A~". - U.
l l l
o i = 1, ... ,5 (7)
where: c - is a vector of prices (positive components are for pro-
ducts, negative for inputs, zero for non-marketable com-
modities) ,
"i - is a vector of Lagrange mUltipliers for active constraints
in the i-th sector,
u i - is a vector of Lagrange mUltipliers for upper or lower
bounds; therefore
u~ ';;;0 if
l
u~ = 0 ifl
u~ ;;;. 0 if
l
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~j l~x.
l l
l~ < ~j < h~ ( * )X.l l l
x~ h~
l l
where j designates a particular product or input and T means matrix
transposition.
According to requirement number 3, additional constraints on
prices may be formulated, for example:
r. 0;;;; cx. .;;; r.
-l l l
.;;; .;;; -c c c
where £i and r i are lower and upper bounds on income in sector i,
and c and c are lower and upper bounds on prices. It is assumed that
(**) is feasible.
If the system of conditions (7), (*), (**) has a solution, it is
usually non-unique. Therefore the following problem A can be formu-
lated:
min
n wlLj =1 c j Ic. - c·1J J (8)
sUbject to (7), (*), (**), where c is a vector of reference (desired)
prices. If problem A is feasible the set of prices that fulfill re-
quirements 1 through 3 exists and can be determined.
It may happen that problem A is infeasible. To illustrate a pos-
sible situation let us consider an example with two sectors and two
commodities. Let the optimal solution of an overall plan (see Fig. 2)
be xl and x2 for sectors 1 and 2, respectively, and El, E2, Dl, D2 be
active constraints.
A price vector has to be a linear combination of gradients of
active constraints for each sector. Obviously no such price vector
would be the same for both sectors. More detailed discussion of this
problem may be found in [2] or in [3].
If the problem A is infeasible one may formulate a partially per-
turbed problem B as follows:
n 5 n .
min ( L wl Ic. - c. I + w2 L L v~)
j =1 c j J J i= 1 j =1 l
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sUbject to
c - A~A.
l l
V. ;;. 0
l
U.
l
V.
l
o i 1, ... ,5 (10)
and (*), (**).
The non-zero (if any) components of vectors vi correspond to products
for which quotas are allowed and to inputs for which limits are per-
mitted (the concept of quotas has been proposed by A.P. Wierzbicki [8]).
One may also add conditions for quota shadow prices (see [2]). If the
problem B is feasible a set of prices can be determined. Note that
v4 > 0 implies the introduction of a constraint on commodity j in sec-
l '"
tor i of the type x~ ~ x~ (where x~ is a component of the solution of
l l l
the overall plan), i.e. introduction of either a quota or a limit (de-
pending on whether the variable is a product or an input).
Figure 2. A case for which a common set of prices does not exist.
Should the problem B be infeasible (which may be caused by "tight"
conditions (**» the following perturbed problem C may be formulated:
subject to
min
n( L
j=l
w1
c.
J
5 n . .
Ic. -c. I + L L (w2·v~ +w3It~ I»
J J i=l j=l l l
(11)
v. ;;;. 0
l
o (12 )
and (*), ( ** ) .
It is easy to see that problem C is always feasible. However, its
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solution does not satisfy requirement number 1. If the values of vec-
tors t i are small one may expect that the solutions of the sectoral
problems would not differ much from those of the chosen overall plan.
Therefore the sectoral problems have to be solved and the solutions
examined to check whether the differences are acceptable. If the re-
sUlting sectoral solutions are not acceptable either some conditions
on the prices have to be slackened or another overall plan should be
examined.
The weight coefficients wi, w2 and w3 reflect the preferences of
the decision center. Usually w3 has the biggest value because the con-
sistency of sectoral and overall plans is generally of greatest im-
portance. If it is preferred to have the price structure "closer" to
the desired structure, at the expense of introducing more quotas or
limits, then wi should be greater than w2. In the opposite situation
the relation should be reversed.
6. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
The decision support system is composed of a system of programs
implemented on a UNIVAC 1100 at the Computation Centre of the State
Planning Commission in Warsaw. The software may be used in different
ways in order to meet the specific needs of particular users (see [9]).
The typical mode of operation of the decision support system is
presented in Figure 3.
One starts with sectoral models, which are generated using a data-
base according to the current requirements of the decision center.
Then a set of requirements and sectoral models are used to generate a
mUltiobjective planning problem covering the whole agricultural system.
This problem is solved several times (for different assumptions con-
cerning aspiration levels, constraints, etc.) until an acceptable solu-
tion is found. Then the next set of decisions on reference prices,
quota conditions, etc.) is used to generate the price problem, which
is also solved several times until an acceptable solution is found.
It may then be necessary to re-examine sectoral problems if Problem C
is being considered (see Sec. 5).
At each stage of computation, reports containing information
necessary for the evaluation of a solution by the decision maker are
produced. Programs that enable easy generation of new scenarios have
also been developed.
The software allows efficient analysis of the problems described
in this paper. However, for the time being at least, it is not a fully
"automatic" system, and therefore it is necessary to contact one of the
designers of the model for information on some parts of the computations.
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v. EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS
l
INTRODUCTION
When planning the meeting the organizers (who are also the volume
editors) tried to include experimental sessions in the program to pro-
vide the opportunity for on-line testing of software for interactive
decision support. Although there were some technical problems to over-
come, the participants had access to one mini- and several microcom-
puters during the meeting.
This gave the participants the chance to assess the usefulness of
the decision-support software presented at the meeting. To our know-
ledge, this is the first time that on-line demonstrations and experi-
mental testing of approaches and applications have taken place at a
meeting on interactive decision analysis. However, the continuing
improvement in the performance and portability of microcomputers sug-
gests that this type of presentation and verification of new ideas will
become more common in the future.
In his contribution, Udink ten Cate discusses the determination
of the optimal temperature for the growth of an early cucumber crop in
a greenhouse. The multicriteria problem here is to weigh the economic
gains of an early crop against the extra costs of heating the green-
house. A nonlinear mathematical model of the complex relation between
the temperature regime and the earliness of the crop is developed.
The process of decision analysis is then demonstrated using the non-
linear version of the DIDASS package.
In his paper DISCRET - a package for multicriteria optimization
and decision problems with discrete alternatives, Majchrzak presents
a series of interactive sessions. The package selects nondominated
alternatives and helps the decision maker to choose his final solution.
Lewandowski, Rogowski and Kr~qlewski present numerical experiments
based on the trajectory-oriented extension of DIDASS (see Section IV);
the example considered is a flood control problem.
The use of the HG package described in Section IV is demonstrated
by Zebrowski, Dobrowolski and Rys.
Support for another type of decision problem is provided by Krus.
He presents a method for two-person games and demonstrates how it may
be applied to a regional planning problem. The interactive system
generates a sequence of Nash equilibria for modified achievement func-
tions which approximate the utilities of the players.
In his contribution Two empirical tests with approaches to multiple-
criteria decision making, Bischoff questions underlying assumptions concerning
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the decision maker's ability to provide information regarding his pre-
ferences, and the preference structure as a whole. He describes the
experimental set-up for this work, which is still in progress.
Not included in the Proceedings are three other experimental
sessions, which we will describe briefly for the sake of completeness.
Manfred Strubegger demonstrated the use of the integrated pro-
gramming package described in Section IV by analyzing a problem of
competing energy technologies. The criteria were economic, energy
and "environmental" efficiency.
When developing long-term regional water policies it is necessary
to reconcile conflicting interests in regions with open-cast mining.
The most important interest groups in such areas are those responsible
for mining, the municipal and industrial water suppliers, agricultur-
alists and environmentalists. Stefan Kaden presented a software
package based on the nonlinear version of DIDASS for dealing with this
type of multicriteria problem.
Finally, Ferenc Toth demonstrated the usefulness of operational
games as a method of improving communication between modelers and
decision makers.
M. Grauer
ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL TEMPERATURE
FOR THE GROWTH OF AN EARLY CUCUMBER CROP
IN A GREENHOUSE
Alexander Udink ten Cate
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
ABSTRACT
A means of determining the optimal temperature for cUltivation of
a cucumber crop in a greenhouse is presented. The optimal temperature
is derived from a comparison with a standard temperature regime and is
selected on the basis of two criteria: (1) expected income from an
early crop and (2) heating costs.
The nonlinear problem is solved using the reference point approach
as implemented in the DIDASS/N software package.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of greenhouses is to provide a beneficial en-
vironment for crop growth. In the colder parts of the world, this means
that greenhouses must be heated in winter, requiring an energy input
which is equivalent to roughly 25% of the total capital costs of pro-
tected cultivation. This makes energy a significant cost factor and
there has been much research on ways of using fuel more economically.
Crop growth and development is closely related to the temperature of
the greenhouse air, and traditional research in horticulture focuses
on temperature patterns which are in some way "optimal" for production
under average conditions, notably the average local weather conditions.
These so-called "blueprints" for the greenhouse air temperature are
available for a wide variety of crops in various regions. However, at
a time of rapidly changing energy costs, the validity of such blue-
prints is questionable. More recently, research has been reported in
which a relation between temperature and yield is used explicitly in
an optimization procedure.
The relation between temperature and crop growth is extremely complex,
and therefore a simplified relation between the temperature regime and
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the earliness of the crop is adopted. Earliness (or delay) is the dif-
ference between the time when the fir~t fruits grown under some partic-
ular conditions can be marketed and the time of marketing of the first
fruits grown under a standard or blueprint temperature regime. Because
the prices are higher when the first fruits enter the market after the
winter, earliness/delay has a significant effect on the economic results.
The typical optimization problem in this area would try to weigh the
economic gains of an early crop against the extra costs of heating the
greenhouse. Note that the objective is not energy conservation as such,
but rather the more economical use of fuel.
An example of the above approach is the drawing of thermal screen
in a greenhouse when it is still light, in order to conserve energy.
The savings are compared with the delay in production (Seginer and
Albright, 1980). Another possibility is to make on-line calculations
of the desired temperature by weighing the earliness of a cucumber crop
against the heating costs (Challa et al., 1980) using an earliness model
such as that developed by Challa and Van de Vooren (1980). Here the op-
timization problem is formulated using a single criterion. Because of
the uncertainties associated with the parameters of the models used,
however, a more appropriate approach would be based on the theory of
multiple-criteria decision making. This paper reports on such a study
using the interactive reference point approach (Wierzbicki, 1981) as
implemented in the DIDASS/N software package (Grauer and Kaden, 1984).
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In general the effect of the temperature of greenhouse air on crop
growth and sUbsequent yield is difficult to assess. The relation bet-
ween short-term phenomena (processes with time constants up to one day)
and long-term processes in particular is plagued with severe method-
ological difficulties (Udink ten Cate and Challa, 1983). However, with
a cucumber crop the problem can be simplified by considering the period
from planting until harvesting. The temperature maintained throughout
this period affects the earliness of the yield, while the rate of pro-
duction itself is not affected (Van de Vooren et al., 1978).
A relation can be established between earliness and temperature,
with photosynthetically active radiation (light) as an external variable
(Challa and Van de Vooren, 1980). Assume that the onset of flowering
depends on the stage of development of the plant (expressed in terms of
313
the total number of leaves per plant) and that the time between flowering
and harvesting of the first fruits is constant. The rate of develop-
ment can then be expressed as:
d(8,¢";t)
where
O.33[l-exp (5.59-0.46)(6-exp (1.704-6.39.10-3¢~))l (1)
-1d(·) - rate of development (leaves.day )
- average temperature in the crop canopy over the daylight
period (OC)
_"¢ (.)p - average photosynthetically active radiation over the daylight
period (W.m- 2 ) .
The averages depend on the number of hours of daylight (typically 8 hrs
_" -1in winter); consequently ¢ may also be expressed in [J.day 1 • Notep
that the unit of time is the day. (The night period (16 hrs) is not
taken into account in eqn. (1).)
The effect of the optimal temperature 8
0
is compared with that of
the standard (blueprint) temperature 8b and leads to a difference in
development rate
( 2 )
Flowering of the (cucumber) crop occurs when d
c
leaves are formed. For
the standard crop this happens at time t
c
' so that d(8 b ;t c ) = d c .
For the optimal crop at development stage d(8
0
;t) the earliness ~tc due
to the difference in development ~d(tc) d(8;t) - d(8 b ;t ) can beo c c
found. Making a linear approximation
Da)
leads to
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The fact that the time between flowering and production is not dependent
t .
on the temperature implies that 6t = 6t Furthermore, 6d(t )= JC 6d dt.
P c c t=O
The standard crop and the optimal crop are terminated at the same time.
Particularly with an exponentially decaying auction price, the increased
earliness of the crop gives rise to the additional profit
( 4 )
where Pf(')
Y ( • )
t
P
6p
- price of fruits (Dfl. kg-i)
-2 -1
- production rate per unit of ground area (kg.m .day )
- onset of production phase (day)
-2
- additional profit per unit of ground area (Dfl.m )
On a daily basis, the effect of the difference in development is
6p(t) = yet ) Pf(t )p p
M(t)
where 6d(t) follows from eqn. (2) The energy consumption rate and
the corresponding costs are estimated using
c(8;t) = KCP (ij-ij ) - Q(~")g a (6 )
where c ( .) - cost of energy consumed per unit of ground area per day
( Df 1. m- 2 . day -1 )
K - heat loss coefficient per unit of ground area (W.m- 2 .K- 1 )
ij - average air temperature inside the greenhouse during the
daylight period (OC)
ija - average air temperature outside the greenhouse during the
daylight period (OC)
C - conversion factor from Watts to m3 gas.day-l (m3 .day-l. W-l)
for a period of 8 hours
Pg - price of gas (Dfl.m-
3 )
Q(.) - effect of external heat sources.
Note that in the night period it is assumed that 8
0
= 8b . The daily
difference in energy costs between the optimal temperature regime and
the standard temperature regime is obtained from eqn. (6) as
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KCP (8g 0 (7)
The gains expressed in eqn. (5) have to be weighed against the
costs given by eqn. (7). Because some of the parameters, especially
y(t ) and Pf(t ) in eqn. (5), are uncertain, the problem is expressedp p
as a mUltiple-criteria decision problem based on two objective functions
max ~p(t) from eqn. (5)
(8)
min ~c (t) from eqn. ( 7)
where an expected average (over the daylight period) of the photosyn-
thetically active radiation ~" is used in eqns. (1) and (2). Thep
decision strategy is not to deviate too much from the standard (blue-
print) temperature.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
The nonlinear problem described by eqn. (8) was implemented with
DIDASS/N (Grauer and Kaden, 1984), using the parameters given in Table
1 (Challa et al., 1980).
The value of the parameter K given in Table 1 is dependent on the
average wind velocity over the daylight period. Parameter C is based
on a boiler-to-greenhouse efficiency of 72% and a combustion value of
35.7 MJ per normal m3 of natura~ gas.
Table 1. Parameter values.
Parameter Value
y( t ) 0.195 -2 -1
P
kg.m .day
Pf(tp ) 1. 50
-1Dfl.kg
d(8
o
;t
c
) 0.7 leaves.day-1
Parameter
K
C
Value
- -2 .-19.26+0.79,vwindW.m .K
3 -1-10.0011 m .day .W
0.40 Dfl.m-3
The objective functions of eqn. (8) have to be modified in order to comply
wi th DIDASS/N requirements. Therefore, the original problem is reformulated
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as follows:
max
IIp(A;t) + 1 objl (max. earnings due to earliness of crop)
-lIc(A;t) + 1 = obj2. (max. heating savings)
15 < 8
0
< 35
2The ground area A = 10 m is introduced to scale the objective. The
value +1 is added in order to have positive objective functions, as
required by DIDASS/N. The bounds on 8
0
follow from the horticultural
requirements. Using the reference point approach, it is necessary to
identify an optimal value for 8
0
based on daily expectations of the
photosynthetically active radiation and wind velocity. The photosyn-
thetically active radiation ~" was estimated at 25% of the total ex-p
ternal radiation (assuming 50% transmission through the greenhouse and
50% photosynthetically active radiation).
Table 2. Values of parametersa in typical weather
situations.
(ji" v
wind Descriptionp
10-20 1 Dark December day
40-60 3 Alternating periods of
cloud and sun
80-100 4 Bright February day
a The ranges of these parameters are 10-100 for
radiation intensity and 1-5 for wind velocity.
A standard temperature (ijb) of 20°C was assumed.
Several values of expected radiation are typically considered in making
a decision (Table 2). The strategy is not to deviate too much from the
standard regime. In the optimization procedure, a situation with
ijo=ijb corresponds to objl=l , obj2=1
The differences in income due to use of the optimal regime
rather than the standard regime are of the order of 0.01 Dfl.m- 2 . For
2 -2
an average commercial holding of 10,000 m , a gain of 0.01 Dfl.m re-
presents a total gain of Dfl 100. Table 3 presents some typical results.
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Table 3. Typical results with expected ¢" in the range 80-100.
-
p
'6 b = 20 and v wind = 1 were assumed.
objl obj 2 '6 Remarks
0
¢" 100 1. 25 0.88 22.6 Net gain 0.013 Dfl.m-2=P
¢" 80 1-.17 0.92 21. 7 Net gain 0.009 -2= Dfl. mp
Reference point 1. 20 0.90
4. CONCLUSIONS
The optimal cUltivation strategy for an early cucumber crop is
studied as a multiple-criteria decision problem. The objectives are
maximization of extra income due to the earliness of the crop and
minimization of extra heating costs relative to a standard or "blueprint"
regime. The decision variable is the temperature of the air inside the
greenhouse. Parameters considered in the decision include the standard
(blueprint) temperature, the expected average photosynthetically active
radiation over the daylight period, and the wind velocity. The night
period (no radiation) is not taken into account - here the standard
temperature is employed in both cases.
The decision is made by comparing the trade-off between the two
objectives, with the additional aim of not deviating too much from the
standard temperature. This last requirement makes it necessary to use
a multiple-criteria formulation. The results demonstrate that the
mul tiple-cri teria approach is a feasible way of studying such problems.
Since the particular problem considered here is relatively small and
uses only a single decision variable, however, a decision based on
graphical representation of the objectives could also be envisaged in
this case. This would reduce the computational effort considerably.
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DISCRET - A PACKAGE FOR MULTICRITERIA OPTIMIZATION AND
DECISION PROBLEMS WITH DISCRETE ALTERNATIVES
Janusz Majchrzak
Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy ofSciences, Warsaw, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
DISCRET has been developed to deal with mUlticriteria optimiza-
tion and decision making problems with a finite number of discrete
alternatives. The following problem structure is assumed:
(i) All feasible alternatives (decisions) are explicitly listed
in the set XO = {x 1 .x 2 •· ..• xn }.
(ii) All of the decision maker's (DM) criteria are known. Both
ordinal and cardinal criteria are permitted. Let f(x) =
= (f1 (x).f 2 (x) •...• f m(x» be the criteria vector.
(iii) For each alternative the criteria are evaluated and their
values listed in the set Q = {f(x1 ).f(x 2 ) •...• f(x n )}.
The aim of the DM is to optimize his criteria simultaneously.
The DISCRET package selects the nondominated (Pareto-optimal) alter-
natives and helps the DM in choosing his final solution. It is
assumed that the DM works with the computer in an interactive way and
gathers experience related to the problem as well as to his preferences
during the session. He is expected to have only a very basic know-
ledge about mUlticriteria optimization theory and problems. No un-
derlying utility function is assumed. but any of the DM's scalarizing
functions may be adopted during the session. if they are included in
the criteria vector f. At any stage of the decision making process
an arbitrary subset of criteria may be used by the DM to express his
current preferences.
A preliminary version of the package was created in the Systems
Research Institute. Polish Academy of Sciences. Warsaw [1]. This paper
concentrates on the version being developed in cooperation with IIASA.
Only the utilities already implemented are described. An example of
an interactive session is presented.
2. APPROACH AND IMPLEMENTATION
To start the session with DISCRET the user (DM) has to supply
the file containing the set Q of criteria values for all alternatives
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and (optionally) the file containing the set xO of alternatives. These
files, called the data and additional data file respectively, may be
created by special problem generators or some other computational pro-
cesses. To define the problem two specification files have to be
created.
The command ~gen asks for the problem identifier, total number
of criteria, number of alternatives (elements) and the dimensions of
additional data or number of records in the case of non-numeric data.
The command ~gen enables the user to indicate for each criterion
whether it should be minimized, maximized or ignored and to specify
the criterion value tolerance. If for two alternatives the difference
in criterion values is lower than the value of the criterion tolerance
parameter, then the criteria values are assumed to be equal.
After the problem generation and specification phase the user
may obtain information about the ranges of criteria values (yranges
command) and he may put lower and/or upper bounds on the values of some
of the criteria (ybounds command).
The command ysolve runs the discrete mUlticriteria optimization
problem solver. The method chosen [2] (which is of the complete enu-
meration type) selects the set N of nondominated solutions from the
set Q in the case of criteria value tolerances equal or close to zero.
In the case when the tolerances have values equal to significant frac-
tions of the related criteria value ranges, the solver returns a re-
presentative subset of the set N called its representation R(N). The
idea of selecting a representation R from the set N is illustrated in
Figure 1.
o
o
o
o
o
l...- f 1
Figure 1. Representation R of set N.
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If proper values are chosen for the tolerances, the representation
R contains a small number of elements but still gives a good impression
of the shape of set N.
The DM may use the command ysort to sort set R according to in-
creasing/decreasing values of a chosen criterion in order to provide
a better analysis of the set.
The command ypick selects those elements of set XO which relate
to the elements of set R.
During the interactive session the commands briefly presented
above may be used in any order, including command repetition. This
feature of DISCRET transforms its very simple command structure into
an efficient decision support system. By setting appropriate bounds
the DM may change his region of interest, then by analysis of the re-
presentation R he learns about the shape of the set N in this region
and the criteria tradeoffs. In the next step he may define his region
of interest more precisely or scan the set N further. By proper bounds
setting theDM may also adopt the equality/inequality method, switch-
ing, for example, into the analysis of two-criteria subproblems.
The ability to change the criteria under consideration allows
the DM to use a lexicographic or gr'oup-Iexicographic approach. He may
also use scalarizing functions such as goal functions or utility func-
tions or any other additional criterion at any stage of the decision
making process.
It is worth mentioning that the package offers the possibility
to return immediately to any of the previous stages of the session at
any time.
3. AN EXAMPLE OF AN INTERACTIVE SESSION
We shall take a simple location decision problem adopted from
[3] as an illustrative example. A firm is evaluating 6 potential pro-
duction plant location sites in 4 different states to serve 4 distri-
bution centers. Up to 3 facilities are to be opened. Their sizes are
bounded by state production limits based on environmental quality
standards. A lower bound on facility production size and a production
increment step are introduced for technological reasons. For budgetary
reasons the cost of constructing new facilities is limited. Command
~ generates the problem.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ ygen +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ ygen +++ type identificator of the problern~
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(up to five digits; example :<54321:>) i dpr=6666
+++ ygen +++ available criteria :
1 - total unsatisfied demand
2 - favored customer center demand satisfaction
3 - total cost
4 - averadge life quality score
5 - fixed cost for opened locations
6 - transportation cost
7 - production cost
8 - unsaled production
+++ type chosen criteria (example :<3,1,4,»
:1,2,3,
+++ ygen +++ chosen criteria (remember their new numbers 1):
1 - total unsatisfied demand
2 - favored customer center demand satisfaction
3 - total cost
+++ ygen +++ for problem identificated by
number of generated variants
number of feasible variants
number of locations schemes
i dpr=6666
nall=1486
nfea= 640
nloc= 35
%X~ ypspa file %X~
----- text -------- name number
problem identific. idpr 6666
number of criteria rom 3
number of elements nn 640
additional data dim. nx 6
add. da ta records no nr 4
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ end of ygen +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
% ysbgen.go
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ begin ysbgen +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ ysbgen +++ prcblem identific. idpr=6666, numb of criteria nm=3 +++
+++ ysbgen +++ default yispb file display: +++
~~~ yispb file ~~~ idpr=6666 , rom= 3 ~~~
crit.num min/max tolerance ~ min/max=-l Zmin ; =+1 -max =0 -not .inp::>rt.
1 1 0.100e-09
2 1 0.100e-09
3 1 0.100e-09
+++ do you want to change someting ? type <y> or <n> Jl
+++ ysbgen +++ your final version of yispb file ,
~~~ yispb file ~%~ idpr=6666 , rom= 3 ~%X
crit.num min/max tolerance ~ min/max=-l -min ; =+1 -max =0 -not .inp::>rt.
1 1 0.100e-09
2 1 0.100e-09
3 1 0.100e-09
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ end of ysbgen +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
% yranges.go
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ begin yranges +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ yranges +++ criteria values ranges : +++
~x~ ycran file ~~~ id=6666 , m= 3 , nn= 640 ~~~
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crit.num lower value upper value difference
1 0.272502e+03 0.105838e+04 0.785878e+03
2 0.300000e+03 0.120000e+04 0.100000e+03
3 0.136924e+07 0.207347e+07 0.704230e+06
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ end of yranges +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
% ysbgen.go
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ begin ysbgen +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ ysbgen +++ problem identific. idpr=6666 , numb of criteria nm= 3 +++
+++ ysbgen +++ default yispb file display: +++
xxx yispb file xxx idpr=6666 , m= 3 xxx
crit.nurn min/max
1 1
2 1
3 1
+++ do you want
tolerance~ min/max~1 ; =+1 -max =0 -not import
0.100e-09
0.100e-09
0.100e-09
to change someting? type <y> or <n> :.x...
+++ ysbgen +++ nON you can change the yisp:> file (record by record)
+++ type three numbers <integer,integer,real> standing for
(l)criterion number
(2 )min/max indicator: <-l>-min, <+1>-max, <O>-not important,
(3)tolerance •
+++ example: <2, -1, 12.3> +++ for termination hit <cr> (new line) +++
: 1, -1, .le3,
~ yispb file xxx idpr=6666 , rom= 3 xxx
crit.nurn min/max tolerance ~ min/~l -min; =+1 -lllaX =0 -not import.
1 -1 0.100e+03
2 1 0.100e-09
3 1 0.100e-09
(... )
+++ ysbgen +++ your final version of yispb file ,
ux yispb file xxx idpr=6666 , rom= 3 xU
crit.nurn min/max tolerance ~ min/~l -min ; =+1 -max =0 -not import.
1 -1 0.100e+03
2 1 0.100e+03
3 -1 0.100e+06
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ end of ysbgen +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
% ybounds.go
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ begin ybounds +++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ ybounds +++ this is the default ycbnd file: +++
xxx ybnds
crit. nurn
1
2
3
file xxx idpr=6666 , m= 3 ,
lower bound upper bound
0.272502e+03 0.105838e+04
0.300000e+03 0.120000e+04
0.136924e+07 0.207347e+07
nn= 640 xU
range
O.785878e+03
0.900000e+03
0.704230e+06
+++ ybounds +++ now you can change the ybnds file (record by record) +++
type three numbers <integer, real ,real> standing for:
(1) criterion number,
(2) lower bound of the given criterion,
(3) upper bound of the given criterion.
+++ example: -<2,-12.5,1.05> (to terminate type : -<cr> or <new line» +++
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++++ ybounds +++ this was the final version of the ybnds file +++
+++ ybounds +++ 640 ot of 640 alternatives satisfy the bourrls
+++ ybounds +++ the following two files were generated
xxx yispa file xxx file format: (a24,i5) xxx
------ text ------- name number
problem identific. idpr 6666
number of criteria rom 3
number of elements nn 640
addi tional data dim nx 6
add .data records no. nr 4
xxx ybnds file xxx idpr=6666 , rom= 3 , nn= 640 xss
crit.num lower bound upper bound range
1 0.272502e+03 0.105838e+04 0.785878e+03
2 0.300000e+03 0.120000e+04 0.900000e+03
3 0.136924e+07 0.207347e+07 0.704230e+06
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ end of ybounds +++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
% ysolve.go
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ begin ysolve +++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ ysolve +++ solution has been found 1!1
ssx yospa file xxx
------ text ------- name value
problem identific. idpr 6666
number of criteria rom 3
nond. points ntmber nnon 7
additional data dim. nx 6
add. data records no nr 4
input data points naIl 640
scalar comparisions ncmp O. 325e+04
expected canp numb. ecmp 0 .134e+0 5
+++ hit <cr> «new line» to continue
xxx yoinf file xxx idpr=6666, rom= 3 xxx
crit.no. best value worse value difference
1 0.272502e+03 0.908380e+03 0.635878e+03
2 0.120000e+04 0.300000e+03 0.900000e+03
3 0.136924e+07 0.207347e+07 0.704230e+06
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++ end of ysolve +++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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APPLICATION OF DIDASS METHODOLOGY TO A FLOOD CONTROL
PROBLEM - NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
A. Lewandowski, T. Rogowski and T. Krfglewski
Institute ofAutomatk Control, Technkal University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents selected numerical results obtained during an
experimental session at the Conference on Plural Rationality and Inter-
active Decision Processes. The description of the problem is given
earlier in this volume.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT
It is rather difficult to present the whole experiment - 20-30
iterations are necessary to obtain satisfactory results.
It was observed that the main difficulty in using the algorithm
was connected with the large amount of information which has to be pro-
cessed by the decision maker - he has to work with 3 reference trajec-
tories in parallel (Fig. 1).
qo
control
sections =====:;,~=========~\.:------ ....."
wa wb we
inflow
forecast==========:....--------'
decision =====I~======t=~-----I~
variables ::
reservoirs
Fig. 1. Structure of the network
In order to simplify this task it was necessary to organize the inter-
action process properly.
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The following procedure was established empirically:
convert the downstream trajectories, i.e. (wb and wc) into free
trajectories;
set zero reference trajectory for wa and run DIDASS. This trajec-
tory is evidently not attainable, and therefore the procedure mini-
mizes the maximum distance between the trajectory and zero. In
other words, it tries to minimize the flood peak for this control
section;
calculate the utopia trajectory for wa, exact or approximate;
on the basis of available information, modify the reference trajec-
tory in order to find the correct shape of wa;
change wb from a free into an objective trajectory;
perform the same steps as for wa, but watching wb;
when the wb trajectory is satisfactory check wa again. If neces-
sary correct wa;
if wa was corrected, check wb. This loop must be performed until
both trajectories are satisfactory. Experience shows that the
interaction between wa and wb is not very strong, i.e. changing wb
does not significantly affect wa. Usually 2-3 steps are necessary
to find the compromise solution;
convert the wc trajectory from free to objective and repeat the pro-
cedure listed above, considering only wc and correcting wa and wb if
necessary. Terminate this procedure when all trajectories are satis-
factory.
The procedure presented above seems to be rather complicated, but
it would be difficult to solve a more complex problem without some
structuring. This kind of structuring was quite evident in this case-
the decision maker should move in the direction of water flow - this
determines the direction in which decisions have a strong influence on
the resulting trajectory. It is evident that if we are interested in
controlling the wa trajectory, the wb and wc decision variables are not
of interest (Fig. 1).
The situation is more complicated when the interaction is bilat-
eral. Some research must be done on the methodology of such problems.
Due to lack of space we are able to present only selected results
- Figs. 2,3,4. These represent an intermediate step in the decision
process - the wa trajectory has been correctly tuned, and the decision
maker is manipulating the wb reference trajectory.
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Fig. 3. Trajectory wb - reference trajectory, utopia
trajectory and corresponding solution
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Fig. 4. Trajectory wc - reference trajectory, utopia
trajectory and corresponding solution
3. CONCLUSIONS
It follows from the experiments that:
a proper structuring scheme is necessary to solve a complex decision
problem;
relatively long training is necessary to learn about the problem;
flexible interaction and proper presentation of the results are
extremely important in ensuring efficient DIDASS - decision maker
interaction;
strong feedback between the decision maker and the creators of de-
cision support tools is necessary - without such feedback it would
be difficult if not impossible to generate new tools or improve
existing ones.
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AN EXPERIMENTAL SESSION WITH THE HG PACKAGE
M. Zebrowski, G. Dobrowolski and T. Rys
Systems Research Department of the Institute for Control and Systems Engineering
and of the Institute for Industrial Chemistry, Cracow, Poland
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the experimental session reported here is twofold. First,
to give an empirical evidence of applicability of the Decision Analysis
Aid based on the Skeleton Method. Second, to enable discussion on the
proposed approach and its confrontation with various experience repre-
sented by participants of the conference.
The method and its implementation is described in the paper "Decision
Support Based on the Skeleton Method - the HG-Package" by H. Gorecki
et al. (published in this volume). It is assumed that the reader is
familiar with this paper and therefore all specific terms already
introduced there will not be explained.
We shall give a brief introduction to the real case of decision analysis
which has been used as an example for the experimental session.
AN EXAMPLE OF DECISION ANALYSIS - THE CASE OF METHANOL
The aim of the presentation was to show an application of the HG-pack-
age as a decision analysis support. Two aspects of such an analysis are
possible from the decision maker's point of view:
1. To check whether estimates and expectations (expressed in terms of
ADS) are appropriate for an object described by a model.
2. To find a solution (in the sense of the safety principle in the al-
location problem) which is in agreement with the estimates and ex-
pectations.
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In the first case three basic results may occur [1,2]:
(i) The estimates are in agreement with the data represented by the
model and a feasible solution can be obtained;
(ii) ADS cannot be attained;
(iii) A result can be better than the estimates.
The second case corresponds to one of the examples presented at the ex-
perimental session.
For illustrative purposes we have used a real life example of the com-
parative study of methanol. The comparative analysis of technology is
one of the stages which are to be performed in the evaluation of devel-
opment programs [1]. Besides, the methanol study has been reported
in an extensive form as a part of a research report [2].
We have chosen this example for several reasons: it is a real, prac-
tical case of decision analysis, and up to now only results of the
analysis have been presented but not the use of decision support which
the HG-package is. This paper and ["Decision Support ..... by H. Gorecki
et al., this volume] are complementary with [1,2] and, therefore, full
information referring to the real case, results of the analysis, theory
of decision support and its implementation is available.
Seven various technologies of methanol production constitute the object
under investigation represented by a linear model of PDA-type [1].
Each technology is characterized by its ability to transform certain
resources into others. There are raw materials, products and by-prod-
ucts, waste products, and other resources required for the construction
and utilization of the technology. The analysis of \erious technologi-
cal possibilities under different resource estimates may be performed
with the help of the HG-package and the above model by multifarious
validation of the assumed estimates or expectations expressed by them.
This constitutes in fact an auxiliary problem of the comparative stUdy.
Such a single problem is presented in this paper.
The resources of main concern, i.e. investment, efficiency and energy
consumption were chosen as objectives in the multiobjective problem.
For given estimates of these resources and under the safety principle
we obtained an optimal solution which was in agreement with the esti-
mates and pointed at an appropriate technological alternative of the
comparative stUdy. As it turned out, the estimates were attainable but
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the safety principle was maintained only to such an extent that the
technologies, subject to given conditions, could be engaged in their
physical activity. This means that there was no feasible utilization of
any choice of the proposed technologies, which is faithful to the prin-
ciple. In our example the alternative consists of two methanol technol-
ogies consuming natural gas and a mixture of natural gas and carbide
gas. Additionally, the solution contains amounts of all resources in-
volved in the processing.
USER'S DIALOGUE WITH HG-PACKAGE
In this section we describe the printout given in the appendix which
contains a hard-copy of the user's dialogue with the HG-package. We
present only some possibilities of the package in order to give a sim-
ple and short sample of the package run.
The first part of the printout contains the dialogue with Input Manager.
After the package banner has emerged, we can observe an effect of three
control commands. Each of these commands starts with an asterisk.
After ,the first command ~p (print) has been entered, the set of pos-
sible objectives referring to the model under investigation is dis-
played in a tableau form. Columns of this table contain consequently:
a sequence number, MPS code, a real life description of the code and,
finally, a measure unit.
The next command ~l (list) is entered to display the set of cur-
rent objectives selected from the set of possible objectives displayed
above. We can observe that three objectives have been picked out. One
of them is maximized and the other two are minimized.
The skeleton data (lower and upper estimates) are also printed. The
values of these estimates are expressed in the units already displayed,
i. e.,
sprwn efficiency in monetary units,
nkldd investment in monetary units,
enrgg energy consumption in tons of coal eqUivalent.
The II epsll and II rho II are parameters for the scalarizing function.
All these data have been prepared in a previous package run and saved
on OBJECrIVE file.
The last command ~q (quit) finishes Input Manager work and starts Sol-
ver. When a solution is foun~, Output Manager becomes active and the
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solution is printed in a short form. We can see that in the presented
case the desired solution has been obtained at the boundary of the
optimal compromise set.
The next section of the printout presents the solution in a simple gra-
phical form. This has been induced by v (video) command.
The last part of the printout contains the real life description of the
solution.
The package run is terminated by "no" command.
CONCUJSIONS
The HG-package proved to be applicable, understandable and easy to han-
dle for a user not familiar with theoretical background and computers
in general. Xhe user, however, should be well instructed in properties
of this tool and aware of the meaning of the safety principle.
The HG-package was implemented as a part of research done by System
Research Dep. for the Programming of the Development of the Chemical
Industry in Poland. It was partly developed in cooperation with the
SDS Program at IIASA.
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APPENDIX
An Example of User's Dialogue with HG-package
o 0
o 0
000000
o 0
o 0
o 0
0000
o 0
o
o 000
o 0
0000
+++ HELLO
+ enter cmd
Jq>
no. obcode comment ••••••••••••••••••••••••• dim •••
=== -======= ==~==~==============~==~=============~
efficiency
energy consumption
investment
labour
natural gas
coal
heavy residue
benzine
carbon bioxide
waste water
ash
concrete
steel structure
equipment
pumps and compressors
pipes
• .. lower.•..
3000000.00
6000000.00
19000.00
1 sprwn
2 enrgg
3 nkldd
4 ztdnn
5 gazzm
6 wegil
7 cpzos
8 benzn
9 atmos
10 sciek
11 popil
12 beton
13kstal
14 apart
15 maszn
16 rurki
+ enter cmd
Jfl
no. obcode
1 sprwn max
2 nkldd min
3 enrgg min
eps- 0.000100
rhoa 3 •000000
+ enter cmd
Jfq
+++ WAIT for results, please.
••. upper•••••
4000000.00
7000000.00
25000.00
m.u.
t.c.e.
m.ll.
men
thou.Nm3
tons
tons
tons
thou.Nm3
m3
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
DES IRE D SOLUTION
• ••••value ••••.
0.35429e+07
0.64571 e+07
0.19752e+05
set .....
...............................
••••• objectives •••••
efficiency
investment
energy consumption
•••at the boundary of compromise
...............................
v
s
p
r
w
n
e
n
r
g
g
e
n
r
g
g
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-----------------------------------------------------------,
.••....•.•...e•.•.•..
•
------------------------------------------------------------
nkldd
I
I
I
•I
•I
•I
I
•
•
•I
-----------------------------------------------------------~
sprwn
.------------------------------------------------------------
•1
1
1
I
1- J
nkldd
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GENERAL
efficiency
energy consumption
investment
labour
methanol total
methanol purchased
METHANOL
3542937
19751
6457062
133
740000
109513
PRO Due E R S
m.u.
t.c.e.
m.u.
men
tons
tons
natural and carbide gas unit
natural gas unit
130486 tons
500000 tons
RAW MATERIALS
natural gas
carbide gas
WMO catalyst
ZNO catalyst
reforming catalyst
synthesis catalyst
water
B Y - PRO DUe T S
575828
29229
18914
67746
20806
126097
6935354
thou.Nm3
thou.Nm3
kg
kg
kg
kg
m3
higher alcohols
WAS T E
waste water
PRO DUe T S
4828 tons
819205 m3
CON S T Rue T ION D A T A
concrete
steel structure
equipment
pumps and compressors
pipes
29737
2200
6948
350
2747
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
n
+ restars - yes or no, repeat session - !, save - s
no
?Yo
AN INTERACTIVE METHOD FOR DECISION SUPPORT IN A
TWO-PERSON GAME WITH AN EXAMPLE FROM
REGIONAL PLANNING
LechKrus
Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy ofSciences, Warsaw, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of our interactive method was proposed by Wierz-
bicki (1982). The method was implemented and several modifications
tested by Fortuna and Krus (1983). A number of experiments based on
this method have been carried out for a regional planning problem.
This paper presents the results of one such experiment. A general
outline of the method is also given.
2. THE METHOD
The method is designed for decision problems in which two players
(Pl and P 2 ) each try to maximize a pair of objectives. Let player 1
have objectives Yl'U 1 • The models describing the objectives are then
( 1 )
subject to xl E ~,
where x, is the control variable of player 1 and the set ~1 is defined
by constraints.
The objectives Y2 ,U 2 of player 2 are described by the models
(2)
where x 2 is the control variable of player 2 and the set ~2 is defined
by constraints.
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The decision problems of the players are interrelated, i.e., the
decision of one player affects the outcome obtained by the other. In
such two-person games the Nash equilibrium is typically considered as
the status-quo point. The Pareto solutions of the individual players
are then analyzed at this point.
The main purpose of implementing this method in the form of an
interactive computerized system is to help the players (decision makers)
to learn about the problem. It is assumed that there is no explicitly
given utility function. Each player is however assumed to have his
own ideas of the importance (utility) of each objective, and will use
the system to identify the decisions (by selecting the best solutions)
which maximize his own utility function. The selection is guided by
aspiration levels established through a learning process. This choice
provides information which is used to construct achievement functions
approximating the player's utility function. The achievement functions
are then used to calculate the Nash equilibrium point.
The method involves the following steps:
Step 0 Set the current iteration number i = O.
Step' Choose an achievement function from the family of functions
Y" U,
Go to
-i -i -i -i
where Y" Y2 ; u" U2 are the aspiration levels of players'
and 2, respectively.
Step 2 Compute the Nash eq~ili~riu~ fo: s, versus s2' finding the
b .. yl. l. l. Ul. d ho. Jec~l.ve vectors "Y2 , U" 2 an t e control variables
x~, x~. Present the Nash equilibrium to the ~laY7rs.
Ask player' to modify his aspiration level y~, u~.
Calculate the Pareto point in the space of objectives
by maximizing s, for the modified aspiration level.
step 3a and repeat steps 3a,b five times.
Step 3c Present the sample Pareto solutions to the player and ask him
to select the one he likes best.
Step 3a
Step 3b
Step 4
Step 5
Go to step 3a and repeat the steps 3a-c five times.
Repeat the sequence of steps 3a-c for player 2 modifying his
-i -i
aspiration levels Y2 , u2 .
-i+' -i+' -i+' -i+'Take aspiration levels Y, , U, , Y2 ' U2 on the basis of
the solutions selected by the players. Let i = i+l.
Go to step'.
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The procedure is linearly convergent if the influence of the
other player is sufficiently small and if the players' actions are con-
sequently such as to maximize their own utility function. Under these
assumptions the achievement functions approximate the players' utility
functions with increasing accuracy as the sequence of iterations pro-
ceeds, and the Nash equilibrium calculated for the achievement func-
tions converges to the Nash equilibrium of the players' utilities.
This procedure has been implemented as an interactive computer
system, in which the players can work at remote terminals.
Details of the method and the interactive system can be found in
Fortuna and Krus (1983).
3. A REGIONAL PLANNING PROBLEM AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The following illustrative example is based on a regional plann-
ing problem which arose during the course of the Notec Project. The
Notec Project (see Albegov et al., 1981) dealt mainly with the develop-
ment of a water system designed to increase agricultural production in
the Notec region of Poland. Detailed linear optimization models de-
scribing the development of the water system and its effect on agri-
cultural production were constructed to carry out benefit analysis.
To evaluate the agricultural labor force properly it is necessary to
take into account the rural-urban migration, which is relatively high
in this region. This high migration rate is due to disparities in the
standard of living between rural and urban areas. For this reason it
was necessary to construct a Regional Development Model (see Krus,
1981; Kulikowski, 1981) describing in an aggregate way the production
and consumption levels in the rural and urban parts of the region.
This model is designed to allow regional planners to analyze these
proouction and consumption processes while taking into account the
effects of migration. These analyses can take the form of a game bet-
ween the planners responsible for development of the rural and urban
parts of the region. Each planner (player) is assumed to have a given
budget Zi which he must allocate between production zi and aggregate
consumption (public services) zi+2 i = 1,2. Each tries to maximize
two objectives: net production and level of consumption.
The net production
i 1 ,2
is a function of the labor force Yi and the financial input zi.
3~
The labor force depends on population processes and in partic-
ular on the migration rate m:
The migration rate is taken to be the ratio of net migration to the
total population of the rural area.
The level of consumption (see Kulikowski, 1981) is defined as a
function of public services, of the wage fund and of migration factors
(in particular, the migration rate), and can be written as follows:
The migrants' behavior is described by the econometric relation
Thus migration links the two areas of the region and hence the two
parts of the problem.
Let us make the substitutions x 1 = z3' Z1 -x1 = z1' x 2 = z4'
Z2 - x 2 = z2' The regional planning game can then be written in the
form (1,~). The objectives Yi , Ui' i = 1,2 are calculated by software
within the regional development model. The data used below relate to
the Notec region in 1978.
During the conference several runs of the system were performed
with different players. One of the runs is presented below, and se-
lected results are given in Tables 1-3.
At each iteration the players, for a given Nash equilibrium, have
the opportunity to experiment and study the solutions lying in the
Pareto set. Each player can try five different modifications of the
aspiration (reference) levels, each time obtaining a different Pareto
solution. After experimenting the player is asked to indicate his pre-
ferred solution (see steps 3 and 4 of the method). Examples of such
results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. In his first two experiments,
player 1 tested the maximum and minimum values of the objectives, as-
suming the maximum aspiration level for one and the minimum level for
the other. In later experiments he tried to find the solution closest
to his preferences, and selected the 4th solution as the best. (The
player's responses are underlined in the tables.) Player 2 behaved in
a similar way. In his 4th experiment he tested the system by introduc-
ing (0.,0) as an aspiration level, finally selecting the 6th solution
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as the best. The aspiration levels related to the selected solution
are incorporated into the achieve~ent function at the next iteration
and a new Nash equilibrium is calculated. The whole procedure is then
repeated at the new equilibrium.
Table 1. Results obtained on experimenting with aspiration levels
(player 1)
1 message from master is finished
player 1 (rural economy)
the following results are obtained:
reference values:
net production [mId zlj
20.000 O.
consumption level jthd
20.000 39.600
39.600
zl/capl
O.
20.000
25.000
o.
o.
o.
o.
resultinq objectives:
net production [mId zll
18.993 12.693 20.925
consumption level [thd zl/capl
20.207 39.798 14.200
you can change reference point -
type y if you want to give the
type n if no
n
17.634
24.433
new values
o.
o.
o.
o.
decide please, which solution is the best for you ?
type 1,2, ... ,6 respectively
4
message is sent to master
Table 2. Results obtained on experimenting with aspiration levels
(player 2)
3 message from master is finished.
player 2 (urban economy)
O. 55.000 45.000
O. 40.000 40.000
resulting objectives:
41.405 49.258 42.855
42.449 18.850 38.093
new values
the following results are obtained:
reference values:
59.400
zl/capj
O.
net production jmld zlj
40.000 O.
consumption level Ithd
40.000 59.400
net production Imld zl]
41.405 35.625 49.258
consumption level lthd zl/capl
42.449 59.819 la.S50
you can change reference point -
type y if you want to give the
type n if no
n
decide please, which solution is the best for you ?
type 1,2, ... ,6 respectively
6
message is sent to master
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Table 3. Final solutions obtained in the experimental session.
player 1 (rural economy)
the following results are obtained:
17.773
zl/cap!
24.530
net production jmld zl!
16.927 17.269
consumption level [thd
27.302 26.391
resulting objectives:
18.993 O.
20.207 O.
O.
O.
consumption
1.483
Jmld zl!
4.517
in aggregated
1. 557
in production
4.443
Imld zlj
1. 333
4. 667
allocated expenditures:
0.984 O.
5.016 O.
O.
O.
related socio-economic quantities:
employment [thousand of empl.j
104.821 107.237 110.037 117.066 O. O.
wage fund jmld zll
5.713 5.844 5.997 6.380 O. O.
migration rate
0.085 0.082 0.121 0.200 O. O.
number of migrants jthousandj
33.596 32.460 47.865 79.269 O. O.
migration cost [mIn zlj
176.715 170.742 251.770 416.956 O. O.
population dependent on migration lthousand[
362.404 363.540 348.135 316.731 O. O.
i t era t ion s
4 3 2 1 0 0
player 2 (urban economy)
the following results are obtained:
net production Imld zIt
43.063 43.506
consumption level [thd
36.729 35.499
42.750
zl/cap[
37.960
resulting objectives:
41.405 O.
42.449 O.
O.
O.
allocated expenditures:
[mId zl!
2.982 3.565 O.
in aggregated
2.822
in production
9.178
consumption
2.662
Imld zl!
9.338 9.018 8.435 O.
O.
O.
related socio-economic quantities:
employment [thousand of empl.!
266.980 268.679 266.538 262.949 O.
wage fund !mld zll
16.660 -16.766 16.632 16.408 O.
migration rate
0.085 0.082 0.121 0.200 O.
number of migrants lthousand!
33.596 32.460 47.865 79.269 O.
migration cost [mIn zl!
176.715 170.742 251.770 416.956 O.
population dependent, on migration [thousand[
654.596 653.460 668.865 700.269 O.
i t era t i o n s
4 3 2 1 0
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
O.
o
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The run that we shall consider only consists of four iterations:
the final difference between the Nash solutions (shown in Table 3)
were relatively small so that the system stopped the run at this point.
The objectives and control variables as well as some socio-economic
quantities are also given in Table 3. It is clear that the net pro-
duction and consumption level were smaller in the rural areas than in
the urban areas in 1978. This is the result of a smaller rural budget
and the lower efficiency of agricultural production. In such condi-
tions it seems reasonable for player 1 to try to keep consumption above
the level taken as a minimum. In this way he also tried to decrease
the rural-urban migration. On the other hand player 2, with a rela-
tively high net production and consumption level, gave more emphasis
to production. As a result of these strategies the migration rate de-
clined from 0.2 at iteration 1 to 0.085 at iteration 4. The migration
cost (including associated housing, services and transportation costs)
decreased from 416 to 170 mln zl over the same iterations. The number
of people employed and the wage fund are correlated to the production
value.
4. FINAL REMARKS
The iterative system generates a sequence of Nash equilibria for
moaified achievement functions which approximate the utility functions
of the players. At each Nash equilibrium the players test the Pareto
sets by varying their aspiration levels and choose their preferred
solutions. The convergence of the method can be proved theoretically;
practical experiments showed the method to converge in several itera-
tions.
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TWO EMPIRICAL TESTS WITH APPROACHES TO
MULTIPLE-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING
Eberhard Bischoff
Department ofManagement Science and Statistics, University College ofSwansea,
Swansea, UK
1. INTRODUCTION
Intensive research, especially over the last 10 to 15 years, into app-
roaches to multiple criteria decision making has led to the development
of a large number of formal methods. There is, however, generally little
agreement - and often fierce dissent - among the proponents of different
techniques as to the relative merits of these procedures.
Many debates on this topic focus on what can 'reasonably' be"assumed
about the decision maker's ability to provide information regarding his
preferences, and about the preference structure as such. The arguments
used are mostly backed up by only very scant empirical evidence which,
moreover, is often far from unambiguous.
Although several authors have pointed out the need for more empirical
research into the assumptions underlying different methods for multiple
criteria decision making, few such studies have emerged to date. In an
attempt to start to remedy this situation two sets of experiments were
set up to be conducted during the Workshop. Both experiments relied on
the availability of computing facilities which in the event, however,
could not be fully provided due to hardware problems, so that no more
than a handful of experiments were actually carried out. What follows,
therefore, is merely a brief description of the research questions con-
sidered and of the experimental set-up, which is included here at the
editors' request for the sake of completeness of the proceedings. It is
intended, however, to carry out a full set of these experiments in the
near future.
2. EXPERIMENT A
The purpose of the first experiment was to compare the performance of
three reference point procedures for exploring the set of alternatives.
Conceptually, all three techniques considered represent variants of the
approach suggested by Wierzbicki (1979).
A commonly used implementation of Wierzbicki's approach is the computer
package DIDASS (cf. Grauer (1983)), which in its most elementary form
employs the weighted Chebyshev norm as a measure of the distance of an
1
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alternative from the reference point. More precisely, if the decision
problem under consideration is a vector maximum problem of the form
max f l (x)
max fr(x)
s.t. x E A
(1)
the best alternative with respect to a given reference point
g = (gl' g2' ... gr) and an associated weighting vector w = (w l ,w2 '·· ,w r )
is calculated as the solution of
min max d. + £
i=l, .. , r 1.
r
L
i=l
d.
1.
s.t. fi(x) + di/wi = gi ' i = 1, .•. , r
x E A
(2)
where £ is a small positive constant. (The second term in the scalar-
izing function s merely serves to ensure that the solution obtained is
non-dominated. )
Many alternatives to formulation (2) exist, of course, and the question
arises naturally whether the use of one method, as opposed to another,
has a significant influence on the number of iterations needed to produce
a "good" solution, or on the user's ability to find reasonable solutions
in a practically feasible number of iterations. Two alternatives to the
above procedure were considered in the experiment. The first was to
replace the Chebyshev norm by the Ll-norm, i.e. to use the sum of the
weighted deviations from g instead of the maximum over the criteria
involved. The second alternative examined was to define the weighting
vector w in (2) internally on the basis of the reference point given,
rather than asking for a separate input from the user. The formula emp-
loyed was
w. = (f,+ - f.-) / (f.+ + a. - g.) where f.+ and f. rep-
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
resent the maximum and minimum, respectively, of f i over the feasible
region and a i is a small positive constant. The rationale behind this
definition is that it might be reasonable to assume that a user places a
higher degree of importance on an attribute if he specifies an aspiration
level which, in relative terms, is closer to the highest value achievable.
The experiment involved a choice between 250 alternatives, described by
their values with respect to 5 attributes. The alternatives were gener-
ated in such a way that none was dominated by any of the others. Subjects
were told that the aim was to select the best candidate for a certain job
and that the attribute values, all defined on a scale from a to 100,
could be interpreted as an assessment of the candidates against criteria
such as relevant experience, leadership qualities, creativity, etc..
No definite meaning, however, was given to anyone of the attributes.
In addition to being given some general background information about the
hypothetical decision problem they were asked to tackle, subjects were
informed that their final choice would be judged on the basis of an
additively separable pay-off function with increasing pay-offs - but
decreasing marginal pay-offs - in each argument. The precise function
used was illustrated graphically. Moreover, the computer program
employed in conducting the experiment enabled subjects to calculate the
value of the pay-off function at the reference points used as well as at
the intermediate solutions obtained.
At the start of the experiment the subjects had no information about the
alternatives available, apart from being presented with a matrix showing
the highest value attainable for each of the 5 attributes, together with
the best alternatives' (with respect to the pay-off function used) which
would provide these values. Subjects received a detailed briefing,
however, about the reference point procedure they were asked to use.
Each subject used only one of the three procedures described above and
subjects were given no information about the other two methods being
tested.
This experimental set-up clearly allows the final as well as the inter-
mediate solutions obtained by the subjects to be evaluated against an
objective yardstick, the pay-off function used, and could thus throw
at least some light on the question of how the three procedures tested
compare with each other. However, as mentioned earlier, the limited
number of actual experiments which could be carried out during the Work-
shop does not permit conclusions of any significance to be drawn.
3. EXPERIMENT B
The second experiment was closely related to the first, but concerned a
somewhat more fundamental question. Instead of comparing procedures
where reference points are a primarily technical means of exploring the
feasible region, it addresses the question of what type of metric is most
appropriate for modelling a decision maker's preferences in a neighbour-
hood of a reference point which represents a set of actual aspiration
levels. Put succinctly, the concrete question posed is whether the
Chebyshev norm, the Ll-norm, or some weighted average of the two norms
is a better measure of a decision maker's preferences with respect to
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deviations from his aspiration levels.
Subjects taking part in the experiment were asked to assume that they
had won a car in a competition and that they could influence the model
they would get by specifying their aspiration levels on 4 criteria:
price, top speed, acceleration, and petrol consumption. For each
criterion the range of feasible values was presented to the subjects and
they were told that if the price of a particular model was below the
price of the most expensive model they would receive the difference
in the form of petrol vouchers.
Having been given some time to reflect about their aspiration levels,
subjects were requested to type the values they had decided upon into a
terminal which then displayed a series of questions about their prefer-
ences with respect to a set of feasible alternatives. Unknown to the
subject, these alternatives were generated on the basis of the aspiration
levels specified and structured so as to allow inferences to be made
about the metric underlying his/her choices. Again, however, the very
small sample of results obtained at the Workshop does not permit any
specific conclusions to be drawn from the experiment.
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